The Enquirer

From Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney Ministers extraordinary and Plenipotentiaries at London, to Mr. Madison, Secretary of State.

[COPY.]

LONDON, March 14, 1807.

My Lord,

In conformity with the intimation which your lordship was so good as to make to us at a late interview, relative to certain claims and prize causes, which had been brought into discussion in the course of the late negociation between his majesty's commissioners, and those of the United States, we have the honor to transmit to your lordship the copy of a note to lord Holland and lord Auckland, in which those claims and prize causes are fully explained. It is proper to add, that at the time of the signature of the treaty it was distinctly understood between the commissioners on both sides, that this subject was not to be affected by it, but was to remain completely open for future adjustment.

We leave it upon the statement contained in that note and the documents to which it refers, in perfect confidence that it will be viewed by your lordship with the interest which belongs to it, and that every thing which is suitable to the high and honorable character of his majesty's government, and the just claims of the United States, will be done with relation to it, as promptly as circumstances will permit.

We have the honor to be, With the highest consideration, My Lord, Your lordship's Most obt. humble servants,

(Signed) JAMES MONROE,

WM. PINKNEY.

The right honourable Lord Viscount Howick, &c. &c. &c.

[COPY.]

London, August 20, 1806.

The undersigned commissioners extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the United States of America, think it necessary to give to lord Holland and lord Auckland, the commissioners extraordinary and plenipotentiary of his majesty, a brief explanation in writing of the claims, which they have already had the honor to mention to their lordships in a recent conference of sundry American citizens, for suitable compensation for losses and damages sustained in the course of the present war, by reason of irregular or illegal captures or condemnations of their vessels and other property, and at the same time to call the attention of their lordships to the situation of certain prize causes, arising out of some of these captures, now depending in the tribunals of this country.

The undersigned are happy in having it in their power to state that, according to the information they have been able to obtain, such of these claims as relate to captures, which, from causes peculiar to themselves, have excited in America a more than ordinary degree of sensibility; are not so considerable in number as at first was supposed.

The complaints of this description, to which the undersigned would particularly invite the attention of their lordships, have been produced by seizures as prize, made in direct violation of rules of maritime practice, previously declared by his majesty's government to the government of the United States, and in no degree revoked or affected by any arrangement between them, or even by any notification, that they were about to be abandoned.

Of these seizures the most important, and in every view the most interesting, were made in the year 1805, and in the early part of the year 1806, of the ships and merchandise of American citizens, upon the pretension, that the voyages in which they were engaged were direct or continuous between the colonies of his majesty's enemies and some port in Europe.

Although it is certain that the government of the United States has never admitted, that illegality can be imputed to such a trade, even when confessedly continuous or direct, and had concluded that the question had been otherwise formally settled in its favor; the undersigned believe it to be unnecessary to bring that point into view with any reference to the cases now under consideration.

It is sufficient to state that, at the date of these seizures the merchants of the United States did explicitly understand, and were justified in a confident belief, founded not only upon antecedent practice, but upon a formal communication, in the year 1801, to the American minister in London from his majesty's principal secretary of state for the department of foreign affairs, that the circumstances, by which these voyages were accompanied, had been, and were distinctly admitted by the British government and by British courts of prize, to break their continuity, and render them unquestionably lawful.

The following detail will shew more precisely the nature and effect of the communication to which the undersigned allude.

The public and private armed ships of this country having seized American vessels, bound from the United States to the Spanish West-Indies, on the pretext that their cargoes consisted of articles of the growth of Spain, then at war with Great Britain, and the vice admiralty court of Nassau having condemned the cargo of one of these vessels upon that pretext, Mr. King, in a note to lord Hawkesbury of the 13th of March, 1801, remonstrated against these acts as palpable abuses. The subject of this remonstrance was immediately referred to the king's advocate, whose report of the 16th of March, 1801, after declaring that the sentence of the vice admiralty court was erroneous, concludes with the following exposition of the law as understood in Great Britain, relative to the commerce of neutrals with belligerents and their colonies. "It is now distinctly understood, and has been repeatedly so decided by the high court of appeal, that the produce of the colonies of the enemy may be imported by a neutral into his own country, and may be re-exported from thence, even to the mother country of such colony; and in like manner the produce and manufactures of the mother country may, in this circuitous mode, legally find their way to the colonies. The direct trade, however, between the mother country and its colonies, has not, I apprehend, been recognised as legal, either by his majesty's government, or by his tribunals."

"What is a direct trade, or what amounts to an intermediate importation into the neutral country, may sometimes be a question of some difficulty. A general definition of either, applicable to all cases, cannot well be laid down. The question must depend upon the particular circumstances of each case. Perhaps the mere touching in the neutral country, to take fresh clearances, may properly be considered as a fraudulent evasion, and is in effect the direct trade: but the high court of admiralty has expressly decided (and I see no reason to expect that the court of appeal will vary the rule) that landing the goods and paying the duties in the neutral country, breaks the continuity of the voyage, and is such an importation as legalizes the trade, although the goods be reshipped in the same vessel, and on account of the same neutral proprietors, and be forwarded for sale to the mother country or the colony."

