The Enquirer

MESSAGE
From the President of the United States,
transmitting a letter from the Secretary
of War, accompanied with sundry docu-
ments; in obedience to a resolution of the
31st of December last, requesting such in-
formation as may tend to explain the cau-
ses of the failure of the arms of the United
States, on the Northern Frontier.
(Continued
Letters from the Secretary at War, to Major-Gen-
eral Lewis, commanding at Sackett's Harbor.
Extracts of a letter from the Secretary of War to
Major General Lewis, dated
War Department,
July 9, 1813.
"An order was expedited to General Dear-
born yesterday, permitting him to retire from the
command of the army and district. Another was
sent to Boyd forbidding him to engage in any affair
with the enemy that could be avoided, and subjee-
ting him to the orders of major-general Hampton &
of yourself. This last (for Hampton is now the
oldest officer in the district) was intended to meet
the contingency suggested in my last letter, viz.
that if we regained the command of the lake, and
Yeo retired under the guns of Kingston; that this
moment of superiority must not be lost, and that
bringing down Boyd's division, a blow might be struck
at that place. To favor this enterprise, orders will
be sent to general Hampton to push his head-quar-
ters to the position held by our army the last cam-
paign on Lake Champlain: and a requisition for
ten thousand militia from the states of New-York &
Vermont, in reinforcement of this part of the plan,
will be superadded.
" The moment Chauncey goes out, our stores a-
long the south shore of the lake should be brought
down to the harbor, and in that case, your small
posts [consisting of regular troops] drawn into your
main body."
War Department,
SIR,
July 3, 1813.
It is not merely possible, but probable, that the
British fleet in lake Ontario may upon the fitting out
the General Pike, refuse a battle and take shelter
under the guns of Kingston until their new brig
shall restore to them the superiority. A question
of much importance arises on this supposed state
of things. What will be the best possible employ-
ment of our force during the period, we may be a-
ble to command the lake? Shall we reinforce the
troops at fort George from Sacket's Harbor and
cut off Vincent, or shall we bring from fort George
the mass of the division there, and uniting them to
your present command, attack the enemy at King-
ston! If the latter part of the alternative be adoj-
ted, two things must be done. A heavy body o
militia should be assembled at Ogdensburg to draw
to that point the enemy's attention, and general
Hampton should move rapidly and in force against
Montreal. Our assembled force at Sackett's Har-
bor would amount to seven thousand men, indepen-
dently of the naval means. The enemy's land force
at Kingston is about four thousand. Could a success-
ful attack be made here, the fate of the campaign is
decided-perhaps that of the war. The object is
great; but in proportion as it is so, the means of ef-
fecting it ought to be well considered. From the
sketches I have been able to procure of Kingston &
its vicinity, I have no doubt but that the attack should
be made on the works which cover the battery on
Mary Point. These gained, town, battery and har-
bor are all at your discretion. Beware of dividing
your attack. Confine it to a single point, but let
that point be a commanding one.
Believe me, general,
Very respectfully and faithfully yours,
JOHN ARMSTRONG.
Major General Lewis,
Sackett's Harbor.
Correspondence between the Secretary of War and
Major General Harrison.
Extract of a letter from. the Secretary of War to
Major General William H. Harrison, dated
War Department,
March 5, 1813.
"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt
of your despatches of the 11th and 20th ultimo.
"The suspension of your movement in advance,
appears to have been necessary; but though this
may be the case. your demonstrations against Mal-
den should not cease. These you will make in
such way as shall be best calculated to keep the e.
nemy's alarms for the safety of that post, and of the
ships of war wintering there. You will be more
able to appreciate the value of this policy when I
state, that we shall very soon be in motion on the
Niagara & St. Laurence.
" You did well in stopping the march of the two
regiments from Ohio. To have added to your force
so long as your object is restricted to the mainten-
ace of your present position, would have been a
very useless expenditure of both public spirit and
public money.
" As your campaign is now at an end, and yet
nearly approaching to that which is coming, it may
be proper to communicate to you the President's
views in relation to your subsequent movements.
It would appear that Malden can only be suc-
cessfully approached by the route you are now upon,
at two seasons of the year--mid-winter and mid-
summer. The former is gone, and to wait for the
latter, would be hardly less disastrous than defeat
itself. What remains for us to do is to keep our pre-
sent ground till the lake opens, and then to approach
our object by water, and under convoy of the vessels
of war building at Presque Isle. These will be afloat
and ready to operate by the middle of May. By
the same time boats for the transportation of troops
a train of artillery, baggage, &c. may be constructed.
