Richmond Enquirer

REPUBLICAN GROUND

The Following Address is the fruit of a Meeting of "Democratic Republican citizens of the county of Allegheny," Pa. convened by public notice, at which were adopted a number of resolutions, deprecating resolutions passed at caucus and partial Meeting at Pittsburgh :

To the Democratic Republicans of the State of Pennsylvania.

Fellow-Citizens: The same spirit which operated for a time, so fatally, in the state of Pennsylvania, has again been set at work, for the purpose of disconcerting and defeating the prospect of union in the Democratic party, upon the great question of the Presidential election. The same fallacies, and the same tissue of sophistry, are urged against a Congressional Caucus, that filled the Federal papers in this Commonwealth, on the nomination of Mr. Madison, in 1812, by the Democratic Members of Congress. It is a source of deep regret that the friends of any Democratic candidate should believe it necessary to risk the safety of the party, by breaking through a system which has been attended with uniform success, in a desperate and hopeless attempt to elevate the individual of their exclusive choice to office.

Without being the exclusive friends of any of those distinguished citizens, who are now before the public as candidates for that enviable and honorable station, we shall, with candour and calmness, examine the question, which has on one side excited a degree of warmth and invective, not calculated to promote a free discussion of the subject; and in doing so, we address ourselves with confidence, to the good sense, sound intelligence, and reflecting consideration of our Democratic fellow-citizens, confident that if they will apply a few leisure moments to weigh our arguments, they will most assuredly concur in the opinions they find here expressed.

The administration of the General Government, for so many years eminently successful, glorious, and happy, under the guidance and direction of Democratic Presidents, has been chiefly indebted, for the firm support it has received to the unanimity with which the distinguished statesmen who, since 1800, have filled the office, were selected. Before the mode of selection so long pursued, the dangers of internal commotion, arising from local differences and sectional jealousies, have disappeared.—Whenever the great party standard has been raised, the democracy of the county, pursuing the advice of the immortal Washington, and banishing from their bosoms all that could be prejudicial to the public weal, have flocked around it, and presented to their opponents a firm and immovable phalanx. The fruit of the so much reprobated system of nomination, has been the Presidencies of Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Madison and Mr. Monroe,—the least of these, a name that may compare with that of any other statesman of the ancient or modern world. That the caucus system has so far produced no harm, is readily admitted by its opponents; that it has eventuated in much good, every man will be convinced who will reflect upon the history of our country, whilst governed by the patriots referred to. Firmly, indeed, ought we to be convinced of the necessity of altering such a system, before we consent to travel out of a tried path, whose safety is warranted by experience, into one, which, however bright it may be in prospect, has yet to receive the test and sanction of experiment.

Independent, however, of the important lessons which we find written in the volume of experience, we may appeal to every Democrat, whether the success of his party is not, of all political objects, that nearest his heart? Does he believe that his principles are preferable to those of his opponents? Does he wish the triumph of those principles, and is he earnest in the pursuit of those means that are necessary to secure such triumph? Can the wisdom of any one amongst us devise an expedient more conducive to the important object we have in view, than that which has for twenty-three years promoted our success? Is not party unanimity an object now as much as it has ever been? Has it not gained us power? Enabled us to retain power? And shall we, on the approach of an election, the most important that has ever taken place since our Union, risk its success by abandoning the mode in which there is no doubt, for one which is at least hazardous? Shall an infuriate zeal for any particular candidate, induce us to snap at the shadow and lose the substance? To doubt the discretion of Democrats, would be to insult their understandings.

To us, one of the most important inducements, for pursuing the good old mode of nomination, is that, which, by a strange perversion of reasoning, has, by some, been considered as a formidable objection to it. We speak of the number of candidates that appear to fill the public eye. They are all of one party. It, as has been suggested, in some recent observations on the subject, in the selection of former candidates, those were nominated, upon whom the public mind was directed, in such manner that their nomination had no influence in producing their election, 'tis certainly a substantial reason for making a selection, that the public will is so much divided amongst the candidates, that whilst we are sighing for the game, the fox may carry it off. The Federal party is not only anxiously vigilant, but the very subject-matter of our present dispute is fomented by them. If the Democratic Members of Congress decline making a caucus nomination, and nominations as numerous as are the candidates, should be made by the different States, do you believe it impracticable for the Federalists to thrust in the sickle and gather up the harvest?