An extract from this report, containing the foregoing passage, was transmitted by the duke of Portland, in a letter of the 30th March, 1801, to the lords commissioners of the admiralty. His grace's letter concludes thus: "In order, therefore, to put a stop to the inconveniences arising from these erroneous sentences of the vice admiralty courts, I have the honor to signify to your lordships the king's pleasure that a communication of the doctrine laid down in the said report should be immediately made by your lordships to the several judges presiding in them, setting forth what is held to be the law upon the subject by the superior tribunals, for their future guidance and direction."

On the 11th of April, 1801, lord Hawkesbury communicated to Mr. King, for the information of the government of the United States, a copy of the above letter of the duke of Portland, which is stated by his lordship to have been written by his majesty's command, in consequence of Mr. King's representation of the preceding month, together with a copy of the extract from the report of the king's advocate, referred to in his grace's letter, and already above quoted. Upon the receipt of this communication Mr. King transmitted it to his government in a letter (of which a copy is annexed) containing the following observations: "I take the liberty of suggesting the expediency of publishing these copies in our news-papers, as the most expeditious means of communicating the same to the cruizing ships and privateers in the American seas. Having intimated this suggestion to lord Hawkesbury, before he prepared and sent me his answer there can be no exceptions here against such a publication." The publication was directed, and took place accordingly.

The undersigned are persuaded that lord Holland and lord Auckland will at once perceive that the report of the king's advocate, thus unequivocally adopted by his majesty's government, and communicated, as an act to be respected and confided in, through the American minister, to the government of the United States, and finally to their citizens and to Europe, through the medium of a publication expected and authorized, cannot, in any fair construction, be viewed as any thing short of a formal declaration, on the part of Great-Britain, "that the landing of the cargo and the payment of the duties in the neutral country," would be considered as legalizing the circuitous trade, even between a belligerent and its own colonies.

The practice during the late, and the two first years of the present war, was in perfect conformity with this document, and by that conformity increased its authority, and furnished an additional justification, if any had been required, for a dependance upon the doctrine which it announced.

In the summer of 1805, however, when a large amount of American property was afloat, undeniably entitled to the protection of the above rule, and committed to the high seas, under an implicit reliance upon a strict adherence to it, the rule was suddenly abandoned, and British cruisers fell upon this trade, thus sanctioned by the express admission, as well as by the acquiescence of their government; and these captures are understood to have received the highest judicial sanction.

The undersigned have no desire to dwell upon this subject. They are convinced that the liberal and equitable sentiments which distinguish his majesty's government, render unnecessary the farther explanations of which it is susceptible. Referring to two notes, from the undersigned Mr. Monroe, to lord Mulgrave of the 23d of September, 1805, and to Mr. Fox, of the 25th of February 1806, the undersigned have only to declare their sincere conviction that his majesty's government will not fail to see in the facts, which they have had the honor to state, an irresistible call upon it to repair the injurious effects of these seizures. As to the few cases of this class, now depending before the lords commissioners of appeal, or in other prize courts of his majesty, the undersigned feel assured that measures will be taken to cause them to be favorably disposed of, and that suitable reparation will moreover be secured to the parties injured, for the loss and damage they have sustained. The undersigned have the honor to transmit herewith a list of all the cases of this class, in which are distinguished such as are still judicially depending.

The next class of these cases (of which lists and estimates will hereafter be furnished) comprehends captures, during the existing war, contrary to the tenor of a letter of the 5th January, 1804, from sir Evan Nepean to Mr. Hammond, on the subject of the blockade of Martinique and Guadeloupe, of which a copy was inclosed in a letter of the 12th of April, 1804, from Mr. Merry to Mr. Madison, of both of which letters copies are herewith transmitted.

The citizens of the United States complain that they have suffered severely by captures, in violation of the rules laid down with so much fairness and precision in this communication, and that, where condemnations have not followed, compensation equivalent to the actual loss has not been, and cannot be procured in the ordinary course, by any exertions on their part. The pretext for some of these captures has been the breach of an alleged blockade of Martinique or Guadeloupe; for others, the breach of an imaginary blockade of Curacoa; and for others the
breach of an equally imaginary blockade of other ports and places. In all of these cases, either the actual investment of the particular port was wanting, or the vessels, seized for an imputed criminal destination to it, had not been warned as required. The just extent of these claims the undersigned are not able to state; but they presume that it cannot be considerable.

The only remaining claims, which are reducible to any precise class, are those which relate to captures within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Of these, as well as some others of a miscellaneous nature, which the undersigned have not at present the means of presenting distinctly to lord Holland and lord Auckland, lists shall hereafter be prepared, and laid before their lordships, accompanied by suitable explanations.

The undersigned request lord Holland and lord Auckland to accept the assurance of their perfect consideration.

(Signed) JAMES MONROE,

WM. PINKNEY.
An extra-official communication with regard to the Canada trade.

