Daily National Intelligencer

DEBATE ON THE SEMINOLE WAR.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

CONTINUED.

Mr. TYLER, from Virginia, said, that he owed an apology to the committee for rising at so late a period of the debate to address it. He proposed to present a very brief sketch of the views he had taken on this interesting subject. At the onset, I close in, Mr. Chairman, with the position laid down by the gentleman who has just addressed you, (Mr. Nelson) and say, that, however great may have been the services of Gen. Jackson, I cannot consent to weigh those services against the constitution of the land. Other gentlemen will, no doubt, yield me the correctness of this position. Your liberties cannot be preserved by the fame of any man. The triumph of the hero may swell the pride of your country—elevate you in the estimation of foreign nations—give to you a character for chivalry and valor: but recollect, I beseech you, that the surest anchor of our safety is to be found in the constitution of our country. Say that you ornament these walls with the trophies of victory—that the flags of conquered nations wave over your head, what avails these symbols of your glory if your constitution be destroyed?

To this pillar then will I cling. Measures, not men, and I beg gentlemen to recollect it, has ever been our favorite motto. Shall we abandon it now? Why do gentlemen point to the services of the hero in former wars? For his conduct there he has received a nation's plaudits; and won our gratitude. We come to other acts. If our motto be just, we must look alone to the act, not to the actor. It is only then that we shall judge correctly. A republic, sir, should substitute the Roman Manlius, and disapprove the conduct of her dearest son, if that son has erred.

From what quarter do you expect your liberties to be successfully invaded? Not from the man whom you despise: against him you are always prepared to act—his example will not be dangerous. But, sir, you have more to fear from a nation's favorite; from him whose path has been a path of glory; who has won your gratitude and confidence—against his errors you have to guard, lest they should grow into precedents and become in the end the law of the land. It is the precedent growing out of the proceedings in this case that I wish to guard against. It is this consideration, and this only, which will induce me to disapprove the conduct of General Jackson.

Our sympathies have been appealed to in his behalf. There exists no cause for the appeal. Are we about, by this vote, to wither the laurels which bloom on his brow—to deprive him of character, of standing? No, sir, we arraign not his motives. On all hands it is conceded to his supporters that his motives were correct. Did we insist that he had intentionally violated the constitution and the law, then should we make a charge, which, if supported, would properly degrade him in the estimation of all good men. But we make no such charge—we disapprove only his acts. Is this a vote of censure of the odious character which it has been represented to be? Censure implies bad motives and bad acts. Say, if you please, that I have shot my arrow over the house and wounded my brother. He complains of my act, not my intentions, because he is aware they were innocent; but, although he neither upbraids nor censures me, the wound still festers in his side. Is there not then a wide distinction between a vote of censure in the obvious acceptation of the term, and a vote of disapproval? Is there any thing more common than for an officer ordering a court martial to disapprove the sentence of the court, and direct it to reconsider its opinion—and yet, was ever such disapproval esteemed a censure on the court? An inferior court gives an erroneous opinion; an appeal is taken to a superior tribunal; the opinion of the inferior court is reversed—was such reversal ever construed to imply a censure on the judge? You differ from me in opinion. You disapprove my premises and the deductions therefrom. Sir, was it ever heard of before, that this difference of opinion required us to regard each other as such objects of censure, as to interrupt our harmony or mutual respect and confidence? We do nothing here but combat the opinions and actions of the General, and, if gentlemen will have it so, of the Executive. Shall we be denied the liberty of boldly and manfully expressing this difference of sentiment? Sir, I protest against this slavery of the mind. The body may be enchained and bowed to earth, but that ethereal essence resists your power and scoffs all efforts to enthrall it.

