Daily National Intelligencer

WASHINGTON
SATURDAY, OCTOBER 10.

THE SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN.

Much has been written on this subject, from conjecture, or on light information. The article which follows is of a different character. It appears in the Nashville Whig of the 19th ultimo, and, from the place of its birth, may be safely attributed to one who knows the views of Gen. Jackson, and speaks his sentiments. It is, therefore, entitled to more than ordinary consideration.

TO THE EDITORS OF THE NASHVILLE WHIG.

What were the facts, as they presented themselves to general Jackson, on the theatre of war? This next deserves our enquiry.* General Jackson observed, no doubt, that his government had taken possession of Amelia Island, which belonged to the king of Spain, who seemed unable or unwilling to prevent its being the refuge of runaway slaves from the contiguous states, and affording an asylum to dissolute people, occupied in the daily violation of the revenue laws of the United States. He must have observed, also, that general Gaines, after having taken possession of Amelia Island, had received orders from the government to march through Florida, and to chastise the Seminole Indians; who, just before or soon after, captured a boat on the Appalachicola, laden with provisions for our troops, under the command of Lieut. Scott; putting to death him, and forty men all of whom wore the military uniform of the United States. It was these troops, under the guidance of general Gaines, together with such auxiliary military force as he might deem necessary and call forth, for the purpose of putting an end to the Seminole war, that General Jackson was designated to command, by the order of the Executive. After organizing the Georgia militia at Hartford, he marched from thence on the 19th of February; on the 22d, reached Fort Early, and soon in March arrived at Fort Scott, near the Florida line. Within the limits of the United States, general Jackson could find none of the hostile Indians. His orders authorized him to search for them in Florida; he did so and found but few at Tallahasse. Still pursuing the object of his command, he found them embodied at Mickasucky, where he defeated them, and took some prisoners from whom he learned, that a large body of his enemies were protected and provisioned at St. Marks, a Spanish garrison. From this place, in prosecution of the object of the war, he determined to dislodge them. Before taking this step, however, he wrote to the Spanish governor at Pensacola, requesting permission to navigate the Spanish waters in the conduct of the war against the Seminoles. This request was refused; and the denial was couched in terms so harsh and acrimonious, as, when taken in connection with the information obtained by the prisoners, furnished the evidences of a well grounded belief that the Indians were instigated to war, and received assistance from the Spanish authorities in Florida. Under this conviction, he marched to St. Marks, which he reached early in April. On his march to the place, he ascertained clearly that at this post the Indians were in the habit of receiving supplies of provisions and munitions of war; and that they were encouraged by the Spaniards there to plunder the frontier inhabitants of their cattle, which they exposed for sale to the inhabitants of St. Marks; and that in consequence, the inhabitants at this post had purchased cattle of the Indians with a full knowledge of their having been stolen from the frontier inhabitants of the United States. It was during the continuance of these habits of intimacy between the Indians and Spanish authorities, while the former were holding councils in their forts, and receiving from them the munitions of war, that general Jackson took possession of St. Marks, and wrote to the governor of Pensacola expressive of the motives which had induced him to do so—stating that his intentions were entirely pacific, or precautionary, and without any disposition to hold the possession of the place any longer than might be absolutely necessary to the speedy termination of the war; all which he referred to his government. Whilst at St. Marks general Jackson received information that, on the 15th April, the governor of Pensacola had furnished provisions to five hundred warriors, or hostile Indians, and that two different parties of them had, with the knowledge of the governor, been supplied and furnished for war, had proceeded from Pensacola to the frontier of Georgia, for the purpose of killing and plundering its inhabitants. The general, as yet, had been able to find but few of the enemy, and those were nourished, assisted, and protected, by the Spanish authorities, constituting but a small portion of those whose inroads and outrages on the frontiers, so frequently repeated, had produced the necessity of the campaign. Was he required under these circumstances to return home, without having done anything in the least effectual in putting a period to the murderous & predatory incursions of the savages? This was an object all important to the government, and to effect which, it had been deemed necessary to put in requisition the very distinguished energy and talents of Jackson. He had done little towards chastising these savages, and still less, which was calculated to put an end to the war, which constituted the great object of the expedition, and which must have been principally insisted on by the spirit of the president's order to the general. Under these circumstances, I say, was it required for general Jackson to direct back to their homes his brave and patriotic followers, who had suffered considerable hardships in a march of six or eight hundred miles, without half provision, and often wading to their chin in swamps and rivers? I repeat it, under such circumstances could it have been expected of general Jackson to turn back his troops; and that too without having done anything in the least calculated to put an end to the war, which was the sole object of his long and harassing march? General Jackson knew, when at St. Marks that the principal chief and warrior of the Seminoles was then at Pensacola, with a large number of his followers, waiting only the retrogression of our troops to march from that post to renew the scene of blood and robbery which had been so recently checked on our borders by the approach of the army. Was he then required to retrace his steps, and take post within our lines, and then patiently wait until savage chivalry should give him battle in his trenches—or, proceed to Pensacola, where the Spanish subjects and authorities aided and protected the Indians—route them from thence, garrison the Spanish fort, and report the whole proceedings to his government, that such a course might be taken as policy and justice should require? Had the general done less than this the whole nation would have raised an outcry, and might