A memorial has been presented to lord Holland and lord Auckland, on the part of the Canada merchants, setting forth a variety of injuries which they complain of having sustained from the government and servants of the United States, and praying that their complaints may be attended to, and redress obtained for them in the discussions which are at present pending between the American and British commissioners.

The injuries brought forward on their memorials may be reduced to the three following heads.

1st. Their exclusion from Louisiana.

2d. Their being made to pay higher duties for the goods they import into the United States from Canada, than the duties payable by the citizens of the United States on the importation of the same goods in American vessels into the Atlantic ports of the United States.

3d. Certain minor grievances which they contend to be in like manner contrary to the letter and spirit of the treaty of 1794.

By the 3d article of the treaty of 1794, it is agreed that it shall at all times be free to his majesty's subjects, and to the citizens of the United States, freely to pass and repass, by land or inland navigation, into the respective territories and countries of the two parties on the continent of America, and to navigate all the lakes and waters thereof, and freely to carry on trade with each other.

But notwithstanding this express stipulation, which secures to his majesty's subjects, without limitation or reservation the right of commercial intercourse by land or inland navigation with all the territories of the United States, on the continent of America, the governor of Louisiana has thought proper to exclude them from the commerce of that extensive province, unless they abjure their allegiance to his majesty, and take an oath of allegiance to the United States, and the same governor has also taken it upon him to prohibit the introduction of any goods or merchandise, which are not the property of citizens of the United States.

This arbitrary proceeding, besides being a direct violation of the treaty of 1794, is highly detrimental to the private interests of the Canada merchants, for it excludes them from a country where they have been carrying on trade successfully for many years, without interruption from the Spaniards, having latterly pushed their commercial posts even to the banks of the Missouri, and augmented the sale of their goods in Louisiana, to the amount of about £40,000 or £50,000 annually.

By the second paragraph of the 3d article of the treaty of 1794, it is agreed, that all goods and merchandise, whose importation into the United States shall not be wholly prohibited, may freely, for the purpose of commerce, be carried into the same, in the manner aforesaid by his majesty's subjects, and such goods or merchandise shall be subject to no higher duties than those payable by citizens of the United States, on the importation of the same in American vessels into the Atlantic ports of the said states.

But notwithstanding this stipulation, that the duties on goods imported into the United States from Canada, shall be no higher than the duties paid for the same goods when imported in American vessels into the Atlantic ports of the United States; the custom house officers of the inland ports practise a mode of estimating the duties on goods imported from Canada, which has the effect of raising the duty on the prime cost of these goods to 22 per cent. instead of 16 10 per cent which is the amount of the duty payable on the same goods, when imported in American vessels into the Atlantic ports of the United States.

As these goods are destined ultimately for the Indian market, this difference gives a decided advantage in that commerce to the citizens of the United States, over the subjects of his majesty, contrary to the spirit and obvious meaning of the treaty of 1794, the basis of which, in all its stipulations with regard to the Indian trade, were impartiality, equality and reciprocity of advantages.

The manner in which this evasion of the treaty is effected, will appear from the account given of it by the Canada merchants, in their memorial above referred to.

They state, that by the revenue laws of the United States, all goods imported into their territory, not charged with a particular duty, pay a duty of 15 per cent. ad-valorem, excepting goods from the Cape of Good Hope, and from the countries beyond it; that in calculating this duty, 10 per cent is first added to the prime cost of the goods, and the duty afterwards calculated on the amount in the following manner:

Prime cost, 100

10 per cent. added, 10

110

15 per cent. duty on 110, 16 10

But that in estimating the duty on goods imported from Canada, the custom house officers add 10 per cent. not to the prime cost, but to their value at Montreal, where it is the custom for merchants to add 33 1-3 per cent. to the prime cost in Europe, as an equivalent for the expense and risk of transporting them so far, and that proceeding on this principle, the duties on goods imported into the United States from Canada are calculated in the following manner:

Duty of 15 per cent. on £146 13 4 amounts to 22: so that the same goods which pay a duty of only 16s. 8d. when imported by an American dealer, pay a duty of 22 when brought to the same market by a British dealer, contrary to the obvious spirit and meaning, and to the express stipulation of the treaty of 1794.

Under the third head of minor grievances are to be classed the following: 1st. Though British subjects are entitled, in the terms of the treaty of 1794, "freely to pass and repass by land or inland navigation into the territories of the United States," yet they are obliged to pay six dollars for a licence to trade with the Indians within the boundaries of the United States by the servants of the states, and when they arrive at the American ports in the interior, they are often compelled to dismiss their canoe men, and to hire others at a great expense and inconvenience.

2d. Though it is agreed in the treaty "that no duties shall be payable on any goods which shall merely be carried over any of the portages, or carrying places, on either side, for the purpose of being immediately re-embarked and carried to some other place or places," yet various attempts have been made to collect such duties at the American portages, which have at length compelled the British traders to abandon the grand portage, and to establish a new portage at Kaministi within the British line.

