The Potters Herald

Economic Highlights

Happenings That Affect the Dinner Pails, Dividend Checks and Tax Bills of Every Individual—National and International Problems Inseparable From Local Welfare

The 1948 election belongs to history, and the historians will dig deep and long in search of the whys and wherefores of Mr. Truman's amazing victory. It was an unprecedented contest in several respects, and not the least of these is the fact that apparently only one man in high position in the country sincerely believed that the President could be elected. That was the President himself, and he was right.

The magnitude of the upset is illustrated by the publication, in one of the nation's largest weekly picture magazines, just prior to the election, of a full-page photo of Governor Dewey with a caption referring to him as the President Elect! Every one of the polls, despite a remarkable record of accuracy in previous elections, was dead wrong. So were the gamblers who fixed the betting odds. And so—their current sorrow—were a great many Democratic officeholders who abandoned the Truman cause in the belief that all was lost and tried to save what they could for themselves.

So much for the unchangeable facts. What theories can be advanced to explain Mr. Truman's demonstrated ability to get the vote?

There is some criticism of the Republican campaign, and it existed even before the election. Those who feel this hold that Mr. Dewey was too confident, too sure of victory, and, as a consequence, too careful in his tactics. He did not go in for an all-out scrap.

It is possible that, also due to over-confidence, the GOP organizations partially failed on the vital job of getting out the vote. The total vote cast, while large, was not as great as was expected. The Democrats worked extremely hard at urging their followers to go to the polls. So, perhaps, substantial numbers of Republican registrants didn't trouble to vote due to the comfortable illusion that it was in the bag.

The labor leaders, as was to be expected, are claiming the lion's share of the credit for the upset. Labor was doubtless an important factor—but it is also true that Mr. Truman was very strong in the great agricultural areas which had been written off as Dewey territory. His margins in most industrial regions, for example, were not as great as Roosevelt's. But his margins in the country were often greater. Perhaps the farmers took Mr. Dewey's assurances with a grain of salt that farm price support would be continued, and regarded Mr. Truman as a safer bet.

Dr. Gallup, whose poll missed the boat with the rest, has said that there was a tremendous surge to Truman at the very end, and that this was largely at the expense of Henry Wallace. That, he thinks, is the main reason for the polls going wrong. The very poor showing made by Wallace gives credence to this opinion.

In all probability Mr. Truman scored heavily when it came to the housewives' vote. He never stopped blaming the Republicans for the high cost of living. So, rightly or wrongly, many women voters decided that he was the man to help them with their budget problems.

Last, but by no means least, was the President's courageous fight in the final weeks. He conducted an essentially old-fashioned campaign. He called names and pulled no punches. On several occasions he threw carefully prepared speeches away, and spoke his mind without a text—and it was then that he got the most tumultuous applause. His approach and his attitude were homespun and down to earth, and people liked it. American sentiment traditionally runs to fighters and to underdogs, and that may have been enough to put the President over in an election which was very close. It was so close, in fact, that a shift of but a handful of votes in a few key states would have given the decision to Dewey.

One of the big questions now concerns the future of the Republican Party. It could not have received a more bitter blow. It had won handily in the Congressional election of 1946, and everything seemed to be in its favor for the first time in twenty years. It stood on its legislative record, and that record, in the view of the majority, was not good enough after Mr. Truman got through with his burning attacks on it.

Losing the Presidency was bad. The losses in Senate and House were staggering. At the worst, the GOP leaders thought there might be a 48-48 tie in the Senate, and no one even considered the possibility of losing House control. As it stands, the Democrats have amazingly large majorities in both bodies.

Also serious is the GOP's heavy loss in governorships. This means a weakening in state strength, a decline in patronage, and the undermining of the local groups upon which the vitality of a party largely depends. The big policies are made in Washington, but it is in the precincts and the townships that the basic work is done.

These are all GOP debits. Heavily on the credit side is that the party did poll 22,000,000 votes or so. A party that can do that is hardly dead. And everyone knows how the Democratic Party came back after the doldrums it found itself in after the first war. There will be some reorganization. The party will have to look around for attractive candidates and start grooming them for the future. There will have to be greater and more effective effort to attract younger voters. Such matters as these will be the main concern of GOP chieftains in the years ahead.