Richmond Enquirer

BRITISH NAVY.

The second part of M. Dupin's distinguished work entitled Voyages dans la Grande Bretagne, is published, in two quarto volumes. The end of the whole work is so dignified and important, its subject matter so valuable, and its execution so powerful, that we should conceive ourselves equally wanting to the cause of general knowledge, and to that of our own national policies, if we failed to offer this public testimony of the interest which we have felt in its perusal. The immediate subject of discussion in this part of the book is the naval force of England; For a Frenchman, a delicate and trying theme. But M. Dupin is not an ordinary Frenchman. We do not say that he has wholly shaken off the peculiarities or prejudices of his nation; or that the justice of some of his reasonings, the accuracy of his conclusions, and even the authenticity of a few of his facts, have not been in a slight degree affected by the emulous medium through which he has examined this country. But such errors are specks upon the sun. M. Dupin is deceived, but rarely, and others he never seeks to deceive. We have never read a book by any foreigner which bears the strong impress of such indefatigable diligence, of such clear intelligence, of such temper, such candour, or such integrity, as this of M. Dupin. The information has been collected from the fountain head. A great proportion of it must have been official: but the admirable mode in which it has been arranged, and the able disquisitions to which it has been made subservient, betray small marks of English office. The subjects treated are of great variety. They embrace the whole essence of our naval system; its constitution and administration in all their parts. The author begins with a view of the operation of the royal and legislative authority on the marine force of the state, and follows out his inquiry through an immense multitude of ramifications, until he finishes with the break water at Plymouth. There is a large portion of historical as well as scientific investigation throughout this singular book, which in a passing sketch it would be impossible and useless to advert to. We shall quote merely two passages, both on points of which the interest can never wholly vanish from the national mind of England. The first relates to the design of invasion by Bonaparte, and affords some curious calculations of the capacity on one side to execute, on the other to defeat, that gigantic and memorable project. The second passage with which we shall present our readers describes the respective characteristics of the British and American navies at the commencement and during the last maritime war: the occurrences are detailed in the work of Mr. James, on which M. Dupin in general places implicit reliance. The former extract may assist to fortify this nation against the possible return of ill-founded fancies unworthy of her intrinsic strength; the latter, to prevent the recurrence of delusions opposite in their character, and more replete with shame and eventual danger :—

At this epoch Great Britain had, besides the regular army, 600,000 militia. infantry, and cavalry, in arms, all the seamen of the merchant service enrolled for the gun boats, and the inhabitants of the coast embodied in corps, called sea-fencibles. It remained to be seen whether this force was capable of withstanding the shock of the army of Boulogne, had that army crossed the Channel. When the first consul threatened England with an invasion, he did not appear inclined to attempt it with ships of the line : he caused gun-boats to be built in all the ports and in all the rivers on the Atlantic coast, and collected them to the number of 2,500 in the port of Boulogne. Troops to the amount of 100,000 were to be embarked on board of those gun boats and transports. In the case of a successful descent, immense reinforcements were to follow. They were to force a landing on the opposite coast, and proceed direct to London, not, as was supposed might be done in the time of Lloyd, by advancing only two miles a day in consequence of the difficulties of the ground and the embarrassment of baggage, but by forced marches, carrying every position by the bayonet or field artillery. After their landing, nothing would in the first instance have arrested the progress of the conquerors of Lodi, of Zurich, of Hohenlinden, and of Marengo. But was the descent possible? It was not possible to enter Dover by force. That port is situated between two high mountains, in a position in which lofty batteries and works, safe from any coup de main, would easily destroy the most formidable fleet. There was besides on the heights of Dover an entrenched camp, occupied by a considerable force, which would have defended the coast under the protection of the forts and batteries. On the other hand, how were 2,500 vessels to get out of Boulogne in one tide, and to stand over in anything like order to the English coast? This could never be done under the fire of the English squadron cruising in the Channel. But the squadron might be driven off its station by a gale of wind : and before it could have time to return, the French