Herald Of The Times

The Rail Road Accident.-- We subjoin the official expose of the Board of Directors, relative to the late lamentable accident on the Camden and Amboy Rail-Road. It appears to be drawn up in a spirit of candor, and without any desire to conceal the truth. It will be seen that the rate of speed had been, a short time before the accident, greater than that prescribed by the Board, and that this was owing to an injury that the time-keeper had received, which prevented him from being at his post. There are two causes, however, that have been discovered and now developed, adequate to the result, without attributing it to excess of speed. The one was a latent defect in the broken axle, notwithstanding the greatest precaution and expense in procuring the iron, which reduced three-eighths of its strength; and the other, that the agent stationed to apply the brake on the instant of approaching danger, was diverted, at the unfortunate moment, from his usual business, by having discovered that a spark from the engine had ignited a bundle of cotton, which he hastened to extinguish.

Although we are not wont to listen to the every-day excuses that are made to screen carelessness and delinquency in the management of steamboats and other vehicles, yet there does really seem in the present case to have been a combination of causes against which human prudence could not be expected to guard, and which ought not to impair public confidence in this popular mode of conveyance.

[N. Y. Com. Adv.

ADDRESS
Of the Camden & Amboy Rail Road and Transportation Company.
TO THE PUBLIC.

The unfortunate accident which occurred on the road on Friday last, and the melancholy consequences resulting from it, have occupied the most serious attention of the Executive committee of the board of Directors.--Every exertion has been made to obtain a correct statement of all the facts that they might be disclosed to the public.

The security of the passengers from the commencement of the operations of this company, has been an object of the first consideration. For several weeks after a sufficient number of locomotives to carry the passengers, were completed and on the line, the horses were continued notwithstanding the importunity of the public for the change. The most unfounded reports as to the capacity of the road or this species of power were circulated and believed from this delay. During all this period, however, the engines were constantly in use, when the line was free from the passenger's cars, in transporting merchandise and materials on the road.

The Directors preferred the odium attached to their delay to the risque attending the substitution of the engines until the engineers had become familiar with their use. They were then placed on one line only, that they might be under the immediate superintendence of confidential agents of this company. Positive instructions were given that the trip (35 miles) should not be made in less than two hours and a quarter; allowing two hours, or a speed of seventeen and a half miles per hour, for the actual running of the engine, & fifteen minutes for the necessary stoppages. Special instructions were also given that no one mile should be run in less than three minutes. To ensure a compliance with these orders, an agent was placed on each line, whose special and only duty is to take the time of running each and every mile, with a stop watch, for the government of the engineer, and to note down the same, and report it to the Executive Committee. From the commencement these reports have evinced so nearly a compliance with the orders as to be entirely satisfactory. From a careful inspection of the reports of the week immediately preceding the accident, it is discovered that the time actually occupied in running, shews an average rate of eighteen miles per hour, and the fastest trip was at the rate of nineteen miles. -Unfortunately the time keeper of this line had sustained a slight injury from a fall a day or two previous, and was not then on the line. As the engineers had become so well regulated in their time, it was deemed unnecessary to procure another agent to fill this temporary vacancy.

Had this officer been at his post, the first object, to wit: the rate to which the cars were running, would have been attended with no difficulty. From the excitement naturally produced by the disaster, it has been found impracticable to obtain information on this subject. The Committee are led to a conclusion, however, that a short time before the occurrence of the accident, the speed of the engine had considerably exceeded the rate allowed, but that at the time and immediately before, this was not the case. This opinion is induced by the following facts.

There were two trains of cars attached to separate engines. The accident happened to the last train. The first engine is the least powerful on the line. The engineer is positive that so far from being in advance of, he was behind his time. He moreover states that from inadvertence his fire had got down and his steam was so low as to render it difficult to maintain his proper speed at that point, as the road there ascends. The committee are satisfied that the orders had not been materially violated as to the whole time of running the distance.

