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Foreign News September 27, 1847

The Arkansas Banner

Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas

What is this article about?

Mexican President Santa Anna issues a manifesto on August 23, 1847, detailing the defeats at the Battles of Contreras and Churubusco on August 19-20, blaming General Valencia's insubordination, describing the retreats, and announcing agreement to an armistice proposed by U.S. General Scott to negotiate peace.

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From the N. O. Delta of the 11th inst.

SANTA ANNA'S MANIFESTO.

Of the Battles of August 19th and 20th.

The following account of the battles of Contreras and Churubusco, although erroneous in many particulars, shows in a stronger light than even the accounts of our own correspondent, the splendid and decided nature of the late victories of General Scott. From the tenor of this, the tamest and most subdued document which has been written during this war, by the self-complacent and boastful Mexican, it will be seen that Santa Anna still keeps up his old habit of shuffling the responsibility off from his own upon the shoulders of an inferior officer.

Gen. Valencia is the scape-goat of the battle of Churubusco, as Marion was of the battle of Buena Vista.

MANIFESTO

Of the President ad interim of the Republic and General-in-Chief of the Army, to the Nation.

In such solemn and critical moments as these it is the duty of him who presides over the destinies of the Nation to give publicity to passing events: and it is with the greater pleasure that I perform this duty, inasmuch as frankness has ever been the character of my administration. The unfortunate events of the 19th and 20th are only too well known; and it only remains for me to present a review of them in order that they may not be distorted, either by the spirit of detraction and malice, or by that error which arises from an insufficient analysis of affairs of the gravest and most serious nature.

The Nation is aware of the great, the extraordinary efforts which I have made within the last three months for the defence of the Capital that was about to fall defenceless into the hands of the enemy. I have formed, armed and equipped an army of more than 20,000 men; I have collected an immense amount of material for this army; have fortified various points in order to keep at a distance from Mexico the ravages of war, have created resources in the midst of the insulation to which the Government was reduced, and no labor, no fatigue have I spared in order that my country might present itself with dignity and firmness in the struggle to which it had been so unjustly provoked.

In war, a mere accident, apparently the most insignificant trifle, may frustrate the best formed combinations. A glance at the defences which I established around the city is enough to discover the plan which I had proposed to myself. The forces which I had advanced by one flank were supported on the other, were suitably arranged in echelons, and had a convenient and well known ground left open for retreat. A certain Gen. (Valencia) who was in command of a strong division, consisting of 5000 men and 24 pieces of artillery, whose headquarters were in the village of San Angel. I ordered on the 19th, at 11 o'clock in the morning, to fall back to the village of Coyoacan, intending by this to concentrate the forces in order to meet the movements already exhibited by the enemy, and to develope promptly my plan of operations.

But this General, forgetting that there cannot be two commanders-in-chief in the field of battle-forgetting that the execution of a plan will not admit of observations that render it nugatory; permitted himself to object to the orders which he had received; and as all obedience and discipline so essential in military matters had thus been banished from between us, it became necessary, for the evading of greater evils which may be readily foreseen, to tolerate what to consent to would appear an absurdity, and thus, in spite of myself, I was forced to let him go on, charging him with all the responsibility of the result. As might have been expected, this result was fatal. He moved forward motu proprio for more than a league to choose a position whence he could go out to meet the enemy, without informing me in the least, either of the movement or of his designs. His refusal to comply with my directions was the first notice that I had of his temerity; and immediately the explosion of cannon pointed out his position, and at the same time gave me to understand that he had engaged with the enemy. Although oppressed with the presentiment of what was about to take place, I immediately put myself at the head of a brilliant brigade of 4000 men and 5 pieces of artillery. I arrived at the moment when a considerable force of the enemy had gained the rear of the unfortunate General's position; and scarcely could I check their operations because it was already near night.

But I noted with the most profound grief that position was an isolated one, that there was a large baranca between us, that the enemy occupied an intermediate wood, that the force of my immediate command could not advance by the only route left open without compromising themselves in the same manner as the other had done, and in short it was only by a battery which arrived late upon the field that any thing could be accomplished. The fire having ceased, our brigade took up its quarters in the adjoining village of San Angel, for the rain fell in such torrents that to have kept troops out in the field would have been as much as to insure their defeat.

Before this, however, I directed my aid-de-camp. Col. Ramirez, to go round the head of the terrible baranca that lay in our front, and by way of the skirt of a distant hill, guided by the deputy, D. Jose Maria del Rio, who was well acquainted with the ground, to hasten at the top of his speed to the camp of the said General and give the most positive orders to spike his artillery, which it was no longer possible to save, and to fall back that very night upon San Angel with his infantry and cavalry, by the only road that was left to him. This my aid-de-camp did, communicating my orders between 10 and 11 o'clock at night; but instead of yielding implicit obedience, the said General would hardly allow my Aid to speak, interrupting him with his wants, which were, 5000 men and munitions: and finally he sent him away with two official reports, signed and sealed, in one of which he states, that on the previous evening he had beaten the enemy--putting him to a shameful flight, and that, in consequence, he had granted promotion to generals, chiefs and officers.