What but a caucus nomination, circumstanced as we are, can promote unanimity? To us it is obvious, that not merely the experienced way, and that which has been uniform in its success, but likewise the extreme necessity of the case, unite in urging the old plan of selecting a candidate. That a nomination by a delegation from the different States, duly authorized to make it, would be a preferable mode of selection, is at least doubtful; but it must be obvious, that time and expense, incident to such an assemblage, render it impracticable. Few persons can afford either—no party would wish to be under an obligation of such a description to any set of individuals. It is certain that men assembling as their own expense, from an immense distance, to some central point, for the purpose of putting a candidate in nomination, would think themselves entitled to a species of official compensation, that could not easily be denied, and perhaps ought not to be granted.

Such are some of the reasons that induce us to prefer, at the present period of affairs, a caucus nomination. We come now briefly to examine the objections that are urged against the system: and in doing thus, we must call upon our readers so distinguish, as their good sense will easily enable them to do, between what is mere declamation in our adversaries and carries no weight along with it, and that which bears the semblance of argument.

In the first place, it is said to be unconstitutional. That it is so neither in form nor fee, a few remarks will make obvious. Let us examine into the nature of a Congressional Caucus. What is it but an assemblage of citizens, distinguished for talents and respectability, and selected on account of their integrity, to represent their constituents in the legislative assembly of the nation? Their stations every day in the year, give them the highest evidence of their virtue and fair-dealing, and repel every charge that would, in the least degree, reflect upon their principles. Collected from every part of the Union—acquainted with the sentiments of their Constituents upon the subject, they meet together for a free discussion of their various opinions, and thus congregated, after due deliberation, give their recommendation to support such an individual as they deem best adapted to harmonize all differences in their party. That the sentiments entertained by the persons thus assembled are, in nine instances out of ten, those of their constituents, is undoubted. And what barrier has the Constitution placed to this expression of sentiments? Is it not the right of any collection of individuals, whether assembled at Washington or elsewhere, to recommend men or measures for the common good?

Does the circumstance of their being men in honorable stations, men who have been elevated by the voice of the people, disqualify them from exercising this most important privilege? Is a Member of Congress the less a citizen, because his countrymen have thought his worth and ability entitled him to that dignified station? Or has it become a maxim in politics, that official accountability renders a man unworthy of attention, and his opinion unworthy of respect? It appears then, that there is no basis for the reasoning, "that the interference of Democratic Members of Congress for the purpose of recommending a suitable candidate for the Presidency, is unconstitutional." It is a fallacy easily detected, and most dangerous in its effects. A selection so made, is entitled to attention, and it does not detract from such selection, that those who make it, have the confidence of their fellow-citizens.

But it is contended that the "People have the right to make this nomination." Nothing can be more obvious; and by this very assertion, our opponents surrender the argument. They admit with us, that such nomination is essential—the sole question is as to the most politic and practicable mode of making it. That it would not dispose to unanimity in the Democratic party, for the people to assemble in every convenient district, and there nominate according to the will of the majority, is obvious: for, after all the nominations were made, amounting probably to thousands, how would it be practicable to collect them and make any one candidate the object of party selection? The public will, to be expressed usefully must be expressed efficiently. It must be expressed in such way, that the decided opinion or will of the majority must govern. In order to do this, it is proposed that Pennsylvania shall send delegates to some central point, who are to nominate for her a candidate for the Presidency. Suppose the party in this state should combine for such a purpose, and that a favorite candidate were selected, and that electors, instructed to support such candidate, are nominated and elected: What other effect would it have, than to throw away the whole weight of this important state? What probability is there, that other states would concur in our novel system? And if so, what certainty that they would not nominate a different candidate? But this does not appear to be the evil most to be dreaded. In this state, there is much difference of opinion prevailing. There would, in all probability, if the delegation system should be pursued, be as many delegations as candidates, and as many electoral tickets as delegations. And to this glorious state of confusion and fatal and never-ending faction, should we be driven by those who so inconsiderately oppose the good old system.

