Thank you for visiting SNEWPapers!
Sign up free
Editorial
April 3, 1761
The New Hampshire Gazette
Portsmouth, Rockingham County, New Hampshire
What is this article about?
An editorial from London on January 5 argues for a British attack on the French island of Martinico, highlighting its economic importance to France via sugar exports, the threat from its privateers, illicit trade with British subjects, and its vulnerability compared to past failed attempts, especially after Canada's surrender.
OCR Quality
95%
Excellent
Full Text
LONDON, Jan. 5.
Considerations on the Island of Martinico, and why it should be attacked.
CANADA having surrendered some Time since to the victorious British Arms, it has been expected they would make an Attempt on the Island of Martinico; nor does there appear one Object for which a British Armament could be more properly destined. This Island is of great Importance to the French, as may be instantly perceived by the following Account of what Sugar has been exported from it to France in only 7 Years, which was laid before the House of Commons in 1731.
Hhds.
In 1724 7607
1725 9397
1726 9394
1727 10569
1728 7104
(An Earthquake occasioned this Decrease)
1729 12,750
1730 14,546
And its Detriment to us by being in the Hands of our Enemy appears from the great Number of Captures which have been made by its Privateers; for notwithstanding our being possessed of Guadaloupe, Experience has convinced us that we have not put a Stop to the Enemy's Privateers, which swarm in those Seas in greater Number than before, and carry their Prizes into Martinico. To this Disadvantage may be added another still greater: Many British Subjects both on the Continent and Islands of America, but especially on the former, have carried on for these 20 or thirty Years past, a very large illicit Trade with the French at Martinico, particularly in Horses, Tools, Wood, and Utensils for carrying on their Sugar Works; while the Returns are only what may be supplied by our own Sugar Islands.
Perhaps there is not a Settlement which France ever had out of Europe, she would be more loth to part with than this Island. It is notwithstanding all that can be said in favour of Guadaloupe, in every Respect preferable to it. The taking of Martinico would put a final Stop to the unfair Traffic of the Dutch, and be such a Step towards the humbling of France, as twenty Victories in Germany would not counterbalance.
Now what is there to deter us from attacking this Place, of so much Importance to France, and mischief to us. Is it because the Dutch, under Admiral Ruyter, made an unsuccessful Attempt upon it in 1674, or the English in 1693. However, if any Arguments, drawn from these two fruitless Attacks, were offered, they would be far outweighed by the opposite Scale of the present Time, when the Enemy, without a Fleet, cannot send to it any Reinforcements in Case its principal Forts were besieged; and the Force already in the Island is not sufficient to repel a vigorous Attack. This assertion is clearly demonstrated in the Accounts which a French Officer has given of our late Attempt on this Island, and the Memorial of the Lieutenants du Roi, of its Districts, presented to the Governor, setting forth their Incapacity of defending it.
The Citadel of Fort Royal is the strongest Place on the whole Island, and in this their principal Hope of Defence lay: but at the Time the British Fleet appeared before it, which was no Surprize, for it had been long expected, the Garrison consisted of no more than 236 private Men and 14 Officers, with only 100 Barrels of Beef for their Subsistence, & very little Water in the Cisterns. Therefore there was great Probability of its falling into our Hands: but for some unaccountable Fatality or Jealousy arising among our Officers, and the Cannon not being properly managed, nor landed in the Place which the Land Officers thought most serviceable, the Troops were re-embarked after terrifying the Inhabitants and Garrison to the very Point of surrendering.
The State of its principal Strength is now indeed somewhat altered. The great Number of Privateers which have lately been fitted out there, compose the principal, if not the only additional Force that can be employ'd in its Defence. But what is this to compare with what Great Britain can send for its Reduction. A great Number of those brave Troops employ'd in the Reduction of Canada, may be spared for the Service against Martinico. Our American Islands, Barbadoes and Antigua in particular, could also spare a Number of Troops for this Service, without exposing themselves to any Danger, there being no Enemy to attack them.
Considerations on the Island of Martinico, and why it should be attacked.
CANADA having surrendered some Time since to the victorious British Arms, it has been expected they would make an Attempt on the Island of Martinico; nor does there appear one Object for which a British Armament could be more properly destined. This Island is of great Importance to the French, as may be instantly perceived by the following Account of what Sugar has been exported from it to France in only 7 Years, which was laid before the House of Commons in 1731.
