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In the Court of Peers on Oct. 26, 1830, Prince de Polignac and Comte de Peyronnet were interrogated about their involvement in the July 25 ordinances, Chamber dissolution, and events sparking the French Revolution, denying coup plans and affirming actions as legal under the Charter.
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COURT OF PEERS. Oct. 26.
PRINCE DE POLIGNAC.
Since what period did you know that you were to be called to the Ministry before your nomination of the 8th of August, 1829?—I only became acquainted with it a few days before.
Did you form the Ministry, and did the King agree with you concerning all the members who composed it?—I found the Ministry partly formed, and proposed to the King M. de Courvoisier, M. de Montbel, and M. de Rigny: the latter refused.
What rule of conduct did you intend to follow on taking in hand the direction of affairs?—The same that my predecessors had followed.
What predecessors do you speak of?—Of all: we all had but one desire—that of maintaining the established order of things. All my papers have been taken, and amongst them some notes must certainly have been found which express my real intentions.
In calling into the council, or in accepting as colleagues, men who were considered by the public opinion as enemies to constitutional institutions, did you not intend to make use of them in order to overthrow those institutions?—To be able to answer this question, I should first know who were those men considered as hostile to constitutional institutions. M. de La Bourdonnaye had been for years the object of the encomium of the opposition papers; besides, I did not propose him to the King's choice, for he was named before I entered the council. As far as M. de Bourmont, the only reproach addressed to him was relative to a military affair, which could have no influence on his politics, nor offer any precedent in regard to his conduct in the direction of public affairs.
At that period, and during your ministry, you positively affirmed that you had a mission to abolish the electoral law and the liberty of the press.
Who had given you that mission?—I never said that I had any such mission, and consequently no one ever gave it me.
By whom were you seconded in the Council in the execution of the plan which ultimately gave birth to the ordinances of the 25th of July last?—No plan of the kind was formed up to the last moment.
Was the line of conduct which you followed discussed in the Council?—If by line of conduct you mean the subversion of the institutions, such a design was never discussed in the Council: for it never existed. In regard to the system of Government which the Ministry of the 8th of August was desirous of following, it merely consisted in developing, as much as possible, the Charter itself, through the medium of institutions which might be concordant with our laws and character. During my residence in England, I took care to study the institutions of that country, which might also be of use to France, and I even wrote a kind of treatise on the subject, which must have been found at the Ministry.
When you advised the King, Charles X., to dissolve the Chamber, had you already concerted with your colleagues the plan which was put in execution by the ordinances of July?—The dissolution of the Chambers was decided in the Council of Ministers, and in the King's Council, but it had no kind of relation with the ordinances, which were not then thought of.
How could you think, disposed as the public opinion then was, that the new Chamber would be different from the other which was dissolved?—Changes of this kind have often taken place, both in France and England, and I really thought that the new Chamber would be composed differently from the former. Many persons were of the same opinion with myself.
In order to obtain a Chamber such as you desired it to be, did you not make use of means, either personally or through your agents, which might be termed illegal, in order to influence the choice of the electors?—No; I made use of none.
Did you not in particular threaten the public functionaries, to force them to vote in your favour?—Never; and, as Minister, I wrote but one circular on the subject of the electors, and that was of such an inoffensive nature that it gave rise to no kind of censure whatsoever. The only elections which ever attracted my particular attention (and then merely as a private individual) were those of the Haute-Loire, on account of the numerous relations which I had in that department.
At what period did you form the project of the ordinances of July 25th? Seven or eight days before they were signed, and they were really decided upon at the very moment of their publication.
Did not M. de Peyronnet, who drew up the electoral circular of the 25th of July, read to you another of the same kind before he entered the Ministry?—No; besides, I cannot say who drew up the ordinance.
Was the object of the dissolution of the Chamber to engage the King so far, that it should become impossible for him to remain on the throne unless supported by bayonets!—By no means; and indeed I cannot imagine what can give rise to such a question.
If the dissolution of the Chamber, the designation of the 221 Deputies as enemies of the King, and the intention of maintaining his Ministry at any cost, at any risk and at the expense of any law, were all plans conceived by the King himself, why did you not represent to him the dangers to which he exposed himself?—I shall first begin by putting as aside every thing that relates to the person of the King, which is sacred: secondly, I repeat that the 221 Deputies were never designated as being his personal enemies; and in fine, the intention of preserving the Ministry, as far from being illegal: it was not the first time since the restoration that a Chamber of Deputies had been dissolved in order to maintain the Ministry.
