The National Intelligencer And Washington Advertiser

Congressional Register.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 9.

Debate on receding the District of Columbia.

[Continued.]

Mr. LUCAS. After having heard the question under consideration so extensively and ably discussed, I rise with the greatest diffidence, indeed I do rise not so much in hope to throw light as to justify the vote which I intend to give. That I may preserve perspicuity, I shall investigate the following points in their proper order.

Hath Congress the constitutional power to cede to the states of Maryland and Virginia, part of the district of Columbia? Hath Congress the power to cede it without the consent of the inhabitants of the parts intended to be ceded? Is it expedient to make that cession, both with respect to the United States and with respect to the inhabitants of the parts intended to be ceded?

The power vested in Congress by the constitution to accept a district not exceeding ten miles square, to become the seat of government, is a power which appears to stand on a perfect level with all the other powers enumerated in the eighth section of the first article: it is as optional to Congress to accept or not accept a district not exceeding ten miles, as to lay or not lay duties, imposts and excises. There was a seat of government before the district of Columbia was in existence. and there may be a seat of government after the district of Columbia may have ceased to exist. if it be urged that in as much as there is not in the constitution an express delegation of powers to cede the district, Congress cannot cede it, I shall retort, that as there is no express power delegated by the constitution to repeal laws laying impost or excise, Congress cannot repeal such laws. This argument proves too much to prove anything. My apprehension of the power of Congress is, that whatever it hath the power to do, it hath the virtual power to undo; indeed without that power Congress could not change its operations with circumstances nor improve the system of legislation.

The next question is this—hath Congress the power to cede a part of the district of Columbia without the consent of the inhabitants of that part? This point leads to a previous one. Could the legislatures of Virginia and Maryland originally cede to Congress a part of their states not exceeding ten miles square, without the consent of the inhabitants of the parts ceded? I believe that those legislatures had not that power. It ought to be remembered that the inhabitants of the district of Columbia, although they have been represented in the course of the debates as men in a state of degradation, were a part of the people who, in the preamble of the constitution of the United States, did express themselves in the following manner: "We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity," &c. The right of being represented in the Legislatures of their respective states, and in Congress, was the right of the inhabitants of the district of Columbia at the time they were component parts of the states of Virginia & Maryland. Those blessings of liberty were secured to them and their posterity by their respective state constitutions, and by the federal compact.

How then can it be conceived that the legislatures of Virginia and Maryland had the power to give them away, to become subject to the "exclusive legislation of Congress in all cases whatsoever;"that is, to be deprived of their elective franchise and right of representation? How can it be conceived that the legislatures of these states, that are, the creatures of the constitution, had the power to bereave Americans of the most valuable rights that the constitution of their country guaranty to them? It is the comfort and pride of an American, that no power on earth but his own can deprive him of his constitutional rights; this is a principle still more evident. But it is urged, that the inhabitants of the district of Columbia, notwithstanding this, are actually subject to Congress, without elective franchise. This I grant. But if they are so, it is by their consent, without which the cession could not have been legitimate. Thus it hath been their pleasure to barter their elective franchise for pecuniary advantages, or other considerations arising from being within the bounds of the seat of government. It is evidently a matter of choice on their part, and they have been put in that situation neither by violence or conquest.

To those who contend that the legislatures of Maryland and Virginia were of themselves as competent to make the cession to Congress as Congress was competent to accept, I beg leave to observe that yet as by those acts the right of elective franchise of the inhabitants of the parts ceded would have been virtually defeated, this brings me back to my former position, that the cession made by Maryland and Virginia could not be legitimate without the consent of the inhabitants of the part ceded, otherwise the constitution would give power to invade liberties which at the same time the constitution intended to secure. This consent was given by acclamation, even the women and children of the district rejoiced on that occasion. Hence the consent of the inhabitants of the district having been necessary to render that cession legitimate, and that consent having been given, a contract exists between them and Congress; a contract way exint and does generally exist between the governors and the governed, the protection and subjection are reciprocal obligations even in monarchies: the whigs of England contended in 1688. that James the Second had violated the original contract between him and his people, a contract which nobody pretended to be reduced to forms and written, but which nevertheless was binding, and derived its force from the relations, necessarily existing, between the monarch and the subject.