Though the arrangement of the Indian trade by the treaty of 1794, was "intended to render in a great degree the local advantages of each party common to both, and thereby to promote a disposition favorable to friendship and good neighborhood." yet the revenue officers of the United States, without considering the difficulty of observing in the lakes and rivers of Canada those regulations with regard to the approach to shores and ports which are applicable to the ports of the ocean, have, in many instances, and in particular in the case of the two batteaux stopped at Michilimackinac, manifested a disposition to harrass and impede the trade of British merchants on pretences the most frivolous and unfounded, and in a manner equally vexatious and injurious to them.

Additional charge at Montreal,	£ 100	33	6	8
Additional 10 per cent:	133	6	8
	13	6	8
	146	13	4

(DUPLICATE.)

LONDON, April 22, 1807.

SIR,

We had the honor to receive your letter of February 3d, on the 6th instant, and are now to give you a detail of the measures we have pursued in obedience to the instructions it communicated.

To enable you to form a just idea of those measures, it will be proper to state concisely what had occurred at the time of receiving your letter, after the departure of Mr. Purviance with the treaty, and our dispatch of the 3d of January.

Soon after that date we resumed our conferences with the British commissioners, as we intimated it was our intention to do, and had nearly digested with the project of a supplemental convention upon the principal topics alluded to in the last paragraph of that dispatch, when an entire change took place in the British ministry; lord Grenville and his associates being compelled to retire in favor of the friends of Mr. Pitt. This change of course, suspended the farther progress of the business, and in that state it still remains.

Before this change in the administration, we had presented to the British commissioners, according to an agreement which accompanied the signature of the treaty, an ante-dated note on the subject of indemnity, and another to lord Howick on the same subject, previously seen and approved by the British commissioners. With these papers (of which copies are now transmitted) the British commissioners not only expressed their perfect satisfaction, but assured us then, as they have frequently done since, that the just confidence with which that agreement had inspired us, in regard to its object, would not be disappointed.

We had many conferences with the British commissioners, previous to the late change, upon the subject of impressments, in which they invariably declared to us, that the practice of their government would be strictly conformable to the spirit of the article, which they had settled with us, and which was afterwards rejected by the cabinet. They stated that the prejudice of the navy, and of the country generally, was so strong in favor of their pretension, that the ministry could not encounter it, in a direct form; and that, in truth, the support of parliament could not have been relied on in such a case. It was their idea, that by discontinuing the practice in the mode proposed by them, which might be done without giving any shock to the public feeling, this prejudice might be gradually overcome, and an arrangement by treaty on this very delicate and difficult subject, rendered ultimately practicable. The U. States would in the interim enjoy the security they sought, without any abandonment of their rights, and be induced to yield in return, as their confidence increased, the equivalents which we had offered in our project.

The footing upon which the note of the B. comm. (which is and must be considered as equally obligatory as if actually inserted in the treaty) left this point, was supposed to be the less liable to exception on our part, because, while it affords a pledge unquestionably intended to secure the substance of our object, and constantly admitted here to be equal to that effect, it keeps it, nevertheless, for our advantage, completely open for future negociation and more formal adjustment.

The note declares that the discussion of any plan will be entertained that can be devised "to secure the interests of both states, without injury to rights to which they are respectively attached," and consequently provides for a renewal of negotiation with a sincere view to such an arrangement as shall be practically consistent with the declared pretensions of the U. States, and yet leave untouched the British principle; or, in other words, an arrangement, in which G. Britain shall agree to conform her conduct to our views, without renouncing the claim which she has hitherto maintained and acted upon.

It was supposed, therefore, to be the clear import of that note that the conduct of Great Britain would not, while the discussion of such a plan as it might be proper to insert in a treaty, stood postponed at the request of its commissioners, encroach in practice upon rights, which we had so strongly asserted and vindicated as rights not to be abandoned, which it was well understood our government and country would not suffer to be invaded in future as they had been during the past, and which the British commissioners themselves, acting under the immediate orders of the cabinet, had in their note distinctly recognized as fit to be preserved hereafter from injury and violation. This conclusion was thought to be more just and natural when it was remembered that it was supported, not only by the verbal admissions and declarations of the British commissioners, which would of course, as they knew, be governed thereby.
In the language of such parts of the note as particularly to the future practice of impressments, it was believed to be fortified too by the obvious consideration, that the U. States would be authorized, notwithstanding any adjustment by treaty upon other points, in a case of the impressment on the high seas of a single mariner from on board an American vessel, to view it as an act of aggression, and to resent it accordingly. This right existed, undoubtedly, independently of that note; but it seemed notwithstanding to derive from it a new and high sanction favorable to its just effect: and certainly the sensibility and determination which have been manifested on this point by the U. States, especially of late, and by the American commissioners during the recent negotiation, must have inspired this government with the conviction, that a perseverance in such outrages upon their sovereignty and the rights of their citizens, would be wholly incompatible with the peaceful relations of the two countries, which it was the professed object of the British commissioners and their government to preserve. It is proper, however, for us to state that it was our intention to have requested of this government written explanations on this topic of impressment, as well as on that of indemnity, for the purpose of transmitting them to you. The approaching departure of Mr. Montoe for the U. States, would, it was thought, furnish a suitable occasion for such an application.

