The National Intelligencer And Washington Advertiser

Papers laid before the British Parliament respecting the
NEGOTIATION WITH FRANCE
(Continued.)

No. XXXVI.
Extract of a letter from lord Hawkesbury to lord Whitworth, dated Downing-street, Feb. 9. 1803.
The most remarkable passages in this dispatch are the following:--The late treaty of peace was conducted on a basis not merely proposed by his majesty, but specifically agreed to in an official note by the French government, viz. that his majesty should keep a compensation out of his conquests for the important acquisitions of territory made by France upon the continent. This is a sufficient proof that the compact was understood to have been concluded with reference to the then existing state of things; for the measure of his majesty's compensation was to be calculated with reference to the acquisitions of France at that time; and if the interference of the French government in the general affairs of Europe, since that period; if their interposition with respect to Switzerland and Holland, whose independence was guaranteed by them at the time of the conclusion of the treaty of peace; if the annexations which have been made to France in various quarters, but particularly those in Italy, have extended the territory and increased the power of the French government, his majesty would be warranted, consistently with the spirit of the treaty of peace, in claiming equivalents for these acquisitions, as a counterpoise to the augmentation of the power of France. His majesty, however, anxious to prevent all misunderstanding, and desirous of consolidating the general peace of Europe, as far as might be in his power, was willing to have waived the pretensions he might have had a right to advance of this nature; and as the other articles of the definitive treaty have been in a course of execution on his part, so he would have been ready to have carried into effect, at the true intent and spirit of the 10th article, the execution of which, according to its terms had been rendered impracticable by circumstances which it was not in his majesty's power to control. A communication to your lordship would accordingly have been prepared conformably to this disposition, if the attention of his majesty's government had not been attracted by the very extraordinary publication of the report of col. Sebastiani to the First Consul. It is impossible for his majesty to view this report in any other light, than as an official publication; for without referring particularly to explanations which have been separately given upon the subject of publications in the Moniteur, the article in question, as it purports to be the report to the First Consul of an accredited agent, as it appears to have been signed by col. Sebastiani himself, and as it is published in the official paper with an official title affixed to it, must be considered as authorized by the French government. It discloses, however, views of the highest degree injurious to the interests in his majesty's dominions, and directly repugnant to, and utterly inconsistent with the spirit and letter of the treaty of peace concluded between his majesty and the French government; and his majesty would feel that he was wanting in a proper regard to the honor of his crown and to the interests of his dominions, if he should see with indifference such a system developed and avowed. His majesty cannot therefore, regard the conduct of the French government on various occasions since the conclusion of the definitive treaty, the insinuations and charges contained in the report of col. Sebastiani, and the views which that report discloses, without feeling it necessary for him distinctly to declare, that it will be impossible for him to enter into any further discussion relative to Malta, unless he receives a satisfactory explanation on the subject of the communication."

HAWKESBURY.

No. XXXVII. Extract of a dispatch from lord Whitworth to lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, Feb. 17, 1803. This dispatch is not very interesting, as the subject of it is more fully explained in the subsequent number.

