Richmond Enquirer

FOR THE ENQUIRER

Auditor's Report on Revolutionary Claims

I see that you have re-published the Auditor's Reply to my Remarks on his Report; but whether this Reply is written in that spirit of candor which should increase the favors of " those whose confidence he is proud to enjoy." I will not undertake to determine. He may be assured of one thing, however that my remark did not proceed from any feeling of resentment, at his attempt to dispel the golden dream to which he alludes. On that particular point I am in a very comfortable condition of feeling. If he fail in his effort to defeat the claims, very well—if he succeed, he will conclusively prove that I did not overrate the difficulties in the establishment of the claims, when I undertook them. He may be further assured, that I acted from no disposition to injure him in the estimation of " those whose confidence he is proud to enjoy;" but in this extraordinary effort to deserve that confidence, he volunteered to say a great deal that was not asked of him, calculated unnecessarily to injure the feelings of individuals, and made many statements that I knew to be erroneous. Duty to myself required the correction of these errors; and although the exposure of the Auditor's mistakes might be the consequence, I could not avoid it. How far the remarks made by me, and controverted by the Auditor, were correct, I will presently show; but before I attempt that, it is proper that I should enter a confession of one mistake myself, which I will readily do, although I do not perceive how it will relieve the Auditor from his error. His statement was that Major Du Val "deposited with the committee the original Roll of Officers entitled to half-pay." evidently meaning, as the context clearly shows, the original roll of all the officers that were entitled. My remark was, in substance, that the roll deposited by Major Du Val, was a copy only; and moreover, that it did not even purport to extend to the Illinois regiment, Crockett's regiment, or the Navy. I now repeat, that my statement was correct, except so far as related to the Illinois regiment, and into that error I was led by the statement of Col. Muter, a copy of which I had examined just before writing the very hasty remarks I made on the Report. By the way, I will observe, that many copies of these Rolls, I believe, have been taken; one was published, I have understood, in the Norfolk or Portsmouth newspapers, and in the Kentucky paper, extending the information as widely as possible. The statement of Col. Muter follows:- " The first Board of Officers did not finish the whole business, as there were no officers attended from (I think) Crockett's regiment, Illinois regiment, and the Navy. Other officers were, therefore, afterwards appointed to receive the statements of these regiments and the Navy, and their proceedings were (I believe) also sent to the Auditor's. The whole of the proceedings and statements were at Richmond, and read before a committee of the House of Delegates, at the fall session of 1785; though I have heard that they are not now to be found. The within copy is taken from a copy of the Statement I gave to the Board of Officers, and which I kept for my own satisfaction." In a sort of postscript to this Statement, Col. Muter supposes he was in error in saying no officer from the Illinois regiment attended the Board. But then, again, says:- "I find I was right." Having this Statement before me, and not referring to the Roll itself, I was led into Col. Muter's error, and stated that the Illinois regiment was not on the Roll. I admit the advice I gave the Auditor, should be followed by myself, and hope he will consider this one accidental aberration sufficiently explained.

I now proceed to show that there are not the original Lists made by the Board, and later myself I shall be able to satisfy the public, however the Auditor may remain unconvinced. Endorsed on one of the papers, filed by Major Du Val, is the following statement in the handwriting of Col. Muter:- " The Statement of which this is a copy, was authenticated by the Board of Officers, and, together with the Statements of the other regiments, and the proceedings of the Board, signed by the President, transmitted to the Commissioners of the War Office, and afterwards, the whole proceedings, &c., ratified and authenticated by the Governor and Council, and delivered to the Auditors, on which, after taking the Attorney General's opinion, they proceeded agreeably to the act of Assembly, to issue warrants for half-pay."

