The Enquirer

FOR THE ENQUIRER.

It is said, that there has been a large Meeting of the Republicans of both houses of congress on the 6th instant, at which it was decided that the embargo should be raised the 4th of March, except as to England and France; as to them a non-intercourse; that an additional number of troops be raised, and that a loan be authorised of $10,000,000.

Admitting this to be a fact--and we shall soon be able to ascertain it by the measures taken--this is a course that I could no where consent to.

The calculation, that you can permit your vessels to go to sea, and whilst at sea, restrain them in their traffic, is void. If this position wanted proof, it is amply found in the number of American vessels, that have since the embargo, been trading with British licenses, and in the deviation of voyages from Norfolk to Boston by touching in the West Indies. To the course above described, I object, because it partakes of all the objections of more efficient plans, without any or inconsiderable advantages.

It is true that the dependencies of the Belligerents, even Holland, are not included, which will leave you on paper, some respectable commerce. But we are seeking a measure that is to coerce the belligerents into justice. The plan proposed, if faithfully executed, and we are to presume, it has been predicated on that presumption, cannot have that effect. You transfer all the American trade from England to the continent. Admit this to be an efficient measure, G. Britain must on her system make a direct war of capture on this trade; for she has told you that she will take your vessels going to the continent, even though you allow her a full participation in the commerce, nay more, when she is fattening on that commerce, as is proved by Baring and others. It is your belief of that declaration which impels to this very act. It is therefore demonstrable that this course ends in war, if executed according to its import. In what situation will you find yourselves? The market of Britain filled with American articles captured from them. Your enemy made rich by your own spoils, you by that, much poorer. You commenced this contest in 1808 with full treasury, with the most ample supply of foreign articles. In 1810 you will recommence it with an empty treasury, dependant on loans to supply it, and when your former stores are exhausted.

This is called the gaining time. Now to me it is exactly the reverse. It is loosing all the 18 months of contest we have had. It is acknowledging that we are determined not to go to war, which will be no small accession to the popularity of Mr. Canning, and take as much from the American character.

Again, on the idea of gaining time, we have this advantage, to be sure, that our numbers increase daily, but great as that advantage is, it will not compensate for every other consideration, nor for the difference of entering on the war with advantageous or disadvantageous grounds, such as stated above; much less will it pay the increase of debt or compensate for the loss of public spirit, which this plan is calculated to produce, whether you mean it as a public declaration of the great council of the nation, that the people are not to be roused to war or only as to the effect of procrastination.

Truly not only on my own judgement, but again and again have I heard it said, that at the time of the attack on the Chesapeake, the nation was ready for war; that since they had cooled off. Will not the same effect take place now as to the orders of council? You tell the nation they are not to go to war for them. What will you tell them next year? That they must. If at your fiat, the war propensity is to rise and fall, then are you deprived of your first motive: that of the nation not being ready for resistance. Is it not rather to be believed, habituated to the idea of British taxation, that the people will say after enduring it for two years, had we not better bear it yet a little longer, and will not your argument of delay be as applicable then as now, and consulting the course of the human heart, you must say more congenial to its ordinary workings?

But, suppose this plan should result in a form of trade elsewhere, whilst it was in reality with G. Britain. It is not necessary to consider the various ways by which it could be effected. Some are very ostensible. A supply of cotton may be sent to Britain by the means of any of the Spanish or Portuguese possessions. Pensacola, for example, may take the place of Charleston and New York, as shipping ports for cotton; tobacco too may be lodged there. Or, as our vessels require no papers to go directly for Britain, they may clear out for some European port of the same nations, but not go there, except in their way home. Clearances for Tangiers or Hamburgh, and a market, may be as common as that for Cowes, and a market formerly was. What is to prevent this? Your laws operating in Europe, how are you to obtain the evidence? Shall I be told that the patriotism of the merchants will prevent it? I must be pardoned for the want of confidence, since the experiment of the embargo, and as British consuls are American merchants. I cannot, therefore, but condemn a proposition which, whilst it proposes to gain time, loses it: and which, whilst it proposes to be neither submission nor war, must eventuate demonstrably in one or the other.