What are the points of difference arising out of this case? Gentlemen justify the capture of St. Marks on the plea of necessity: we contend that no such necessity existed; and, believing so, we disapprove the capture. We agree, in our premises, that the general would only have been authorized to seize a neutral post, in order either to save his army, or to guard the post against the imminent hazard of falling into the hands of his enemy. We call upon gentlemen for the proof of the existence of such necessity, or of such danger. The letter of the governor of Pensacola, informing General Jackson that the garrison of St. Marks was too weak to defend itself against a hostile attack, and that the enemy had made demonstrations of an intention to seize it, will not justify him in having taken possession at the time he did. Before he approached, the danger had retired; no force was before it, nor within a great distance of it; nor had he any enemy in his rear, and his army was easily thrown between the fort and the foe. Sir, every document on your table goes to prove that the Indians were defeated, their forces broken, and that they had sought shelter and protection from the ruin and destruction which pursued them, in their swamps and hiding places. An attack on St. Marks was, therefore, rendered improbable. But admit, for the sake of argument, that this was not the case; nay, Mr. Chairman, to give to our opponents the strongest of all possible cases, let us imagine the Indians in possession of the fort—would your army have been in danger? Can any gentleman believe it? Sir, did you ever hear of an Indian's using cannon in action? Their situation would, indeed, have been ludicrous. I submit it, in the spirit of candor, to gentlemen to say, if the General could more ardently have wished for any event than that the enemy should have concentrated the whole of his forces at St. Marks, with the settled determination of holding the post. He would have been saved the fatigue of marching further; one action would have terminated the sufferings of his army; the defence would have been weak and unavailing, and a new spark of glory would have illumined the crest of the hero. But even this imaginary state of things would have presented a case contemplated in his orders, and, as a military man, he would have been bound to have reported to the President before he could have struck a blow. But we are told triumphantly by honorable gentlemen, that the governor of St. Marks had violated his neutrality; that he aided and assisted the Indians—furnished them with munitions of war—nursed their wounded, and suffered them to hold their councils under his very nose. Be it so: I will admit all this. I give to gentlemen all they can ask. Nay, I will go further, and yield to them that he was destitute of principle, and was a deadly, but secret enemy of the United States: what inference can be drawn from these admissions? Why, sir, that he furnished you with abundant cause of war against Spain. But I demand to know who was authorized, under the constitution, to have declared the war, Congress or the General? To this point we must come at last. Great Britain gave you innumerable causes of war; she searched your vessels—confiscated your property—disregarded your flag—impressed your seamen—& made an attack on one of your frigates in sight of your coast. France also committed aggressions on you, of a serious and afflicting character; yet, was it ever dreamed of that your Commodore had a right to strike a blow before Congress gave him authority. I put you a case parallel to the one I have supposed to exist: You had, during Mr Adams's administration, a quasi war with France. Did not Spain then violate every obligation of neutrality towards you? She suffered French consuls, residing in her sea-ports, to grant commissions to privateers, to prey on your commerce. She transferred to these consuls a portion of her sovereignty, and permitted them to adjudicate prizes. Would you have excused your naval officer if he had entered a Spanish port, captured their shipping, and destroyed their town? And yet is not that case as strong as the present? I implore you then, Mr. Chairman—I supplicate this committee, in the name of liberty—in the name of the constitution, to beware how they countenance a precedent of this sort. This nation, if this precedent receive your sanction, may be involved in war without the question ever having been submitted to the representatives of the people. Do you wish any further illustration of this position? Suppose a war to exist between us and a northern tribe of Indians; your arms are victorious—your enemy flies, for protection, to a fort in Canada: they receive succor and protection at the hands of the officer commanding such fort: your general demands a surrender of the fort; his demand is refused: he carries it by storm, and retains possession—Would the governor of Canada submit in silence? No, sir—he would send an army to attack you: the pride of your officer would not permit him to retreat: we have then hostile armies in the field; the war rages between us and England, without the approbation of the constituted authorities. You, however, must soon become parties in the war; for, if you admit the right to exist with the General to involve you in it, you owe a corresponding duty, and must furnish him the means of waging it to a successful termination. Taxes must be levied to carry it on; your resources must be developed: you will not abandon the standard of your country. And, sir, what prevented these consequences in the instance under consideration? Nothing but the imbecility of Spain. And shall we adopt a different rule of conduct when a weak nation is concerned, from that we would put in practice against a strong, a formidable nation? Manhood forbid it! Patriotism forbid it! Valor avert the deed! Mr. Chairman, the principles of justice—the principles of your constitution, are inflexible, immutable; they yield not to time or circumstance. I appeal to the honor of this committee—to the oath which each member has taken, to support the constitution of this land—to guard and protect, not only that constitution, that honor, but the character of this nation for justice and impartiality.