Again he says:- "I made out from the proceedings of the different Boards, statements of the officers entitled to half-pay, and delivered one copy to the Auditors for their guide. And I herewith send a rough copy, but a true one, taken from the proceeding of the first Board of officers, which sat in February, 1782. To discriminate, &c." Now, it is evident upon inspection of the papers, that the Roll filed in the office of the Keeper of the Rolls, in the rough copy spoken of by Col. Muter. It is not signed by the President, nor authenticated by the Governor and Council. It is a rough copy, made out by Col. Muter, from the authentic documents which were accompanied with the proceedings of the Board, and sent to the Commissioners of the War Office; and the probability is, that after the act of June, 1783, directing the Auditors to issue such warrants, this List was made out by Col. Muter, for them, he retaining a rough copy for his own satisfaction The paper found by Judge Cabell, and filed by him with the proceedings and sundry original returns, is perhaps the copy referred to by Col. Muter, as made out by him from the authentic documents certified by the President of the Board, for the Auditor's guide, and this supposition is fortified by an endorsement on that paper, believed to be in the hand-writing of one of the Auditors, viz:- " You shall swear that you have not, at any time since your discharge or becoming supernumerary, refused to re-enter into the service—so help you God." The rough Copy filed by Major Du Val, has this endorsement on it, in Col Muter's hand-writing:- " No list of the officers of the Navy and of the officers of Crockett's regiment, having been sent to the Auditors, authenticated by the Executive; therefore, they are not included in the foregoing list, &c., &c." Does this not clearly show that this rough copy was made out after the authentic returns of the Board had been sent to the Auditors? It is unquestionable.

But I beg it to be observed, that in my first remarks on this point, I said I referred to this error merely to show that the statement must have been made from hearsay. Since the statement is re-affirmed, I am bound to presume the Auditor did examine the paper and its accompaniments of intention, but somewhat at the expense of his perception.

The Auditor admits that the officers of Crockett's regiment and the Navy, are not on the Roll, as stated in his Report, but triumphantly asks how this will affect the argument, and says it does not appear that I over employed to prosecute the claims of a single Navy Officer.

Upon reference to his own list of the cases in court, it will appear that there was but one claim of Navy Officer before the court, excepting Markham's case, that had been in the Court of Appeals. I admit I was not employed in that one case, and of course it is true, that it did not appear that I " was ever employed to prosecute the claim of a single Navy Officer."

But it seems I misconceived the Auditor's meaning. in that part of the Report which stated the names being ascertained by the Roll, "all that was afterwards required was the necessary proof of identity "I must of course, accept as the correct reading, the version which he says he intended.

What then? The law does require further proof than that which this Roll furnishes, of continuing supernumerary until the end of the war; and that proof is not produced, either from the intrinsic difficulty of the undertaking, or my incompetency to the task—and in either case, if the Auditor be right. in it not evident that I am to receive no compensation? Yet he said the object could have been equally effected for one 50th part of the compensation required. His own reasoning delimits him in-

Whether the Auditor or myself be right, in our views of ex parte evidence, I will not now inquire, but I do think it passing strange, that a long paragraph should be bestowed on certainly the least conclusive answer of the two I gave to that part of his Report; while he says nothing about his waiving the notice, which I expressed a willingness to give. If required.

The next paragraph of the Auditor's reply, I fear I do not understand. I certainly do not wish to misunderstand or misrepresent him. After speaking of the acceptance of the commutation offered by Congress being optional with the lines of the several States, he asks-"But when was the commutation offered by Congress? In 1783. Immediately at the close of the war, when the option referred to was the choice between ten years half-pay certain, and the allowance for a single year with the chances and uncertainties of life. The same inducement existed then for accepting commutation which now exists for rejecting it. The cases are, therefore, not at all analogous—and if the principle was right in 1783, it is also right in 1831."

The Auditor by such reasoning will not entitle self to the further favor of "those whose confidence he is proud to enjoy"

The argument he seems to use, (for I admit I do not comprehend his meaning) to justify Virginia in coercing the officers to accept the commutation, is the very one I should have used to show such an attempt would be improper, as they had escaped the hazards of being cut off in a few years. If Congress had chosen to give ten or even twenty years full-pay, in commutation for the half-pay, the officers would have accepted it—and I do not see that any principle would have been violated. But, not understanding the argument, I ought not to attempt to answer it.

But, I am "entirely incorrect in supposing, that the allowance of commutation would give to some of the claimants three or four times as much as the court has adjudged to them. There are but two cases in the whole list of judgments, in which that allowance would exceed the half-pay, and the difference is very inconsiderable."