If you did not form the project of the ordinances before the moment of their publication, what new circumstances had placed the country in a situation to justify such a measure? Was not the country in a state of tranquility?—No; there was a party which conspired against the charter and the dynasty?
Had the Administration experienced any formidable resistance, and of such a nature as to justify any great change in the established order of things?—The administration had to encounter obstacles in every quarter, though its proceedings were everywhere conformable to the laws.
Of what kind were those obstacles?—They resulted especially from the malevolence with which all the acts of the Government were received, and which was manifested by the most bitter censure of measures which had been claimed before as blessings—by the calumnies invented against the government—by associations formed to oppose projects which never existed—by the most indiscreet publicity given to the orders and to the plans of the administration, to compromise their execution; in fine, all that passed evidently showed that a party was organizing for the fall of the Monarchy.
But supposing this state of things to be exact, you must allow that it had long existed, and yet it had not determined you to take immediately the measures you adopted at a later period; how is it that you delayed them so long?—We hoped that the dissolution of the Chamber would produce a majority determined to support the Ministry, and we had the more reason to expect that such would be the case, as shortly after the address several of the members who voted it declared that if the same circumstance was to occur again, they would not vote in its favor. But as the new elections sent back a Chamber still more hostile than the former, we were of opinion that the measures alluded to became indispensable.
Here is a letter from M. de la Ferronays, from Naples, dated August 2, and which arrived in Paris after you had left the Ministry, and proves that you had communicated to him at that period certain projects which excited his apprehension?—That letter can only allude to the consequences of the dissolution of the Chamber, and of the convocation of the new Chamber on the 3d of August, but not at all to the ordinances, of which I had neither spoken nor written to any one, as I declare again that I never thought of them before the moment I have mentioned.
The ordinances appear to have been combated in the Council by MM. de Peyronnet, Guernon de Ranville, and de Montbel; how could you, in contradiction with those Members of the Council, with the opinion of the nation, and merely not to yield to the wishes of the people who were hostile to your Ministry—how could you excite the King to such terrible extremities? How could you engage yourself in such a perilous career?—The ordinances were approved by all the members of the Council. I did not even draw them up, but I gave in my approbation as well as the other members of the Council.
The ordinances may have met with the definitive approbation of the Council, and yet have been previously combated in the course of discussion; can you say by whom they were combated?—The ordinances, as well as many other projects which were presented at that moment, were certainly discussed in a preparatory deliberation, but they were ultimately approved by all the members of the council; and I cannot enter into any detail concerning the share that each member had in the discussion, or even in the act of drawing them up.
Did you not communicate the definitive form of the ordinances to any person, before they were discussed in the Council?—No; to no one who did not belong to the Ministry.
Did not M. Guernon de Ranville address to you as early as the month of December, a memorial, in which he opposed beforehand the ordinances and the coups d'etat, and maintained that it was impossible to have recourse to extra legal measures without incurring great danger?—I remember he sent me a note, which I answered by saying that I was perfectly of his opinion.
However, some intention of violating the charter must have been manifested to induce M. Guernon de Ranville to think a note of this kind necessary.—Nothing of the kind had ever been thought of, and I beg that M. Guernon de Ranville may be particularly interrogated on that point.
Did not M. de Peyronnet carry to the council the original copy of the ordinances?—I am bound to be silent on all that passed in the Council, and especially in what concern the names of persons.
Had the project been concerted beforehand between yourself and the King?—No.
You must have foreseen that the ordinances would excite general indignation; they expelled from the electoral colleges almost all the commercial classes, & put an end to direct election: a legitimate and loyal resistance must therefore have been expected. What plan had you laid down in order to triumph over that resistance?—We hoped, on the contrary, that all persons attached to order and tranquillity would acknowledge the object which we endeavoured to attain, & which was to put an end to the agitation of the public mind. We therefore had concerted no plan, because we did not foresee any kind of resistance.
However, you could not expect any thing from the tribunals whose strict fidelity to their duty was well known. Before what kind of jurisdiction, did you intend to bring those who should oppose the execution of the ordinances?—Before no other but the ordinary jurisdictions.
Do you understand by ordinary jurisdictions councils of war and provost courts?—No, by no means.
At least you must have expected that on the 3rd of September the electoral ordinances would meet with some resistance, and especially to that one which authorizes the seizure and the destruction of the printing presses without any form of judgment, in Paris and the other large towns of the kingdom. What measures had you taken to enforce the execution of those ordinances, so contrary to the laws?—The measures proper to enforce the execution of those ordinances did not concern my department, and no others were proposed than those authorized by law.
