Richmond Enquirer

RICHMOND, JANUARY 3, 1824.

FOR THE ENQUIRER.

CONGRESSIONAL CAUCUS.

No. 4.

If a caucus be neither useless, if it fail, nor, if Congress do not make the President, of it succeed, is it not peculiarly proper, in the Presidential canvass?

There are few states, or even counties, in the Union, in which candidates for public office, are not selected by some mode of regular nomination, sanctioned by the will and experience of the people; and we are not at a loss to discover, how these matters could be better arranged. The disproportion of offices, to the number of those who seek them, is always sufficient to impose some such regulation upon every popular community, and even the tranquillity of every neighborhood, renders the system of regular nominations indispensable. And how much more necessary is this system, in an election, which embraces the whole extent of the Union! We are aware of the practice, existing in one or perhaps more of the states of the Union, of candidates voluntarily offering for public offices, which within a small district, and under the restraint of limited suffrage may be kept within reasonable bounds. But, resembling as it does, the "ambire magistratum" of the Romans, we cannot avoid referring our fellow-citizens to the progress of this custom among that people, with whom it had its rise; and we beg leave to remind them, that to mischiefs which it then occasioned, and which are incident to the practice every where, and under any circumstances, one of the wisest of the ancient writers, attributes, in a great measure the ruin of the Roman commonwealth. But above all, we deprecate the introduction of such a practice, in any form, into the Presidential canvass. We hope never to see the day, when a candidate for the Chief Magistracy shall be found voluntarily obtruding himself upon the people, travelling through the country, courting support, employing his time in gaining partisans, and assiduously practising all the low acts of popularity, to compass his purpose. Such a course would be derogatory to the station, and humiliating in the eyes of the world. If it would not lead directly to the worst species of corruption, we are unacquainted with the human heart, and can derive no instruction from the lessons of history.

It should be considered indicative of a corrupt taste, if not of a polluted state of society, when an individual candidate would venture to establish a venal press, to deal in proscription and denunciation of the best of men in the country, to subserve the purposes of its founder: but if the period shall ever come, which will exhibit the spectacle of some five or six candidates for the Presidency, traversing this continent and chaffering for votes, we may take leave of all that is valuable in the republic. The perpetuity of our institutions requires, that the people should repress, as much as possible, every personal effort on the part of the Presidential candidate. He should repose himself upon the public confidence in his qualifications and the republican simplicity of his character, and be content to be designated by the public voice of the nation, acting in its own way, and by its own means of selection. He would thus enter upon the duties of his office, as the President of the nation, and not of a faction. He should be untrammelled by previous pledges and promises; he should be free from bargains, and hold his patronage for his country's good. We fearlessly venture the opinion, that this will never be the case, without some system of regular nomination. If a candidate be encouraged to offer himself, and push his own pretensions, he will not always be the most capable, and the worst men will soon be the most forward in the race. All such will purchase their own success, and long before a vote be given, every office in the gift of the Executive, will be disposed of, without regard either to merit, or future contingencies. The evil only becomes greater, when the number of candidates is multiplied, for then the people are not only cajoled, but the candidates themselves, are to be treated with. But one out of the whole number can succeed; some must therefore retire; or, as we have already heard it intimated, in some newspapers, they must connect among themselves, and all withdraw, but he who may be supposed to have the best chance of success; or, in other words, who has played his game with the most adroitness! What is such an arrangement, but a caucus among the candidates themselves?— And who would prefer a caucus of candidates to one by the people? And how are these matters to be arranged in such a caucus?— Will the rest of the candidates voluntarily quit the field and gratuitously surrender the victory to one? And if not, what is to be the price of renunciation, by either or all? It requires no great share of wisdom to see, that such practices would open the widest field for corruption, and utterly prostrate the Executive independence. It is apparent, also, that such a system would multiply candidates without number, since, if the individual could not elect himself, he might not prevent the election of another, unless he could make his bargain for an office, to which he could otherwise have had no pretension.

The system of regular, caucus nomination, cuts up these evils, by the roots. Disregarding individual ambition, it looks directly to the public will, and recommends to its support a candidate who must succeed, if at all, by means altogether independent of his personal interference. His competitors retire from the contest, not in consequence of any bargain with him, but in obedience to the people's choice, which they cannot subvert, by force or stratagem.

If then, the considerations we have submitted, in relation to the caucus system be correct, what becomes of the objection, founded upon its interference with the rights of the small states? Is it not, at once, factious and unreasonable?

