Alexandria Gazette

Jonathan Answered.

In common with others around me, I have shared in the enjoyment furnished us by the witty article of a writer in Friday's Gazette over the signature of "Jonathan." I may well be excused for having hesitated whether I should answer it, for I fear I shall hardly escape the charge of rashness in venturing into the lists with a writer of so much reading and erudition, and whose article shows him to be no less familiarly acquainted with the customs, manners and laws of ancient as of modern nations, "not excepting the Turkish," to say nothing of those of his own country, and of the lighter literature of the day. My thanks are due to "Jonathan" for his charitable admission that I may be "honest and sincere" in my views, and in return I congratulate him that he has not allowed his fondness for Dickens or the Greek classics to interfere with his study of the Scriptures of Truth.

In return for his apt quotation from the latter, and his clever commentary upon it, I will try to relate to him an anecdote which I have read somewhere, in which, if my memory (a poor one, I admit,) does not deceive me, the despot Napoleon figures as one of the parties, and a poor shoemaker as the other: and I do this for the warning which it furnishes to the parties whom "Jonathan" has taken under his protection, notwithstanding that I perceive the use he may make of it as furnishing another illustration of the despotic tendencies of the Canal Board, since they ask for power to do that which even Bonaparte did not attempt. I do not pretend to perfect accuracy in giving this little piece of private history. "Jonathan's" extensive reading and good memory will enable him to correct my errors, as well as to point me to the author of it. The story as it was told ran somewhat after this manner: that Napoleon, in order to carry out one of his magnificent plans of building, found it necessary to get the title to a little 5 by 10 shop belonging to the shoemaker, somewhere in the neighborhood of his "palace," and worth some small sum, say 1000 francs. The emperor sent and offered him 2000 for it; but finding who the purchaser was, the shoemaker offered to sell it for 10,000. This being altogether disproportionate to its value, was refused, and here the matter dropped for the present. After some time the emperor, unwilling to give up his favorite project, sent and offered to pay the shoemaker his price; but now he wanted 20,000. Another pause ensued, and when at last 20,000 francs were offered, 100,000 were demanded, and so on until nothing less than 100,000 would satisfy the owner. The consequence was, that the whole plan was abandoned or changed, and then the shoemaker was willing to take the last offer, and then the preceding one, and so on, until he could not get the first one of 2000 francs. One by one the bright visions of wealth which had danced so gaily before the poor shoemaker's imagination vanished, and he was left to the undisturbed possession of his little 5 by 10 shop: and as he daily plied his humble art, which scarcely afforded him a meagre subsistence, he had ample opportunity to meditate upon his folly in having lost all by grasping at too much. I leave "Jonathan" to extract the moral and to make the application.

I should really like to be able to answer "Jonathan's" inquiry as to the mode of procedure by "the despotic governments of Europe not excepting the Turkish," when private property is wanted for public use. He must pardon my ignorance in this matter. No doubt he can tell us, and I am sure, my fellow-citizens will feel as much obliged to him, as I shall be, if he will condescend to enlighten us. With great diffidence I will venture only to say that I thought, in such countries and in such cases it was not an unheard of thing that private property should be taken for public use without compensation.—or, when compensation was given, without the troublesome formality of having the land valued by a jury of the vicinage, whose little sympathy for "soulless corporations" in matters litigated by them with individuals, is so well known as to have passed into a proverb. I profess some little better acquaintance with 'the laws and practice of our own country, and I sincerely mean as I say, that it is but little.

If my memory does not deceive me, there is a clause in the Constitution of the United States which says that private property shall not be taken for public purposes without full compensation: from which, I infer, that it is neither unconstitutional nor unjust to do so, the proviso being complied with.

A writer of "Jonathan's" intelligence does not need to be told that in all acts incorporating Companies for the construction of Roads and Canals a provision is inserted granting the power to condemn the requisite land without which provision, the acts themselves, in a majority of cases, would be wholly nugatory.

Although I am unable to tell "Jonathan" how things are conducted in these cases in the despotic countries of Europe not excepting Turkey, yet I can tell him that scarcely a session of a petty County Court within the State of Virginia is held at which application is not made for the condemnation of land for roads, and not on the plea of necessity, but simply of convenience, and the application granted too, if it can be shown that thereby a hill may be avoided or a short cut to market gained, by a few farmers of the neighborhood: and yet we hear no complaints of the unjust and despotic nature of these proceedings. What is it, let me ask "Jonathan," which renders that power so monstrous when exercised upon lands fronting on a river, which is so natural and so harmless when exercised on land in other situations, that not a murmur of complaint is heard? I cannot do the intelligence of "Jonathan" the injustice of believing that he is sincere in what he says on this subject, although I am compelled to compliment his understanding at the expense of his candor;—neither can I suppose him ignorant of the facts stated above, for his communication bears on its face evidence that he is not less conversant with the proceedings at law, whether in County or Superior Courts, than he is with those of the "despotic countries of Europe not excepting Turkey," those of ancient Greece, and, for aught I know to the contrary, of the Medes and Persians.