Cleveland is believed to be the place best fitted
for this purpose. It will also be made the de-
po' for the troops to be employed on the expediti-
on, which will be the 4th regiment now at Massac
and three of the twenty new regiments provided
by an act of the session of congress which closed
yesterday. Two of these will be raised in the state
of Ohio, and the third in that of Kentucky.
" Whatever these troops may fall short of the
number and strength contemplated by the laws un-
der which they shall be raised, must necessarily be
made up from militia and volunteers ; whence will
arise the necessity of strictly attending to the pro-
gress of enlistments, so that in the event of their
failure, w: h may be readily foreseen, time may
be left for resorting to the other expedient."
War Department,
March 7, 1813.
SIR,
Your letter of the 18th of February was, from
some cause, delayed much beyond the usual course
of the mail, and even some days after the receipt of
your despatch of the 20th
You will find by my letter of the 5th inst. the plan
prescribed for your part of the ensuing campaign;
and to prevent any ill effect arising from its miscar-
rying a second copy is herewith enclosed. It is pro-
bable that colonels McArthur and Cass will both be
promoted to the rank of brigadier, and will be as-
signed to the command of the two brigades intended
to form your division of the army. In the enumera-
tion of corps making parts of this division, I did
not mention the two regiments of the line, the 17th
and 19th, parts of which are already with you. The
filling up of these would be an important service, &
you are requested to promote it. If you are at ease
with regard to the safety. of your present post, a-
gainst the attacks of the enemy, and have secured
toyourself the means of subsisting it, there can be
no motive for either reinforcing it by new drafts
from the militia, or retiring from it. If. on the o h-
er hand, your force should be so reduced as to
make your stay perilous without a further reinforce.
ment, you may employ the two regiments raised in
Ohio, or so many of them as may be necessary to
your object. If against the power of adding to your
force be forbidden, by the difficulty of subsisting it
and there is a continuation of both defects, viz-
a want of force to maintain your present position.
and a want of means to subsist a larger one, in that
case, and in that alone, you will retire to the fron-
ther settlements, and interpose the wilderness be-
Iween you and the enemy.
These directions have not grown out of any en-
gestions to be found in your letters, but have been
produced by a circumspection which it is always
proper to extend beyond the mere limits of existing
circumstances.
I am, sir, with great respect,
Your obedient servant,
JOHN
ARMSTRONG.
Major General Wm. H. Harrison,
Franklin ton. Ohio
War Department,
March 9, 1813.
SIR,
The government have the intention of building
a number of boats on lake Erie, for the purpose of
transporting troops on that lake. Cleveland is the
point farthest west. where any portion of these can
be made with sufficient expedition. If the whole
could be made there the better. These boats will
be of the kind known by the name of Schenectady
boats, narrow, and sharp a-head, and flat-bottomed.
They will carry from forty to fifty men each, with
their baggage, arms and accoutrements, and provi-
sion for the voyage. It is proposed to commit the
superintendence of this service to you, and to bes-
tow upon you, pro hae vice the said appointment
of deputy quarter master general. If workmen
cannot be found at Cleveland and other places on
the lake, you will take them from Pittsburgh. Such
materials as you may want, other than those pro-
duced by the country itself, you will provide at
Pittsburg and have sent on without delay. Funds,
for this purpose, will be put under your control, &
you will be careful to make reports weekly of your
progress.
Very respectfully, I am, sir,
Your obedient servant,
JOHN ARMSTRONG.
Captain Jessup, Washington.
Extract of a letter from Major General Wm. H
Harrison to the Secretary of War, dated
H. Q. Chillicothe,
March 17th, 1813.
"The known candor of your character is a
sufficient security for my receiving your p rion for
the liberty I take in making objections to the plan
of operations communicated in your letter of the 5th
instant. If there is a positive certainty of our get-
ning the command of lake Erie, and having a regu-
lar force of three thousand five hundred, or even
three thousand well disciplined men, the proposed
plan of setting out from Cleveland, and landing on
the northern shore, below Malden would perhaps
be the one by which that place and its dependencies.
could be most easily reduced. I am unac-
quainted with the extent of the preparations that
are making to obtain the naval superiority on lake
Erie but, should they fail and the troops as-
sembled at Cleveland, it would be difficult to get a-
gain upon the proper track for making the attack
round the head of the lake. The attempt to cross
the lake from Cleveland should not be made with a
ny other than well disciplined troops A compara-
tively smaller number of men of this description
could effect the object, & for those the means of con
veyance might be obtained; but the means of trans-
porting such an army as would be required of Mi-
ltia, or undiscipined regulars, could not be procured.