If an election, by the people, be not only lawful, but desirable, for the harmony and stability of the government, it should be promoted by all honorable expedients. The small states cannot and should not have any weight in the election, disproportionate to their population, until a choice by the people, be frustrated, and if they cannot complain that the people elect, they have as little cause to complain if the people combine to preserve their power of electing. The equality of vote, secured to the small states in an election before the House of Representatives, is entirely too disproportionate to be regarded as an ordinary right, and the real danger consists, in familiarizing a resort to instances of extreme power. If the other means fail, why then, the vote by state sovereignty may be submitted to;— and we are of the number of those, who would not rashly violate this provision; but it is the interest of the country, that all other means should be first tried. We would retain this feature of the constitution, among other reasons, as the means of stimulating the people of the U. S. to an efficient exercise of their own power which can only be defeated, by artifice which deprive them of the benefits of union and concert. And in this, we assert will be found our great security, after all, rather than the perpetual tinkering and patching of the constitution, which appear to be the fashion of the day.

The small states will not promote their interests by courting this opportunity for the exercise of their power. Their true policy consists in giving effect to the public will, and in reserving their sovereign vote to compose difficulties which are unavoidable. They are more dependant, in all respects, upon the Union, than the large states, and they cannot shake its stability, without endangering their own safety in a ten fold degree. If they act wisely, they would not desire to wear the giant's coat as an every day dress, but seek to conceal the shortness of their stature in their devotion to the common weal. In this way, the worth and talent with which they may be represented in the national councils will be duly felt: and with this, they should be contented. It would be vain to expect to arrest from the large states their advantages of a more numerous population, and if ever the small states shall be found following in the train of some ambitious man, seeking power against the majority of the people, the inevitable consequence must be, a combination among the large states; engendering divisions, whose progress it would be fearful to delineate.—

We ask our readers, to ponder upon the events now passing before their eyes. If Tennessee, Illinois, Alabama, Maryland & other small states, array themselves in opposition to the ancient, regular and established mode of concert; if they instruct their members to oppose any general mode of nomination and thus lead to disorder and division, and defeat by distracting the voice of the great mass of the people; is it not reasonable to suppose, that New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Ohio and other large states, will form the means of concert among themselves, and avoid the danger by which they are threatened? Will not this expedient be forced upon them, by the example of Tennessee alone, who first makes a nomination by her local legislature, in solemn caucus, and then denounces any attempt at a general caucus, in which the people of the other parts of the Union are to be represented? and this, because her favorite will have no chance, in such councils?*

We hope, then, we have shewn, in the course of these numbers, that some mode of nomination, by which public opinion may be consulted and united, is both desirable and necessary:

That a caucus, by delegates chosen in all parts of the Union, is liable to great and insurmountable objections, and at the present period impracticable:

That state nominations are even more defective, in disappointing the great end and object of a caucus, to wit, union and concert;

That a congressional caucus is not liable to the objections which have been urged to it, and less obnoxious to abuse, than any other system which has been yet devised;

That it originated in the will, by the consent, and under the authority of the people;

And has been beneficial in its results;

That the people have not yet manifested any general opposition to its continuance; and,

That under this system, not only has the republican party preserved its integrity, but the nation has been blessed with virtuous and patriotic rulers.

For what purpose, then, permit us to enquire, are all these efforts now making to cry it down, but to breed tumult and confusion— to throw the apple of discord among the people, to break down a system which has been invariably productive of good, and exhibit to the eyes of the nation and the world, a scramble for power, of the most odious character, and fatally dangerous to the liberties of the people!

We entreat our fellow citizens, then, to beware how they yield to the artifices now employed to distract their choice in the coming election. Let them look well to it, before they abandon a system which has always crowned their exertions with success, and adopt a new and dangerous experiment. Let them not throw away their compass and charts, and rashly commit themselves to the uncertain elements.

We also implore the great republican party of this union, to preserve their ancient land marks, and cherish the means by which they have flourished and become powerful. If they have risen and grown up under the caucus system, let them not, in the fullness of their power, cast it away: if it have always shewn the means of concentrating their forces, let them not now listen to those who would dismember their ranks: if a caucus have sustained their power for twenty years, it is now more than ever necessary to perpetuate it; and if in every previous conflict it have animated their spirit and nerved their arm, let them distrust the men who having triumphed under its auspices would now denounce its influence.

We call upon them to reject all specious innovations, and resist the spirit of discord, though it should bear the popular guise of reform. We exhort them to rally round the old standard of their struggles and their triumphs, and, with a Roman fortitude, "stare super vias antiquas."

PUBLIUS.

In alluding to the Tennessee nomination, we disclaim particular hostility to the favorite candidate of that state.— We will not disguise our undivided preference for another; but Gen. Jackson is not the last on the roll of competitors whose cause we should espouse.