The remarks which I have made, relative to the seizure of St. Marks, are now strongly applicable to that of Pensacola. It is in vain you tell me that the Governor was destitute of principle—had violated his neutrality—had given shelter to a poor, miserable, broken and defeated foe—a foe, who, like the hunted beast of the forest, had held you but a moment at bay, and was then flying to his secret places, far from the haunts of civilized man, to hide himself from the desolating vengeance which pursued him. Sir, I carry you back to my first position. Congress, and not the general, was alone authorized to make war upon him. Will it be said, that necessity, which justifies all things, authorized its capture? Where is it to be found? Indians retreated to the town—were in possession of it, if gentlemen will ask the admission. We require that the General shall look to his orders. It is the very case they contemplate—he must report to the Executive. But a threat is made—you are braved to your teeth. The gauntlet of defiance is thrown; you are threatened with an attack—let it come on. The storm has no terrors for the brave, nor can the frown of the Spaniard shake the soul of the hero. But there was no danger to be apprehended. The Governor had no force with which to make the attack. My honorable friend from Virginia (Mr. Barbour) in graduating the necessity of this case, states, that if the attack had been made, Jackson would have been justified in seizing Pensacola. True, his right to seize might have existed, but he could have held it only for a moment. The assailant vanquished, the General would have been compelled to have returned to him his armour. Need I call to the recollection of the committee the case of the Tripolitan brig. Before you declared war against Tripoli, one of her armed vessels attacked one of yours—the valour of our seamen triumphed—the brig surrendered. But, the battle ended, she was immediately restored. This proceeding was approved by that friend of liberty and man, Mr. Jefferson, and, in a message to Congress, he represented the war as being altogether on the one side, and demanded that our condition should be changed. This was the course of proceeding in older times. Would that the principles of those times could exist forever! But, sir, what was General Jackson's course of proceeding? He did not wait for, but made the attack. He seizes the post, enters into terms of capitulation with the garrison, and sends it off to a Spanish island; appoints officers of police—introduces our own laws, and makes what he calls a valuable addition to our territory. Sir, I appeal to my honorable colleague (Mr. H. Nelson) who has advised us to read the documents, and who professes a most intimate knowledge of these transactions, to say, if I have stated any thing but facts. Mr. Chairman, I cannot imagine a more formidable inroad on the powers of this house. The military commissions the officers of police; the American law prevails; the Spanish customs are disregarded. Who has done all this? Not the Congress of the United States, but the commander of its armies. I am no apologist for Spain; our wrongs are numerous and great. But, I will never cease to protest against this violation of the constitution. But the gentleman who has just addressed you (Mr. H. Nelson) urged that, in order to protect your frontier, it was necessary you should have these posts. That, but for their occupation, that frontier would, even now, in all probability be visited by massacre and blood. And are we prepared to justify this proceeding upon the plea of convenience; to what conclusions will this lead us? In prosecuting a war with the Turks, would not this same plea justify you, if you possess the power, in seizing on Gibraltar? This would enable you, with little difficulty, to bring them to terms, and to overawe any subsequent rupture. In the event of a war with England, you could not do better than wrest Cuba from the hands of Spain; for, by doing so, the commerce of the West-Indies would be placed at your mercy, and their prosperity depend upon your will. And yet, sir, will the gentleman say, that one of your commodores, without your authority, should possess himself of Cuba? I again call upon this committee to guard against the evils of this precedent. I have pointed out some few of its consequences; I have argued this as an abstract question; have attempted to meet it fairly; I argue from the principles of common sense, and base myself upon the constitution of my country. My colleague (Mr. H. Nelson) has asked you, if you were disposed to acquit yourself from the responsibility of these measures, after making an appropriation to carry on the war against the Seminoles. Sir, I will, with all due deference, propose a question to honorable gentlemen. Did not the chairman of the committee of foreign relations distinctly announce, on this floor, at the last session, his intention of submitting to that committee a proposition to authorize the President of the United States to take possession of Florida? I understood it was submitted to that committee, and rejected by an unanimous vote. Ere Mr. Holmes, from Massachusetts, rose to explain; he said that the proposition had been submitted to the committee of foreign relations, at the last session, but that it had not been authorized by the President or the House. Mr. Tyler continued. It came from the chairman—he had the right to submit the proposition. But I care not from whence it came. The proposition was submitted, and was distinctly negatived. Would not this house have done the same thing? I heard no second to the proposition. You would not even authorize the President to seize on these posts, and yet, when a military officer does it, we calmly fold our arms and approve the act. Has our course of policy so suddenly changed? What has produced this change? A summer campaign? Have we more light now than we had last winter? Did you not know then, as well as you do now, the feelings of the Governor of Pensacola towards this nation? He had suffered, in our late conflict with England, an English army to possess itself of Pensacola, and from thence, to carry on hostilities against us. General Jackson, in the year 1814, was compelled to dispossess that enemy. Sir, we had every light then, which we possess now, on this subject, and we distinctly disapprove of the occupation of these posts.