No. XXXVIII.
Paris, Feb. 21, 1803.
My Lord,
My last dispatch in which I gave your lordship an account of my conference with M. Talleyrand was scarcely gone, when I received a note from him informing me that the First Consul wished to converse with me, and desired I would come to him at the Tuilleries at 9 o'clock. He received me in his cabinet, with tolerable cordiality, and, after talking on different subjects for a few minutes, he desired me to sit down, as he himself did on the other side of the table and began. He told me that he felt it necessary, after what had passed between me and M. de Talleyrand, that he should in the most clear and authentic manner, make known his sentiments to me, in order that their being communicated to his majesty, and he conceived this would be more effectually done by himself than through any medium whatever. He said that it was a matter of great disappointment to him, that the treaty of Amiens, instead of being followed by conciliation and friendship, the natural effects of peace, had been productive only of continual and increasing jealousy and mistrust; and that this mistrust was avowed in such a manner as must bring the point to an issue.
He now enumerated the several provocations which he pretended to have received from England. He placed in the first line our not evacuating Malta and Alexandria as we were bound to do by treaty. In this he said that no consideration on earth should make him acquiesce; and of the two he had rather see us in possession of the Faubourg St. Antoine than Malta. He then adverted to the abuse thrown out against him in the English public prints: but this he did not so much regard as that which appeared in the French papers published in London. This he considered as much more mischievous, since it meant to excite this country against him and his government. He complained of the protection given to Georges and others of his description, who instead of being sent to Canada, as had been repeatedly promised, were permitted to remain in England, handsomely pensioned, and constantly committing all sorts of crimes on the coasts of France as well as in the interior.
In confirmation of this, he told me, that two men had been within these few days apprehended in Normandy, and were now on their way to Paris, who were hired assassins, and employed by the Bishop of Hiraul, by Georges, and by Dutherl, as would be fully proved in a court of justice, and made known to the world.
He acknowledged, that the irritation he felt against England increased daily, because every wind (I speak as much as I can of his own words and expressions) which blew from England, brought nothing but enmity and hatred against him.
He now went back to Egypt, and told me, that if he had any inclination to take possession of it by force, he might have done it a month ago, by sending 25,000 men to Aboukir, who would have possessed themselves of the whole country in defiance of the 4000 British in Alexandria. That instead of that garrison being a means of protecting Egypt, it was only furnishing him with pretence for invading it. This he should not do, whatever might be his desire to have it as a colony because he did not wish it worth the risk of a war, in which he might, perhaps, be considered the aggressor, and by which he should lose more than he could gain, since sooner or later Egypt would belong to France, either by the falling to pieces of the Turkish empire or some arrangement with the Porte.
As a proof of his desire to maintain peace, he wished to know what he had to gain by going to war with England.--A descent was the only means of offence he had, and that he was determined to attempt, by putting himself at the head of the expedition. But how could it be supposed, that after having gained the height on which he stood, he would risk his life & reputation in such a hazardous attempt, unless forced to it by necessity, when the chances were, that he and the greatest part of the expedition would go to the bottom of the sea? He talked much on this subject, but never affected to diminish the danger. He acknowledged that there were one hundred chances to one against him; but still he was determined to attempt it, if war should be the consequence of the present discussion; and that such was the disposition of the troops, that army after army would be found for the enterprize.
He then expatiated much on the natural force of the two countries. France with an army of 480,000 men, for to this amount, it is, he said, to be immediately completed, all ready for the most desperate enterprizes; and England with a fleet that made her mistress of the sea, and which he did not think he could equal in less than ten years. Two such countries by a proper understanding might govern the world, but by their strifes might overturn it. He said, that if he had not felt the enmity of the British government on every occasion since the treaty of Amiens, there would have been nothing that he would not have done to prove his desire to conciliate; participation in indemnities as well as in influence on the continent; treaties of commerce, in short, any thing that could have given satisfaction, and have testified his friendship. Nothing, however, had been able to conquer the hatred of the British government, and therefore it was now come to the point, whether we should have peace or war. To preserve peace, the treaty of Amiens must be fulfilled; the abuse of the public prints, if not totally suppressed, at least kept within bounds, and confined to the English papers; and the protection given to its bitterest enemies (alluding to Georges and persons of that description) must be withdrawn. If war, it was necessary to say to, and to refuse to fulfill the treaty. He now made the tour of Europe to prove to me, that in its present state, there was no power with which we could coalesce for the purpose of making war with France; consequently it was our interest to gain, and if we had any point to gain: renew the war when circumstances were more favorable. He said, it was not doing him justice to suppose that he conceived himself above the opinion of his country or of Europe. He would not risk uniting Europe against him by any violent act of aggression; neither was he so powerful in France as to persuade the nation to go to war unless on good grounds. He said, that he had chastised the Algerines, from his unwillingness to excite the jealousy of other powers: but he hoped that England, Russia and France would one day feel that it was their interest to destroy such a nest of thieves, and force them to live rather by cultivating their land, than by plunder.