Hhds.
In 1724 7607
1725 9397
1726 9394
1727 10569
1728 7104
(An Earthquake occasioned this Decrease)
1729 12,750
1730 14,546
And its Detriment to us by being in the Hands of our Enemy appears from the great Number of Captures which have been made by its Privateers; for notwithstanding our being possessed of Guadaloupe, Experience has convinced us that we have not put a Stop to the Enemy's Privateers, which swarm in those Seas in greater Number than before, and carry their Prizes into Martinico. To this Disadvantage may be added another still greater: Many British Subjects both on the Continent and Islands of America, but especially on the former, have carried on for these 20 or thirty Years past, a very large illicit Trade with the French at Martinico, particularly in Horses, Tools, Wood, and Utensils for carrying on their Sugar Works; while the Returns are only what may be supplied by our own Sugar Islands.
Perhaps there is not a Settlement which France ever had out of Europe, she would be more loth to part with than this Island. It is notwithstanding all that can be said in favour of Guadaloupe, in every Respect preferable to it. The taking of Martinico would put a final Stop to the unfair Traffic of the Dutch, and be such a Step towards the humbling of France, as twenty Victories in Germany would not counterbalance.
Now what is there to deter us from attacking this Place, of so much Importance to France, and mischief to us. Is it because the Dutch, under Admiral Ruyter, made an unsuccessful Attempt upon it in 1674, or the English in 1693. However, if any Arguments, drawn from these two fruitless Attacks, were offered, they would be far outweighed by the opposite Scale of the present Time, when the Enemy, without a Fleet, cannot send to it any Reinforcements in Case its principal Forts were besieged; and the Force already in the Island is not sufficient to repel a vigorous Attack. This assertion is clearly demonstrated in the Accounts which a French Officer has given of our late Attempt on this Island, and the Memorial of the Lieutenants du Roi, of its Districts, presented to the Governor, setting forth their Incapacity of defending it.
The Citadel of Fort Royal is the strongest Place on the whole Island, and in this their principal Hope of Defence lay: but at the Time the British Fleet appeared before it, which was no Surprize, for it had been long expected, the Garrison consisted of no more than 236 private Men and 14 Officers, with only 100 Barrels of Beef for their Subsistence, & very little Water in the Cisterns. Therefore there was great Probability of its falling into our Hands: but for some unaccountable Fatality or Jealousy arising among our Officers, and the Cannon not being properly managed, nor landed in the Place which the Land Officers thought most serviceable, the Troops were re-embarked after terrifying the Inhabitants and Garrison to the very Point of surrendering.
The State of its principal Strength is now indeed somewhat altered. The great Number of Privateers which have lately been fitted out there, compose the principal, if not the only additional Force that can be employ'd in its Defence. But what is this to compare with what Great Britain can send for its Reduction. A great Number of those brave Troops employ'd in the Reduction of Canada, may be spared for the Service against Martinico. Our American Islands, Barbadoes and Antigua in particular, could also spare a Number of Troops for this Service, without exposing themselves to any Danger, there being no Enemy to attack them.
What sub-type of article is it?
Military Affairs
War Or Peace
Imperialism
What keywords are associated?
Martinico Attack
French Colony
British Strategy
Sugar Trade
Privateers
Illicit Trade
Fort Royal
Canada Surrender
What entities or persons were involved?
Island Of Martinico
France
Britain
Canada
Guadaloupe
House Of Commons
Admiral Ruyter
Lieutenants Du Roi
Fort Royal
Editorial Details
Primary Topic
Justification For British Attack On Martinico
Stance / Tone
Strongly Advocating Military Assault On French Colony
Key Figures
Island Of Martinico
France
Britain
Canada
Guadaloupe
House Of Commons
Admiral Ruyter
Lieutenants Du Roi
Fort Royal
Key Arguments
Martinico's Sugar Exports Vital To French Economy
Privateers From Martinico Capture British Ships Despite Guadaloupe Control
Illicit Trade By British Subjects With Martinico Harms British Interests
Martinico Preferable To Guadaloupe For France
Capture Would Stop Dutch Traffic And Humble France
Past Failed Attacks Outdated; Current Enemy Weakness Allows Success
Fort Royal Garrison Weak And Undersupplied
British Troops From Canada And Islands Available For Assault