This is an evasion again most palpable.— My argument was not limited to those judgments—it extended to all the claims—and so did the Auditor's plan. Now, does the Auditor mean to say, none but these two officers died within ten years after the close of the war? He surely does not. And is it not palpable that every supernumerary officer, who did not live ten years, must, under the judgment of the court, receive less than the commutation? Those who died at the end of one year would receive one-tenth only of the commutation—those at the end of two years, one-fifth— and all who died within five years, would get less than half the commutation.

His own Report shows that six naval officers were dead in May, 1831: and it does not appear but that each may have lived to the end of the war and would come in for the commutation, And on the rough copy, filed by Major Du Val, is an endorsement, made probably in 1783 or '84, that several of the officers within were believed to be since dead.

There is an abundance of other testimony to show, that many of the supernumerary officers died within ten years after the war, all of whom would receive less than the commutation—and some, perhaps, not one-tenth of it—yet the Auditor says, I am certainly incorrect.

But, he says. his meaning relative to the further claims of those who have heretofore received the commutation, was misinterpreted—He now says-"The obvious design was to show, that though legally barred, their claims would be equitable and just. Some of them were particularly distinguished throughout the war and it would be passing strange that five years full pay should extinguish their rights forever and that supernumeraries who rendered little or no service should receive four or five times the amount."

the Auditor's Report did refer to those supernumeraries who had been paid by the Legislature, and still I had thought I think it was susceptible of that construction.

The language was- "Those officers, moreover. who have already received the commutation of five years full pay, will urge their applications to be placed upon an equal footing with their companions in arms. Many of them will be entitled to receive double or treble the amount heretofore granted by the State, and it is difficult to perceive upon what principle they can be excluded, while the rest, with no stronger claims; are so liberally provided for."

But now, it appears the reference was made to those who were not supernumeraries—that class of the State line was a very small one—and were all (who have received at all) paid between April '91 and August '96. with interest from the end of the war. They took that in preference to the half-pay, not being required to do so; and I think it would be neither just nor equitable, that having received the commutation and interest, (the latter averaging more than half the former.) the descendants of any of them (for there is not one now living) should demand the half-pay to the time of their deaths, if perchance it should exceed the commutation and interest, which is questionable—and this again induced me to suppose the Auditor referred to supernumeraries in his Report', as with them only was it possible the half-pay claims could be treble or even double the commutation.

The Auditor says he is charged with suppressing the testimony, &c. I said he had "failed to state" the evidence in many cases. I did not impute any design in so doing. The fact he admits, "in some half-dozen cases," and explains how it escaped his observation -

He says-"By the way the "Agent and Attorney' thinks that the decision of 1799 and not of 1792 should have been referred to. But why?-Both decisions were alike adverse to the claimants, and it seems of little consequence which was selected." By this time, I presume, the Auditor perceives why I pointed out his inaccuracy -In a formal document transmitted to the Assembly, he had gravely said-"It is well known, that as far back as 1792, several officers of the State line carried their demands for half-pay before the highest judicial tribunal of the State, which decided against their validity. Whatever diversity of opinion existed with regard to that decision, it was acquiesced in by all—the law was settled and the claims abandoned.' Matters thus quietly rested for nearly thirty years, until the winter of 1820," &c. &c.

I meant to show, that the Auditor was not familiar with the subject of his essay,—to which cause is attributable his not understanding in his Report the difficulties of establishing the claims—And I now take my leave of this "public functionary" and his Report.— I have been drawn thus far into the matter, by his voluntary and unjustifiable inferences, insinuations and suggestions, or whatever else he is pleased to call them, against the conduct (though acquitting the motives) of myself and others. It was due to myself to show, as I think I have done, that the facts upon which the Auditor professes to ground his charges did not exist.- This volunteering, on his part, was not necessary even to his "plan." (if plan it may be called, which consists in the suggestion that a plan may be devised)—as no peculiar favor was asked or desired on behalf of the contracts. For myself, I say, without fear of contradiction, I asked nothing and desired nothing which the law did not sanction—fearless then, as I am now, of any attempt to involve me in any impropriety, by a true statement of facts.

AN AGENT AND ATTORNEY.