In the little I said to him, for he gave me in the course of two hours but very few opportunities of saying a word, I confined myself strictly to the tenor of your lordship's instructions. I urged them in the same manner as I had done to M. Talleyrand, and dwelt as strongly as I could on the sensation which the publication of Sebastiani's report had created in England, where the eyes of France towards Egypt must always command the utmost vigilance and jealousy.
He maintained, that what ought to convince us of his desire of peace, was on the one hand the little he had to gain by renewing the war, and on the other, the facility with which he might have taken possession of Egypt, with the very ships and troops which were now going from the Mediterranean to St. Domingo, and that with the approbation of all Europe, and more particularly of the Turks, who had repeatedly invited him to join them for the purpose of forcing us to evacuate their territory.
I do not pretend to follow the arguments of the First Consul in detail: this would be impossible, from the vast variety of matter which he took occasion to introduce. His purpose was evidently to convince me that on Malta must depend peace or war, and at the same time to impress upon my mind a strong idea of the means he possessed of annoying us at home and abroad,
With regard to the mistrust and jealousy which he said constantly prevailed since the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens, I observed, that after a war of such long duration, so full of rancour, and carried on in a manner of which history has no example, it was but natural that a considerable degree of agitation should prevail; but this, like the swell after a storm, would gradually abate, if not raised up by the policy of either party, that I would not pretend to pronounce which had been the aggressor in the paper war of which he complained, and which was still kept up, though with this difference, that in England it was independent of government, and in France its very act and deed. To this I added that it must be admitted, that we had such motives of mistrust against France, as could not be alleged against us, and I was going to instance the accession of territory and influence gained by France since the treaty, when he interrupted me by saying, I suppose you mean Piedmont and Switzerland; "ce sont des bagatelles;" and it must have been foreseen whilst the negotiation was pending; "Vous n'avez pas le droit d'en parler à cette heure."
I then alleged as a cause of mistrust and jealousy, the impossibility of obtaining justice, or any kind of redress for any of his majesty's subjects. He asked me in what respect; and I told him that since the signing of the treaty not one British claimant had been satisfied, although every Frenchman of that description had been so within one month after that period; and that since I had been here, and I could say as much of my predecessors, not one satisfactory answer had been obtained to the innumerable representations which we had been under the necessity of making in favor of British subjects and property detained in the ports of France and elsewhere, without even the shadow of justice; Such an order of things, I said, was not made to inspire confidence; but, on the contrary, must create mistrust.-- This, he said, must be attributed to the natural difficulties attending such suits, when both parties thought themselves right; but he denied that such delays could proceed from any disinclination to do what was just and right. With regard to the pensions which were granted to French or Swiss individuals, I observed that they were given as a reward for past services during the war, and most certainly not for present ones, and still less for such as had been insinuated of a nature repugnant to the feelings of every individual in England; and to the universally acknowledged loyalty and honor of the British government. That as for any participation of indemnities, or other accessions which his majesty might have obtained, I could take upon myself to assure him that his majesty's ambition led him rather to preserve than to acquire; and that with regard to the most propitious moment for renewing hostilities, his majesty, whose sincere desire it was to continue the blessings of peace to his subjects, would always consider such a measure as the greatest calamity; but that if his majesty was so desirous of peace, it must not be imputed to the difficulty of obtaining allies; and the less so, as those means which it might be necessary to afford such allies, for perhaps inadequate services; would all be contracted in England, and give a proportionate increase of energy to our own exertions. At this part of the conversation he rose from his chair, and told me that he should give orders to general Andreossi to enter on the discussion of this business with your lordship; but he wished that I should at the same time be made acquainted with his motives and convinced of his sincerity, rather from himself than from his ministers. He then, after a conversation of two hours, during the greatest part of which he talked incessantly, conversed for a few moments on indifferent subjects, in apparent good humour, and retired.
Such was, nearly as I can recollect, the purport of this conference..
It must however be observed, that he did not, as M. Talleyrand had done, affect to attribute col. Sebastiani's mission to commercial motives only, but as one rendered necessary in a military point of view, by the infraction by us of the treaty of Amiens.
I have the honour to be, &c.
WHITWORTH
P. S. This conversation took place on Friday last, and this morning I saw M. de Talleyrand. He had been with the first consul after I left him, and he assured me that he had been very well satisfied with the frankness with which I made my observations on what fell from him. I told him, that without entering into any further detail, what I had said to the first consul amounted to an assurance, of what I trusted there could be no doubt, of the readiness of his majesty's ministers to remove all subjects of discussion, where that could be done without violating the laws of the country, and to fulfill strictly the engagements which they had contracted, in as much as that could be reconciled with the safety of the state. As this applied to Malta and Egypt, he gave me to understand that a project was in contemplation, by which the integrity of the Turkish empire would be so effectually secured as to do away every cause of doubt or uneasiness, either with regard to Egypt or any part of the Turkish dominions. He could not then, he said, explain himself further.

