Richmond Enquirer

[From the Washington Globe of December 15.]

BANK EXPOSE.

In the National Gazette of the 10th inst. is the Bank version of the transaction relative to the 3 per cents. evidently prepared by President Biddle himself. It is made up of the merest subterfuges under which official delinquency ever sought to conceal itself.

The first position is an attempt to show that the Secretary of the Treasury sanctioned, beforehand, the arrangements made by the Bank in England.

We learn, that when Mr. Biddle was in this city, prior to the passage of the Bank Bill at the last session of Congress, some conversation took place between him and the Secretary of the Treasury, relative to the payments of the public debt to be made on the 1st October and 1st January succeeding. It was then understood, that the Bank, as agent of British holders, controlled two or three millions of the three per cent. stocks. Not knowing to what extent Congress might carry their appropriations, and being desirous to extinguish the debt, the Secretary inquired whether, if the public funds should run short, the Bank would retain the certificates it controlled to the amount of the deficiency, until the deposites of the Government should be sufficient to meet them? Mr. Biddle replied in the affirmative. He went home and Congress adjourned.

Now mark facts and dates!

No understanding existed between Mr. Biddle and the Secretary in relation to the amount of public debt which was to be paid. Biddle only knew that the Secretary intended to pay to the extent of the Government deposites, and that if he should happen to exceed it a small sum, he wished the Bank to hold back a few certificates which it controlled, a week or so, until funds came to hand.

In this state of things, what does Mr. Biddle? He goes home, and makes immediate arrangement for sending an agent to London to negotiate a postponement of at least five millions for one year! Did he know what the Secretary would determine to pay? No. Did the Secretary ever imagine, or say, there would be a deficiency of five millions?--Did the Secretary tell him the Government would not have funds to meet the deficiency for one year? No. The arrangements were all made, and the agent sailed for England on the 15th July. On the 19th July, in Washington, the Secretary of the Treasury writes the letter which the Bank has published. It was probably received at the Bank on the 21st, three days after their agent was on his way to England. Hear what Mr. McLane says.

'TREASURY DEPARTMENT, July 19, 1832.

Sir: It was not until to-day that I have been able to ascertain the amount of the appropriations made at the last session of Congress, and, therefore, I have not been able to decide before now upon the amount of the three per cents. to be redeemed on the first of October. I find, as was supposed when you were here, that we shall be able to pay off about two thirds at that time. A notice will accordingly be given in to-morrow's paper for the payment of that amount on the first of October, and the remaining third on the first of January.--

This has been adopted with the understanding had between us, that if it should happen that the public moneys are insufficient to complete those payments, the Bank will delay the presentation of any certificates of which it may have the control, until the funds are sufficient to meet them—the interest to be paid by the United States during the interval.

You will be pleased to indicate such transfers of funds as may be desirable preparatory to the proposed payments.

I am sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

LOUIS McLANE.'

It hence appears, that it was not until that day, the 19th day of July, that the Secretary could "ascertain the amount of appropriations made at the last session of Congress," and, therefore, had "not been able to decide before upon the amount of the three per cents. to be redeemed on the first of October." As the Secretary had not, until that day, been able to decide on the amount to be paid, it is palpable enough that the Bank could not anticipate a deficiency, and that Gen. Cadwallader's mission, which had already been undertaken, could not have been superinduced by any such prospect.—But see in Mr. Biddle's reply, how adroitly, even then, he seized hold of the suggestion of the Secretary to contrive a subterfuge under which, if it became necessary, he might ultimately conceal the true object of the extraordinary mission.

'BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, July 25, 1832.

Sir: I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 19th instant, apprising me of your intention to reimburse two thirds of the 3 per cents on the 1st of October, and the remaining third on the 1st of January next. You further state this course has been adopted with the understanding had between us, that if it should happen that the public moneys are insufficient to complete those payments, the Bank will delay the presentation of any certificates of which it may have the control until the funds are sufficient to meet them—the interest to be paid by the United States during the interval.