But, to come to the gist of the matter. "Jonathan" does not dispute that the lands claimed by the Alexander's south of the Canal cannot be got in any definite period in any other way than by condemnation, and yet this is the direction in which elbow room will be first required, and perhaps the only direction, which would be a sad blow to the hopes of Hepburn and his friends. The mention made of the 5 or 6 acres purchased by Hepburn, and adjoining the lands of his children, and which we are told he can sell, seems only intended to blind and mislead. If the public had been told how far this tract lies from the mouth of the Canal—(so far that it is not likely ever to be brought into use for the shipment of coal.) it would not have been necessary to have noticed this point in "Jonathan's" article and it would not have been there, because it would not have served him any useful purpose.

How then stands the case as regards the lands belonging to Hepburn's children at his death, and in which he holds a life estate "Jonathan" says "counsel learned in the law, says he can (sell) by application to either of the courts" and, "besides it is not certain that very eminent counsel have given the opinion, that Moses Hepburn cannot sell the land which he got by the will of William Hepburn." I am not learned in the law, as I have already said, (and probably shown too) and am indebted for my legal opinions in this matter, to those who are. Whether "Jonathan" would allow them to be very eminent counsel" would depend, perhaps, upon their opinions agreeing with his own. I ought to confess both as to myself and to my legal friends, that neither they nor I, have studied the will of William Hepburn, as carefully as "Jonathan" has, and therefore we may not be entitled to speak as confidently as he may, of its contents. It is, however, I believe, generally admitted that Moses Hepburn possesses only a life estate in the land in question, and that at his death it goes in fee to his children. It is not denied that the Courts may, under certain circumstances, decree a sale of the land. but let us see whether, in the present case, there is the remotest probability of its being done, supposing that Moses Hepburn has, as "Jonathan says he believes he has, applied to the Superior Court for that purpose.

I believe it will be admitted by "Jonathan" that the Court will decree the sale of infants lands, only in the case where it can be shown to be for the interest of the infant, and it will be next to impossible to prove it in this case. The father is owner for his life—his children have no interest in it during his life, while every year is adding to the value of the land, and a sale now must operate to deprive them of all the increase of value, from the time of sale to that of the death of the tenant for life their father. and can in no possible way benefit them, since they will not derive any benefit from the fund during their father's life. The Court could hardly decree a sale under such circumstances. neither is there any security for the prosecution of such a suit. There are three, and only three possible contingencies touching the land in question, and the interest of the infants in it. Their title is future entirely and exclusively Their interest is concerned with the value of the land, when they come into possession of it. Their father is in the prime of life, and may live for twenty years and more.

The question to be passed on by the Court, is the probable value of the property at that time. Now it must either,
1st. Continue of the same value as at present.
2nd. It must depreciate or:
3rd. It must increase in value.
All these results being future, are also contingent and to be determined by the probabilities of the case; but the sale can only be made upon proof of a decided probability of advantages to the infants. Now if the land will probably remain the same in value, the infant having no present interest, and so not interested in the accruing income the Court would not order a sale. for that would only be to encounter causelessly the risks of a change of investment.

If the land will probably increase in value, as it is clear it must, the present sale would only affect the infant, by making them lose the difference between the present and future value. If the land will probably decrease in value, then the Court would unhesitatingly order a sale: but who is so insane as to ask a sale on such grounds.

An act authorizing the condemnation is no more arbitrary than a decree of the Court for a sale: for it proceeds under the special act of the Legislature, and disposes of private property without the owners consent. The difference is the COURT looks to the PRIVATE, the LEGISLATURE to the PUBLIC interest. The sale may be at public auction under the act as well as under the decree, and the interests of all parties equally well cared for.

The objection then to an act for condemning the land, resolves itself into this. The Legislature—should never take land for public purposes unless it be for the benefit of the owners, present and future so apply it. Who would' be so silly as to urge such a principle upon any Legislative body!

The value of the land is estimated on just principles,—compensation full and ample is directed—and when that has been done and not till then, the land is condemned—for the public interests cannot be thwarted by "impracticable" private ownerships, when every possible means has been taken to compensate them.

With what face then can any of this community which has asked and obtained power to condemn land for its Canal—for a Railroad to Harper's Ferry, and is asking to be permitted to do the same for one from here to Gordonsville, prate about Naboth's Vineyard?

One word more in reply to "Jonathan's" enquiry whether "the Alexandria Canal Company has ever got any land condemned." If it has never condemned any land, (which I do not know,) it certainly had the power to do it, and what will please "Jonathan" still less to hear, perhaps, there are many who think it still possesses this power. And further, if the Company has never condemned any land the more is the pity. for if it had condemned the worthless land which it occupied in passing through the estate of Preston, it would only have had to pay some few hundred dollars for that which cost it some $9000 and upwards, and the Common Council would not have been obliged to advance the money, to save the Canal from being levied on and sold, and the people of the town would have been saved so much taxation.

Z.