No. XXXIX.
Downing Street, Feb. 18, 1803.
My Lord,
Your excellency's dispatch, of Feb. 21st, has been received, and laid before the king.
I have great satisfaction in communicating to you his majesty's approbation of the able and judicious manner in which you appear to have executed the instructions which I gave to you in my dispatch of the 9th inst.
The account you have given of your interview with the first consul is in every respect important.
It is unnecessary for me to remark on the tone and temper in which the sentiments of the first consul appear to have been expressed, or to offer any observations in addition to those so properly made by your excellency at the time, upon several topics which were brought forward by the first consul in the course of your conversation: I will therefore content myself with referring your excellency to my dispatch to Mr. Merry of Aug. 28, 1802, in which the subjects of the complaints of the French government, respecting the freedom of the press, the emigrants, &c. are particularly discussed. I cannot, however, avoid noticing, that nothing approaching to explanation or satisfaction is stated to have been thrown out by the first consul, in answer to the just representations & complaints of his majesty, in consequence of the unwarranted insinuations and charges contained in col. Sebastiani's report against his majesty's government, the commander of his forces in Egypt, and his army in that quarter: but that on the other hand, the language of the first consul has tended to strengthen and confirm the suspicions which that publication was peculiarly calculated to excite.
I do not now proceed to give you some farther instructions on the language which it may be proper for you to hold respecting the charge which has been advanced against his majesty's government, of their unwillingness to fulfill the treaty of Amiens. The treaty of Amiens has been in a course of execution, on the part of his majesty, in every article in which, according to the spirit of that treaty, it has been found capable of execution. There can be no doubt, that Egypt is at this time completely evacuated: The delay which had arisen in the evacuation of Alexandria, was owing to accidental circumstances, the particulars of which were explained to you in my dispatch of the 20th of Nov. last; and I had every reason to believe, from the communication which I had with general Andreossi on the subject, that the French government were perfectly satisfied with the explanation which he was authorized at the time to give them respecting it.
With regard to that article of the treaty which relates to Malta the stipulations contained in it (owing to circumstances which it was not in the power of his majesty to control,) have not been found capable of execution. The refusal of Russia to accede to the arrangement, except on condition that the Maltese langue should be abolished; the silence of the court of Berlin with respect to the invitation that has been made to it, in consequence of the treaty, to become a guaranteeing power; the abolition of the Spanish priories, in defiance of the treaty to which the king of Spain was a party: the declaration of the Portuguese government of their intention to equalize the property of the Portuguese priory, as forming a part of the Spanish langue, unless the property of the Spanish priories is restored to them; the non election of a grand master: The circumstances would have been sufficient, without any other claim on grounds, to have warranted his majesty in suspending the evacuation of the island, until some new arrangement could be adjusted for its security and independence. But when it is considered how great the dominion, power, as in fluence of France have of late been extended. his majesty must feel, that he has an incontestable right, conformably to the principles on which the treaty of peace was negotiated and concluded, to demand additional securities in any new arrangement which it might be necessary to make with a view of effecting the real objects of that treaty. And these considerations, sufficient as they might be in themselves to justify the line of conduct which his majesty had determined to adopt, have received additional force from the views which have been recently and undeservedly manifested by the French government, respecting the Turkish dominion and the islands in the Adriatic (and which have been in a great degree admitted by the first consul, in his interview with your excellency--views, which are directly repugnant, not only to the spirit, but to the letter of the treaty of Amiens.
From the postscript in your excellency's letter, it appears that a project was in contemplation, by which, according to the declaration of M. Talleyrand, the integrity of the Turkish territory would be secured. so as to do away every cause of doubt or uneasiness, either with regard to Egypt, or to any other part of the Turkish dominions. His majesty will consider the communication of such a project as indicating a disposition on the part of the French government, to afford him explanation and satisfaction
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"He then desired leave to go to the first court, promising to let me know the result when we met at the Prussian minister's. He did not come there till near 7 o'clock, and, when we rose from dinner, he took me aside, and informed me, that although the first consul had been highly irritated at the unjust suspicion which his majesty's government entertained, yet he would not allow himself to be so far mastered by his feelings, as to lose sight of the present calamities which the present discussion might entail upon humanity. He dwelt much on this topic, and explained the measures to which he should be obliged to resort; he said that if England wished to discuss fairly, he wished the same; that if England prepared for war, he would do the same; and that if England should finally determine on hostilities, he trusted to the support of the French nation in the true cause of honor and of justice. It was in vain that I repeated that England did not wish for war; that peace was as necessary to us as it could be to France; that all we desired, and all that we were contending for, was security; that every thing proved to us that that security was threatened by the first consul's views on Egypt; and that consequently our refusal to evacuate Malta was become as much a necessary measure of precaution, as the defence of any part of his majesty's dominions."