Certainly, Mr. Chairman, the inhabitants of this district are not in a worse situation than subjects are under a monarchy; yet a worse treatment is offered to them; by the present resolutions they are to be receded against their consent to Maryland and Virginia. The word consent has been much used in the course of the debate, but I have not heard it explained; it is a word of very extensive import, and includes every thing that can be said or done by the inhabitants, either collectively or individually, to express their approbation or disapprobation of the measure.
Recession heretofore unknown in a contract is introduced in the resolutions, I suppose to offer or to put the grant offered to the people of this district under disguise: by this intended recession they are to be transferred as a bale of goods, and if they can be transferred to Maryland and Virginia, they may be transferred to Vermont and Georgia; for the acts by which they have been severed from Maryland and Virginia are perfect and complete and what is termed a recession in those resolutions is as completely a transfer as if the district had never been a part of Maryland and Virginia.

But a gentleman from Virginia has told us that by the cession and acceptance Congress is omnipotent over the district; for my part I am at a loss to find the grounds that can justify such an assertion; the constitution gives Congress the power "to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such district." How can it be said that exclusive legislation and omnipotence are convertible terms?

Under the monarchy of France, before the revolution, the king did exercise exclusive legislation; yet he could not make a transfer of the monarchy, By fundamental laws it was declared unalienable in a lineal succession, and not otherwise. Had the dynasty been extinguished, the three states of France would have been the sole authority competent to make the choice of a new dynasty. Thus the people of France, although under the exclusive legislation of their king, were vested by the fundamental laws of the monarchy with an eventual political right. The exercise of a power and the power itself are then obviously two distinct things.

Believing that I have proved that the consent of the inhabitants of the district was necessary to legitimate the cession made by the states of Virginia and Maryland, it being all notorious, that such a consent has not been given, and that an implied consent exists between the inhabitants of the district and the people of the United States, they have a right to the protection of Congress. Congress hath a right to their obedience. These mutual obligations cannot, in my opinion be defeated, but by mutual consent, or at least, if Congress should find it inconvenient to exercise the power of legislation over the district: the terms of submission on the part of the inhabitants of the district; and reason and justice require that they should be left to themselves and not be an object of traffic. The right of a guardian over an orphan is a species of jurisdiction and government; yet a guardian cannot transfer his right to another. If he find it inconvenient to discharge his duties, he may resign. It is the right of an orphan, if he hath attained the age of discretion to choose his own guardian. The tenants themselves acknowledge that the rights of patronage of church jurisdiction and other feudal honours are not transferable, unless as appurtenance of a glebe or manor. The same of jurisdiction intended by the resolutions before the committee is less justifiable than if it had originated in feudal principles; it is neither an appurtenance nor appendage of any glebe or other object susceptible of transfer.

Among others, two gentlemen from Virginia have told us that the inhabitants of the district of Columbia are in a state of political annihilation--that they possess no right--that they are unconditionally at the discretion of Congress--am one of those that cannot give my assent to these positions--I believe that they possess a political and civil rights, which Congress hath no power to abridge or impair. I believe that Congress and they are mutually bound by moral obligations. The exercise of exclusive legislation over the district by Congress having not been introduced by violence or conquest, cannot be consequently of a despotic kind. It necessarily partakes of the qualities of the power of legislation commonly exercised by a political and civil authority.

The power which the constitution authorizes Congress to exercise is defined; it is to exercise exclusive legislation. The exercise is no more, as I have already said, but the use of a power, and by no means the ownership of that power. If the right of ownership is not vested in Congress, it remains in the inhabitants of the district: thus far the people of the district possess a political right; this consequence arises fairly from the premises, and is perfectly congenial with the tenets of American polity.

The inhabitants of the district possess all civil rights; for the exercise of the power of legislation vested in Congress is generally qualified by the declaration of rights introduced in the amendment to the constitution: "Congress shall pass no law respecting an establishment of religion," &c. This restriction applies to all laws whatever: a law passed by Congress for the government of this district is not less a law of Congress than a law passed by Congress for the government of the United States--Hence the people possess civil rights, As to moral rights, no society can exist without them, unless in a momentary struggle of revolution. These rights are reciprocal and obligatory upon moral agents, either in a single or corporate capacity.

Mr. Chairman. I must confess, however that the situation of the inhabitants of this district is not such as I should delight to be in. No pecuniary advantages could ever induce me to part with my elective franchise: but it has been the pleasure of those people to part with theirs, and the constitution of the United States has authorized them to do so--That has no criterion, "Sui quemque trahit voluptas." The people of this district are in such a situation as had been foreseen and intended by the good and great men who framed the constitution of the United States. To find fault with the situation of the people of this district, in point of principle, is to find fault with the constitution.-- Was I to tender for their rights as some gentlemen appear to be--was I conscious that the manner in which they are governed is of a pernicious example to the people of the United States, I should endeavor to apply a radical remedy. I should move an amendment to the resolutions, by including also the city; for in principle the evil remains the same, if the district be continued within the bounds of the city.