*It is obvious, that this is an evasion of the matter in issue The fact was not mentioned to magnify the importance of my services, but to show that the Auditor, "tho' not guilty of an error proceeding from wilful intention, or positive ignorance,' was not familiar with the subject about which he undertook to write, even "under a due sense of the importance and responsibility of the task. "And for this purpose the argument is the more forcible, as the fact is admitted by him.

VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE.

HOUSE OF DELEGATES.

Tuesday, Jan. 25th.

A communication was received from the Senate, stating that they had passed the bill, " To amend and revive an act to incorporate, a Company, to erect a toll bridge across the Shenandoah River."

A communication was received from the Superintendent of the Penitentiary, claiming an account of the articles manufactured at the Penitentiary, &c. agreeably to a resolution of the House.

Mr. Morris moved to take up the Report of the Committee of Privileges and Elections, in the case of the Orange Election—but on the Speaker's suggestion, that the Orders of the Day must first be disposed of, Mr. Morris moved that they be laid upon the table. Mr. Gilmer suggested, that it would be best for the House to dispose of the order respecting the bill, " To provide for opening and repairing of the Public Roads in this Commonwealth"—and to refer it to a Select Committee—which was agreed to; and the following gentlemen appointed the Committee, viz: Messrs. Gilmer, Williams of Harrison, Gibson, Caldwell. Williams of Shenandoah, Powell of Loudoun, Preston, Jackson, Gholson, Chichester, Wood of Frederick, Anderson (Botetourt) and Moore.

The resolutions reported from the Committee of Courts of Justice, was postponed till to-morrow: and the Report of the Committee of Privileges and Elections, in the Orange case, was taken up and read as follows :

" The Committee of Privileges and Elections having, according to order, had under consideration the memorial of Thomas Davis, complaining of the undue election of James Barbour, Esq. the member returned to serve in the present House of Delegates, from the county of Orange, have agreed upon a Report, and come to the following Resolutions thereupon :

" It appearing that the said election was holden on the 29th day of December, 1830, and that the taking of the votes at the said election, terminated on that day; that the return of the High Sheriff of the county of Orange, made upon the writ which issued from the House of Delegates on the 15th day of December last, bears date on the 30th day of December, 1830; that the memorialist gave the sitting member a notice in writing, on the 31st day of December, 1830, of his intention to contest the right of the said sitting member to a seat in the present House of Delegates; and that the memorial referred to this Committee, was presented to the House of Delegates, on the 21st day of the present month:

" Resolved, as the opinion of this Committee, That the said memorial was not presented to the House of Delegates within the time prescribed by the 18th section of the Act of Assembly, entitled " An act reducing into one act the several acts, concerning the election of Members of the General Assembly, and for other purposes," passed January 27th, 1818

"Resolved, as the opinion of this Committee, that the said memorial be rejected."

Mr. Claiborne opposed the Report of the Committee, on the ground that they had not computed the twenty days allowed a contesting candidate to take testimony, from the period contemplated by the law. The law gave twenty days after the close of the election. The question then was, when did an election close? He argued that it closed when the Sheriff made proclamation of the result, which he was required to do at the next County Court after the election, and that an election could not be closed without a proclamation. In counties where there were precincts, five days were given for bringing in the polls to the Court House, where the Sheriff had the duty to perform of comparing the polls; and he might find it necessary to obtain information as to any two similar names on the polls, as they might be those of different individuals. It was impossible for the people to know who was elected, if the Sheriff saw fit to keep the information to himself, until a proclamation was made; and if the construction of the committee was correct, he might prevent a contest by refusing to declare who was elected, until required to make the proclamation by law, and then he might give the return to the individual having the smallest number of votes, precluding the other candidate or the electors from contesting, because they would not have been able to give notice or take testimony in time. The House would not be prepared to sanction such a principle. The proclamation was required by law, and it must have been intended for some purpose.

He considered the close of the election as a technicality, intended to imply the proclamation, which was the real close. If his construction of the law was correct, the petitioner in this case had presented his petition in good time. He alluded to the Culpeper case, in which the result was not declared until the 20th November, although the election took place in October. The question ought now to be decided, as to the time from which the twenty days should be computed. They must begin from some specific time, and thought it ought to be from the proclamation by the Sheriff, at the Court House.