Note verbale referred to in No. 42.

1. If his Britannic majesty in his message means to speak of the expedition of Helvetia lays, all the world knows that it was destined for America, and that it was on the point of sailing for its destination, but in consequence of his majesty's message, the embarkation and putting to sea are about to be countermanded.

2. If we do not receive satisfactory explanation respecting these armaments in England, and if they actually take place, it is natural that the first consul should march 20,000 men into Holland, since Holland is mentioned in the message.

3. These troops being once in the country, it is natural that an encampment should be formed on the frontiers of Hanover; and moreover, that additional bodies should join those troops which were already embarked for America, in order to form new embarkations, and to maintain an offensive and defensive position.

4. It is natural that the first consul should order several camps to be formed at Calais, and on different points of the coasts.

5. It is likewise in the nature of things, that the first consul should send a fresh force into Italy, in order to occupy, in case of necessity, the position of Tarentum.

7. England arming, and arming with so much publicity, will compel France to put her armies on the war establishment; a step so important, as cannot fail to agitate all Europe.

The result of all these movements will be to irritate the two countries still more. France will have been compelled to take all these precautions, in consequence of the English armaments, and, nevertheless, every means will be taken to excite the English nation by the assertion, that France meditates an invasion. The whole British population will be obliged to put themselves under arms for their defence, and their export trade will, even before the war, be in a state of stagnation throughout the whole extent of countries occupied by the French experience of nations, and the of events prove, that the distance in such a state of things and actual is unfortunately not remote.

the differences, of whichn men- gade in his Britannic majesty's we know not of any that we h England; for it cannot be ii that a serious intention can ba: ed in England of evading the ex u of the treaty of Amiens, under the t ion of a military armament.— Eur weil knows that it is p~ibie to atte., t ic dimemberment of France, but no: t. intimidate her.

No. XLIII.

My LORD,

Paris, March 14, 1803.

The messenger Mason went on Saturday with my dispatches of that date, and yesterday, Sunday, I saw no one likely to give me any further information such as I could depend upon, as to the effect which his majesty's message had produced on the First Consul. At the court which was held at the Thuilleries on that day, he accosted me evidently under very considerable agitation. He began by asking me if I had any news from England. I told him that I had received letters from your lordship two days ago. He immediately said, and so you are determined to go to war? No! I replied, we are too sensible of the advantages of peace. Nous avons, said he, d'ja fait la guerre pendant quinze ans. As he appeared to wait for an answer, I observed only, C'en est deja trop. Mais, said he, vous voulez la faire encore quinze années, et vous m'y forcez. I could him, that was very far from his majesty's intention! He then proceeded to Count Marcow and the Chevalier Azara, who were standing together at a little distance from me, and said to them, Les Anglois veulent la guerre, mais ils tout les premiers a tirer l'épée, je serai le dernier a la remettre. Ils ne respectent pas les Traites. Il faut dorénavant les couvrir de crêpe noir. He then went his round.

In a few minutes he came back to me, and resumed the conversation, if such it can be called, by something personally civil to me. He began again—Pourquoi des armements? Contre qui? des mesures de precaution? Je n'ai pas un vaisseau de ligne dans les ports de France; mais si vous voulez armer, j'armerai aussi; si vous voulez vous battre, je me battrai aussi. Vous pourrez peut-être tuer la France, mais jamais l'intimider. On ne voudrait, said I, ni l'un ni l'autre. On voudrait vivre en bonne intelligence avec elle. Il faut donc respecter les Traites, replied he: Malheur a ceux qui ne respectent pas les Traites, ils en seront responsables a toute l'Europe. He was too much agitated to make it advisable for me to prolong the conversation; I therefore made no answer, and he retired to his apartment, repeating the last phrase.