I cannot, for my part, carry my philanthropy so far as to enforce upon persons privileges which they do not wish to have. A man who lives in Turkey would not thank us for dragging him into our free country. I do not think I should have relished the liberties of America, if I had been taken from France by force and brought here against my own will. Our choice is a necessary ingredient in our enjoyment; but if the two gentlemen from Virginia feel such tenderness for the rights of others, &c. are so fond of extending the elective franchise, let their charity begin at home; there they will find a full opportunity to extend and improve the system of representation.

Mr. Chairman. was I an inhabitant of the district of Columbia, having but a small property, I think that I should be very little anxious to better my condition by going to live in Virginia. I know that my political influence would be here merely nominal--I know that whatever my moral worth might be. I could not stand in competition with those who possess that kind of property, which is entitled to representation. I know that my occupation and habits would keep me a stranger among my neighbours, and render my situation uncomfortable, perhaps disgusting.

Had Congress the power to refuse to legislate over the district of Columbia. nay, had it the power to cede that district to Maryland and Virginia, would it be expedient to do it? For my part, I avow that I do not see a great utility in the constitutional provision, which authorizes Congress to accept a district. I am one of those who believe that the safety and independence of Congress must rest upon their regard to the true interests of the people of the United States, and the virtue and spirit of that people. I believe that when these things shall be wanting, it is idle to think that the district of Columbia can make up the deficiency. However the sages who framed the constitution thought that a district might be useful, the Congress that did accept the district, and the several Congresses that did let it exist, are authorities of great weight and respectability.

I feel averse to undo what a future Congress cannot do again. If we cede to Maryland and Virginia any part of the district of Columbia, is it to be expected, if another Congress should wish to have those parts restored, that Maryland and Virginia, after having experienced the versatility of the present Congress, would consent to make another cession? It plainly appears to me that, if the resolutions now before the committee be adopted, any future Congress will become virtually disabled from restoring the district to its present extent. This unavoidable consequence adds, in my mind, importance to the question. Those that will sit within these walls next year will have a more recent evidence of the people's confidence than that which we now possess. Would it not be more prudent to leave them the opportunity of exercising their opinion upon these resolutions?

As to the expediency of the contemplated cession, so far as it relates to the inhabitants of the district, I will not undertake to say anything. They know much better than I do what suits them, and if it was their interest to be ceded again, we would have seen them over here their consent, or petitioning for the cession.

Mr. THATCHER was opposed to the motion for a recession, and had heard only two reasons urged in favor of the measure; that the exercise of exclusive legislation by Congress over the district of Columbia was attended with an undue expense the public money, and occupied so much of the time, that the business of the union was interrupted and put to a stand by the interference of the local concerns this place. This statement he did not believe to be perfectly correct; no doubt some of their time was taken up, but he would leave it to every gentleman to say, whether if they had even more business before them than they had, there was not time enough to transact it.

The House usually sat from 10 o'clock till three: but it must have been frequently observed, that the adjournment took place much earlier, for want of business to employ them. But he was not an advocate for the present mode of conducting the business of the district it would perhaps be a better way to give them a subordinate government, controllable by Congress--or a committee of Congress might be appointed for the purpose. He did not see that the complaint of too much legislation was well founded, in anything that had taken place during the present session--if the little labor they had had to perform was too great for them, what must the labor of their predecessors have been, who had passed all the laws in existence for the government of the district, and yet he had never heard any complaint made by them on the ground now taken; they knew that the constitution enjoined upon them the duty of exercising exclusive legislation over the ten miles square, and they performed it with patient attention.

His mind revolted at the idea of recession. Gentlemen had contended that the powers exercised over the people of Columbia, were derogatory of, and inconsistent with the principles of free government. Yet what does this motion for recession propose? Why to transfer them and the territory away, in the manner practiced in Russia, in the transfer of provinces or manors, transferring the vassals with the soil This may be truly called derogatory to the principles of freedom! Nor is this all; you do not transfer them merely without their consent, but in the teeth of their serious remonstrances against the transfer.