The Bank has taken the necessary steps to obtain the control of a considerable portion of these certificates, and will very cheerfully employ it in such a manner as may best suit the convenience of the Government.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, yours,

N. BIDDLE, President.

Hon. Louis McLane, Secretary of the Treasury, Washington, D. C.'

The Secretary alluded to certificates which the Bank then controlled, as agent for British stockholders; but Biddle, in order to cover his foreign mission by Government authority, artfully says, "the Bank has taken the necessary steps to obtain the control of a considerable amount of these certificates;" as if the object was to accommodate the Government?

When the reader adverts to the fact, that, when the Mission was got up, and when the Agent started for Europe, the Bank did not even know what amount the Government desired to pay, when he recollects, that in no event was a deficiency apprehended beyond a few hundred thousand dollars, which would be replaced in a week or two, whereas the object of the Bank Agent was to postpone five millions for a whole year; and that while the Government proposed only to pay the interest, which was three per cent., the Bank agreed to pay 1 1/2 and 1/2 commission for the postponement; he will pronounce this attempt to throw responsibility upon the Secretary, and protect the Bank by securing official authority, one of the weakest inventions, and most shameless subterfuges ever invented to avert merited reprobation.

I here give another view of this subject which makes Mr. Biddle appear absolutely ridiculous in his efforts at deception. The Bank was then agent for the Barings and others to the amount of two or three millions, and as such controlled the certificates. The Secretary requests Mr. Biddle, in case of deficiency, to "delay the presentation of any certificates of which it may have the control, &c." Biddle says in reply "The Bank has taken the necessary steps to obtain the control of a considerable portion of these certificates," &c. Was this true? No; it was the reverse of truth. So far from taking steps to obtain the control of more certificates, it was pouring out of its control those which it had controlled before. Look at the arrangement with the Barings: They were to buy in the stock for the Bank, and retain certificates for one year. Look at the arrangement with the stock holders, including the Barings. They were to wait a year, receiving interest from the Bank and retaining the certificates -

Instead, therefore, of obtaining the control of more certificates, the steps taken by the Bank were to put the certificates, already held by them as agents, entirely beyond their control! And Mr. Biddle now has the assurance to say, that he was taking steps to comply with the Secretary's wishes, when he was doing precisely the reverse! It must be recollected, that the secretary desired the certificates to be retained, not by the stockholders but by the Bank, and not by the Bank "unless the public moneys are insufficient to meet those payments," only "until the (Government) funds are sufficient to meet them."

Was there any deficiency on the 1st October? Let us see. The amount of debt to be paid was $8,404,000. The Government money in Bank on that day, were $13,648,000. The Bank had enough to make the payment, and have five millions of dollars left. What pretence is there, on the ground Mr. Biddle now places his defence, for withholding the certificates or vouchers payable on that day? If he had "taken the necessary steps to control" them, where are they?—Why are they not delivered up? The Secretary never assented to the withholding of them so long as there should be public money in the Bank. It was only in case of deficiency, and only to the amount of that deficiency, that he anticipated they would be withheld. Mr. Biddle has not, therefore, on the ground assumed by himself, even a subterfuge for not applying the $8,405,000 put at his disposition for paying the first October instalment.

Nor will he have any better pretence for withholding payment in January. By presuming to correct the Treasury estimate, he does indeed attempt to show that there will then be a trifling deficiency. The Secretary estimated, that in case the Bank paid both instalments complete, there would be left in the Treasury, on the first January next, $1,644,000, of which, $1,400,000 would be in unavailable funds, leaving an available balance of only $244,000. In the Secretary's estimate was included the Danish indemnities, amounting to $691,000, which Biddle maintains, are also unavailable, and therefore ought not to have been included. By deducting that sum, he shows a probable balance against the Treasury, of about $450,000.

