The National Intelligencer And Washington Advertiser

LONDON October 26.

OF THE ENGLISH FLEET.

The mind receives, with a degree of incredulity, accounts it wishes to believe untrue. We heard that an unsuccessful attempt had been made by our troops on Cadiz; but conceived that, benefitting by the experience we had so dearly purchased, we should avoid further disasters:--that the yet fresh recollection of Holland and of Ferrol, would have removed every possible cause of miscarriage, and that increased discredit would not, by elating the enemy, augment the danger our gallant soldiers must have to contend with when they come to action.--We would not credit the account, till we yesterday received letters from the fleet and army, dated the 21st of September, and 2d and 7th inst. from which the following painfully important particulars are extracted.

On the 13th of September, Lord Keith, accompanied by Sir Ralph Abercromby, and 10,000 of as brave fellows as the world can boast, arrived from Minorca at Gibraltar.--The return of this army was unexpected, and the contiguous coast of Spain defenseless: but the alarm created by the intelligence was accompanied by preparations, and troops began to collect from various quarters to Cadiz, and to the lines and fortresses at St. Roche. On the 18th, the Spaniards moored in the Pontal six sail of the line and a frigate, with springs on their cables, in such a manner as to form a powerful protection to the carracks and the dock-yard; and dismantling these ships, sent half their crews into gun-vessels, and to assist at the batteries. On the same evening Sir R. Bickerton, who with about six sail of the line had effectually blockaded Cadiz, fell in with Sir T. M. Pulteney and 15,000 men, not inferior to the others, and informing him of the progress of preparation at Cadiz, urged his stay, whilst he, the Admiral, dispatched a frigate to Gibraltar to apprise Lord Keith and Sir Ralph Abercrombie: but the General's orders were peremptory, and he proceeded to Gibraltar, where he arrived on the 19th of September.

The Rock being unable to supply the necessary quantity of waters to this increased number of persons, 70 of the troops ships were sent to the Bay of Tetuan, 14 leagues distant, about half way to which, passing Ceuta, a Spanish port which had resisted several sieges, the garrison was so weak that it is stated they only waited a summons to surrender. At Tetuan a body of troops were landed to prevent all communication with the Moors during the watering; but a gale from the west having driven most of our fleet far into the Mediterranean, it was the 6th of the present month before we were in a state to make the purposed attack on Cadiz.

The arrangements being made to land between Rota and St. Lucars, and after carrying those posts, to take the fort of St. Catherine's, by which the Fleet would be enabled to get to the N. W. side of the bay and co-operate with the army, and 800 soldiers got into the boats for that purpose; but when the general saw that the boats were not competent to take a greater number at one time, conceiving that they were not equal to the object to be accomplished, the undertaking was relinquished, and the fleet and Army ordered to proceed to Tetuan, from whence our Letters express a belief that they are to go to Leghorn.

Assured by authorities, in which we place much confidence, that Cadiz could have been carried the beginning of last month, by 3,000 men, and apprised of the infinite importance of such an acquisition, we cannot enough lament the delay and universal notification of attack to which we have to attribute our failure and disgrace.

The impossibility of driving succour it Gibraltar and the difficulty of getting from thence, which on account of a strong western current, can only be effected with a breeze at East, renders that place peculiarly ineligible as a rendezvous for an enterprize to the westward. It is alike painful and extraordinary, that the planners of this expedition, knowing, that it was to comprise 25,000 men, & the importance of debarking at once as many as possible, did not provide the means to land more than 3,000: and that the Officers who directed it did not know, till the men were actually in the boats, that these boats could not contain a sufficient number of troops to afford a probability of success.