Virginia Argus

MR. PICKEN'S RESOLUTIONS.

Mr. Gholson's remarks thereon in the House of Representatives.

Mr. Gholson said, in substance, that as he expected to vote on the question before the House differently from a large majority of his colleagues, he would beg permission very succinctly to assign some of the reasons by which he was governed. The reasons which operate on my mind, said Mr. G. are not such as have been resorted to in the debate. I shall support, sir, the proposition submitted by the hon. gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Picken) because it will tend to nationalize the institutions of the country to which it relates, and will give to them a more federative republican form.

At present the electors of the Chief Magistrate of the nation are chosen by the various modes of eighteen distinct independent state sovereignties. In some states the choice is by the Legislatures thereof; in some by general ticket, in others by districts, &c. Now, it is perfectly manifest, that where those who are to appoint the President are themselves thus selected, the election of a President may not be substantially and unequivocally by the people: There is no certainty, or assurance that electors chosen by the state Legislature, for instance, would select the same person for President as would the people or persons immediately appointed by them for the purpose.

Under the present mode, the fact cannot be concealed, and I am far from attempting to disguise it, that recourse must of necessity be had to the agency of bodies called caucuses—and I do not know, sir, under the present arrangement how they could be avoided. The custom, for example, in the states choosing electors by general ticket, is for the Legislatures of such states to meet informally, that is in caucus, and to designate and recommend to the people certain persons or the most part unknown to them, to be electors; and these persons are accordingly uniformly chosen by the people. In this case the right of election is virtually exercised by the Legislatures, and only formally by the people. This is obvious to every gentleman. It would be uncandid to deny it.

Here then, not intentionally, but from the very nature of our institutions, there is an encroachment on the privileges of the citizen. Now, sir, without any previous nomination or recommendation in this way of electors to the people, I would prefer that the people themselves should select by districts, and within their acquaintance, their own immediate responsible agents for the purpose of appointing a President. Thus we should have a system at once, uniform and national, and referring directly to the people for their decision—And in all cases I would prefer a decision by the people where it is practicable, and can be fairly expressed.

Let it not be understood that I am fond of an innovation, or that I would encourage frequent constitutional amendments. No, sir; on the contrary, I have with much reflection adopted it as a fixed principle, that in a government whose form is a pure representative democracy, I would make no change in the constitution except such as should be suggested by practical experience. I never would alter a republican constitution merely for the sake of theorizing. Testing the operations of our constitution and provision on the subject now before the House by this maxim the question arises whether any partial inconveniences have resulted. It is perfectly notorious that such inconveniences have taken place, and they require to be remedied. They need not be recited. I am justified by experience in saying I would take as little power out of the hands of the people as possible. I would restore it to them in this case—I would not deprive them of the important privilege embraced and secured to them by the amendment before us. There is no necessity for withholding it, and it is at least as likely to be exercised with safety by the people as in any other way: I therefore hope the amendment will be adopted.