But to subvert the fundamental laws of a country was certainly to effect a revolution in the government of a country, and did you not look upon the change of the electoral law by an ordinance as a real change of a fundamental law?—I shall speak of this in my defence, and there I hope to prove that in virtue of the 14th article of the Charter, when circumstances required it, it became allowable to effect some modifications in the electoral laws by ordinance, without effecting what is called a revolution.
The laws on the press were enacted with the sanction of the three powers of the state; how could you think it possible to change those laws by an ordinance, without violating the fundamental law of the realm?—The answer I made relative to the question on the electoral law is equally applicable to this question.
When measures of such a perilous nature are once adopted, it seems but natural to make sure beforehand of a strong military force, especially when no support can be expected from the tribunals. Had you sounded the disposition of the troops and their chiefs?—No.
Did you inform the Prefect of Police of the desperate steps you were about to take? Did you concert any plan with him?—No.
If you advised the King to publish the ordinances, without taking at least some of the precautions which we have enumerated, would it not be just to infer from thence that you yielded to the impulse of some hidden power, some secret authority, which you could not resist?—No.
When Charles X. ordered you to draw up the ordinances, or when he adopted them, did you make to him any representations to prevent him from running headlong into an abyss which his most faithful servants signalized to him with horror?—As the Ministry proposed the ordinances to the King, and as we did it with a view to public interest, we could not dissuade him from the adoption of measures which we deemed indispensable.
The ordinances were signed on the 25th July; did the disunion relative to them continue up to that day?—They were already agreed upon: they might indeed have been discussed on the day of the signature, but if so, it was very briefly.
In signing them, did the King evince any symptoms of anxiety?—I shall always be silent on all that relates to the King personally.
Did you inform the King of the first disturbances in Paris on the 26th?—I had but an imperfect knowledge of them myself, and did not inform him.
Were you aware on the 27th of the resistance of the journalists (particularly the Temps,) and the protest signed by 44 of them?—I read the protest in the journal.
It appears, however, that you had a more intimate knowledge of it, since the Procureur du Roi went to your hotel to confer on the subject. Did not you order him to arrest the 44 who had signed the protest?—The Procureur may have been at my hotel, but I did not speak to him.
(The examiner then denies that the arrest was discussed in the Council of Ministers held at his hotel at ten o'clock on the evening of the 27th, but admits that the ordinance declaring Paris in a state of siege was so.)
Did not the project declaring Paris in a state of siege, depriving the capital of its Magistrates and authorities, to deliver it without resource into the hands of military power, open your eyes to the unconstitutional nature of ordinances which could only be supported by force?—We conceived the measure to be legal, and thought that concentrating the power in a single hand would be the shortest mode of restoring order, particularly considering the interruptions of the ordinary communications which were the result of the disturbances.
Were you yourself aware of all the consequences of the ordinance declaring Paris in a state of siege?—I could not be so, not having studied the laws on the subject.
(The examiner admits that he took that ordinance to be signed by the King on Wednesday morning, and states in answer to another question, that he knows nothing of its having transpired on the Tuesday, or of the Prefect of Police having declared that he had no longer any authority.)
The deliberations on this ordinance were on the evening of the 27th, and notwithstanding the scenes which had already marked that day with blood, they had not been sufficiently general to justify so extreme a measure in the most prejudiced eyes, the city even appearing sufficiently quiet for all the troops to repair to their quarters; what, then, was the motive which determined the step?—When we took that determination Paris was so far from being calm, that we had just received information that all workmen had been discharged by their masters, the consequence of which might be, that there would be 40,000 men, without work or bread, to swell the commotion of next day.
What steps did you take to apprise the citizens of this ordinance, so as to prevent their unwillingly rendering themselves liable to be cited before the Councils of War?—I only delivered the ordinance to M. le Maréchal.
Why were not the citizens enjoined to disperse in the terms required by the law before force was resorted to?—I have no knowledge of this circumstance. I am a stranger to all the measures adopted by the civil or military authority during the three days; but from what I have been told since, I collect that the necessary injunctions to disperse were given, and that even on the preceding night a proclamation of the Prefect of Police had forbidden every species of assemblage of the people.
Did you inform the King on Tuesday evening that the troops had already fired upon the people assembled, amid the cries of "Vive la Charte?"—I never knew the circumstance.
Were you at St. Cloud on Wednesday morning, when the Marshal informed the King by letter of the manner in which the resistance was developing itself in Paris?—No, I never knew that the Marshal had so written.