* There appears to have been a preliminary essay from the same pen, which has escaped our observation.
with great propriety have declared, that much too little had been effected--nay, that nothing effectual had been accomplished, though great expense and incalculable hardships had been incurred and suffered. The general had no time to lose; the sickly season was fast approaching; most of his army exhausted by fatigue and suffering; and every day becoming more anxious to return to their homes and families. The Indians were protected at Pensacola, where they were supplied with provisions, or had eluded all his search and diligence by inaccessible swamps and morasses. Spain, it is said, was unable to restrain the Indians from the commission of hostilities, agreeably to her treaty with the United States. In deference to the Spanish government, this is presumed; and it is so stated in the Intelligencer. From the fact, however, of finding the Indians embodied at, and in the Spanish garrisons, from whence they proceeded, furnished & equipped for war, by the Spaniards, no other conclusion could have been formed, but that these garrisons were not only unable to restrain the Indians, but that, dreading their vengeance in case of denial, they were compelled to furnish the means of their massacres and plunder. In this respect the case is perfectly similar to the circumstances which had before induced the United States to seize upon the occupation of Amelia Island. It seems that a set of pirates, renegadoes, and runaway negroes, had not only taken possession, but had also usurped all the authorities of the Island and were daily pirating the seas, and smuggling, in violation of the revenue laws of the U. States. Under these circumstances, the United States took possession of the Island; and, it is not understood the Spanish minister, resident at Washington city at the time, made any complaint to our government on the subject--sensible, no doubt, from the facts, that the conduct of the government in the affair had been just and proper. Spain was similarly situated in respect to the savages in Florida, being additionally bound by treaty to restrain them. But she was not more able to restrain the Indians of Florida from robbing and killing on our frontier, than to prevent the settlement of a set of pirates and smugglers in Amelia Island. The United States are not at war with Spain, nor does she desire to be so, but is ready, according to Jackson's treaty with the garrisons, to deliver them up whenever the Spanish nation will furnish a force sufficient to prevent the Indians from taking shelter in, and, by compulsion, procuring war-like support from them. There is one difference, and only one, between the case of the garrisons of St. Marks and Pensacola, and Amelia Island. The first was taken possession of to prevent the effusion of the blood of men, women, and children; the latter to prevent spoliations on our revenue, or to save a little money to the treasury. Had Jackson returned home without destroying his enemies whom he could not reach, and left St. Marks and Pensacola as he found them, his campaign had been less than nugatory. The Indians, exasperated but not conquered, would have pursued in the rear of his retiring army, and with increased ferocity crimsoned his steps with the blood of those he was sent to defend. The course of general Jackson was therefore the only correct one on the occasion. He acted on his own responsibility, to be sure, as he should do in all cases; but has he, in doing so, disobeyed his orders? Certainly not. The special order in relation to the Spanish posts, founded necessarily on the presumption that the Spaniards were neutral in the war, ceased to exist the moment that these people took any part with the enemy. The discovery of this fact therefore, left Jackson to the sole direction of the general order given him, in adopting all lawful means to put an effectual end to the Seminole war. Jackson acted on a state of things as they presented themselves to him on the theatre of action--facts which were entirely unknown to the President, and which could have formed no part of his contemplation at the time his order was issued. It was a new case, not within the scope of the order to respect the Spanish forts, but depending on the law of nations and usages of war, which gen. Jackson was bound to observe, or for any violations of which he stands responsible to his country. That this was the state of things is made plain by example. Let us suppose that when gen. J. marched to Saint Marks in search of his enemy, agreeably to his orders from his government, that he not only found his enemy under the walls of the garrison, but within it; and that the Spaniards commenced firing from the walls of the fort upon his army. Could it be possible that the president's order to the general was intended to embrace such a case as this, under the special provision to respect the forts, &c.? Was Jackson in this situation to halt his army, rest their arms, and receive the butchering fire of the garrison, directed by Indians and Spaniards, combined in unknown proportion? or retreat precipitately without the Spanish limits, leaving the Indians ready to issue from their asylum, equipped, provisioned and refreshed by their friends, to lay waste the frontier settlements, in the absence of all relief? I say, under such circumstances, should Jackson have thus acted? Or should he not rather have advanced, dislodged his enemy, garrisoned the fort, and thereby effected for Spain what she was unable to do for herself--and which, left undone, exposed our frontier to savage butchery and depredation? Common sense--the sense of all nations will answer this question. This supposed case is in all essential particulars similar to the facts which occurred to gen. Jackson on his approach to these forts. He was not fired upon, it is true; but here the enemy found refuge from his pursuit, and were furnished with all the means necessary for the pillage and murder of our citizens. The Spaniards did not, as it appears, take an immediate share in the hostilities of the savages, but by the protection and supplies furnished them in their forts, the Indian war acquired all its force, and indicated a participation on the part of Spain, either voluntary or constrained, the effect of which was equally injurious as a state of war with that power.

ARISTIDES.