When he considered the doubts which had been suggested as to its being constitutional or not, he declared that such a circumstance would decide him to vote against the measure, and he supposed it would decide the vote of every member, who was not fully and clearly satisfied that Congress possessed under the grants of the Constitution the power of recession. But if we have a constitutional right to recede the jurisdiction, we may transfer it to whom we please; but such a measure being merely an act of Congress, could not bind up the hands of a future Congress to assume the power over it at some future day; and if the parts of the district were severally given to the states of Maryland and Virginia, what is to prevent their from giving the whole back whenever Congress might require it. From this view of the case, he did not see that the members in favor of recession were likely to fix it on any durable foundation.

A gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Findley) had contended that only as Congress was restricted by the constitution from ceding this territory, Congress possessed the right, as essential to their exclusive legislation. He, for his part, considered the converse of this proposition to be the truth; and gentlemen were bound to show that part of the Constitution which gave the power now contended for--If they cannot show this, their right may be doubted, and under such circumstances the safer mode of proceeding would be to reject the resolutions.

He was further of opinion that the inexpediency of the measure was of itself sufficient to induce the committee to lay it aside. It had been stated, and he knew the facts to be true, that at one time the old Congress had been pent up in the house in which they were sitting by a party of soldiers, and at another time insulted by an assemblage of the people. Such circumstances as induced those outrages upon the national government may occur again; but if Congress retain the power of exclusive jurisdiction, they may by a prudent caution prevent these effects. The circumstances which he had mentioned, laid the foundation for granting in the constitution the power alluded to, and while the nature of man continued the same as heretofore, he believed it would continue to be a regulation wise and expedient. He could enumerate several cases, such for instance, as a contested Presidential election in which the danger of sitting in a large city made independent of the control of Congress would be imminent; but he would forbear as it would be as well understood as if expressed. He concluded with expressing his disapprobation of the present resolutions.

MR. TAGGART. Mr. Chairman, as considerable time has been already spent on the question under consideration, it is not my intention to detain the committee long; but as it is one of very considerable magnitude, and one upon which there seems to be a disposition among members to express their sentiments, and not content themselves with giving barely a silent vote, I crave the indulgence of a few minutes, while I state some difficulties which are still in the way of my voting in favour of the resolutions for a recession, unremoved by the discussions which have taken place.

Gentlemen who advocate the resolutions now before the committee disavow an intention to do anything which may pave the way for the removal of the seat of government from this place, or weaken the confidence of either the citizens of the district, or of the United States at large, in their belief that it will continue to be permanent. I am disposed to give full faith and credit to the sincerity of gentlemen making this declaration; but permit me to observe that the belief that the permanent continuance of our national government at the city of Washington, will not be affected by the recession, can be founded on nothing but conjecture. That it would materially affect the probability of such a permanency and even prove an important inchoate step towards a removal, is also a matter of conjecture, which appears to me to be founded on quite as great a degree of probable evidence as the other, and so long as I retain this apprehension I cannot vote for the resolutions. So long as human nature continues what it is, and has always been, we may naturally expect that three rival places in the situation of Alexandria, Washington and George-town, when owing allegiance to, and protected by the immediate jurisdiction of three distinct independent sovereignties, would be much more likely to enter into, and prosecute measures, mutually to trample and injure the prosperity of each other, than when under the immediate control of the same sovereign authority disposed to do justice and render protection equally and impartially to them all.

Should such a disposition prevail, while they were under distinct sovereignties, the probable consequence would be, either that one would obtain such an ascendency as to cause the others to sink, or that they would mutually weaken and injure each other. Should Alexandria, for instance, gain such an ascendency as to cause this city to decline and come to nothing, a removal of the seat of government, though not contemplated at present, might soon become a matter of necessity, and not of choice. Should such a necessity arise, and notwithstanding all the plausible arguments I have heard urged to the contrary, should the proposed recession take place, I cannot view it as an unimportant step towards that event,--so many and different and even clashing are the local interests, and such the variety of maxims and habits in the United States which are constantly increasing with our extended and still extending population, that the fixing of another seat of government might, and probably would materially affect the union itself. As I hope not only to see the union of the states to continue during my time, but that it may descend unbroken to ages yet unborn, I cannot vote for a measure which has, in my view, a remote, or even a conjectural tendency to affect it.