(The examiner says, in answer to several questions, that it was Wednesday night that the troops stationed round Paris were ordered to march on the capital, and that it was about 1 o'clock on Wednesday afternoon that he left his hotel, and established himself at the head quarters of Marshal Marmont in the Tuileries where the other ministers arrived in succession.)
Did you, while at head quarters, consult with your colleagues on the deplorable state of affairs of which you were the witnesses?—I have already said, that although there were ministers, there was no longer a ministry.
How was there no longer a Ministry? Although Paris was in a state of siege, had you no other duties to perform towards the King?—I mean that the ministry was no longer in activity at Paris. There was still room to hope that the disturbances might be appeased.
Did you not refuse to see the Deputies of Paris, who came to entreat you to put a stop to the carnage? The Marshal informed me in a few words that some Deputies from Paris had come to him, stating that it was necessary to revoke the ordinances; to which I replied that I could not do so myself, but that I would write to the King on the subject. I had before desired an officer of the staff to apprise me when these gentlemen left the Marshal, which he did. I hesitated a moment whether to go to them or not, but, considering that I could say nothing more than I had already done through the Marshal, I begged them not to wait, the Marshal having promised to give me all the details of the conversation.
Did you consult your colleagues as to whether you should receive the deputation or not?—No; the whole circumstance passed in a very few minutes.
Did you know the names of the Deputies who presented themselves at head-quarters?—I only knew MM. Lafitte and Casimir Perrier.
Did you communicate to the King in writing the steps taken by the Deputies—Yes.
It appears that the Marshal communicated to the King on the same Wednesday, about noon, the situation of Paris, and the actual position in which he was placed; but as the King did not correspond with the Marshal alone, he must also have corresponded with you, as President of the Council and Minister of War. It appears that at 4 o'clock, he thought himself in full security, and his troops victorious in every direction. Was not this error attributable to the reports sent him by you?—I knew nothing of the communication of which you speak. The Marshal never showed me what he wrote, and I had no correspondence with the King, except the letter to which I have just alluded.
(The examiner then, in answer to successive questions, denies having ordered the arrest of the twelve Deputies of Paris, or having had any conference with M. de Champagny, or given any orders on the subject of a military commission. He also denies having been visited on Wednesday morning by an agent of the police, who came to represent the difficulty of executing the forty-five orders of arrest given the evening before, and states that he was ignorant of the names of the individuals to whom these orders related, and never gave any directions whatever concerning them, and particularly denies having had any conference with M. de Foucauld on the subject on Thursday evening.)
Was not the hope of being enabled, by the troops which you expected during the night, and the artillery from Vincennes, to assume a commanding position of attack on Thursday morning, your real motive for keeping the King in ignorance of the actual state of Paris?—No.
It appears that the king, informed at last of the true state of affairs, was disposed about eleven on Thursday morning to revoke the ordinances, and change the Ministry. Did you dissuade him from so doing, or cause the delay which took place in carrying these resolutions into effect?—On the contrary, it was I who first, about half past ten, made him feel the necessity of revoking the ordinances, and I then gave in my resignation. I pointed out the Duke de Mortemart as the most desirable person to announce the fact at Paris, and having received the royal authority to speak to him, I immediately did so, and introduced him to the King.
Can you throw any light on the extraordinary circumstance of the fires which desolated part of Normandy during the latter period of your administration, and which took place in a manner confirmatory of the existence of some plan projected by deadly enemies to the repose and happiness of France? Notwithstanding the institution of the strictest inquiries, and the adoption of the most minute precautions, in which we were zealously seconded by the local authorities, we have never been able to make any discoveries; I can only, therefore, most urgently entreat the committee to adopt every means which may tend to elucidate the whole truth on this subject.
You appear to state, that after declaring Paris in a state of siege, you did not take any measure for the organization of councils of war; the indictment however, states that you gave instructions on this point on Wednesday morning at St. Cloud, to M. le Viscount de Champagny, and that he even assembled the clerks of the War-office, to obtain information on this point. How can you explain this? I do not recollect having seen M. de Champagny at St. Cloud on Wednesday morning; indeed, I feel certain that I did not, but he came to me at the Tuileries late on Wednesday night. He spoke to me of the formation of a council of war, and of the nomination of its members, notice of which had been given at the War office on Wednesday evening. I told him that having but little acquaintance with the army personally, I could not point out any officers, but advised him to come to an understanding with the Marshal on the subject, if it were considered necessary to establish a council of war.
