Richmond Enquirer

Nor do we consider you more fortunate, sirs, in deriving support from the opinions of Mr. Madison. In his Message of 1819, he mentions among the means of promoting the interest of the country, the establishment of roads and canals, "which can best be executed under the national authority"—also "a national reminary of learning within the District of Columbia" to be erected with the funds arising from the sale of lots in Washington. To prove that Mr. Madison meant these recommendations to be taken only in the limited sense we give to them, it is only necessary to refer to his uniform interpretations of the powers actually conferred by the Constitution; to his Message, in which he speaks of the propriety of asking for further powers; and to his solemn veto to the Bank Bonus Bill. In that veto he expressly states, that he does not consider that Congress has power to adopt a general system of Internal Improvement. And is it not wonderful, gentlemen, that under these circumstances, you still insist upon his authority as being in your favor! The better informed part of your readers must commiserate as much the desperation of your arguments, as the flimsy sophistry and disingenuousness, which, when hard pressed, you permit yourselves to employ.

We have already refuted these arguments—but you still cling to them, without attempting to answer the refutation. You have, indeed, found it unavoidable, and have thus noticed, Mr. Madison's veto: "We do not consider the force of this authority" (his limited recommendations before noticed) "as essentially affected by the veto of that distinguished statesman to the bill setting apart a fund for Internal Improvement. Occasional appropriations for such works stand on a different footing." Can it be necessary to detain the reader by any comment on this passage! Impossible—He will not fail to see how miserably you shrink from Mr. Madison's unequivocal protest against such a scheme—and the adroit manner in which you seek to get round it, by saying, "Occasional appropriations for such works stand on a different footing." This is the only meagre comment which you venture to make upon that celebrated veto. And by it you would blind the reader's mind, when turned to Mr. M's opinion, by an innuendo, that you were only advocating, "occasional appropriations"—and that they stood on a different footing from a regular system. These miserable subterfuges must be clearly seen and duly appreciated. Like the new planets in the political system, before whom you worship, we presume that your point must be carried, if not by fair, by indirect means.

We frankly admit that the authority of Mr. Monroe is against us. But the force of it is more than counterbalanced by the authorities and the arguments which we quoted in our last—waiving every offset that we might draw from Mr. Monroe's own express declarations on the other side, in a previous part of his administration.

You say, gentlemen, that we are driven to the Resolutions of our last Legislature, and that if they be analyzed, they would be found to express a hostile feeling to the Administration, rather than to the power proposed to be exercised. This compliment to our Legislature, partakes of your usual spirit—and shows what heavy sacrifices of candour and fairness you are prepared to make in support of that Administration. The Resolutions in question, expressed, except in one unimportant particular touching the Tariff, the deliberate opinion of every Republican in the Legislature—and with that exception, were but the echo of the Report of '99—They spoke the uniform sentiments of Virginia under every Administration.

One remark more! You cite the able Report "penned by Henry St. G. Tucker, now one of the Chancellors of the State, in the shape of a report to the H. of R., December 9th, 1819, which received the sanction of that body." We fully subscribe to the compliment you pay to that ingenious paper, and to its distinguished author; but even the modified principles of this Report are not the doctrines of Virginia. He requires the consent of a State as a preliminary condition to the making of a road: You go further, dispensing with all consent. The great mass of the people in Virginia dissent from you both.—But when we come to particularize the opinions of our politicians, we might cite against you the strict principles for construing the constitution which were adopted by Mr. James Barbour, now the Secretary of War, in the impressive speech which he delivered in the Virginia Legislature of '98-'99, on Mr. Taylor's Resolutions.—But after all, we appeal from men to things themselves. We appeal from precedents to the Constitution. We appeal from authorities to arguments: And we contend, that your doctrines as tested by the great Charter of our land, are nothing but "straw and stubble."

*The Editors of the N. I. are rather unfortunate in their references: they do not seem to understand, for instance, Mr. T's opinions. With the exception of the case of Internal Improvements (made after a particular manner too,) these are perfectly in unison with those of the "Virginia School," so called by the N. I. -In the last No. of their paper, the Editors quoting the article about Chancellor Tucker's deservedly celebrated Law School, says, "It is a source of great satisfaction to us, that so successful a Law School should exist, where it does, under the guidance of so able and orthodox a statesman as Judge Tucker. It will, at least, have a tendency to correct the error which is so sedulously instilled into the minds of the youth of Virginia, touching the relations of the Federal & State Governments. We will venture to say that Judge T. will not teach his students that the State Judiciary is paramount, or even tantamount, to that of the General Government, in questions involving constitutional construction." -Now, it turns out that on the 17th Feb. 1821, Mr. T. while a Member of the Senate of Virginia supported and voted for the famous "Citation resolutions," the 1st and 2nd of which are as follows:

"Wherefore, Resolved, as the opinion of the General Assembly of Virginia, that the supreme court of the U. S. does not possess appellate jurisdiction, in any case decided by a state court. That, even if thus appellate jurisdiction did exist in cases decided by a state court, between individuals, a state cannot be made a party defendant, to any suit before a federal tribunal, commenced with a view to obtain a judgment against such state, or to reverse one obtained by it in a state court: or to any process or proceeding instituted in a federal court, to correct or reverse a judgment entered in a state court for a penalty or punishment: prescribed for the commission of any offence.

"Resolved, That the supreme court of the United States has no rightful authority under the constitution to examine and correct the judgment for which the Commonwealth of Virginia has been "cited and admonished to be and appear at the supreme court of the U. States;" and that the General Assembly do hereby enter their most solemn protest against the jurisdiction of that court over the matter."