Pawtuxet Valley Gleaner

THE WAR IN THE EAST.

The Coming Winter in Bulgaria and the Preparations Made to Meet It.

All our news—and equally so all rumors received—from the seat of war, says the New York Tribune, point unmistakably to preparations for the Winter. The first task for Russia has been already set, and until that is completed, we need hardly look for important operations in other quarters. Turkey's line of defence is indicated with similar clearness, both by the necessities of her position and the recent movement of Mehemet Ali, the only one of her generals who is free to move his army. Snow on the Balkans and heavy rains from their base to the Danube, have given a dismal foretaste of Winter, and the exigency of providing for the inclement season is even greater than that of winning new victories this year.

There is no doubt that Osman Pasha continues to hold Plevna with a grip which will not be easily loosened. The place is provisioned for two or three months, at least. His communications with Widdin are still intact, although those with Sophia have been disturbed of late, and he will probably be able to make all necessary preparations for sustaining a very long siege. If General Todleben's opinion is correctly reported, it will indeed be a long and laborious work for the Russians; but the capture of the place is an inevitable condition of their further advance. Suleiman Pasha's position at the Shipka Pass only differs from Osman's at Plevna, in this, that he is not besieged, but, by the general plan of resistance, is compelled to keep his place. It would be nearly correct to say that one-half of the pass is held by each antagonist, met in a dead-lock of strength, which neither dares relax. On the east, the retirement of Mehemet Ali beyond the Lom is undoubtedly for the purpose of taking the strongest defensible line for the Winter. This he will find in the hills to the eastward of the river, and at the same time he will shorten his communication with Rasgrad and Shumla. By holding the town of Osman Bazar as his extreme left, he will cover all the eastern passes of the Balkans, except the Demir Kapu, which will still be nearer to him than to the Russians at Tirnova. But it is not likely that he will be attacked in force, while the Crescent continues to wave over Plevna.

The strategy prescribed for Russia is equally plain. If she cannot wholly isolate Osman Pasha, so that the capture of Plevna shall give her also his army, she must at all hazards prevent his retreat upon Sophia. This necessity explains the attitude of Servia, reluctant to join in the war, restrained by Austrian influence, yet now holding—or soon to hold—the power of final victory in her unsteady hands. Unless a considerable garrison has been left in Widdin, which is not probable, a well-officered Servian army, operating in the rear of that fortress, would be able to cut off Plevna, and then, without even waiting for its fall, to clear the way for a Russian advance on Sophia. But if Osman Pasha saves the greater part of his army, he will instantly occupy the western passes of the Balkans, as Mehemet Ali will occupy the eastern. With the aid of the spade, which is becoming a more formidable weapon than the bayonet in the hands of the Turkish soldier, a stronger line of defence than that of the Danube will confront the Russians next year. And this terrific contingency is the result of two almost incredibly stupid blunders—the failure to occupy or even to examine Plevna, after crossing the Danube, and the failure to support General Gourko by an army corps, after he had crossed the Balkans! If Russia desires to prevent such a contingency, she must reduce her Grand Dukes to the rank of honorary spectators, and replace their parade adjutants, now in command, by soldiers of experience and intelligence.