Towards the end of the last month, the change took place in the ministry, and on the 27th the diplomatic corps had their first interview with Mr. Canning, who succeeded Lord Howick in the foreign department. Although the meeting was general, a separate audience was given, as is usual, to the representatives of each power. At Mr. Canning's request we gave him a concise, but just view of the state of business between our governments. He appeared not to have heard before of what had taken place relative to the project of a supplemental convention. He said that he had come too recently into office to be able to say anything decisive on any of the topics of which we had given him a sketch, but that he would soon make himself acquainted with them, and give us another interview. His professions, which were of a general nature, were conciliatory.

Such was the state of affairs when we had the honor to receive your letter of February the 3d. We were anxious to carry into effect the instructions contained in that letter, in the best manner in our power, and with the least possible delay. It became especially our duty to make known to the new ministry, as soon as we might be able, the understanding which had subsisted between the British commissioners and through them the late cabinet, and us, as to the condition on which we had consented to continue the negotiation, after our project relative to impressments had been rejected; that in fact we had no authority to treat after that event; and that our government was not bound, or supposed or intended to be bound, to ratify what we had done, if it disapproved of it.

We were equally desirous of turning to the best account the appeal which a refusal to ratify by our government, would make to the interests of this country, in an effort to arrange by treaty this great point with the new ministry. The first measure seemed to be free from difficulty. The statement proposed was an act of justice to our government, and of duty to it and our country, which might be discharged without the slightest hazard to the public interest. Indeed, as it was presumable that this government would soon receive intelligence from Mr. Erskine, which, without an explanation, could hardly fail to produce an unfavorable effect, it appeared to be indispensably necessary to make it, to prevent a public injury. The second object, however, was evidently involved in more difficulty. From what we had seen, in the debates in Parliament, of the disposition of several of the members of the new ministry, before they came into power, on subjects which were connected with our treaty, independent of other causes, we had reason to believe that great caution ought to be observed in any communication which we might make to it on that point. Although Lord Holland and Lord Auckland had retired from their offices of Lord Privy Seal and President of the Board of Trade, they still retained their situations as commissioners extraordinary and plenipotentiary, and as we presumed, would continue to do so until the business, in which we had been engaged with them, should be concluded. In every view it seemed to be just and expedient to confer with them on the subject of our late dispatch. We accordingly obtained an early interview, in which we communicated, in confidence, the substance of that dispatch, as well in conformity with the orders of the President, as in the hope that they might be able to assist us in the accomplishment of its object. But we found them under circumstances of such peculiar delicacy with the new ministry, that it was not in their power to give us the slightest aid.

They informed us that, on the exchange of ministers, Lord Howick had communicated to Mr. Canning the state in which our business stood, and more particularly the progress which had been made in the proposed plan of convention, in the expectation that he would have requested them to proceed in it: that, however, no such request had been made, in consequence of which they should feel it their duty, in case he continued silent, to withdraw from the commission. They expressed their regret that they had not been able to arrange with us by treaty the subject of impressment, as they wished to have done: but assured us that the order which they had engaged should be issued in their note of November 8th, had been actually issued about that time, and in terms calculated, as they had understood, to accomplish the object desired. They saw no objection to our being furnished with a copy of that order, and presumed that it might so be obtained. In adverting to the understanding which had subsisted between us on the failure of the article which had been submitted to the cabinet for providing against impressments at sea, we were happy to find that they retained a perfect recollection of it in the sense in which we have stated it above. They admitted that we had a right to expect from the new ministry an explanation of its views relative to the project of a convention, and to indemnity & oppressions, from the particular state in which those great subjects were left, and claims which we had on the government on what had been done in them. Of the making with the present ministry a satisfactory arrangement against impressments by treaty, they said nothing; but repeated what they had often said before, that they had done all on that point in their power; and declared it as their opinion that, if their friends had remained in office, well disposed as they knew them to be towards the United States, the mode in which we were now about to pursue this object would not tend to produce, in that or any other respect, a favorable effect. They could therefore give us no advice as to the part which it became us to take in the present juncture.

They intimated, however, that by obtaining an interview and conferring with Mr. Canning we might probably ascertain the sentiments of his government on the whole subject, and be enabled thereby to pursue the course which would be best adapted to the spirit of our instructions & the interests of our country.

Immediately after our interview with the British commissioners we asked one of Mr. Canning, which was obtained on the instant. It was our intention to have confined ourselves in the first instance to the topics above mentioned, and to the information which we thought it our duty to give him of the understanding which had subsisted between the British commissioners and ourselves, of the condition on which we had proceeded to the other points of the negotiation after the project of an article relative to impressments had been rejected. As soon, however, as we glanced at the objects of the interview, he observed that he had just received intelligence which, if true, would make it unnecessary for us to enter at present on any of the topics alluded to; that it had been represented to him that an officer, just arrived from America, had that morning informed the admiralty that the treaty which had been lately concluded here, had been rejected by our government; that he had not seen the officer, and therefore could not state the grounds on which the information rested.

