Alexandria Daily Advertiser

From the New York Gazette.

Elizabeth-Town, May 25.

You ask me, sir, if I think that the king of Sweden will be able to resist all the different powers now united against him? In answer to that question I must first consider the situation in which that sovereign is placed, the extent of his territory, the genius of his people: respecting the military art, the force of his armies, the nature and strength of the country into which the war will be carried, the state of his finances, and the succors he may expect from his allies. After considering all these things I think it will not be difficult to prove that the king of Sweden, however great may be his courage, will not be able for any length of time to resist numerous enemies.

Only consider, sir, all the different powers with whom he has to contend: on one side you will find France, having at her disposal, in Denmark only an army of 70,000 men, commanded by the best generals in the world. That army is now ready to cross the Sound or the Great Belt. The remainder of the Danish navy is at her disposal, and is already collected on the shore opposite Sweden, waiting for a favorable opportunity to cross into that country. Undoubtedly that fleet of small boats, armed vessels, sloops of war, frigates, &c. may expect the greatest opposition from the British navy, if the court of St. James is aware of the eminent danger of Sweden, her only friend and ally in the world. But even admitting that the French will not be able to pour their armies into Sweden so soon as they expect, you are forced to acknowledge that Sweden will always be obliged, as long as the French menace her shores, to have a part of her army, which is indeed very weak, divided and ready to meet the invasion of her country on that side, as it might suddenly be effected with a fair wind if the British fleet was to be dispersed. The army of Sweden being already divided, what means will that power have to resist all the numerous armies of Russia that are now in the territory? If the accounts that we have received is correct, the king of Sweden after uniting all the resources of his kingdom has carried his forces to 60,000 men, besides his militia, will it be too much for him to keep 40,000 soldiers to face about 100,000 Russians? and will 10,000 men be enough to resist all the forces of the French, or even one half of them if they were to cross to his dominions? He would fight bravely no doubt, but he would be overpowered by his enemies' But it is not enough to fight battles, to raise armies; a king so severely attacked on all sides must be sure that he will always have the means to pay his soldiers and supply them with provisions: What are the resources of Sweden to meet the danger that menaces her own existence? Is she a rich country, is her soil productive, are all the citizens united in opinion, are they all disposed to support such a war at the risk of their lives, fortunes and property? Is the militia of that country itself well trained and exercised and able to defend the kingdom if it was to be seriously attacked? Every one knows that Sweden is a poor country. If the king was to pay his armies only one year from his treasury it would remain empty at the end of the first campaign, and he would no doubt be obliged by necessity to seek for a dishonorable peace. England alone can help him in money, and she is certainly disposed to do it: with her money Gustavus may fight for a time it is true, but England's money cannot give him the means to beat and disperse his enemies. Her fleets may secure for a short time part of his dominions, but will they always secure them? Who is not acquainted with the vicissitudes that commonly attend blockade by sea? In spite of the exertions of the British officers, a gale of wind, a hard winter itself may destroy all their best plans.

The fleet being driven only one day from the Sound or the Great Belt, the French fleet will take that opportunity to join their enemy on its own shore. Respecting the fleet of Sweden it may be kept in check by the Russian fleet, and nothing can then prevent all the French craft, gun boats, schrs. &c. to reach their destination. We know too well the politics of the British cabinet to suppose that the British ministers will even send a single English soldier to assist Sweden. Were they disposed to help her as the ally and friend of England, it would likely be only with her foreign troops called German legion, who do not amount to more than a few thousand men; and can it be expected that such succors would be able to defend the kingdom? That country in fact can only depend on her own warriors. May we not reasonably be permitted to suppose that the subsidies obtained by Sweden from England to support the war may not by accident be lost, or detained, at least in part? If such an unfortunate circumstance was to happen, how could the king pay his soldiers? Could he keep them under his standards by fair promises? Every one knows that a soldier will only serve his master as long as he is paid and his wants are provided for. Would not such an embarrassing circumstance produce murmurs and even riots among the soldiers and endanger the safety of Sweden? Petitions to the king from all the cities for peace would first take place, and if he was not to listen to them perhaps, in spite of his authority, a revolution would take place amongst a people well known for their easy turn of mind. It may be said that the kingdom of Sweden offers strong natural positions, and that a few soldiers in some particular places, could stop a strong body of troops. Admitting that assertion to be true, I would say that these positions would be excellent indeed if the war was to be conducted as it was formerly, if the means of defense were proportioned to those of attack, but it is not now the case. I have just before observed that 100,000 Russians were marching against 40,000 Swedish soldiers. In some places I do not doubt that the king of Sweden will resist the Russians with advantage, and even defeat part of their forces.—But it in a single point his line was to be forced, his successes would not be of any advantage to him. Obliged to fall back not to expose his flanks he would deliver part of his country to the enemy; in that case new forces would surely come to his assistance, he would form new corps from his militia but can you expect that new levies of citizens could resist long against troops of the line? His enemies would also receive reinforcements, they would come on him with new regiments in great numbers, and would finally take his own capital: not able to carry on an offensive war he would retreat. Fight with courage, despair, till he would be brought into such a small circle of resources and real means of defense that he would certainly lose his crown. Is it in fact natural to suppose that Gustavus could fight long against the population of Russia? Against a power who had no enemies but himself, against a power who could bring against him, if it was necessary, an army of 500,000 men?

Having constantly to fear the invasion of the French, part of his forces would be of no use to him: and if he was to send them against the Russians, the French with a few thousand men, who could without great danger be sent into his kingdom, would bring the desolation to the very gates of Stockholm: but this is not all—I spoke only of the Prussians alone. Leave the king of Sweden fighting his heroes against them when suddenly there comes that all the French army is in the centre of his states. Such a thing is possible, and may certainly take place. Whether he divides or not his army, what would be his situation? What remedy would genius of that great monarch find to save him if such evils were to fall at once upon him! If Russia alone can make him unable, what will it be when she will be powerfully assisted by a French army? The king of Sweden is brave, his character stands high in the world, but his kingdom is too small, his resources too little to resist his powerful enemies. Was he emperor of Russia perhaps he might do something for the world, he could at least with reasonable hope his forces against those of France; but as he is king of a small and poor state, he will be lost forever if he does not try to make a peace with his enemy, a peace that will be honorable for his people, for his honor: peace that will wound his feelings, which will be absolutely necessary to save him. If he is not willing to sacrifice part of his states to save the rest he will be ranked amongst the kings who have lost their crowns, and after all his courage and perseverance he will not be pitied even by his former friends. Such is my opinion, sir, I give it to you as I conceive it. I should however be very happy if it should not prove correct.

I am yours.