The New York Herald

The Fishery Question—Important Intelligence—War—Presidential Considerations.

We publish this morning various extracts from the leading English journals, received by the Atlantic, upon the fishery question, from the general drift of which it appears that the cabinet of Lord Derby has receded from its late rigid construction of the treaty of 1818, and has taken a position almost exactly corresponding with the views of Mr. Webster. The London Morning Herald, the recognized organ of Her Majesty's present administration, substantially declares that the Bay of Fundy, and other large bays of the fishing grounds, are not claimed as coming within the terms of the treaty—that, consequently, our American fishermen are not to be excluded from those inland seas; but that they are to enjoy the same rights as they have heretofore enjoyed, being only restricted to a line three miles from the shore, within as well as without the bays of Her Majesty's North American colonies.

This semi-official announcement of the pacific disposition of the British cabinet, is sustained by the facts set forth by Mr. John Livingston—bearer of despatches from Mr. Lawrence, our Minister at London, to the government at Washington—in his speech at a dinner given by Captain West, on board the Atlantic, on Saturday last, a full report of which will also be found in our columns to-day. Mr. Livingston feels quite sure that, if no collision has taken place before the delivery of his despatches, there is scarcely the possibility of a rupture upon this fishery question.

Placing entire confidence in the statements of this gentleman, too, we can only conclude that the British government is quite prepared to satisfy all the reasonable demands in behalf of our American fishermen, as set forth by Mr. Webster in his proclamation from Marshfield.

This prudent letting down on the part of the Derby administration may be ascribed to various causes. The extreme pretensions of the colonies, in reference to the treaty of 1818, could not be enforced except at the hazard of war; our government could not possibly have conceded such pretensions upon any terms; peace with this country has become a primary necessity with England, from the dependency of her cotton factories for their supplies of raw material upon our Southern States. On the other hand, there is no reliance to be placed in the amicable professions of Louis Napoleon, and no security of defence within the British islands against the contingencies of a French invasion. Hence, the policy of peace on the part of England is the policy of necessity and self preservation, and the conciliatory overtures of my Lord Derby we may, therefore, regard as bona fide. We must also bear in mind that the Parliamentary elections are over, and that the bold stand of the Derby cabinet in support of the monopolizing pretensions of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick has served its purposes. Whatever of practical popularity was to be gained by that movement has been realized. It was made in time for the congratulations of the colonists to react upon the English people; and thus far it was "capital for Buncombe," before, but of no sort of service after, the elections for the new House of Commons.

On the part of Mr. Webster, it has been intimated in various quarters, that his unusually bold and decisive pronunciamento from Marshfield was designed as a coup d'etat for the Presidency—that its object was to excite a war panic against England, and by an exaggeration of the difficulties to a peaceable adjustment, to enhance the importance of securing a first rate diplomatist at the head of affairs. This may or may not have been the impelling motive of our Secretary of State, in casting forth upon the country his late extra-ministerial and belligerent proclamation. Assuming, however, that his defiant and warlike attitude in behalf of our Yankee fishermen was intended simply as a stroke of diplomacy, he has now occasion to plume himself upon the result. Had not President Polk taken a similar warlike stand upon 54 40, the joint occupation of Oregon would not have been so speedily ended as it was ended; and had Mr. Webster been equally bold and emphatic in regard to the affairs of Central America, there would have been no necessity for a joint protectorate over those States, between Great Britain and our own government.

It is remarkable, however, that the cabinet of London and our cabinet at Washington—the latter through the personal mediation of Mr. Seward, between the Secretary of State and the British Minister—should have arrived at the same conclusions upon this fishery dispute, at about the same time. We have the liberty to say that the late speech of Mr. Seward, in the Senate, was the result of a conference of that Senator with Mr. Webster and Mr. Crampton, and, subsequently, with the President; and was, therefore, by and with the advice and consent of the administration. That speech is an apology to the country for the peaceable inclination of the administration, in regard to this controversy, and is tantamount to an official notification, on the part of the President, that he washes his hands of the whole business, and casts the responsibility of action, in the premises, upon the two houses of Congress. The high ground originally taken by Mr. Webster is abandoned, upon information that the colonial construction of the treaty of 1818 is not and will not be enforced; and the President, in reference to other concessions to our fishermen, by reciprocity or otherwise, holds that Congress is the proper initiative authority.

Thus, then, the matter stands. The original complaint of Mr. Webster against the "rigorous construction" of the treaty by the British authorities, local and supreme, whereby American fishermen would be excluded from the Bay of Fundy, and all other bays of the fishing grounds, is abandoned; and our fishermen are, and will be, admitted to approach within three miles of the colonial shores, within as well as without the headlands of the bays. This is the liberal construction of the treaty contended for by Mr. Webster, and conceded by Lord Aberdeen—practically conceded, in fact, for the last thirty years. Having secured, then, the confirmation of this concession in the despatches from Mr. Lawrence, we may rest assured that our cabinet will be content to leave all further proceedings in the business to the initiative action of Congress.

What our fishermen now want is, the privilege to fish within the international maritime league of the shores of Her Majesty's North American colonies, the privilege of free access to the shore for bait, and for the purpose of curing their fish. It is well known that the shoals of mackerel and herring are seldom met with beyond three miles from the shore in the fishing season; and the maritime league is, therefore, substantially, the exclusion of our fishermen from the mackerel and herring branch of the trade.

These additional privileges necessary to a full participation in the colonial fisheries are at the discretion of the British government; and that they will be conceded, without some measure of reciprocity upon our side, is scarcely to be expected.

The cabinet have thrown the whole matter upon Congress; but it is now too late to expect anything of Congress, for the short remnant remaining of the present session. The whole question, then, will go over to the next administration. The leading whig journals are as strongly opposed to the principles of reciprocal free trade with the British North American colonies as they are to a war with England upon any provocation. On the other side, the speeches of General Cass and Mr. Soulé indicate a totally different policy. We presume that a democratic administration would not be averse to some treaty of reciprocity with our Northern neighbors, in order to secure to our citizens the full benefits of the fishing grounds, and the free navigation of the St. Lawrence and the St. John; and we presume, on the other hand, that they would not be averse to enforcing the admitted rights of our fishermen, to their fullest extent, if necessary, even at the risk of war. The present restrictions upon the fishing grounds will be a source of constant trouble and danger as long as they exist. Sooner or later they will be removed—by war, by reciprocity, or by annexation.

Of the present administration and the present Congress nothing can now be expected. The permanent settlement of this question is, therefore, involved in the Presidential election.