It is to be remarked that all this passed loud enough to be overheard by two hundred people who were present, and I am persuaded that there was not a single person who did not feel the extreme impropriety of his conduct, and the total want of dignity as well as of decency on the occasion.

I propose taking the first opportunity of speaking to Mr. Talleyrand on this subject.

I have the honour to be, &c.

WHITWORTH.

Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c. &c.

No. XLIV. is immaterial.

No. XLV. Note.

The Undersigned, his majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, has laid before the king the note of his excellency the French ambassador of the 10th instant.

In obeying the commands of his majesty, by returning an official answer to this note, the undersigned feels it necessary for him to do little more than repeat explanations which have been already given on more than one occasion by himself verbally to general Andreossi, and by lord Whitworth to M. Talleyrand, on the subject of the note, and of the points which appear to be connected with it. He can have no difficulty in assuring the French ambassador, that his majesty has entertained a most sincere desire that the treaty of Amiens might be executed in a full and complete manner; but it has not been possible for him to consider this treaty as having been founded on principles different from those which have been invariably applied to every other antecedent treaty or convention, namely, that they were negotiated with reference to the actual state of possession of the different parties, and to the treaties or public engagements by which they were bound at the time of its conclusion; and that if that state of possession, and of engagements was so materially altered by the act of either of the parties as to affect the nature of the compact itself, the other party has a right, according to the law of nations, to interfere for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction or compensation for any essential difference which such acts may have subsequently made in their relative situation; that if there ever was a case to which this principle might be applied with peculiar propriety, this was that of the late treaty of peace; for the negotiation was conducted on a basis not merely proposed by his majesty, but specially agreed to, in an official note, by the French government, viz. That his majesty should keep a compensation out of his conquests for the important acquisition of territory made by France upon the continent. This is a sufficient proof that the compact was understood to have been concluded in relation to the then existing state of things; for the measure of his majesty's compensation was to be calculated with reference to the acquisitions of France at that time; and if the interference of the French government in the general affairs of Europe since that period; if their interposition with respect to Switzerland and Holland, whose independence was guaranteed by them at the time of the conclusion of the treaty of peace; if the acquisitions which have been made by France in various quarters, but particularly those in Italy, have extended the territory and increased the power of France, his majesty would be warranted, consistently with the spirit of the treaty of peace, in claiming equivalents for these acquisitions, as a Counterpoise to the augmentation of the power of France. His majesty, however, anxious to prevent all ground of misunderstanding, and desirous of consolidating the general peace of Europe, as far as might be in his power, was willing to have waived the pretensions he might have a right to advance of this nature; and as the other articles of the definitive treaty have been in a course of execution on his part, so he would have been ready to have carried into effect an arrangement conformable to the true intent and spirit of the tenth article; the execution of that arrangement, according
ing to terms, having been rendered im- practicable by circumstances which it was not in his majesty's power to controul. Whilst his majesty was actuated by these sentiments of moderation and forbearance, and prepared to regulate his conduct in conformity to them, his attention was particularly attracted by the very extraordinary publication of the report of colonel Sebastiani to the First Consul. This report contains the most unjustifiable insinuations and charges against his majesty's government; against the officer commanding his majesty's forces in Egypt, and against the British army in that quarter: insinuations and charges wholly destitute of foundation, and such as would have warranted his majesty in demanding that satisfaction which on occasions of this nature, independent powers, in a state of amity have a right to expect from each other. It discloses moreover, views in the highest degree injurious to the interests of his majesty's dominions. and directly repugnant to, and utterly inconsistent with, the spirit and letter of the treaty of peace concluded between his majesty and the French government. His majesty's ambassador at Paris was accordingly directed to make such a representation to the French government, as his majesty felt to be called for by the imputations of the nature above described, by the disclosure of the purposes inconsistent with good faith, and highly injurious to the interests of his people; and as a claim had recently been made by the French government on the subject of the evacuation of Malta. Lord Whitworth was instructed to accompany this representation by a declaration on the part of his majesty, that before he could enter into any further discussions relative to that island, it was expected, that satisfactory explanations should be given upon the various points respecting which his majesty had complained. This representation and this claim, founded on principles incontestably just, and couched in terms the most temperate, appear to have been wholly disregarded by the French government; no satisfaction has been afforded, no explanation whatever has been given; but on the contrary, his majesty's suspicions of the views of the French government with respect to the Turkish empire have been confirmed and strengthened by subsequent events. Under these circumstances his majesty sees that he had no alternative, and that a just regard to his own honour and to the interests of his people, makes it necessary for him to declare, that he cannot consent that his troops should evacuate the island of Malta, until substantial security has been provided for those objects which under the present circumstances, might be materially endangered by their removal.