The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. H. Nelson) has referred us to the seizure of Pensacola in 1814, and of Amelia Island, by way of justifying these proceedings. Then, you fought against the enemy, who had possession of the town. That enemy was beaten and driven off, and our victorious army returned to our own territory. The Spanish authorities were not interfered with. As to Amelia Island, I shall not stop to enquire whether its occupation was right or wrong. If it stands on the same footing with the present case, I do not hesitate to pronounce it wrong. And, sir, the circumstance of its being referred to, to justify this proceeding, proves the necessity of guarding against evil precedents. In the estimation of that gentleman, that precedent has already grown into law. Will you suffer this also to become the law of the land; and, by so doing, deliver yourselves up, bound hand and foot, to the arbitrary caprices of the officers of your army? I most devoutly pray that such may not be the result. I have every confidence in the patriotism of that army; but I cannot, will not, consent to invest them with powers conferred on Congress by the constitution.

As to the remaining points of enquiry, I shall be very brief. Sir, my only object is to present you what I esteem the strong points of these questions. I do not wish, even if I had the power, to perplex you with subtle and ingenious reasoning. My object is to meet the questions fairly—to encounter the arguments of honorable gentlemen, with such force as I can, and to contribute, as far as my humble talents will permit me, in elucidating this interesting subject. If, Mr. Chairman, the capture of St. Marks was unauthorized, the execution of Arbuthnot must of necessity have been so. Spain was a neutral in the war. Her flag, therefore, for he was in St. Marks, protected Arbuthnot from your power. This is the principle for which we have never ceased to contend. The same principle prevails on the land and on the ocean. If this man had been on board a Spanish vessel, according to this rule, one of your naval officers would have had no authority to have dragged him from on board that vessel and punished him with death. Against the British practice of search and impressment, our government has never ceased to protest. It was the most prominent cause of the late war. Will you protest against this practice when observed by foreign nations, and shall we adopt the same practice in our armies and on the high seas? Is this to do justice? Our magnanimity, our honor, our consistency, are all at stake. If we cannot look to this House to preserve them, in the name of Heaven to whom shall we look? Even against the seizure of property protected by a neutral flag, we have constantly, unceasingly contended. Shall the rights of persons be less respected? I beg of gentlemen to recollect Valparaiso. The Essex frigate was under the guns of a Spanish battery: two English vessels attacked and captured her. Have we forgotten the clamour which this pusillanimity excited against Spain? Sir, she was represented either as hostile towards us, or so poor and degraded in spirit as to suffer her sovereignty to be invaded without resisting it. We have never ceased to remonstrate against this infraction of her neutrality, and, when we enumerate the causes of war against her, this is never omitted. I demand again, to know if we shall adopt a different rule when we ourselves are the aggressors? No, Sir, I insist that justice is the same every where, and under all circumstances. Let her fiat be done, as well for us as against us.

