The Age Herald

HOW ARTILLERY IS AIMED

The Method Used in England in Late Years Copied from Germans

From the London News.

I notice in many reports from the seat of war that it is mentioned that from the artillery the first shot fell short, the second went over, but that after that the firing seemed to become deadly. This may perhaps be read by many as meaning that the first two shots were bad shots, and that the process of getting the correct range was rather slow. The fact is just the opposite.

The method by which of late years, taking example from the Germans, we have incalculably improved our artillery practice, depends on the firing of at least those two shots-one over, one under. Indeed, as I shall explain presently, a gunner would on reading such reports be a little tempted to think that the battery commanders had been rather over-anxious to think that they had obtained the range before they had really done so. A battery commander is exceptionally lucky if he gets the range-by two trials. These he does not fire with the deadly "time" fuse which makes his shell burst at the point he wishes in the air, but only with a "percussion fuse," as it is called-that is to say, with one that makes his shell burst only when it strikes the ground. As I am quite sure from reading the various reports that the deadly efficiency of our artillery in its practice as compared with the Boer artillery, despite their much longer range of weapons, has been due to the Boers being ignorant of our methods, it may interest many readers to understand them.

There is very little difficulty for artillery to lay their guns accurately in point of direction right and left. Our instruments are so fine that that can be easily accomplished. The difficulty is to prevent the guns from shooting too short or too long, as it will be observed that both the Boer artillery and the "machine guns," which are practically a number of infantry barrels placed together so as to deliver by mechanical means a vast volume of infantry fire, did at Modder Spruit. When a shrapnel shell burst in the air, or when a shell that does not burst is fired into the middle of a town, it is excessively difficult for the observer some thousands of yards away from the object to know whether it has been a good shot or a quite ineffective one. It has been calculated that the Boers, by an expenditure of little short of 3,000 shells on Ladysmith, many of the shells being large, heavy and costly, have succeeded in killing eight men. Obviously for war purposes artillery would be a very inefficient instrument if that represented its best work. Yet substantially when the great change took place which multiplied more than twenty-fold the effective range of the guns at Waterloo, that was the kind of practice which we were carrying on.

In those days we had no practice ground for artillery, such as we have now at Okehampton and in other places. The Germans had practice grounds connected with every garrison town in the country. There they, having made a horrible mess of their artillery work during a war with Austria in 1866, set themselves to improve their practice. They gradually arrived at the following method. Though, when a shell bursts in air you can not tell whether it has been fired effectually or quite uselessly; you can get certain indications from a shell which bursts on the ground, such as enable you to know whether it has gone under or over the object at which you aim. Thus the shell raises a certain amount of dust and smoke, and if you see that the object is partly obscured by this you may be pretty sure that your shell has fallen short. If, on the contrary, you see the object standing out clear and the dust behind it, you know that your shell has gone beyond the object.

Suppose, then, that I estimate the range at 3,200 yards. I want to be quite sure of getting that I don't fire over the object, because if I do, not only will my shot be useless, but I shall have no means of correcting it. Therefore, at first, I fire at 3,100, and if I find that my shot is short I fire a second round, say 3,300, in order to go beyond the object. If I see that my shot does go over I am satisfied that I have established what is called a long bracket; that is to say, I have found two ranges 300 yards apart, between which the object must lie. It does not, however, follow that it lies exactly midway between them, and it is very probable, in fact, almost certain, that it will be better to get two shots nearer together, within which the target must still certainly lie. I therefore fire another shot to shorten the distance within which I can then know that the object must be. This we call on the same principle as the other "a short bracket." I try then to fire a shot actually at the object, and if I seem to get very close to it I am satisfied that I have "the range."

Even then, however, my work is only half done before I can fire with effect. Hitherto I have not tried at all to get the correct "setting" of the fuse, which will make the shell burst in air at the right point. It was necessary first to make sure of the range, but I want, in order that the bullets may scatter properly on the target, to make one or two experiments to insure that the fuse will burst the shell in front of the troops at which I aim, and burst it neither too high nor too low, too near nor too far. It is only when I have made all these trial shots that I know that the battery is really ready to bring an effective fire on the enemy. Day after day, and almost all day long, our batteries at home have been going through the dreary drudgery that is necessary for the perfecting of the mechanism of this system. Year after year they have gone down to carry out the practice very perfectly at Okehampton, or very imperfectly at Shoeburyness, while the Irish batteries have had their own practice grounds and the batteries in the north theirs.

That is why, despite the fact that, as this campaign has shown, though it was well known before, they require a new gun, they have yet, gun for gun, defeated the Boers whenever the conditions admitted of their getting within range of them. That is why the Boers have not been able to make Ladysmith untenable; while, as Lord Methuen has declared, it was the fire of our artillery that made the capture of the Modder position possible. From another point of view it is interesting to note that the commander with his whole battery, in order to produce a decisive result, has, under the excitement of action and the bewildering effect of the enemy's fire, to carry out on the field of battle the trained habit of the practice ground. It is in this respect that our artillery has proved itself so superior to the Boers, despite the heavy nature of the guns they have dragged into the field.