I can see no reason why Cleveland should be pre-
ferred as the point of embarkation for the troops,
or the deposit of the provisions and stores. These
are already accumulated at the rapids of the Miami.
or in situations to be easily sent thither to an amount
nearly equal to the consumption of a protracted
campaign. Although the expense and difficulty of
transporting the provisions, artillery and stores for
an army, round the head of the lake, would be ve-
ry considerable, the lake being possessed by our
ships, and the heavy baggage taken in loads along
its margin, the troops would find no difficulty in the
land route. The force contemplated in your letter
, in my opinion, not sufficient to secure success.-
Admitting that the whole should be raised by the
time pointed out, they would be very little superior
to militia; the officers having, with scarcely an ex-
ception, to learn their duty before they could in-
struct their men; we have, therefore, no alterna-
tive but to make up by numbers the deficiency in
discipline.
"I am well aware of the intolerable expense
which attends the employment of a large militia
force. We are now, however. in a situation to avoid
those errors, which was that of the last campaign
so peculiarly heavy. Our supplies are procured, and
so deposited that the period of the march of the ar-
my from the advanced posts can be ascertained to
an hour, and of course the troops need not be called
out until the moment they are to act. Experience
has convinced me that militia are more efficient in
the early than in the latter part of their service.--
Upon the whole, it is my decided opinion that the
rapids of Miami should be the point of rendezvous
for the troops, as well as the principal depot. Indeed
it must necessarily be the first deposit-the provi-
sions for the army be so placed that they can be ta-
ken to the lake in no other way. The artillery and
a considerable supply of ammunition are already
there. Boats and pirogues have been built in con-
siderable numbers on the Auglaize and St. Mary's
rivers; and every exertion is now making to in-
crease them. intended for the double purpose of ta-
king down the provisions to the rapids, and for coast-
ing the lake with the baggage of the army in its ad.
vance. I had calculated upon being able partially to
use this mode of transportation, even if the enemy
should continue their naval superiority on the lake
--but, with this advantage on our side, the whole
baggage of the army could be safely and expeditiously
carried along the coast in the boats and pirogues,
which could be taken into the strait to transport the
army to the Canada shore.
"As I have before observed, the army, unincum-
bred with heavy baggage, would find no difficulty
in marching round the lake at any season, but what
the enemy would create, and we have the means of
subsisting a force that would be irresistible.
" The objections to proceeding this way, stated
in my letter to colonel Monroe, arose from the
time that would be necessary to construct boats
after we should have arrived at the strait; but this
objection is entirely obviated by our obtaining the
command of the lake, as the boats and pirogues
built upon the Miami will answer the purpose-
With regard to the quantum of force, my opinion is,
that not only the regular troops, designated in your
letter, but a large auxiliary corps of militia should
be employed The only objection arises from the
expensiveness of troops of that description. This,
however, should not be an object, considering the ve-
ry short time that it would be necessary to employ
them. Let the moment for the commencement of
the march from the rapids be fixed, and the militia
might be taken to that point, proceed and accom-
plish the object, and return home in two months.
" Among the reasons which makes it necessary
to employ a large force, I am sorry to mention the
dismay and disinclination to the service which ap-
pears to prevail in the western country--numbers
must give that confidence which ought to be produced
by conscious valor and intrepidity. which never
existed in any army in a superior degree than a-
mongst the greater part of the militia which were
with me through the winter. The new drafts from
this state are entirely of another character. and are
not to be depended upon. I have no doubt, how-
ever, but a sufficient number of good men can be
procured, and should they be allowed to serve on
horseback, Kentucky would furnish some regiments
that would be not inferior to those that fought at the
river Raisin, and they were, in my opinion, superior
to any militia that ever took the field in modern
times. Eight troops of cavalry have been formed in
Kentucky. to offer me their service : and several
of them were intended for twelve months volun-
teers. Governor Shelby has some thoughts of ta-
king the field in person-a number of good men will
follow him. He thinks that an address from me to
the people of the state would produce a good effect:
I have strong objections to those addresses, but will
nevertheless have recourse to one. should other
means fail of bringing forward a sufficient force.
"Every exertion shall in the meantime be used to
forward the recruiting service: for a few weeks I
think that my service would be more useful in that
than any other employment
To be continued.]