The execution of Ambrister and the two Indian chiefs I consider equally indefensible. Although the reasoning applicable to the case of Arbuthnot is not applicable to that of Ambrister, yet all the reasons which go to show the impropriety of the execution of the latter, apply also to the former, I shall not stop to enquire whether the court martial was properly organized or proceeded with due solemnity and form. This has already been sufficiently canvassed, and in my estimation constitutes only a secondary branch of enquiry. I reason from great principles recognized by the law of nations. That law recognizes but one reason cogent enough to authorise a general to put to death his prisoners. And that is "where the safety of his men requires it." Was that safety implicated by suffering a wretch to live? Was the existence of his men or his army endangered in the life of a miserable vampire who had crawled from the sinks of European corruption, and had visited this western shore, either to exist in the commission of crime himself, or on the enormities of others? Or did the continuance of the lives of his Indian captives threaten discomfiture and overthrow? It cannot be pretended. The first was too insignificant to have excited such fears—the power of the last was broken, and all their efforts defeated. The rifle and tomahawk had been struck from their hands, and they were prisoners, defenceless and disarmed. Sir, would it not have better comported with your national character, if, instead of executing these captives, the General had said to them, "go, I give you your liberty: go to your few surviving warriors, and tell them that that nation against whose defenceless frontiers you have raised the murderous scalping knife, with whom you have ever been at war, whose blood you have delighted to drink—that nation, so abused, so insulted, has no law to punish you: it restores you to your native forests, and has only to ask that you will abandon your enemies, and instruct your warriors how to respect her rights." I cannot but think that this would better have accorded with the principles of humanity and the laws of nations. But, Sir, we are told by my honorable friend from Virginia, (Mr. Barbour,) that the ancient law of nations permitted the conqueror to put to death his prisoners, and that that code applies still to savage nations. He admitted, however, that a new code had been adopted by civilized nations; and, Sir, this new code provides the mode of conducting war even against barbarians. Does not the gentleman then see that his position and admission are at variance with each other? If the new code has abrogated the other, are you not bound by the first, and can you resort to the last? Can you break your contract at pleasure? [Here Mr. Barbour rose to explain. He said that it was true, we did extend to savages many of the benefits of the new code, but that it was a gratuitous act on our part, and what they had no right to demand; for, in the language of Bynkershoek, though justice may be insisted on in war, yet generosity cannot.] Mr. Tyler said that he regretted much if he had misunderstood the gentleman. His wish was fairly to meet the argument. But, Sir, I contend that the rights which a civilized nation may exercise over its prisoners when warring against barbarians, are distinctly pointed out in the new code of national law. The very rule which I have laid down, is there to be found, and is actually applicable to a war of the sort I have alluded to. This, then, is your contract with the civilized world. If we do not respect the stipulations of that contract, we throw ourselves out of the pale of the law. The gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Lowndes,) with whom I have the satisfaction to agree, except in relation to this point, admits the propriety of the execution of Ambrister. He derives the power of the General from his right to refuse quarter in battle, and his right to punish for a breach of parole. These are cases constituting exceptions to the rule for which I contend, and are expressly enumerated. But does he find, in all the enumerated exceptions, a right appertaining to the commanding officer, to execute his prisoners, except where the safety of his army requires it? I defy gentlemen to produce such an instance. If his enemy gives no quarter, he has a right to refuse him quarter. But if you strike his weapons from his hand and make him your prisoner, that instant is his life placed beyond your reach, unless it be taken to preserve the lives of your men. The case of a man violating his parole, is founded on the principles of humanity, and his punishment is properly left to the discretion of the officer.

