Gazette Of The United States, & Philadelphia Daily Advertiser

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.
MONDAY—DECEMBER 18.

Mr. Dwight Foster moved that the committee of claims be discharged from the further consideration of the petitions of Israel Jones and Edward Johnson, as they had already been reported upon at a former session, and no fresh facts appeared to induce the committee to report differently. Agreed.

The same gentleman made an unfavourable report on the petition of Mary Ivings, which was concurred in by the house.

Mr. Harper, from the committee of ways and means, made a report on the petition of William Tomlinson, and others, citizens of Virginia, who complained of being obliged by the act relative to the distilling of spirits, to take out licenses at inconvenient seasons. The report recommends a law to be passed to obviate their complaints. It was committed for to-morrow.

Mr. Livingston, from the committee of commerce and manufactures, reported a bill for the relief of North and Vey, of Charleston—Committed for to-morrow.

On motion of Mr. Harper, the house resolved itself into a committee of the whole, on certain resolutions which were lately reported, prescribing the mode of taking evidence in cases of contested elections. They were agreed to both in the committee of the whole, and in the house, without debate, and a bill directed to be brought in accordingly.

Mr. Venable, from the committee to whom was referred the resolution for suspending the second section of the act for regulating foreign coin, and other purposes, reported a bill, which was twice read, and committed for to-morrow.

Mr. Wadsworth moved the order of the day on the bill authorizing the President of the United States to postpone the meeting of Congress in certain cases. The house accordingly went into a committee of the whole on the subject, and, after making a verbal amendment, the committee rose, and the house agreed to it; when

Mr. Gallatin moved a provision to the following effect: "Provided that the day to which the meeting shall be postponed shall not exceed thirty days from the day to which Congress stood adjourned."

Mr. Harper could not see any good effect which this amendment was calculated to produce. If the gentleman were of opinion that it would not be safe to trust the President of the United States with the power of postponing the meeting of Congress, in case of a contagious sickness, or other calamity, the safest way would be to reject the bill; but the present motion, he thought, shewed great hostility, and the highest disrespect, to the President of the United States.

Mr. Gallatin said, it was extraordinary, that upon an amendment, to a bill vesting a power in the President of the United States, which was not given to him by the constitution, because he did not wish to invest him with the power, without limitation, he should be charged with a want of confidence, and a want of respect. He supposed, that so far as related to confidence, they were bound to give the President just so much as the constitution required, and no more.—Confidence beyond this he did not very well understand. As to the motion's containing a want of respect to the President, that charge was still less applicable. Respect, he said, could only be personal, and could, of course, only apply to the present President; whereas the bill under consideration did not relate to him only, but to all future Presidents of the United States. How the argument of disrespect to men not yet in existence, could apply, he was at loss to know. But, he said, it was no uncommon thing, whenever gentlemen differed in opinion on any subject touching another branch of the government, however harmless that opinion might be, to be charged with a want of confidence and respect towards it. He should, however, never be deterred from acting as he thought right by such arguments.

Mr. G. referred to that part of the Constitution where it is said, that, "neither House, during the session of Congress, shall without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting;" and also to that where power is given to the President "to convene both houses, or either of them on extraordinary occasions; and, in case of disagreement between them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he may think proper."

It was clear, therefore, that the two houses had the exclusive power to adjourn to whatever time they pleased, only that in case of disagreement, the President had the power to adjourn them; but this bill went to vest the power in the President of fixing another period of meeting than that agreed upon by the two houses. This, he said, was a delicate subject, and he thought they ought not, upon so slight a view as the present bill had received, to part with a power, without some limit, which the Constitution had placed in their hands. What was the ground, he asked, upon which the bill was founded? The President had suggested, in his Speech, the propriety of giving him the power, in case of similar returns of contagious sickness, to postpone the meeting of Congress. It had been suggested that in three month of November, the President had had doubts whether he should convene Congress in another place, in conformity to the power placed in him for that purpose; but that if he had had the power to have convene them a few days later, he would have done it. The limited power which he proposed to give would enable the President, in any future emergency, to do this, and if, from contagious sickness, invasion or any other cause, a longer postponement should appear to be necessary, he tho't it would be better that Congress should be convened at some other place, than that such a postponement should take place. He did not think the President asked for more than this; and so far from being disrespectful, he thought it the only way in which the bill could be agreed to.