On the following morning I again appeared in the same field, reinforced by a brigade which I had ordered from the Capitol, with the design of forcing the Pass on every hazard; but when I was commencing my operations the enemy made their attack. It lasted ten minutes; and I witnessed, in the midst of despair, the defeat of those soldiers deserving of a better fate, who were unfortunately commanded by a General that had cut himself off from assistance.

The consequence of this defeat were to me terrible; the enemy, by a rapid movement, could now arrive at the Capital before it could be possibly succored: he could by a flank movement, cut off my detachments; he could, from the result of his victory, bring the whole mass of his forces to bear upon a part of mine; and, in fine, from the insubordination and want of skill of a single general, he turned to his own account all the advantages of my position.

The strong advance work of San Antonio could not be defended because our line had been cut; and I directed that the garrison should withdraw while I was covering the fort and tete de pont, of Churubusco. The enemy advanced, and, cutting off a part of the troops that were in retreat, presented himself in front of our most advanced intrenchments. Here I again put myself at the head of our soldiers. and my efforts cost the enemy the loss of no little blood. Our losses, although lamentable were the natural consequence of a sudden retreat, occasioned by surprise, and embarrassed by the trains which were passing along the narrow causeway, flanked throughout its whole extent. The defence was from line to line, until arriving at the third line where I, in person, checked the enemy and thus saved the Capital, which had been so unexpectedly exposed to danger.--While I was occupying myself on the 22d, with the re-organization of the forces and the manning of the batteries, again personally at the head of a column which could defend the Capital to the last extreme. I received a communication from the general-in-chief of the enemy, proposing to me an armistice that might give time to take into consideration the propositions which the commissioners on the part of the Government of the United States of America may make with the view of terminating the contest between the two nations. I consented; and after consulting with my cabinet, I have resolved that the said propositions shall be taken into consideration.

The suspension of hostilities must always be regarded as a good, because war is always an evil, and especially so when great combinations have been frustrated. To free the Capital from its horrors, or at least to delay them, was an exigency which it was not lawful for me to evade, and still more so when it presented itself as a means for the arriving at an honorable peace.

When two nations are at war they enjoy the reciprocal right of making propositions, and this supposes the obligation to entertain these propositions. A perpetual war is an absurdity, for it is a calamity; and the instinct of self-preservation, still stronger and more powerful in nations than in individuals, counsels that no means should be left untried that may conduce to an advantageous agreement.

For the adoption of this course, the Constitution has given me the competent authority.

Consecrated to those noble and privileged interests, it is incumbent upon me to maintain at every peril the prestige and respect of the supreme authority which I exercise, and at this time especially. when, if persecuted by factions and assailed in the freedom of deliberating, it might fall into a nullity in the presence of the enemies of the nation. I will be still more explicit; subversion and sedition shall be exemplarily punished.

I preserve a respectable body of troops, and the nation will aid me in the maintenance of its decorum and the vindication of its glory. I consider myself as free as if I had just gained a signal victory; and there is no fear that the negotiations of the enemy may impose upon me unless surprised by their troops and artillery. We shall compose our difference if our honor has been first saved; and we will even fight again if the sword should be interposed between our justice, and the acknowledgement of the rights of the nation.

[SIGNED]

ANTONIO LOPEZ DE SANTA ANNA.

Mexico, August 23, 1847.

What sub-type of article is it?

War Report Military Campaign Diplomatic

What keywords are associated?

Mexican American War Battles Contreras Churubusco Santa Anna Manifesto General Valencia Insubordination Armistice Proposal

What entities or persons were involved?

Antonio Lopez De Santa Anna Gen. Valencia Col. Ramirez D. Jose Maria Del Rio General Scott

Where did it happen?

Mexico

Foreign News Details

Primary Location

Mexico

Event Date

August 19 20, 1847

Key Persons

Antonio Lopez De Santa Anna Gen. Valencia Col. Ramirez D. Jose Maria Del Rio General Scott

Outcome

mexican defeats at contreras and churubusco; retreat from positions; significant losses due to surprise and retreat; armistice agreed on august 22 to consider peace propositions.

Event Details

Santa Anna's manifesto blames General Valencia's disobedience for the defeats on August 19-20, describing failed orders to retreat, engagements with U.S. forces, isolation of Mexican troops, heavy rains, and subsequent retreat; on August 22, he agrees to armistice proposed by U.S. to negotiate end of war.

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