Mr. Morris said that the report was founded on the 18th section of the law of 1827-8, which gave twenty days after the election, in which to collect testimony and present the memorial. The question was, what was the close of an election?. The time of the proclamation could not be the close. If the proclamation had not been made in this case, it would appear that the gentleman from Orange had been admitted to seat here for twenty days previous to the close of the election, and the committee had not only done wrong in deciding that the petitioner was too late; but they had also done wrong in not declaring that he was premature—for his petition would have been presented before the close of the election. Such a state of things was never contemplated by the Legislature. If it were so, the county might be disfranchised for a whole session. Four-fifths of the Committee of Privileges and Elections had decided in the Culpeper case, that in counties where there were precincts, the election closed on the day on which the Sheriff met at the Court House, with the different polls. Some were of opinion that the twenty days ought to be computed, not from the day on which the polls were brought in, but from the fifth day—five days being allowed for bringing them in. If time was counted from the day on which the polls were compared, the petitioner was too late; if from the fifth day, he was in time: As to the necessity of the proclamation to give information to the people, the same inconveniences existed when the general law was passed in regard to elections of Senators, which now exist in the precincts. But the Legislature never saw fit to make any provision to alter the practice, and no complaints were ever made, although twenty days only were allowed, counting from the time of the comparing of the votes by the Sheriff.. If the principle contended for by the gentleman from Greenville, had been acted on in the October elections, the two bodies of the Legislature would have been sitting before the elections of the members would have closed. There was no difficulty under the present system: the candidates always knew who would be returned at the time the sheriff compared the polls There was a question in the Culpeper election, whether the commencement of the contest should be computed from the last of the 5 days allowed for collecting the polls, or from the day on which they were compared. The Committee decided on the latter. The House, in its vote on that case, had made no decision on that point. It was clear, however, that from one of those two periods, the time should be computed.

Mr. Claiborne contended. that if the time was to be computed according to the gentleman's opinion, the Sheriff was not bound to let any one know the result, but the candidates. But the electors were interested in knowing the result, and had a right to know it. The contest of an election was not confined to a candidate: any one of the electors might engage in it, as was the case in the contested election of Henrico. 'As to the idea that members would take their seats before they were elected, those members having returns would have a right to sit, as in the cases of the gentlemen from Henrico and Culpeper, until it was shewn that they were not entitled to their seats The construction which he had given to the law, would not, therefore, alter the practice in that respect. The construction of the gentleman from Hanover was founded on convenience. Such a construction often led to error, and often to folly. According to the gentleman's idea that five days are allowed to receive the polls of the precincts, and five days thereafter, to give notice, the Sheriff had not an hour allowed him to compare the polls. He therefore could not obtain evidence to enable him to compare them correctly. The superintendents of the precincts, who had nothing to do; were allowed five days, and not one hour was allowed to the Sheriff, whose duty it was to compare the polls. It was not contended that the law had so provided; but it was convenient —for the candidates. The construction was a one-sided one, allowing the candidates a right which was refused to the people. If the people were considered to have any thing to do with it, they ought to be notified. He believed that the proclamation at the court-house was the period from which to commence contesting, for the close of the election seemed to him to be when the people had notice of the result

Mr. Morris in reply said, that the gentleman seemed to suppose that there was a provision in the law relating to precinct elections, which declared totidem verbis, that the proclamation was the close of an election.— But there was no such provision in the law, and the gentleman would be obliged to support his opinion by the aid of convenience. As the law had been altered in regard to the precincts, it was necessary to give competent time for the meeting of the Sheriffs, in analogy with the Senatorial elections. The allusion to the Henrico case was inapplicable, because, in that case, the election had closed. But when this House authorized a writ for a new election, they knew that the election would not be closed until yesterday, if the proclamation was considered the close of the election. Yet, they allowed the returned member to come here and take his seat twenty days ago