Let us, however, admit, that we might set down contented with the Delegate nomination, and that the other twenty-three States in the Union should concur in the same system of selection: how is the public will, thus expressed, to become concentrated? Are the delegates to appoint one or more agents, to meet at some central point, there to endeavor to fix upon the most proper candidate? Are the delegates to be proportioned to the population, or representation, of each state? Are they to assemble gratis, or to be paid for their time and trouble? if so, who is to compensate them? But the questions upon this plan, are innumerable. Enough has been said to evince, that it is as impracticable as unwise. As, then, it appears probable, that, from the embarrassment attending the collection of the public will, by local delegations, no such delegations will take place and, as it is probable, that the nomination by a Congressional Caucus will receive the sanction of the Democratic States generally, would it not be wise in Pennsylvania, to caucus in an arrangement that enables her to retain that rank and control, to which she has hitherto been entitled, by the intrepid front she has exhibited in every national question.

It is further to be remarked on this head, that the members of Congress are identified with the people—they are the people's agents; expressing, in their legislative capacity, the will of their constituents; and it is difficult to conceive, that they may not, in their private capacity as citizens, acquainted with the wishes of their friends and neighbours, express the opinions and wishes of those with whom they have been upon terms of intimacy: And what else, but a union of such opinions, for promoting great party objects, is a Congressional Caucus?

One fact of National History shall close what we have to say upon this point. When Mr. Jefferson was nominated by a Virginia Delegation for the Presidency, he failed in a contest with Mr. Adams. But when put in nomination by a Congressional caucus success crowned the cause of Democracy.

We are however told, that a caucus presents opportunities for corruption and intrigue. How the members, who compose it, are more liable to it in their private capacity when acting as citizens, than in their public capacity when acting as legislators, we are not informed. What is the kind of corruption dreaded, it is difficult to determine, and still more difficult would it appear in its exercise, when all the candidates are on the ground. If such a thing were attempted, the eagle-eyed adversaries of the man, who should be so lost to honor and virtue as to attempt it, would certainly detect it; and if practised, the number required to produce the nomination of one audacious and villanous enough to try the experiment, would assuredly open it to exposure. Besides, it will be admitted, it is indeed admitted, that no public body in the world contains so many pure and incorruptible patriots, as the Congress of the Union. What remuneration could be held out to such men, to induce them to forfeit the esteem of their fellow-citizens, by betraying their interests? The idea is fallacious and absurd," and what renders it more obviously ridiculous, is, that the President of the Union has no office in his gift, no reward in his power, so that those who offer this argument, must either be ignorant of the Constitution of the country, or must suppose that corruption is not only to extend to those who will make the selection, but to the Senate, which is to sanction all the nominations and appointments made by a President, thus corruptly invested with power.

There are other arguments of minor importance, which are not treated of, because we have been careful to study brevity, as far as is consistent with perspicuity. Those arguments on which the opponents of the system of caucus nominations chiefly rely, we have combated—our fellow-citizens will decide with what success

We are opposed to no Democrat who may be taken in caucus. We shall cheerfully unite in promoting the election of the person who is there nominated. We say this with a full faith that it will consist of a general meeting of the Democratic Members of Congress. We should deprecate any partial meeting as inconsistent with the system, and we trust that the friends of all the candidates at Washington, viewing as we do, party unanimity as an object of essential concern, will endeavor to promote it by pursuing, in good faith, and upon such principles, as will enable every Democrat, conscientiously to concur with them in the GOOD OLD PLAN OF NOMINATION. If a nomination is thus made, confident in our cause, we pledge ourselves to sustain it, and to make use of every fair and honorable exertion to redeem this Great State from the unthingness into which a contrary course would unquestionably plunge her.

JOHN HANNEN, Chairman
E. Pentland,
Secretaries.
SAMUEL A. ROBERTS