But it appears that, owing to some trifling derangement of the second engine, the engineer, about three miles before, had reduced his speed to adjust it. After doing so, he states that to recover his proper station, he increased his speed, but not in his opinion exceeding his limited rate. In this he was probably mistaken. But before the accident occurred, he had checked the engine by shutting off a considerable portion of the steam, and is positive that he was not then running faster than the train in advance. The declaration is strongly corroborated by the fact, that one of the agents accompanying the line was on the top of the car which upset, and jumped from it to the ground without injury, when he discovered that it was going over. From the place where he alighted, to that where the car rested, after the train was stopped, is not quite 21 yards.

The accident has also been attributed to the heating of the axle from friction, or want of oil. It is understood that some of the passengers are under the impression that they saw smoke from this cause. This is clearly a mistake. The axles were examined at Spottswood, (not 8 miles distant) by the agent whose duty it is so to do, and found perfectly cool and well supplied with oil. The appearance of the fracture is entirely inconsistent with this idea, and the quantity of oil still adhering to both the journal and box is conclusive as that would have been entirely consumed by the heat.

These matters have been adverted to particularly, because the accident has been attributed to them, and the committee have felt bound to afford every information on the subject. They are convinced, however, that it is to be traced to other causes which could neither have been foreseen nor prevented, & the fatal consequences were produced by a combination of circumstances that have never before occurred and in all human probability will never again occur.

Cast iron wheels have been entirely excluded from the passenger cars on the road. The axles have all been procured from Boonston the most celebrated works in the country, at the exorbitant price of $125 per ton to insure the quality of the iron. They are more than fifty per cent stronger than those used for the passenger cars of the Liverpool and Manchester road, and for still greater security the ends were all welded down before they were turned. Yet with all these precautions it appears by an examination of the broken axle that a latent defect existed in it which caused the accident. There was a flaw in it leaving not more than three-eighths of the strength of the iron to sustain the whole weight, but as the defect was in the journal it was effectually concealed. This was the primary cause of the calamity. But the breaking of the axle would have been harmless as none of the passengers in that car received the slightest injury. It remains only to account for the injury to the other car.

It has been supposed that the car was thrown from the track and upset by running over the wheel of the broken car. This is entirely an error. The axle broke in the journal, outside of the wheel, so that both wheels remained attached to the axle, which at one end maintained its proper position, but at the other, having nothing to sustain it, dropped into the receiver, so that the spokes and the hub, which are of wood, were brought in collision with the iron on the frame, and nearly half of them splintered to pieces by the revolutions of the wheel. It has been this which was mistaken by the passengers for the smoke of the axle.

An agent is always stationed at the brake of the baggage car to keep a constant watch upon all the other cars, and to apply the brake and instantly apprise the engineer if an accident occurs. For the first time since the line has been in operation, a spark had lighted on the baggage car, and ignited a bundle of cotton. The agent discovered this, and was in the act of extinguishing it, when he discovered the breaking of the axle. Before he could recover his station and apply the brake, the car was thrown from the track, and so far over as to be beyond recovery. There is no doubt but that the impetus from the after cars caused the overthrow of this car. It is evident that it must have been projected forward by them and thrown on the front end, from the act of the twenty-four passengers in it at the time, those in the back apartment were uninjured.
This would have been effectually prevented by the application of the brake, but for the unfortunate mischance which drew the agent from his post at that critical juncture. No blame appears reasonably to be attached to the agent, as the train was then running on a portion of the line where there is a double track and perfectly straight or nearly six miles without even a turn-out to guard against.
These are the facts and conclusions arrived at after the most careful examination of this painful subject. Whilst the committee deeply deplore the event and sympathize with the unfortunate sufferers and their friends, they have to console themselves with the conviction, that the company cannot justly be chargeable with the censure of the public. It is believed, that in no similar enterprise, greater care has been taken to protect the passengers from injury and that their intentions have been frustrated by an extraordinary combination of circumstances, not to have been foreseen or prevented by human foresight.
J. H. SLOAN, Secretary.