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Editorial
April 17, 1943
The Wilmington Morning Star
Wilmington, New Hanover County, North Carolina
What is this article about?
Editorial interprets Japanese fears of US air power in Pacific War, focusing on Doolittle raid anniversary, strategies to counter bombers, and US pledges for escalated attacks from Chinese bases.
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Interpreting The War
By GLENN BABB
The Japanese give frequent proof that they fear the rising air power of the United States, perhaps more than any other development in the Pacific war.
Tomorrow, the anniversary of the Doolittle raid on Tokyo, probably will produce fresh evidence. The Japanese are great people for anniversaries, even those of misfortune, and although Americans will recall the thrills of last April 18 with pleasurable anticipation of more of the same, it is likely that the date will get even more notice in Japan.
Last year Honshu, the main island, made the acquaintance of our medium bombers, the B-25 Mitchells. The Japanese know this was only a sample of what is in store when the big four-engine Liberators and Fortresses come. Fear of the big American bombers has had much to do with shaping the strategy of the Tokyo government and high command; one prime objective is to keep them as far away as possible. That has been one of the main concerns of the Japanese in China, where the major campaign of 1942 was waged largely to wipe out actual or potential bases within range of Japan. It also helps explain their continued politeness toward the Soviet Union; they do not want bombers flying from Siberian bases against Tokyo and Osaka, whether they be Russian or American. It also accounts in large part for their efforts to maintain their foothold in the Aleutians and large scale preparations for air war in the Northwest Pacific.
Already this spring the enemy command is showing uneasiness over East China bases. During the first three days of April Japanese air squadrons made heavy, unopposed raids on Lishui, in southern Chekiang province, and Kienow, northern Fukien, where, Tokyo declared, "enemy runways and military installations" were blasted.
The lack of opposition raises doubt as to whether either place was the site of an air field. United States air forces do not leave their bases unprotected, as the Japanese discovered April 2 when 7 of 9 Zeros that tried to attack an American base in Kiangsi province, just west of Chekiang, were destroyed.
That misadventure probably convinced the Japanese that the field of American air operations is being extended to eastern China and intensified its anxieties. The Chekiang-Fukien-Kiangsi area is within heavy bomber range of at least southern Japan. Air fields established there would be within 650 to 800 miles of Nagasaki, chief port of the southwest. From Nagasaki it is only 100 miles to the heavy industry belt of northern Kyushu, 300 miles to the Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto triangle 600 miles to Tokyo. The Japanese know, for we have made no effort to hide it, that new types of American heavy bombers are in production for which the 1,300-mile flight from Kiangsi to bomb Tokyo would be a feat no more remarkable than that of Doolittle's Mitchells.
The story of that feat, pretty much a mystery to most Americans and Japanese alike for a year, is soon to be told by Washington, perhaps this week-end of the anniversary. We know that 80 men, picked volunteers, participated. One plane came down in Siberia and its crew was interned. At least one came down in Japanese-held territory in China and the fliers were made prisoners. Others reached safety in the China-India theater, where 18 still are serving. The leader, now Maj. Gen. Doolittle, and many of his men have returned to the United States and are fighting in other theaters.
But Shangri-La the starting point, has remained a secret. The Japanese insist that it was the aircraft carrier Hornet, later sunk off the Santa Cruz islands. The Japanese hailed the Hornet's end as revenge for the Tokyo raid. The promised OWI account will show how shrewd a guess this was.
We have left no doubt of our determination to make last year's raid just a tiny sample. President Roosevelt has declared that "important actions will be taken in the skies over China-and over Japan itself" and many of his subordinates have echoed this pledge with suitable trimmings.
The Japanese talk a good defense against the impending terror, even comforting themselves with boasts of their ability to bomb the United States. An example was this week's statement by one General Kenryo Sato that "Japanese planes today are in a position to attack the American continent" and that Japan's "air defense has been greatly improved by various inventions of Japanese inventors."
The people of Nippon may draw some comfort from such words as they contemplate the warning of April 18. If the spring in Japan is normal tomorrow should be the Sunday at which Tokyo's cherry blossom season is at its best. Normally it is a time of feasting and merrymaking, picnicking in the parks, sake drinking, Geisha parties. But the war already has tempered such gayeties and remembrances of last year and bodings of the future probably will make it even more somber.
By GLENN BABB
The Japanese give frequent proof that they fear the rising air power of the United States, perhaps more than any other development in the Pacific war.
Tomorrow, the anniversary of the Doolittle raid on Tokyo, probably will produce fresh evidence. The Japanese are great people for anniversaries, even those of misfortune, and although Americans will recall the thrills of last April 18 with pleasurable anticipation of more of the same, it is likely that the date will get even more notice in Japan.