Mr. Harper admitted, that if no other case were contemplated by this bill than the one lately experienced, the proposed limit might be admitted, as harmless; as by the Constitution, Congress must have been in session about the beginning of December, and thirty days would not have elapsed from the second Monday in November to the period fixed by the constitution for the meeting of Congress. He trusted, however, they should not pass a law without an object. Suppose, said he, Congress stood adjourned to the 1st of July, or 1st of August, and a contagious disorder should break out, or an enemy invade the city, a few days before either of those periods, might it not be desirable that the President should have the power of postponing the meeting for longer than thirty days? If such a disorder were to break out in June, could it be supposed that it would subside in July, when it was clear to every one that nothing but frost will put an end to the contagion? This amendment, therefore, where it could be acted upon at all, would be mischievous, and in other cases perfectly nugatory. As to respect and confidence, he did not mean that they should be induced by them to do an improper thing. But if it were proper to place the power in question in the hands of the President, he would not have it so placed as to be nugatory and foolish. The gentleman had found out that respect could only be personal, though all mankind had agreed that respect might be paid to offices, separate from, persons. He never supposed that the law would be particularly disrespectful to the present President; but it seemed to show too great a jealousy of the Executive Department. The gentleman seemed to think the difficulty would be removed by the President's having the power to convene Congress at a different place; but he did not consider what expense and trouble would attend a removal of all the Machinery of government. He could not suppose that if the proposed power were placed in the President, that he would postpone Congress for a longer period, at any time, than was necessary. His own credit would be a sufficient guard against this. The Gentleman from Pennsylvania himself could scarcely believe that it would not.

Mr. Swanwick said, that when congress adjourned to any other day than that fixed by the Constitution, they had doubtless some reason for doing so. If this were the case, why should they put it in the power of the President to frustrate their views. But the expense of removing the government had been objected against. This could not be allowed to be so great an evil as the parting with the power which had been vested in them, of fixing their own time of meeting. He thought the motion of his colleague to limit the postponement to thirty days, would be its sufficient, if such a power was necessary at all, though be thought that of convening congress at any other place, was sufficient to guard against the contingencies which had been mentioned.

Mr. Nicholas believed gentlemen could not figure to themselves a case where, if a postponement were proper, thirty days would not be a sufficient time. The constitution said, they should meet once a year; but that the two houses should have power to adjourn themselves to any time that they thought proper; and if they agreed to meet in July or August, as the gentleman from S. Carolina had supposed, was it proper that the President of, the United States should have the power of preventing them? He would agree, that in all likelihood, his respect for his own character and his responsibility, would in general, prevent him from making an improper use of this power; yet still it was a power vested in the legislature, and it should be recollected that in placing the different powers of the government, there had always been a jealousy over the executive. He could well suppose that cases might exist, where the wishes of a President to do right, might be counteracted by interest. It was possible that the President and legislature might have different views, and it might be extremely important to him to effect his purposes, to have the power of postponing the meeting of congress. If these different cases were within the view of the framers of the constitution, when they arranged the several powers of the government, they ought to be touched with a delicate hand. The law before them was meant to operate principally against any future contagious sickness. To give the power of postponing congress for five or six months, would be an improper power. Nothing that he had seen of the present government could lead him to suppose that such a situation of things as that which he had mentioned should ever take place, by a disagreement in the different branches, but he believed the distribution of powers had been made with a view to these differences. He therefore hoped, the power would be limited.

Mr. Thatcher did not know that the house could be engaged on a subject of less importance than the present amendment; for if they looked back upon all the adjournments which had taken place since the commencement of the government, there had been only one or two cases in which the amendment could have operated; and it was not, probable that in fifty years to come, there would be another. He supposed a number of cases, in which the amendment would either have no effect, or a bad one. He hoped, therefore, it would be disagreed to.

Mr. Wadsworth could see no good effect which the amendment could produce, as the time was already limited by the constitutional day, and thinking it unnecessary, he should be opposed to it.