The Kentucky Gazette

Saturday, October 28, 1797

A curious treatise has been recently published in France, on the subject of equality. This work, in the line of political literature, is one of the most nervous that has appeared since the time of Rouleau. It is destitute of method, or regularity of plan, but discovers the reflections of an elevated mind, vast, profound, and perfectly acquainted with men and varied in historical research. He dwells on the various particular questions relative to the art of governing men. The author is very guarded when he falls on philosophical principles. He does not dispute with the most extravagant democrats the principles on which chiefly found their system of political belief; and he even surrenders to them some degree, their favourite scheme; but at the same time he takes away one of their leading principles, their universal persuasion that the social state originates in nature or morality; or that it is founded on any such basis. He insists that political society is positively contrary to nature, and can subsist only by a sort of artificial organization, no way connected with the general laws of nature, that control the universe. For a state of society, says he, there are two truths that seem to contradict each other: speculative and practical truths. Speculative, (or metaphysical truths) are conformable to the general laws of nature; and the others regard man kind in the abstract. With the former the whole should control a part; in the other, a part ought to command the whole. According to this writer it is evident that a people unlimitedly possesses within themselves sovereignty, as existing in the general mass of individuals. It is mathematically true to be true, that the whole is greater than a part. But this writer maintains that in the artificial order of civil society, invented by man: the natural sovereignty of a people ought to disappear. Then (says he) all natured, a part becomes greater than the whole, and for the good of the whole a part becomes omnipotent. Men yield to the imperious necessity of things; and to be a little at rest, they consent to elevate others above themselves to be governed by. After some positions of this cast, the writer infers that the social structure can have no solid foundation except on the principle of inequality—not only (says he) clear inequality in or out of allied; or from accidental varieties of means, abilities, faculties, genius, or aptitude. But I talk of hereditary inequality, supported by the influence of prejudice, and every illusion of longstanding authority. He allows, however, that personal distinctions should not bear too hard on individuals of inferior classes, and that rank should be put into such a view, and so modified as that the meanest citizen, might have a chance of attaining to the highest grades, in virtue of the progressive contact of every intermediate rank—thus, says he, would more easily be repaired the losses occasioned by the extinction or degeneracy of families; and merit, as well as fortune, would be gratified in its claims.