Last year Honshu, the main island, made the acquaintance of our medium bombers, the B-25 Mitchells. The Japanese know this was only a sample of what is in store when the big four-engine Liberators and Fortresses come. Fear of the big American bombers has had much to do with shaping the strategy of the Tokyo government and high command; one prime objective is to keep them as far away as possible. That has been one of the main concerns of the Japanese in China, where the major campaign of 1942 was waged largely to wipe out actual or potential bases within range of Japan. It also helps explain their continued politeness toward the Soviet Union; they do not want bombers flying from Siberian bases against Tokyo and Osaka, whether they be Russian or American. It also accounts in large part for their efforts to maintain their foothold in the Aleutians and large scale preparations for air war in the Northwest Pacific.
Already this spring the enemy command is showing uneasiness over East China bases. During the first three days of April Japanese air squadrons made heavy, unopposed raids on Lishui, in southern Chekiang province, and Kienow, northern Fukien, where, Tokyo declared, "enemy runways and military installations" were blasted.
The lack of opposition raises doubt as to whether either place was the site of an air field. United States air forces do not leave their bases unprotected, as the Japanese discovered April 2 when 7 of 9 Zeros that tried to attack an American base in Kiangsi province, just west of Chekiang, were destroyed.
That misadventure probably convinced the Japanese that the field of American air operations is being extended to eastern China and intensified its anxieties. The Chekiang-Fukien-Kiangsi area is within heavy bomber range of at least southern Japan. Air fields established there would be within 650 to 800 miles of Nagasaki, chief port of the southwest. From Nagasaki it is only 100 miles to the heavy industry belt of northern Kyushu, 300 miles to the Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto triangle 600 miles to Tokyo. The Japanese know, for we have made no effort to hide it, that new types of American heavy bombers are in production for which the 1,300-mile flight from Kiangsi to bomb Tokyo would be a feat no more remarkable than that of Doolittle's Mitchells.
The story of that feat, pretty much a mystery to most Americans and Japanese alike for a year, is soon to be told by Washington, perhaps this week-end of the anniversary. We know that 80 men, picked volunteers, participated. One plane came down in Siberia and its crew was interned. At least one came down in Japanese-held territory in China and the fliers were made prisoners. Others reached safety in the China-India theater, where 18 still are serving. The leader, now Maj. Gen. Doolittle, and many of his men have returned to the United States and are fighting in other theaters.
But Shangri-La the starting point, has remained a secret. The Japanese insist that it was the aircraft carrier Hornet, later sunk off the Santa Cruz islands. The Japanese hailed the Hornet's end as revenge for the Tokyo raid. The promised OWI account will show how shrewd a guess this was.
We have left no doubt of our determination to make last year's raid just a tiny sample. President Roosevelt has declared that "important actions will be taken in the skies over China-and over Japan itself" and many of his subordinates have echoed this pledge with suitable trimmings.
The Japanese talk a good defense against the impending terror, even comforting themselves with boasts of their ability to bomb the United States. An example was this week's statement by one General Kenryo Sato that "Japanese planes today are in a position to attack the American continent" and that Japan's "air defense has been greatly improved by various inventions of Japanese inventors."
The people of Nippon may draw some comfort from such words as they contemplate the warning of April 18. If the spring in Japan is normal tomorrow should be the Sunday at which Tokyo's cherry blossom season is at its best. Normally it is a time of feasting and merrymaking, picnicking in the parks, sake drinking, Geisha parties. But the war already has tempered such gayeties and remembrances of last year and bodings of the future probably will make it even more somber.
What sub-type of article is it?
Military Affairs
War Or Peace
Foreign Affairs
What keywords are associated?
Doolittle Raid
Us Air Power
Pacific War
Japanese Strategy
Heavy Bombers
China Bases
Tokyo Anniversary
What entities or persons were involved?
Japanese Government
Tokyo High Command
Glenn Babb
Doolittle
President Roosevelt
General Kenryo Sato
United States Air Forces
Editorial Details
Primary Topic
Japanese Fear Of Us Air Power And Doolittle Raid Anniversary
Stance / Tone
Interpretive And Supportive Of Us Military Capabilities
Key Figures
Japanese Government
Tokyo High Command
Glenn Babb
Doolittle
President Roosevelt
General Kenryo Sato
United States Air Forces
Key Arguments
Japanese Fear Us Rising Air Power More Than Other Pacific War Developments
Anniversary Of Doolittle Raid On Tokyo Likely To Produce Japanese Evidence Of Fear
Japanese Strategy Shaped To Keep Big Us Bombers Away, Including Campaigns In China And Politeness To Soviet Union
Recent Japanese Raids On Potential Chinese Bases Show Uneasiness
Us Heavy Bombers Could Reach Japan From Eastern China Bases
Doolittle Raid Details To Be Revealed, Involved 80 Volunteers From Carrier Hornet
Us Determination To Escalate Air Attacks Over China And Japan
Japanese Boasts Of Defense And Ability To Bomb Us