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Respecting some of the points which have been the subject of his representations. But after all that has passed, his majesty cannot consent that his troops should evacuate the island of Malta, until substantial security has been provided for those objects, which, under the present circumstances, might be materially endangered by their removal.

I am, &c.

HAWKESBURY.

No. XL. is immaterial.

No. XLI. Note from gen. Andreossi to lord Hawkesbury, dated March 10th, 1803.

The undersigned ambassador and minister plenipotentiary of the French Republic, to his Britannic majesty, had received from the first consul, express orders to require from the British government some explanations respecting the protracted occupation of the island of Malta by the English troops. He had hoped that verbal communications would have been sufficient to have produced satisfactory explanations, by preparing the way for the mutual conciliation of opinions and interests, a conduct which has been prescribed to him for his ardent zeal for the maintenance of harmony between the two countries, of the peace of Europe, objects of the solicitude of the French government: But the undersigned thinks he can no longer delay complying with the instructions he had received, and he has therefore the honor of addressing the following observations to his excellency lord Hawkesbury, which recall to recollection the spirit and the leading features of the verbal communications which he has previously made to him.

By the conditions of the 4th paragraph of the tenth article of the treaty of Amiens, the English troops were to evacuate the island of Malta, and its dependencies three months after the exchange of the ratifications. Ten months have elapsed since the ratifications have been exchanged, and the English troops are still at Malta. The French troops, on the contrary, who were to evacuate the Neapolitan & Papal states, have not waited the expiration of the three months which were granted to them to withdraw, and have quitted Tarentum, the fortifications of which they had re-established, and where they had collected 100 pieces of cannon.

What can be alleged in justification of the delay in evacuating Malta? has not the tenth article of the treaty at Amiens provided for every thing? And the Neapolitan troops being arrived, under what pretext do those of England still remain there?

Is it because all the powers enumerated in the 6th paragraph have not yet accepted the guarantee which is devolved upon them? But this is not a condition that relates to the evacuation of the island; and besides, Austria has already sent its act of guarantee: Russia itself has made only a single difficulty which is done away by the accession of the first consul to the modifications proposed, unless indeed England itself throws obstacles in the way, by refusing to accede to the proposals of Russia, which after all could not affect the engagements of his Britannic majesty, who according to the express condition of the treaty, is to evacuate the island of Malta within three months, placing it under the guard of the Neapolitans, who are to garrison it, until the definitive arrangements of the order are settled.

It should therefore seem impossible, and it would be without example in the history of nations, were his Britannic majesty to refuse to execute a fundamental article of the pacification, of the very one, which, in the drawing up of the preliminaries, was considered as the first, and as requiring to be settled previously to every other point.

Indeed, the First Consul, who cordially relies on the intentions of his Britannic majesty, and cannot suppose them to be less open and generous than those with which he is animated, has hitherto been unwilling to attribute the delay of the evacuation of Malta, to any other than to maritime circumstances.

The undersigned is, therefore, charged to require explanations on this point, and he is persuaded that the British ministry will be the more anxious to furnish such as will be satisfactory, as they must be sensible how necessary they are for the maintenance of harmony, and how important they are for the honour of the two nations.

The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to renew to lord Hawkesbury the assurances of his high consideration.

(Signed)

F. ANDREOSSI.

Portland Place, 10th March, 1803.

No. XLII.

Letter from lord Whitworth to lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris March 12.

Lord Whitworth had just been apprised of the king's message; his lordship says:

"I found, however, on going to M. de Talleyrand, at two o'clock, that he was already informed of it. He was just setting out to communicate it to the First Consul, and appeared under considerable agitation. He returned with me
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