Mr. Barbour, in a speech of considerable length, observed that he had not said one word to the committee on this subject. It was their own decision that the petitioner was too late. On the 29th Dec. the polls closed, and were brought to the court-house on Monday following, when the result was declared by the Sheriff, before hundreds of people, and was communicated to the people in the neighborhood. On Tuesday the contesting candidate served a notice on Mr. Barbour, that he should contest his election: But the gentleman from Greensville, seemed to doubt, whether he had been sitting here without any right to a seat, because he considered that the proclamation by the Sheriff was the close of the election. The gentleman from Greenville, in pursuit of some imaginary mischief, advocated a principle which would disfranchise the people. If there were any such power, by which the sheriff could force a member upon the House, the Legislature has the power to prevent it. The gentleman supposed that the proclamation was the close of the election, because it was the notice by which the people were informed of the result of the election. But Mr. B.'s opponent was estopped from saying that he did not know the fact, because under his own hand he declared that knowledge on the 31st of Dec. As to the supposition that the polls might not have been brought in until the fifth day after their close, the fact was that they were brought in on the 30th. After many other statements relative to the election, Mr. B. declared solemnly that he had no wish to retain his seat, except on the majority of votes, which he believed he had obtained. But if the report of the committee was rejected, he should be forced to ask further time for the collection of testimony, as his friends in the county had written him that from the inclemency of the weather it was impossible to get through in the period allowed by law.

Mr. Morris stated the fact that at the time the first Orange case was before the committee, the majority were of opinion that the time should be computed from the proclamation; but in discussing the Culpeper case, they had arrived at a different conclusion, which had been sustained by the House.

Mr. Witcher differed from the opinion of the committee. He believed that the time ought to be computed from the five days allowed for collecting the polls. At the time of the first Orange contest, the opinion of the committee was, that time should be computed from the proclamation; and he presumed, therefore, that the contesting candidate was of that opinion also. The House had never tried itself down to technicalities; but put a liberal construction on the law. -Give the construction, he contended for, and the memorial of the petitioner would be in time. By that of the committee, a declaration would be made that they would go for the merits of the case. In both the Culpeper and Patrick cases, a liberal construction was put upon the law, and technicalities were set aside. He thought, because the petitioner was a little out of time. it would be unfair to say that the sitting member should hold his seat. Mr. W. then moved that the report be recommitted, and the committee directed to enquire into the good and bad votes of the respective poll.

Mr. Barbour said, that In case the motion was carried. he should be obliged to ask further time for the examination of testimony. Unless this time were granted, the trial would be utterly ex parte ]

Mr. Davis said, that he had offered the agent of Mr. B. further time, and he would not take it. He had also offered to allow him to take testimony before one commissioner instead of three; which he also declined. He believed that great injustice had been done him by the High Sheriff and others. He had proof that the rules proposed by the gentleman from Orange, and adopted by the High Sheriff, deprived him ( Mr. D.') of many votes.

After some further remarks from Messrs. Barbour, Rives of P. Q., and Morris,-

Mr. Marshall supported the Report of the Committee. The hardship in this case, if there was any, arose out of the law The gentleman, in his anxiety .to obtain ample testimony, came too late—was not within the time prescribed by law; and, therefore, could not be heard. If a case were presented without a memorial, it would not be entertained ; because the law said that there should be a memorial, The same necessity existed, that the memorial should be presented within the time prescribed by law. The Report, therefore; ought to be adopted:

Mr. Goode said, there was a fact which ought to be noticed. At the time of the first Orange contest, the Committee were of opinion, that the time allowed for the contest was computed from the proclamation. I from this opinion, the contesting candidate had drawn the belief, that this was the right construction of the law, it was a fact in his favor, as the House ought not, by any of its acts, to mislead individuals as to the construction of the law. He should be guided in his vote according to the understanding of the contesting candidate on this point.

Mr. Davis said that from what he had heard in the Committee at the time of the first contest, he supposed that the time was computed from the proclamation.

Mr. Barbour asked whether, if the committee had so decided—although he did not so understand that any such decision was made—the House should act according to the law of the land, or the erroneous opinion of a committee?

The question was taken on re-committing, and it was agreed to on a division, by a vote of 65 to 55

Mr. Barbour said he must ask for more time to take testimony, and considering the inclemency of the weather, he thought 20 days would be necessary.

