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The Indianapolis Journal Editorial June 8, 1889
Indianapolis, Marion, Indiana
What is this article about?
Editorial examining responsibility for the Johnstown flood, concluding no direct blame can be fixed, recounting engineer John G. Parke's warning, and urging destruction of any dangerous pleasure dams.
Quality green show the numbers
Measured from the scan
— how cleanly the OCR engine read the characters
- Mean ink quality
- 99.0% The length-weighted average confidence across the OCR lines — the mean of exactly the per-line scores whose tails the two figures below report. Typical is 99%.
- Illegible ink
- 0.0% Text sitting in OCR-detected lines that scored below 80% confidence — very shaky reads. Weighted by line length, so one long bad line counts for more than a short one.
- Uncertain ink
- 0.0% Text in lines that scored 80–90% — somewhat shaky reads.
- Matches source
- 99.27% How closely the served text matches the raw OCR of the same boxes, letter by letter, after collapsing spacing and case. This measures agreement, not correctness: the OCR is often wrong and the extractor corrects it, so 100% does not mean perfect, and a low figure usually means poor scan text was rewritten rather than that text was lost (length vs source shows loss).
- Length vs source
- 99.15% Below 100% means text was dropped from the OCR; above means text was added to make it read.
Assembled by the extraction model
— whether the stitched-together text holds up; catches layout and segmentation errors, which the scores above cannot see
- Transcription confidence
- 97.0% (typical 96%) How cleanly the extractor could assemble what it was given. Low here with clean ink scores points at layout analysis — the characters were read correctly but grouped or ordered wrongly.
- Comprehension
- 95.0% Whether the piece reads coherently start to finish. Can stay high while transcription confidence drops, when only part of the component is affected.
Full Text
AS TO THE RESPONSIBILITY.
Discussion as to the responsibility for the Johnstown disaster may be fascinating, but can lead to no practical results so far as the case in hand is concerned. The evidence is conflicting as to whether the dam at Conemaugh lake was weak or not. It could not have been plainly or notoriously weak, or its existence would not have been tolerated. Evidently there has been some distrust in the minds of some persons, a sort of vague apprehension of calamity, but it has not found positive expression. A few years ago a report that the dam was unsafe became so current that the Cambria Iron Company instructed its solicitor to institute proceedings in court to have the water released. The company's property lay in the path of destruction, and it had a large stake in the question of the safety of the dam. The solicitor informed the company that any legal action against the dam would have to be supported by evidence showing that it was unsafe, and in order to secure such evidence the company employed a number of engineers to examine and report upon the dam. "These engineers," says the Philadelphia Press, "were the best obtainable by that company, but after a thorough examination they reported that the dam, as originally constructed and as enlarged by the club, was perfectly safe. This indorsement of engineers employed by those who wished to condemn the dam settled the matter, as the Cambria Iron Company accepted their judgment that there was no danger to be apprehended, and the contemplated legal proceedings were abandoned." The dam has been subject to frequent examinations, and no fears have been expressed as to its safety other than the occasional vague fear that something might sometime cause it to give way. It was built originally by the State for public purposes, and was considered as safe as other structures of its class.
Mr. John G. Parke, a young Philadelphian, and a civil engineer, is the person who first realized the imminent danger, a few hours before the disaster. Early Friday morning Mr. Parke discovered that the fast increasing waters of the lake must either have an additional outlet immediately, or that the dam proper would give way and destroy the entire population of Johnstown and vicinity. Hastily securing a force of thirty Italians, he set to work to prepare another sluice. In half an hour his purpose had been accomplished, but still the water continued to rise. Something had to be done, and that quickly. Giving orders to his men to cut another outlet, Mr. Parke jumped into the saddle, and with his horse started at breakneck speed toward the village below, shouting the warning. He says, in a published interview:
No blame can be attached to any one. It was a calamity that could not be avoided. For several days prior to the breaking of the dam storm after storm swept over the mountains and flooded every creek and rivulet. The waters from these varied sources flowed into the lake, which finally was not able to stand the pressure forced upon it. Friday morning I realized the danger that was threatening, and although from that time until 8 o'clock every human effort was made to prevent a flood, they were of no avail. When I at last found that the dam was bound to go. I started out to tell the people. and by 12 o'clock everybody in the Conemaugh region did or should have known of their danger. Three hours later my gravest fears were more than realized.
From this it is evident it would be very difficult to fix any direct responsibility on the owners of the lake, if any exists. In the case of the Mill-river disaster in Massachusetts, in 1874, resulting in great loss of life, but not at all approaching this, a coroner's jury found that the engineering work on the dam was discreditable, and the State authorities were blamed for having authorized the construction of the reservoir without taking proper steps to insure its safety. But even such a finding fixes no pecuniary responsibility and furnishes no relief or remedy for the sufferers.