He observed that such an event would place the relations of the two countries in an embarrassing situation, and wished to know whether we had received any intelligence of a like import. We perceived at once, that the important feature in your dispatch of February 3d, respecting the disclosure of which to the new ministry we had entertained some doubt, was not only either already known to it, or soon would be, but that inferences of a dangerous tendency were likely to be drawn from the refusal of our government to ratify the treaty, in case it should occur, which such an event could not justify. We saw therefore, the necessity of communicating to Mr. Canning immediately the substance of that dispatch, as well for the purpose of preventing those errors, as to obey the instructions contained in it, over which, in the respect alluded to, we should have exercised any discretion with great reluctance.

We assured Mr. Canning, that there could have been no foundation for the report of the rejection of the treaty, as we were satisfied that Mr. Purviance, who had carried it to our government, could not have arrived in the United States in time to enable the President to submit it to the consideration of the Senate, before the 3d of March, when Congress must have adjourned; and that he must be sensible, that until the receipt of our dispatch, no step, at least of so decisive a character, would be taken in the business.

We stated, however, that we had great reason to believe that the treaty would not be ratified in its present form, for a cause which was well known to his majesty's late government. We then communicated to him fully all the circumstances on which that remark was founded, particularly the nature of our instructions relative to impressments; the knowledge which the British commissioners had of them; the entire suspension of the negotiation at a certain period, on the failure with the cabinet of a project of an article for the regulation of that point; the considerations which induced us afterwards to proceed in the negotiation, founded on the note of the British commissioners of the 8th of November, the nature of which we fully explained; and finally the condition on which we did proceed in the business, that is, that our government would not be bound to ratify the treaty, if it should not be satisfied with the substitute for such an article offered in that note. He asked us, in case the treaty should not be ratified, in what state our government wished to place the relations of the two countries? We replied that it was its wish that the subject of impressment should be resumed and arranged: we explained to him the nature of the article, on the failure of which the negotiation had been suspended, and showed that Great Britain would gain by it much more than an equivalent for the forbearance of the practice of which we complained, independent of the other good effects likely to result from it: On this point he gave no opinion, but asked what the relation should be, in case no such agreement as we desired should take place respecting impressments? We replied that, in such a case, it would be the desire of our government that no treaty should be concluded, but that the relation should be placed informally on the most friendly footing; adhering, in the explanations which we gave him on this head, to the ideas contained in your letter of February 3d, but without mentioning the actual receipt of such a letter. He said he was glad to find, that our government looked in all events to an amicable arrangement. We told him that we had not heard from you since the treaty had arrived in America; but that full instructions would doubtless be forwarded to us, as soon after that event as possible. He then observed that, under present circumstances, he thought it would be better to let the whole business rest, as it would be impossible for either party to move in it with advantage.

He promised, in case the officer above mentioned, brought anything material, to inform us of it, and to appoint a time for another interview, which however he has not since done. We enclose a copy of his note of the next day.

It is impossible for us to give you a satisfactory opinion as to the prospect of arranging this important business with the present ministry. All the facts on which such an opinion should be formed, not previously known to you, are stated above. As, however, we are not perfectly aware of the consequences of any act on our part, which might tend to lessen the obligation of this government to ratify the treaty, in case it should be ratified by the President and Senate, we have thought it best, (especially as Mr. Canning, after promising us an appointment, has shown no disposition towards another interview) to leave things in their present state until we hear from you. We flatter ourselves that we shall soon have that satisfaction as we see by the gazette, that Mr. Purviance, must have arrived at Washington about the 12th of March. In the mean time we have placed our affairs on a footing the most favorable for any course which our government may take, and we beg you to be assured that we shall, with the utmost zeal and promptitude, adopt that which shall be thought the most expedient.

We have the honor to be,
With the highest respect and consideration,
Sir,
Your most obedient humble servants,
JAMES MONROE.
WILLIAM PINKNEY.

P. S. We are preparing a letter to you, explanatory of the project of a supplemental convention mentioned above, which will be forwarded in a few days. A copy of the project of the B. commissioners, will be enclosed. It is not our intention to proceed, even if this government should be so disposed, to do anything conclusive upon the subjects embraced by it, until the views of the President shall be known to us relative to such of the topics, as were not contemplated by the instructions originally given to the mission.

London, April 25, 1807.

SIR,

We had the honor to inform you in our letter of the 22d inst. that the British commissioners having proposed to us to endeavor to adjust the terms of a supplemental convention relative to boundary, to a trade by sea between the United States and the British northern colonies, and to the subjects reserved for future explanation by the 2d article of our treaty, we had resumed our conferences with them, and had made considerable progress in digesting the plan of such a convention, when the business was interrupted by an entire change of the king's ministers. It is the purpose of this dispatch precisely to explain that negotiation and its objects.

After many interviews, and much discussion, the British commissioners at length presented to us the project of which a copy is now transmitted, differing in many essential particulars from that which had been originally offered on our part.

