The Enquirer

FROM BELL'S WEEKLY MESSENGER, March 4.

CONDUCT OF LORD CHATHAM.

A most extraordinary proceeding has occupied the attention of the Parliament and of the public during the week. It is never pleasing to us to use the language of severity towards public men; but on the other hand it is a duty to our readers to express ourselves with truth and candour--to catch the important topicks as they rise and to present them in their natural colours, divested of their pretexts and disguises.

The circumstances to which we allude, when plainly stated, are as follow:--Immediately after his return from the expedition to Walcheren, the Earl of Chatham, without invitation or command presented a memorial or narrative to the king--his own memorial or narrative, in which, as it appears, he reflects with some severity (implied if not expressed) on the conduct of Sir Richard Strachan, and the want of zeal in the co-operation of the Navy. This memorial was presented immediately to his Majesty by Lord Chatham, without any communication with his brother ministers; it was presented moreover without any communication with Sir R. Strachan--Sir Richard was implicitly accused, and Lord Chatham had told his own tale without Sir Richard knowing the object of his Charge, or that he had been accused at all. On the other hand the ministers had a party interposed between them and the Crown, who had an influence of which they knew nothing.

The mere statement of this extraordinary circumstance is almost sufficient of itself to prove its unfairness and unconstitutionality, and we might safely perhaps leave it here--But as every thing which respects the principles of the constitution is matter of the first importance, we conceive it our duty to enter into a more full development.

Party is for a day--the constitution is for ever--It is the Tabernacle under which we and our posterity are to dwell, and to find a refuge; and it is therefore our interest to preserve its pillars sound, and its roof & its walls weather proof.

The first principle of the constitution is, that ministers are responsible for every act of the crown, and that this ministerial responsibility is the Parliamentary security against the misconduct of the Crown--The misconduct being thus transferred to the instruments by which it is effected, and thereby rendered punishable, and therefore restrictable, in its means, if not immediately in its origin. The King can do no wrong in himself, but he may through his advisers--He is not cognizable in his own person but in those of his guardians--his counsellors, his ministers. Now as very little can be done without agents and assistants and advice, so very little can possibly be done which the constitution cannot reach, whilst in possession of this ministerial responsibility. The constitution requires nothing but to know the adviser, and to see the influence. It is a necessary deduction from this principle, that all advice given to the King, should be within the reach of Parliament, and that the constitution should not be defrauded of ministerial responsibility, by not knowing where to go for it. The responsibility might as well not exist, as not to be within the reach of the country. To what end would the House have the right of punishing bad advisers, if it had no means of ascertaining who those advisers were--if the crown could interpose its prerogative to shield or shelter them? In truth, however, it is not the direct opposition of the crown, which is most to be feared upon this head. What is most to be dreaded is these secret creeping, the back stairs crowd of men, the crawling in of a favorite or party of favorites, who, stealing to the royal ear, may pour in their deadly influence, and corrupt it entirely to themselves.

The Parliament and the country, and even the ministry, seeing its effects, and not understanding its origin, are in amaze.--The Parliament call on the ministers--the ministers, perhaps, proclaim their innocence, & like the father of this Lord Chatham, acknowledge that there is a power behind the crown which they cannot withstand--which alternately advances them or pulls them back--alternately flows with them as a favoring tide, and secretly works against them as an under current. What are the Parliament and the constitution to do, under these circumstances? It is true, that by the principles of the constitution, they may impute even this work to ministers; but can they do it by the principles of fairness and of common sense? Can they in fairness impute to ministers, what they know does not originate in ministers? Can they, in common sense, punish ministers, where the ministers themselves are one of the parties aggrieved? Can they in any reason hold those as responsible, whom they see so totally without control? Is a legal or constitutional fiction ever thus pressed into a practical hardship? The common sense of mankind, & all the sentiments of fair-play and fellow-feeling, are against it.--What then is the necessary consequence? Why, that the effect of this secret agency--this closet advice--this attempt at favoritism--this privy dealing-- would tend to deprive the constitution of its first principle and its best security--the ministerial responsibility--and to leave the Throne uncontrolled--ministers avoiding the responsibility as not having advised the obnoxious measures, and those who advised them avoiding all account by not being seen, and there being no constitutional way of reaching them.