The only excuse for maintaining any reservoir or dam in a position of danger is public necessity or utility. In the case of Conemaugh lake it is easy to see now that when it ceased to be a work of public use it should have been drained. But this is one of the cases in which hindsight is better than foresight. The simple fact is that nobody really apprehended danger. But if there is another dam or reservoir in the United States, located in a dangerous position and maintained for pleasure, it should be destroyed at once.
Discussion as to the responsibility for the Johnstown disaster may be fascinating, but can lead to no practical results so far as the case in hand is concerned. The evidence is conflicting as to whether the dam at Conemaugh lake was weak or not. It could not have been plainly or notoriously weak, or its existence would not have been tolerated. Evidently there has been some distrust in the minds of some persons, a sort of vague apprehension of calamity, but it has not found positive expression. A few years ago a report that the dam was unsafe became so current that the Cambria Iron Company instructed its solicitor to institute proceedings in court to have the water released. The company's property lay in the path of destruction, and it had a large stake in the question of the safety of the dam. The solicitor informed the company that any legal action against the dam would have to be supported by evidence showing that it was unsafe, and in order to secure such evidence the company employed a number of engineers to examine and report upon the dam. "These engineers," says the Philadelphia Press, "were the best obtainable by that company, but after a thorough examination they reported that the dam, as originally constructed and as enlarged by the club, was perfectly safe. This indorsement of engineers employed by those who wished to condemn the dam settled the matter, as the Cambria Iron Company accepted their judgment that there was no danger to be apprehended, and the contemplated legal proceedings were abandoned." The dam has been subject to frequent examinations, and no fears have been expressed as to its safety other than the occasional vague fear that something might sometime cause it to give way. It was built originally by the State for public purposes, and was considered as safe as other structures of its class.
Mr. John G. Parke, a young Philadelphian, and a civil engineer, is the person who first realized the imminent danger, a few hours before the disaster. Early Friday morning Mr. Parke discovered that the fast increasing waters of the lake must either have an additional outlet immediately, or that the dam proper would give way and destroy the entire population of Johnstown and vicinity. Hastily securing a force of thirty Italians, he set to work to prepare another sluice. In half an hour his purpose had been accomplished, but still the water continued to rise. Something had to be done, and that quickly. Giving orders to his men to cut another outlet, Mr. Parke jumped into the saddle, and with his horse started at breakneck speed toward the village below, shouting the warning. He says, in a published interview:
No blame can be attached to any one. It was a calamity that could not be avoided. For several days prior to the breaking of the dam storm after storm swept over the mountains and flooded every creek and rivulet. The waters from these varied sources flowed into the lake, which finally was not able to stand the pressure forced upon it. Friday morning I realized the danger that was threatening, and although from that time until 8 o'clock every human effort was made to prevent a flood, they were of no avail. When I at last found that the dam was bound to go. I started out to tell the people. and by 12 o'clock everybody in the Conemaugh region did or should have known of their danger. Three hours later my gravest fears were more than realized.
From this it is evident it would be very difficult to fix any direct responsibility on the owners of the lake, if any exists. In the case of the Mill-river disaster in Massachusetts, in 1874, resulting in great loss of life, but not at all approaching this, a coroner's jury found that the engineering work on the dam was discreditable, and the State authorities were blamed for having authorized the construction of the reservoir without taking proper steps to insure its safety. But even such a finding fixes no pecuniary responsibility and furnishes no relief or remedy for the sufferers.
The only excuse for maintaining any reservoir or dam in a position of danger is public necessity or utility. In the case of Conemaugh lake it is easy to see now that when it ceased to be a work of public use it should have been drained. But this is one of the cases in which hindsight is better than foresight. The simple fact is that nobody really apprehended danger. But if there is another dam or reservoir in the United States, located in a dangerous position and maintained for pleasure, it should be destroyed at once.
What sub-type of article is it?
Infrastructure
Legal Reform
What keywords are associated?
Johnstown Disaster
Dam Safety
Conemaugh Lake
Responsibility
John G. Parke
What entities or persons were involved?
Cambria Iron Company
John G. Parke
Philadelphia Press
Editorial Details
Primary Topic
Responsibility For The Johnstown Dam Failure
Stance / Tone
Analytical, Concluding No Direct Blame, Urging Destruction Of Dangerous Dams
Key Figures
Cambria Iron Company
John G. Parke
Philadelphia Press
Key Arguments
- Evidence on the dam's weakness is conflicting
- Engineers employed by the Cambria Iron Company found the dam safe
- Parke warned the population but could not prevent the flood
- No direct responsibility can be fixed
- Dangerous pleasure dams should be destroyed