You appear to say that you knew nothing of an order issued on Wednesday to arrest several Deputies, and other individuals. It is, however, stated in the indictment that such an order, including, among other names, those of Messrs. Lafitte, and Eusèbe Salverte, and, I believe, M. de Lafayette, and signed by the Duke de Ragusa, was given on Wednesday to M. de Foucauld. Did you know of that order?—That order not having been signed by me, I cannot answer any questions concerning facts relating to other persons.
Were you informed of the non execution of that order, which appears to have been suspended at the moment the Deputies left the Tuileries, after you had refused to receive them? Did you know the motives for the suspension?—The motives must have been honourable to the person who revoked the order, since individuals bringing a message of conciliation could not legally be arrested. I regret that I could not participate in the revocation, not having been cognizant of the order.
In such a situation, and since you considered that as a necessary consequence of declaring Paris in a state of siege, you had so entirely given up the power, how happens it that it did not occur to you to retire altogether by resigning?—I not only wished to do so, but had several times during my administration expressed that wish to the King. A fortnight even before the ordinances were signed, I repeated it, begging him at least to appoint another President of the Council, even if he thought it necessary for his interest that I should remain in the administration.
M. LE COMTE DE PEYRONNET, OCT. 26, 1830.
Was not your entrance in the administration determined on long before the 18th of May, when it took place?—No; even at that very time I had completed my preparations for a journey to Bordeaux, which I had fixed to undertake on the Saturday of that week.
When you accepted the Ministry of the Interior, renouncing that of the Department of Justice, which you had filled for so many years, were you not specially commissioned to control the elections by influencing the electors? And what means of so much weight were you supposed to possess for that purpose? The negative of the first part of the question is proved by the fact of all the electoral operations being completed at the time I joined the Ministry, and also by the part which I personally took in them: and I take this opportunity of requesting the committee to annex to the proceedings the original, in my hand writing, of the only circular which I addressed to the Prefects on the subject of the elections. I must also express my regret that in the examination made by the Chamber of Deputies, I was not shown several documents which have since been attributed to me, and which I was consequently unable to refute. To the second part of the question I have no answer to give.
You of course calculated the possibility of the electors being opposed to you, and in that case was not the plan of the ordinances of the 25th determined on by you and your colleagues, or at least by you and the President of the Council?—Neither the plan of the ordinances nor the ordinances themselves had been the subject of discussion between any of my colleagues and myself.
When you became acquainted with the decisive result of the elections, did it not occur to you that it was the duty of a good citizen and a faithful subject of the King to break up the Ministry? You did so in 1827, when the necessity was less apparent; what were your motives for so different a course of conduct on the present occasion?—The direction of affairs not being in my hands, the dissolution of the Ministry could not depend on me; besides, important modifications were several times under consideration.
You have told us that the summonses to the members were sent in the usual routine of office-business. We are nevertheless assured that on Sunday evening you had a certain number of them in your desk, and showed them to individuals who questioned you concerning the reports in circulation of a coup d'etat?—That is certainly untrue.
If, as you say, the plan of the ordinances was only conceived between the 10th and 20th of July what had occurred during that period to render such a measure necessary?—Although it is both a difficult and delicate thing for me to explain the motives which may have been alleged in Councils, the deliberations of which should be secret, I think I may, without violating my duty, say, that every one may conceive the perilous situation in which the elections had placed the Government to have been one of the principal motives for the decision.
The expression, "one of the principal motives," leads us to suppose that there were others—were?—That would lead me to communicate all the details of the deliberations of the Councils, which I consider neither allowable nor necessary.
Can you tell us what they were?—You have said in your former examinations, that you never intended to participate in any measures which would have the effect of suspending the charter. Did you not then consider it a primary violation of the charter to change by ordinances laws of so fundamental a character as those voted by the three Powers to regulate the elections and the press?—I have always considered expedience, and the execution of those measures, as well as the possible inconveniences which might result from them, as questions of the greatest importance. With respect to the right of the Crown to adopt them, I, in common with many well regulated minds and in conformity with notorious and important precedents, considered that right to be conferred by the charter.
What are the notorious and important precedents to which you refer?—They are to be found in the Moniteur, and will probably be produced as part of our defence.
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Foreign News Details
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Paris
Event Date
Oct. 26, 1830
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Transcript of interrogations in the Court of Peers trial of former French ministers Prince de Polignac and Comte de Peyronnet regarding their roles in the ordinances of July 25, 1830, the dissolution of the Chamber, and events leading to the July Revolution, including denials of prior planning, discussions on legality under the Charter, and responses to questions about resistance and military measures.