flotilla might cross. Be it so—But let us see what would follow. The English stud line their coast with strong, but temporary batteries on every point where a landing could be attempted. Strong towers were built in short distances along shore, which was completely within the range of their guns; these martello towers could not be taken by a coup de main. Brigades of light artillery, corps of cavalry, having camps of infantry, presented a force moveable along the whole of the sea-coast by a road expressly made for that purpose. The English had besides a great number of gun-boats in all the ports opposite Boulogne. All small craft, all pilot and fishing boats, &c. were prepared for warfare if necessary. They were numbered and classed in divisions, with officers ready to direct, and troops to man them. The guns and ammunition were so disposed in the magazines that these vessels could be armed in a moment. Finally, besides the squadron stationed off Boulogne, there was a fleet of observation in the Downs, another at Spithead, and a third at the Nore. In a few minutes the telegraphic signals could communicate between all these points and the Admiralty in London. Thus, whichever way the wind might blow, it was probable the English would arrive at the point of descent, if not in time to prevent the landing, at least soon enough to burn the flotilla. In that case our army would have been left without a retreat, without support and without provision. That it would have performed prodigies I am sensible It would have been less magnanimous than the army of the east, after the naval battle of Aboukir. But those opposed to it were not Turks and Arabs. It would have had to contend against a people of prodigious obstinacy—against a million of men in arms, animated by the enthusiasm of patriotism, and incited by the most implacable hatred of the French name. I have impartially stated our means of attack, and the English means of defence. I am still of opinion that it was impossible to effect a descent without the protection of a fleet equal to that which we then possessed, and which was defeated in the battle of Trafalgar. But it was necessary that this fleet should first have possession of the Channel, and the captains who commanded it, in consequence of the inexperience of many, and the indecision of others, (though there were honorable exceptions,) were such as to render a victory impossible. As to success after the landing, I leave it to eminent military commanders to determine by their skill and experience the chances of victory and defeat. I confine myself to a statistical view of the military and naval force of Great Britain Instead of attacking the British empire in its centre it would have been more advantageous to land in Ireland. But it would have been necessary to have made this attempt with a great expedition. Had Gen. Bonaparte, instead of conquering Egypt, proceeded with his army of Italy to Ireland, that country would certainly have been lost to England, and British power would have sustained an irreparable blow. By landing in the Bay of Galway, and proceeding afterwards along the banks of the Shannon, a fine position would have been occupied. Ireland would have been thrown into insurrection, the natives armed and organized in corps, and the English driven out of that island. We fomented the revolt of the Irish by sending them trifling succours. They were the victims of their confidence, and frightful massacres followed the insurrection. At the time when our continental army had completed its glory by the campaign and victory of Austerlitz, England, by destroying the combined naval force of France and Spain, off Cape Trafalgar, secured a long duration to her maritime preponderance. Being relieved from all fear of invasion, she abandoned the defensive system, and gradually adventured an offensive war. She failed in her first attempt against Spain, under General Moore; and against Belgium, under Chatham. Instructed by these reverses, she learned to connect more perfectly her military and naval operations; to employ more abundance and fitness in her means, more prudence in her plans, and more vigor in the execution. The army which the naval force at Corunna saved from destruction was soon after brought back by that same force to the Peninsula, where, supplied and supported by the navy, it balanced during five years the success of the French troops in Portugal and Spain, which countries became the tomb of the armies of Austerlitz and Jena. Merchant vessels taken by the English 1,699 and made good prize. Do. Americans, 1,200 Nevertheless, the English were compelled to conclude a peace, because to the public 1,699 captures, divided between the ships of war and privateers, were far from being able to compensate the losses, the bankruptcies, and the disorders caused to society by the seizure of 1,900 merchant vessels laden with the riches of national industry. The late struggle, supported with so much honour by the United States against England, is extremely remarkable, considered with relation to the art of naval warfare. At the moment when the war between the two powers began, the English were satiated with success