The first article in our plan, which, like the first article in their project, defined the connecting line between the mouth of the St. Croix, as heretofore settled by commissioners, and the bay of Fundy, was copied from the convention of Mr. King and Lord Hawkesbury, and adopting the ship channel between Deer Island and Campo Bello Island, first included and then excepted the latter. The British commissioners alleged that the article in that shape accomplished its object by a useless inconsistency; that it gave a line of property and jurisdiction beyond its own views, merely to furnish occasion for an exception of almost equal importance with the whole residue of the subject; and that the navigation of the east passage being secured to the United States by a precise provision, the whole effect of the first article of the convention of 1803, would be produced at once by running the line along the middle of the west passage. They, therefore, proposed an article framed on that principle, to which no objection of any weight has occurred to us. We do not perceive that in substance this article is different from the other, while it is more simple and intelligible in its plan. Even if the commencement of one of the parallel east lines, within which, by the treaty of peace, the United States are entitled to all islands within twenty leagues of any part of our shores (not within the limits of Nova Scotia) should be admitted to depend upon the channel through which our line from the St. Croix is conducted to the bay of Fundy, it would probably be indifferent to the United States whether the east or the west channel were adopted. Grand Menan seems to be considerably southward of an east line drawn from West Quaddy Head, and we know of no other island, taking into consideration the exception in the treaty of peace, to the title of which the commencement of that line can now be important.

To the 5th article, regulating our boundary in the north-west, which has encountered much zealous opposition here, even in the form suggested by the British commissioners, from the prejudices, supposed interests, and mistaken view of many persons, an explanation of some of which will be found in an idle paper written by Lord Selkirk, (of which a copy is enclosed) we finally objected, that the division line between our respective territories in that quarter, ought to be drawn from the most north-western point of the Lake of the Woods, due north or south, until it shall intersect the parallel of 49 degrees, and from the point of such intersection due west along, and with that parallel. This was agreed to by the British Commissioners.

We objected also to the terms defining the extension of the west line, viz. "as far as the territories of the United States extended in that quarter." It appeared to us that by these words a great portion of the subject was in danger of being set at large; that the provision would, perhaps, do no more than establish between the parties the commencement of the line; and might, of course, leave it open to Great Britain to found a claim hereafter to any part of the tract of country to the westward of that commencement, upon the notions of occupancy or conquest, which you will find stated by Lord Selkirk, in the paper above mentioned, or upon some future purchase from Spain, as intimated by others. We therefore proposed to omit the words in question altogether, which the concluding proviso appeared to render wholly unnecessary, even upon the ideas of the British commissioners. This was not agreed to; but it was said there would be no objection to give to this part of the description a character of reciprocity, so as to make it read "as far as their said respective territories extend in that quarter." A copy is enclosed of our plan of a fifth article, as also of the same article with the description above quoted merely made reciprocal.

It is proper to observe in this place that the project of the British commissioners contemplates, what of course had not entered into our plan, a permanent concession, on our part, of access through our territories in the north western quarter, to the river Mississippi, for the purpose of enabling British subjects to enjoy the navigation of that river, as secured to them by the treaty of peace, and the treaty of 1794, and the like access to the rivers falling into the Mississippi from the westward. The desired concession however amounts simply to a right of passage, and is claimed, not only as an equivalent for such a permanent adjustment of boundary as is here thought, or affected to be thought, highly advantageous to us, and injurious to Great Britain, but (as regards access to the Mississippi) upon this idea, among others that the treaty of peace, which secures to Great Britain the free navigation of that river appears to have looked to it, in common with the treaty of 1763, as overreaching our northern limit, and consequently as being accessible to the British in the territory of the Hudson's Bay. It is probable that this demand, so far as regards the waters falling into the Mississippi from the westward, would not be persisted in, if no other difficulty should present itself.

The 7th article of the project is wholly that of the British commissioners, and proposes to extend, as you were apprised by our letter of the 3d of January, would be attempted by them, for the term of the treaty, the privileges of trade and inland navigation, secured by the 3d article of the treaty of 1794, to the territories of the contracting parties to the north and south of the dividing line established by the 5th article, in other words, to Louisiana and the territories of the Hudson's Bay Company, with the exception only of the actual settlements of that company and their immediate neighborhood. This, if agreed to, must undoubtedly be considered as a concession to Great Britain; although the proposed arrangement throws open to us for the first time the territories of the Hudson's Bay; although they still insist that their admission into the trade of Louisiana is a necessary consequence of our acquisition of it, coupled with the third article of the treaty of 1794; and although they sometimes intimate that the independent tribes of savages who inhabit that vast region, have a right to carry on within it their usual traffic with whom they please, and of course to authorize a continuance of the customary British trade to which this article relates; and, if not absolutely to authorize it, at least to give to Great Britain a claim upon the United States for a recognition of it (especially in connection with the treaty of 1794) upon fair terms and equivalents. We resisted this proposal by every consideration which has been stated by you, or has occurred to ourselves. We dwelt particularly upon the high motives of duty and the urgent views of policy, connected with the public tranquility, as suggested by recent facts, or by the state and peculiar population, as far as they were known, of the country to the westward of the Mississippi, as well as by the nature and character of the traffic itself, which were likely to influence our government against any plan, which should admit British, or any other foreign traders, into it. We were not able, however, to produce any disposition to dispense with this demand, and had abundant reason to apprehend that a rejection of it by the United States, would be considered here as an unfriendly act, without an adequate motive, and might prevent the completion of any satisfactory arrangement of the other points embraced by the proposed convention. Still if the consideration of this subject should be resumed, we shall not fail to renew our efforts, whatever may be the prospect of success, to reconcile this government to the failure of this favorite object, unless the instructions we may receive from you should appear to point to a different course.

