The Virginian

MISCELLANY.

THE CONQUEST OF TURKEY

The Baron Von Valentin in a recently published work, entitled Reflections on Turkey has sketched out the following plan for the subjugation of the Ottoman empire, and which, could campaigns on land be as easily conducted as campaigns on paper, would effectually put an end to the power of the tyrant Signior, at least in Europe:

Considering Shumla (about 227 miles from the capital on the ordinary road taken by couriers and travelers to Constantinople,) as the gate of the Balkan mountains, and the Thermopylae of the Turks. Here the vizier has always fixed his camp, and beyond it the Russians have never penetrated. Should a Russian army (he continues, after describing the road between Shumla and Adrianople) design to carry on with vigor, a war of invasion into the heart of the Ottoman empire, there is no doubt that it would choose this route as its line of operations. It is obviously the lowest, that it would be pleasantly necessary to halt or turn by main force, the Turkish army, which we must always expect to be posted at Shumla. The Russian general Hablukoff, failed in both attempts in the campaign of 1829. The latter, however, would easily be attended with much greater chance of success, if while the main body menaced tasks in front and took advantage of every favorable opportunity for attack or embarrassment. Another column were to cross the Danube at Nicopolis or Rustchuk a march, by the way of relative on Adrianople. Upon its road crossing Basa which though actually even ing is very ally used, all the army would be to encounter would in natural obstacles which, with the assistance of some engineers attacked. The advantages and to get easily overcome. For my part, I am of opinion (Aput, other a no phrase before) that the enemy in not of some se i i convenient points for a voyage using this country. Many go to Anapa strong drop of earths r m tained, to organize the t y har or te army, and to occupy with detachments the towns of P dopoy hs. Leischa, Sophia, &c either by tree or attempt fire negotiations, in both of which the most valuable assistance might be expected from the uproarious Greek population in these places and tr the caepera won of the Servians. And with regard to the force necessary to be employed in a similar invasion, I am stopping una less imostaeets to be attached to the utter realistic eight the army destined to enter the campaign. Than to the keeping it constantly in a complete state. Max number fifty thousand in open field h te. Used by Montecucculi, as already mentioned ought to be the present day, to the especially as the Paris no longer bring such large aims into the field as they used to this: and the modern civilization of Europe in upst which we have instructed us as country the time jail force tempers the co ta still more favorable for the Christians. In order that the preparation may, upon the day of battle, have its thinness amid at one giant, we must add to this number 30,000 more. For the third crops upon the coast and the reserved division. Which makes altogether one hundred The corps operating upon Adrianople ought to amount to 30,000. Besides a division which is an advanced guard. And another as a reserve altogether about 60,000 men: whence the total force to be employed in crossing the Balkans would be 140,000 men. In order, however, to secure the rear, and to observe and gradually capture, those places on the Danube, of which the Turks may still be in possession 60,000 men more will be required. Which, as soon as these places are taken, will flow as an army of reserve, and firmly establish, and ever restore should at any time be lost the communication with the main army operating in front. With these 200,000 men whose number must be increased before the end of the campaign, there can be no doubt that an active general, superior to the prejudices of former times, will accomplish the conquest of Turkey in Europe, if not in the first, certainly in the second campaign. The road which leads directly to the heart of the empire is always the shortest and the best: whence the one to Constantinople ought to be preferred to a more circuitous one, even though the latter should seem to lead with the greater degree of certainty to the conquest of the Ottomans. At the same time, the idea naturally presents itself that previously to the attack upon Constantinople, a landing should be effected in Asia Minor a measure strictly conformable to military principles, especially it would prevent the escape of the Grand Signior into that country with his treasures, when ought to serve as an indemnity for the expenses of the war—When, therefore, the army advances upon the capital by Adrianople, the flotilla, which has cooperated in a parallel direction along the coast, will pass over to the Asiatic side, and disembark troops wherever it may be found practicable. And the first occupation of these will be to secure the landing-place by suitable entrenchments. A sufficient number of ships of war equipped in the ports of the Black Sea, must of course make good the entrance into the Bosphorus, and protect the landing. Though the defense of the coasts is represented as being badly organized by the Turks, still the outlet from Black Sea is said to have the best defended. But the most recent descriptions only mention the two old castles Rumili-Hissar and Anadoli Hissar, constructed under Mahomet II the one on the European and the other upon the Asiatic coast. These castles could not inflict much injury upon the ships of war, and might easily be silenced by the superior fire of the latter; and all the coast-batteries would soon be turned by the troops, after a sufficient number had been landed.
possession of Sebastopol, a large and magnificent
But a most important object will be to take
the suburb, if it may be so called, of Constantinople
situated on the Asiatic coast immediately opposite
the amphitheatre, surrounded by heights, the approach
point, completely commanded the moment it is
open running into narrow
vast extent, not easily encompassed with a solid
provided with walls and
rampart would present easy conquest
the greater part are true believers. The Russian
towers or the spires of St. Sophia, and the Constantinopolitan flag would soon be seen waving over the
people would tremble
ble of formidable resistance. We need not illustrate
Constantinople itself is considered as incapable
low the author further. He speaks of a military
operations, and, finally, of driving the Turks to the
invasion of Smyrna as the base of interior operations,
colonization of Asia Minor, of taking possession
original native country, the banks of the Euphrates and Tigris.
[London paper.