This practice of paroling prisoners owes its origin to the rigorous confinement which each captive would necessarily be compelled to undergo, but for its existence. The whole civilized world is, for these and other reasons concerned in its preservation—the individual too accepts his parole under the express agreement, that, if he breaks it, his life will be the forfeit. The gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Anderson) contends that the right of retaliation must, from the nature of things, be vested in the commanding officer—I admit the truth of the position to a certain extent—sir, the safety of his men may be involved in the exercise of this right. This is the controlling principle; under its influence every thing which is done may be proper; but the very instant you pass beyond the limits it prescribes, that moment do you hurry headlong into error, and subvert the established order of things. Sir, take the case which he has put. He imagined your general with his army in Pensacola, besieged by a powerful enemy, and so surrounded as to be cut off from all intercourse with the government; all the prisoners made by your enemy are put to death, and the gentleman triumphantly asks, will you deny to your officer the right of retaliation when so circumstanced? No, sir. I will not deny it to him—I give it to him under the rule which I have laid down. By putting to death his captives, his enemy would be induced to abstain from his fell practices. The safety of his men, the preservation of their lives, would call upon him to retaliate, and the necessity of the case would justify him in doing so. I am then, Mr. Chairman, forced to disapprove the execution of these men. When gentlemen point me to the bleeding scalps of my countrymen—when they read to me the long catalogue of ills which we have sustained—when they portray the sufferings of a mother bereaved of her only child—when they represent to me that child inhumanly butchered—when they shew me the picture of desolation and despair which these wretches have realized—I am not wanting in sensibility, nor is the effect of the representation lost upon me. I can do justice to the feelings of General Jackson with these dread objects of savage barbarity around him—but, when I recollect that this gallant hero had routed these cannibals; had visited their land with the sword; had desolated their dwellings and crushed their power; and that, not satisfied with this, he had executed his vengeance on those who had fallen into his hands—sir, I am permitted to breath, and enquire under what law have these prisoners been bereaved of existence? We live in a land where the only rule of our conduct is the law The power of promulgating those laws is invested in Congress. They are not the arbitrary edicts of any one man, nor is any so high as to be above their influence. It is, then, because these proceedings have taken place in the absence of all law, that I cannot yield to them my approbation. It is because the precedent which may grow out of them is dangerous to the liberties of this country—because they militate against the powers of this House, the repository of the people's rights, and trench upon the constitution of this land, that I must disapprove them.

One word more by way of conclusion. Mr. Chairman, we are denounced as the enemies of General Jackson and the President of the United States. Enemies of General Jackson! Of him who has shed a blaze of renown upon our country, bright as a beam of light, and lasting as history? Or him whose life has been dedicated to the service of his country, and who has by his valor entwined a wreath around her brow, lasting and as imperishable as his own fame? Oh no, sir, I for one, feel no enmity towards him—I am the enemy of no man, but I trust I am a friend to the constitution and the law. The enemies of the President! Where did he come from? What land gave him birth? Sir, he comes from the land in which we dwell; he is the friend and neighbor of many of us; in his long life of arduous service, we recognize the greatest devotion to the public weal; the most unshaken patriotism. But if he countenances what we deem erroneous proceedings, shall we not advise him of his error? Is this tame acquiescence to be expected of us? Suffer me to say, sir, and I say it with all proper decorum, that Virginia will not hesitate to disapprove the conduct of her dearest son, if she believes that son to have erred. Let me tell you, that, if that man who carried you successfully through the storms of the revolution; who conducted you to victory and independence; he who was "first in war, first in peace, first in the hearts of his countrymen;" if that man had erred, dear as he was to her affections, Virginia would have stood forth to oppose his errors. The enemies of Mr. Monroe, sir? In what does friendship consist? Is it to be the faithless helmsman, who, when the danger approaches, when the storm lowers, when the rocks are in sight, still folds his arms and cries out all's well? Or does it consist in advising of the danger, in giving the alarm, in pointing to the rocks which threaten us with shipwreck? Sir, we are all mariners on board one vessel, and that vessel is the constitution of our country. Our destinies, our hopes, the hopes and prospects of our latest generation, are all committed to our charge, and he, who will not aid to reach the harbor in safety, is an enemy to his country, and deserves to perish.

(DEBATE TO BE CONTINUED.)