I find also a constitutional difficulty in the way of the recession, which has not been, to my apprehension, satisfactorily removed, by all the variety and ingenuity of argument and all the laboured discussions I have heard on the subject. I shall not again repeat that clause of the constitution which has been already so often recited and commented upon by gentlemen on both sides of the present question. I only observe that although the members composing a particular Congress are constantly changing, and Congress, as distinguished into 1st, 2nd, third, &c. follow each other in succession, yet the constitution contemplates the Congress of the United States as being permanent, or immortal, if the expression may be permitted. When the constitution says that Congress shall have exclusive jurisdiction or the exclusive right of legislation, over a district of territory not exceeding ten miles square, it is not the particular Congress for the time being, but Congress generally, the permanent Congress of the United States which is meant. I see not, therefore, that the present Congress passes that right to recede the territory, so as in any manner of way to affect the right of their successors, or to hinder a future Congress, the next if you please, from re-assuming the jurisdiction the first day of their session. Without granting the correctness of the position, yet admitting for the sake of the argument, the first proceedings of Congress, in accepting the cession of the territory from the legislatures of Virginia and Maryland, and assuming the jurisdiction over the lands, to stand on the footing of mere legislative acts, repealable at any time, at the pleasure of the legislature, and that they did not partake of the nature of a constitutional provision, or an irrepealable compact, even this would not in the present instance remove the difficulty from my mind. The constitution vests Congress with the power of establishing a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States. I single out this instance in particular, because I have already heard frequent allusions made to it in the course of the debate, and because certain recent transactions must render that subject familiar to the minds of almost every member of the committee.--

Agreeably to this provision some years ago a bankrupt law was enacted. Congress at their last session, saw fit to repeal that law, and I believe it was done with great propriety. But will any person assert that Congress possessed constitutional power to pass a law, affecting the proceedings and decisions which had already taken place, and been carried into effect under the law which they had seen fit to repeal, or to tether a future Congress from either re-enacting, at pleasure, the same law, or framing any other statute to the same effect? I believe this will not be asserted. But by the resolutions on the table, it is contemplated to alienate from every succeeding Congress, that right of jurisdiction vested in Congress by the constitution of the United States: an act which cannot but materially affect the proceedings which have taken place during the continuance of the present session. It appears to me therefore difficult for the warmest advocate for the resolutions to prove that Congress has any constitutional power to make such a permanent recession of this territory, as can in any way affect or impair the right of the next, or of any future Congress to reassume the jurisdiction, whenever it shall be thought proper. I believe there are several powers vested in Congress by the constitution of the United States, which have never yet been carried into effect, and probably may not for many years to come, if ever. But will any member of this committee assert that the present, or any particular Congress, has a right to pass a law, declaring that these provisions of the constitution shall not be carried into effect in future? I believe it will not be presumed that Congress possesses any such power.

Much has also been said about the expediency and necessity of the proposed recession, and a variety of arguments have been urged which, if they prove anything, it is only that the resolutions are inadequate to the contemplated object. This expediency or necessity, is grounded principally on two points, viz. In order to restore them to their natural and political rights, and to save Congress the trouble, and the nation the expense of legislating for the territory. We have heard much in glowing declamation about the restoration of the citizens of Columbia to certain political rights of which they have been injuriously deprived by the act of cession and such an affecting picture has been drawn of their present state of degradation and vassalage, as would lead us to believe that their situation more nearly resembled that of the slaves of a Turkish Bashaw, than that of citizens of the United States. Should a stranger be suddenly transported within these walls, and know nothing of the situation of the inhabitants of the surrounding district only what he learns from the picture drawn in certain discussions on this subject, what a scene of wretchedness would be pictured before his imagination? Would he not almost expect to have his ears assailed with the harsh grating sound of fetters, and the clanking of chains, upon going out into the streets, or, if there was so much liberty left as to permit their departure, to see the wretched inhabitants flying in every direction, from this land of tyranny and oppression, this worse than Egyptian bondage, to the surrounding Elysium of freedom and happiness? But, on making a tour through the district, how great would be his surprise, to see the citizens of Columbia, contented, free and happy, to see the various classes, of civilized society, the man of fortune, the merchant, the tradesman, the husbandman, and the labourer, each one quietly pursuing his respective occupation, and each enjoying the fruit of his labour, under the protection of mild and equitable laws; attached as I am to the rights of man and the principles of civil and political liberty, and wishing that those rights may be extended to every nation on the globe, capable of appreciating and enjoying them, I am not fully possessed of the propriety of doing an act, doubtful at least by the constitution of the United States, for the purpose of restoring people to certain abstract rights, contrary to their wishes, and against their warmest remonstrances. Even the servant under the Jewish law, who had such an attachment to his master as to wish to remain in his present situation, was not compelled to go out free: Congress has been represented as standing in the relation of a master to this district. If this is correct, it is some consolation, that by evidence irresistible, he appears to have hitherto provided a good master at least.

(Mr. Taggart's Speech to be concluded in our next.)