There is another feature in this article which it is proper to notice. It relates to a subject with which you are already familiar, the mode of calculating the ad valorem duties on goods imported into the U. States, under the third article of the treaty of 1794. The calculation is understood to be made upon the value in Canada, not upon the value at the place of original exportation. This is complained of, not as a hardship merely, but as a plain infringement of the treaty. The object is not perhaps of such value as to make a perseverance in this doubtful practice desirable, and it is certain that the explanation, if made at this time (and if not made now, it will probably be pressed hereafter with increased zeal, as being demanded by good faith) will be received in this country as the effect of a just and liberal policy towards G. Britain. The remaining provisions of the article in favor of G. Britain are of no importance, and will perhaps be best explained by the enclosed copy of an "extra official communication with regard to the Canada trade," made to us by Lord Holland and Lord Auckland some time ago.

The 8th article of the project relates to a trade by sea, between some port or ports of the British Northern provinces and the U. States, in the vessels of either party. The article is not such as we entirely approve, but connected with an act of parliament, which it was proposed to pass immediately, and of which the draft was shown to us by the British commissioners, it would perhaps go near to accomplish the object of our government. Our project contained an article upon this subject proposing an open trade in native productions, with the same system of duties as is contained in our treaty. We were told that, although well disposed towards our object, it was impossible for the government to venture at present upon a measure striking so plainly and essentially at their colonial system, that with the aid of the good understanding between the two countries, which would grow out of the adjustment of all points of difference, their plan would be found in its practical effect to be nearly, if not altogether as convenient and beneficial to us as our own; and that, by taking a form as little calculated as possible to alarm the advocates of rigorous monopoly, it was the more likely to become the successful means of introducing more enlightened opinions, and a more liberal practice into the whole colony system of this country.

The 9th article merely prescribes the duration of the commercial articles of the convention.

We ought to add that we had inserted in our project upon the subject of boundary an article relative to Grand Menan, but found it impracticable to retain it: the British commissioners had been induced to believe that Great Britain had been in possession of that island for a great number of years, and that, although this possession might not amount to a title, it was a reasonable ground upon which to presume every thing which constituted title, so as to make it improper for them to bring it into question.

We argued in vain, that the title to Grand Menan must depend upon two plain questions of fact, whether, being in twenty leagues of our shores, it was included within the parallel east lines described in the treaty of peace as comprehending the islands which should belong to the United States; and whether, if that should be so, it was at the making of that treaty, or at any time before, within the limits of Nova Scotia; that it was impossible to pretend that the last of these questions could be answered in favor of G. Britain, and that there was strong reason to believe that the answer to the first, would be found to be in favor of the United States: that their possession, such as it was, (although its precise nature did not appear and ought not to be taken for granted) commenced after the treaty of peace, and could neither give them a title, nor in any fair reasoning applicable to the claims of sovereign states, justify a presumption of those facts upon which their title must rest; facts which were so easily capable of ascertainment, and which it was the immediate object of our article to ascertain in the same manner as other disputed facts, relative to boundary, had already been, and again were by this convention proposed to be ascertained. It was retorted that our title to Moose Island, Frederick Island and Dudley Island in the Bay of Passamaquoddy was under the treaty of peace, of a very questionable kind, and that, even if it should be admitted that their title to Grand Manan was also doubtful, it was but a fair and equitable compromise that, as we were suffered to hold, principally upon the score of possession, three islands to which Great Britain might make out a claim of considerable strength, she should on her part be suffered to retain, upon the same score of long possession, the only island, not given up to the United States, to which they seemed to think they had any shadow of pretension. We replied by denying that it was at all doubtful that these islands belonged to the United States: but as it was evident that there was no disposition to yield upon the main point, we finally thought it most advisable to forbear to press the subject for the present, and to leave the case of Grand Menan for future adjustment, as an independent case, freed from the disadvantage of this idea of compromise.

We have only to repeat, what is stated in our last, that we do not mean in any event to act conclusively upon the project in question, until the views of the President, relative to such parts of it as were not embraced by our original instructions, shall have been communicated to us. The intimations thrown out towards the end of our dispatch of the 3d of January, may, perhaps, produce such a communication.

We have the honor to be,
With the greatest respect and consideration,
Sir,
Your most obedient humble servants,
JAMES MONROE.
WM. PINKNEY.

(To be Continued.)