Norfolk Gazette And Publick Ledger

February 27.

Letters of a late date, received by the Danish mail, confirm the statement in one of the French bulletins concerning the removal of Marshal Kaminskoy and Gen. Buxhovden from their respective commands. Why Buxhovden is superceded is not mentioned; but Kaminskoy is said to have given such unequivocal proofs of insanity, as a measure of urgent necessity. His derangement we understand, broke out in the field of battle suddenly, and in its consequences, proved very disastrous to the Russians. It is reported, that on one of the days previous to the battle of Pultusk, he entered the field stripped to his shirt, over which he hung his ribbands, stars, &c. This eccentric appearance being considered as an awkward though pardonable imitation of Suwarrow, did not excite any extraordinary degree of surprize at the time. It was however soon discovered that it was rather the result of derangement than of policy. He committed a variety of excesses, and issued orders wholly inconsistent with each other. The consequence was that the army was thrown into great confusion. It was this unhappy malady, it is said, which occasioned the seeming remissness of Buxhovden in not coming to the assistance of Benningsen, and through which the French were saved from a total defeat on the 26th of December. Had a junction between these two corps taken place, on the morning of that day, as Benningsen had reason to expect, they would have greatly out-numbered the French, and most probably, judging from the resistance made by the smaller Russian force, have obtained a great and decisive victory.

To the accounts in Danish newspapers is subjoined an assertion that the Russians, in the ardour of their success, had determined on a general battle, the event of which might be every day expected. This is the circumstance in the present posture of affairs, which is not calculated to afford unmixed satisfaction. We should be extremely sorry to see the Russians abandon that system of warfare, which alone has been able to arrest the progress of the French conquests, and to shew to Europe that they are not invincible. Many of the most skilful military men of the day, are of opinion, that Buonaparte, like Hannibal, is only to be beaten by a plan of protracted warfare, and of partial actions. The fate of Europe ought not now to be risked on a single stake, more especially as Buonaparte has always been partial to general and pitched battles; and as it would be too much to allow him to choose his own mode of warfare.