Daily National Intelligencer

FROM THE NATIONAL ADVOCATE.

A writer in the National Intelligencer, under the signature of Cato, has taken up the subject of the increase of our navy in a strong and serious manner, and avows it to be necessary, in effecting our ultimate tranquility, to have the most powerful navy in the world. The question is a serious one, and must, in time, occupy general attention—but we must confess that we were not prepared, at this early period of our national existence, to see a view so enlarged as this writer takes of the subject.

The success which attended our maritime operations during the late war, when our navy was inferior in size to what it is at present, appears to us as a just conclusion that a reasonable addition to our present number of vessels would be sufficient for all the purposes of defense; and when we add to this number our private armed vessels, a powerful auxiliary in war, there is sufficient reason to believe that our commerce can be securely protected, our coast faithfully guarded, and the commerce of an enemy successfully assailed.

A question of great moment will be shortly agitated. It is—What rank are we to hold in the scale amongst other nations? Are we to be a mediating power to Europe? Are we to control the destinies of the whole American continent? Are we to contend, forthwith, for the dominion of the ocean?—For if such views are to govern our future measures, it is evident that we must "have the largest navy in the world." If, on the contrary, it should be deemed politic for the United States to cultivate with sincerity an amicable arrangement with foreign powers—if it can be evidenced that peace is generally to be preferred to war, and that this country is to owe its prosperity to the tranquil operation of its commercial, agricultural and manufacturing interests, it then would appear to us impolitic and inexpedient to increase our navy to that size, so as to awaken the fears, the jealousy, or the suspicion of foreign powers—to involve us in war with any maritime nation, or, above all, create confederacies and alliances against our tranquility or commercial prosperity.

The arguments made use of by the writer in the Intelligencer go to prove the necessity of creating a navy of a size capable of destroying at once the navy of Great Britain. "Are we," says he, "to continue to hobble through inglorious DEFENSIVE warfares for violated rights?" The question is a strange one; if our rights are violated then we must defend them. Such defence cannot be "inglorious." Can an offensive warfare, declared on our part, be justified without a good and sufficient cause? And, by the very position of the writer, would we not be constantly engaged in promoting wars by the possession and application of this extensive maritime power? The true interest of this country would not, it appears to us, be fairly estimated were we to countenance a disposition for dominion on the seas or controlling the destinies of foreign powers. All we can expect is, to defend our flag from every species of aggression. Our strength should be fairly estimated—the cord should not be strained. For defence we are capable and effective—for attack we question our power and resources. Great Britain, at an advanced epoch in her annals, struggled for dominion on the ocean—she conquered all her enemies, and, at this day, each of her former enemies is more prosperous and have less burdens and internal disaffection than the victor. Where are the advantages which a series of naval victories for 150 years have secured to Great Britain? They are empty and evanescent—they contended for dominion on the ocean—they succeeded, and what is the issue of the contest? Her marine is dismantled—her seamen dismissed—commercial rivals wrestling the carrying trade out of her hand, and a national debt contracted which has reduced the honest labourer to poverty, and taken from the wealthy one half of their annual income. This debt, the writer avers, should not be imputed to her, but it is undeniable that the greater part of it was brought on by the expenditure in maritime wars. The cost of our navy, says he, must be of no consideration. "Dollars and cents must not be put in the balance against national honor. Let not my countrymen be appalled at the magnitude of the British debt." It is not only the cost of an extensive navy for its completion and its maintenance which the American people will seriously consider, but also the consequences to which this immense power may extend, which will demand attention and close enquiry. Neither should it be expected that more than an equal part of the revenue will be appropriated for the navy alone; and it is reasonable to conclude that while, on the one hand there is little disposition to control foreign powers on the part of our government, there is still less reason to believe, that the American people would consent to pay the expense of an unwieldy and unprofitable maritime power. The present appropriation for the increase of our navy will give to us a highly respectable and effective force, and, at present, we see no cause for augmenting it.