Now, these $694,000 will stand to the credit of the Treasurer, on Government account, on the first January, as much as any other money in the Bank, and will be, in the same manner, subject to his draft. When or for what purpose the Government chooses to draw it out, is no business of the Bank. So long as the Treasurer has money on deposite, it is bound to pay his drafts, without undertaking to question him as to their object. If a Treasurer's draft appear, the object of which is to pay the public debt, the Bank must pay it if there be money enough to his credit from whatever source it may have been derived. The holders of Danish claims are the creditors of the government, not of the Bank; and if the government use the funds provided for them, until they are wanted, what has the Bank to do with it? The Bank does not hesitate to use the Government's money. In this very article, we are told that the government deposites are "lent out to be used by the citizens until they are wanted." It is not pretended, that the Danish claimants will call for their money before the first of January or before a sufficient sum will accumulate thereafter to meet them. If they should, and the receipts should be no greater, and the expenditures as great as estimated, then there would be a small deficiency.

By Mr. Biddle's own showing, therefore, these claims not being called for, there will be to the credit of the government on the first of January, if the Bank should first pay every dollar advertised, about $214,000, which will increase thereafter at the rate of near half a million per week. Besides the whole amount will not be called for on the first of January, but from day to day, through the month, or a longer time, as all experience proves. As there will be no deficiency, there will be no pretence for the Bank withholding the certificates.—The contingency the Secretary thought possible will never happen, and the Bank will have no apology for not presenting those which it "had taken the necessary steps to obtain the control of." But will they come? No; the Bank does not control them. The very "steps" alluded to put them out of the Bank's control for a whole year, and Mr. Biddle is now attempting in vain to retrace his "steps." Detected and exposed in stepping aside from the path of duty and propriety, he now steps before the public and vainly attempts to implicate the Secretary in his delinquency." But this effort, proved at every point to be disingenuous and false, he only aggravates his own offence, and will call down severer reprobation on his head.

We believe the truth to be, that Mr. Biddle did not intend the Secretary should know the arrangement made by his agent in England. That arrangement was made about the 22d August, and the Bank must have been informed of it about the twentieth of September. On the 15th October, after being three weeks in possession of the arrangement made, Mr. Biddle disavows so much of it as violates the charter, and attempts to modify the rest so as to get the control of the certificates. Why was not this done sooner, and why was it done then? The secret had just then leaked out. A circular of the Barings had reached this country, and men began to ask, how is this? The Bank saw that it must undergo a treasury scrutiny; that its secret practices, its violation of charter and faithless interposition between the Government and its creditors; its arrogant assumption of a power to thwart the public authorities, and retain the public funds for its own use; must all come to the knowledge of the Secretary of the Treasury, and be laid before the country.

Mr. Biddle was not blind to the consequences. He, therefore, took "the necessary steps" to undo what had been done by his agent, and obtain the control of the certificates! If the Circular of the Barings had not come out, the Secretary and the country might have rested in ignorance of the secret practices of the Bank, surprised that the public creditors did not come forward for payment, but unable to comprehend the cause.

The affectation of regard for the interest of the country, its distresses in consequence of the Cholera, and the great pressure upon it, is all miserable pretences to cover the real motive which led to the British Mission and the Baring Treaty. The Cholera raged more violently in the United States when and after the Bank retraced its steps than it did before; and as for pecuniary pressure, there was none in July. These are all petty fictions to mislead.

As to the solvency of the Bank, suppose it be called on for $12,000,000 of specie, and it have $2,000,000 due to it, $8,000,000 in houses, and $2,000,000 in notes of other Banks, how is it to pay the demand, even if it have $5,000,000 in specie? Debts cannot be collected, or houses sold, or notes cashed in a minute or a day. No man supposes, that the Bank is in such a condition that it cannot collect enough to pay the public deposites in time. But that it could not collect enough by the first October, is proved by its acts; and that it cannot collect enough by the first January, is more than possible. He who cannot pay is a bankrupt, whatever may be the amounts due to him.

In relation to the charge, that the Secretary of the Treasury knew the contents of his Agent's Report before he sent his annual Report to Congress, we are informed that it is totally unfounded. Had it been otherwise it would not have changed his opinion, because that Report carries evidence on its face, that the examination was too cursory and superficial to be of the slightest value.