The motion was opposed, on account of the length of the time asked, by Messrs. Davis, Garland of Nelson, Newton, and Williams of S. (who moved that 15 days be allowed,) and supported by Messrs. Claiborne, Anderson of Botetourt, Leigh, Witcher and Morris.

The question was then taken on allowing 20 days, and rejected, 49 to 65.

Mr Castleman moved 10 days, and Mr. Wood of Frederick, 18. The question was first put on 18, and lost without division.

The question was then put on 15, and carried; ayes 75, noes not counted.

On Mr. Morris's motion, the petitioning candidate was allowed the same 15 days. for collecting evidence, which had been granted to Mr. Barbour.

A communication was presented from the Second Auditor, which was laid upon the table.

On motion of Mr. Wood of Frederick, The House adjourned.

Yesterday—A Message was received from the Senate, informing that they had passed the bill making an appropriation for the repairs of the Governor's house; and that they had passed the bill concerning bonds on appeal, writs of error and supersedeas, with amendments—which were agreed to.

Mr. Semple submitted the following resolutions

Resolved, That the Committee of Privileges and Elections be instructed to require of James Barbour, the returned member for the county of Orange, to give them a statement in writing of the names of the voters as to whose right of voting he intends to take testimony, in the contest now depending for a seat in the H. of Delegates, between him and Thomas Davis—That they require the same of the said Davis; and upon such statement being delivered, or within five days from this day, if such statements be not made, that they proceed to an examination of the votes questioned by the respective notices in the said contest, and not embraced in such contests:

Considerable debate arose on this resolution, in which Messrs. Semple; Goode, Morris, Barbour, and Davis took part—when, on motion of Mr. Goode, it was laid on the table.

THE JUDICIARY.

The order of the day, being the following report and resolutions, was called up:

The committee for Courts of Justice having according to order "enquired whether any, and what alterations are expedient in the Judiciary System of Virginia"—Whereupon—

1. Resolved, as the opinion of this committee, that it is not expedient to make any change in the jurisdiction of the county and corporation courts.

2 Resolved, as the opinion of this committee that it is expedient to vest the equitable jurisdiction now exercised by the Superior Courts of Chancery, in the same judges or tribunals which shall or may be appointed and established to exercise the jurisdiction now exercised by the Superior Courts of law.

3. Resolved, as the Opinion of this committee, that a Superior Court of Law, and Equity ought to be established in each county, and each election district represented in the General Assembly.

Mr. Miller of Botetourt moved that the Committee be discharged from further consideration of this subject.

This motion was opposed by Mr. Leigh, who moved that the order of the day be executed, which motion was agreed to and the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, Mr. Barbour in the chair.

The first resolution being announced, Mr. Newton moved its postponement until the others were acted upon.

This motion was opposed by Mr. Leigh, and supported by Mr. Campbell of Brooke; when Mr. N. withdrew his motion.

The second and third resolution having been reported, Mr. Jones moved to strike out the close of the third resolution, after the word county; and insert " in the Commonwealth." On this motion a long and animated discussion took place, in which Messrs. Jones, Christian, Semple, Leigh, and Leigh, participated; when it was adopted, on a division, 59 to 49.

Mr. Maxwell moved that the Committee not rise, and have leave to sit again.

Mr Gilmer opposed the giving leave to sit again, and was sustained by Mr. Christian. Mr. Mason of Frederick advocated the motion.

The question was then taken on giving the committee leave to sit again, and decided in the negative; on a division, 59 to 61.

The committee then rose and reported progress.

On motion of Mr. Leigh the report and resolutions were, for the present. laid upon the table.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

On motion of Mr Maxwell, the bill to organize the Executive Department was taken up. The blanks had being open,

Mr. Maxwell moved that the first blank be filled with the words " first day of February"—as the day on which the Governor elect shall enter upon his office.

This motion was warmly opposed by Messrs. Jackson and Leigh, and supported by Messrs. Maxwell and Witcher.

Mr Jackson moved to fill the blank with the " 4th Monday, in March"—Mr. Barbour moved the " first day of March"

Several other motions were made—And the question being taken on the filling the blank with the words, " 4th Monday in March," it was agreed to by a vote of 62 to 65.

On motion of Mr. Mason of Frederick, the House adjourned.

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