over our navy. In vain did some admirable battles prove to them what French ships well armed and well directed were capable of performing. They knew that in all circumstances Napoleon sacrificed his navy to his army—that he made serve as sappers the workmen engaged for the construction of vessels, and that he used as infantry the marine gunners and the crews of his ships. England trusted that he would lead them to their destruction by land, before they should be in a condition to be formidable by sea. Certain of almost never encountering any but ships manned by recruits and inexperienced sailors, the English abandoned themselves to security. They relaxed more and more from that activity and that frequency of military exercise which had rendered them so formidable. They looked upon themselves rather on a peace than a war footing : in fact, 700 English ships, cruising in all seas, scarcely in the course of a whole year engaged in a dozen of single combats which would merit the title of a naval action. Thus 98-100ths of the British navy remained upon a war footing without having once in a year an opportunity of measuring their strength with the enemy. The same time this vast development of naval force, destined to blockade all coasts, obliged them to mix with the English sailors a great body of foreigners, and to add to experienced a multitude of inexperienced sailors. The Americans on the contrary, having only a small number of ships of war, could employ in the composition of their crews the greatest severity—paying their sailors high, they offered a premium for desertion to the best English seamen, and thus diminished in a double ratio the relative merits of British crews. Besides, the Americans, English by descent, patient, energetic, and coldly but deeply passionate, like the citizens of the mother country, were like them hardened to the sea, and familiarized to manoeuvres by the longest voyages and the most dangerous navigation. In these numerous points of view they could, without disadvantage, sustain a comparison with the sailors of the three kingdoms. The Americans, in making preparations for a struggle against their natural rivals a considerable time before, acted like men who distrusted their own strength, and who dreaded the great reputation of their antagonists. They endeavoured, therefore to enlist on their side all the chances which prudence could prepare and produce. They had to create a navy entirely new. Free from prejudices, and unrestrained by the obstacles which are opposed to improvement to the perfecting of ancient institutions, they set out from the most advanced points of the art. If they constructed vessels, it was on the best principles, and according to the most advantageous dimensions. For every rank of ships they began by giving themselves a physical superiority in the magnitude of their principal dimensions, in the number and calibre of their guns, in the number and choice of their sailors. Then they shewed the greatest attention in exercising the sailors embarked in their vessels. These men, naturally good seamen, became excellent gunners capable of firing from a distance with much precision. With the view of rendering more sanguinary close action, they embarked the best sharpshooters of the Union, where the marksmen are all excellent. They put into their hands carbines to fire downwards from the masts and from the most elevated points of the vessel. To all these elements of success must be added the enthusiasm of freemen in defending their country's freedom, and the fury of a mercantile people, who fight for their interest and the safety of their commerce. It will then be seen that every cause, both physical and moral, combined to give to the last war between the United States and Great Britain the remarkable issue which it had to the astonishment of all nations. The study of the battles between single ships which took place in this war is of extreme interest. It shows how the Americans took advantage of every favourable circumstance, how they began the engagement from a distance, how they employed the superiority of their cannon and their gunners, how they aimed at the lowest point which their balls could reach in the hulls of their antagonists, that the numerous chances which always tend to assist the blow might never be defeated, how they destroyed the rigging of the hostile ships, how they profited by the disorder of their adversary to attack him in a position the best adapted for raking, and how they ended by overpowering him at a small distance, when he ceased to be able by a continued rapid and well directed fire, to return the most decisive rounds. The English, forced to acknowledge at their own expense the superiority of the American vessels, hastened to construct ships of the same size and carrying the same weight of metal. As early as 1816, I examined these new ships with the greatest care ; I described their dimensions and their force, and I pointed out the necessity imposed upon us of constructing vessels of the same strength. Since that time we have built some frigates which we may match against the English and American vessels of the same class London Times.