The Enquirer

The Enquirer.

RICHMOND, JANUARY 4, 1810.

VIEWS

OF THE CORRESPONDENCE, &c

No. II.

THE THREE CONDITIONS,

AS

STATED IN THE CORRESPONDENCE, &c:

We have seen in what way these three conditions sprung from the sophisticating ingenuity or mistakes of Mr. Canning. When these propositions were found to be unacceptable to our government—there was at least a reasonable presumption, that they would never be re-urged in any shape whatever, on the part of the British government. The courtesy, due from one nation towards another, would have dictated this mark of respect. The sole excuse, which was assigned for the first mention of them, did not exist to justify their repetition. The government of the U. S. had shown how "fallacious was the supposition that the propositions were acceptable to them—from their resolute rejection of these propositions.

It is admitted, that these three conditions were not again proposed through the mouth of Mr. Jackson—for as that minister has the modesty to say, "his majesty having afterwards ascertained, that the sentiments of the American government were so different from what they were at first understood to be, I was not instructed to recur to you those proposals; nor to press upon your acceptance an arrangement which had been so recently declined, especially as the arrangement itself is less applicable to the state of things now existing." But does it thence follow, that these conditions were to be lost sight of by Mr. J.—that they were not to tie him up from the acceptance of any arrangement, which might be offered on the part of the U. States—that though he was not to come forward with them, yet that he was to do any thing without them? On examination of the correspondence, it will, in reality, appear, that these propositions are eternally mingling themselves with the views of the British minister—and like an evil spirit, intersecting the path of the negociation—blasting and withering up every hope of adjustment.

It is not very easy, indeed, to understand the propositions and views of the minister. There is a want of precision in his language, which outstrips even the usual forms of diplomatic phrase. He has wrapped himself up in a mass of verbiage, and indefinite phrases. His terms are not distinctly developed. And in some passages, he seems to have resorted to contradictory expressions. This is a serious charge indeed against the Plenipotentiary of his Britannic Majesty—but what are we to conceive of the following phrases, extracted from his correspondence with Mr. Smith? Do they not furnish strong evidences of the prevaricating and contradictory turn of the British minister?

"Such, sir," says Mr. J. in his letter of the 11th Oct. "are the grounds on which it has appeared to his majesty to be unnecessary to command me to propose to the government of the United States any formal agreement to be substituted for that which his majesty has been under the necessity of disavowing; but I am directed to receive and discuss with you any proposal which you may be authorized to make to me on this head."

These terms are certainly of a very limited meaning—they tie up the minister from any powers of concluding an arrangement with this government—they empower him merely to receive and discuss, which are only preliminary operations—they do not extend to the close of a negociation—the silence of Mr. J. on this head, is therefore calculated to produce an impression, that his powers were preliminary only, like those of Hammond in 1791, and by no means of a full and conclusive character.

It is in this light, that these expressions were viewed by our own government, as clearly appears from the reply of Secretary Smith of the 19th Oct. "On the subject of the Orders in Council, the President perceives, with sentiments of deep regret, that your instructions contemplate, neither an explanation of the refusal of your government to fulfil the arrangement of that branch of the existing differences, nor the substitution of any other plan of adjustment, nor any authority to conclude any agreement on the subject, but merely to receive and discuss proposals, that might be made to you on the part of the U. States; and these, it appears, must include a stipulation on the part of the U. S. to renounce the trade with the enemies' colonies, even in branches not hitherto interdicted by British orders in council, and also a sanction to enforcing of an act of Congress by the British navy."

In the same limited light, were the intended instructions to the future minister accordingly viewed by the British government itself—for what says Mr. Canning to Mr. Pinkney in his letter of May 27th? "Some observations will be communicated."
properly through the minister, whom his majesty has directed to proceed to America; not on any special mission (which Mr. Erskine was not authorized to promise, except upon conditions not one of which he has obtained;) but as the successor of Mr. Erskine whom his Majesty has lost no time in recalling.

Such at the first blush, as well as on mature consideration, would be the construction by every man of Mr. J's powers—what then is our astonishment, when in his next letter, we see him giving a new construction and extension to his privileges: "Beyond this point of explanation which was supposed to have been attained; but which is now given to the present letter, in the form understood to be most agreeable to the American government, my instructions are prospective; they look to substituting for notions of good understanding, erroneously entertained, practical stipulations on which a real reconciliation of all differences may be substantially founded; and they authorise me not to renew proposals which have already been declared here to be unacceptable—but to receive and discuss any proposal made on the part of the United States, and eventually to conclude a convention between the two countries. It is not of course intended to call upon me to state as a preliminary to negociation, what is the whole extent of those instructions; they must, as I have before said, remain subject to my own discretion, until I am enabled to apply them to the overtures which I may have the honor of receiving from you."

How much greater is our astonishment, when we find Mr. J., in still more peremptory terms, subsequently giving the contradiction to his first assurances. The following is from his letter of the 4th November:

"I am surprised at the transition, by which it appears to you, that this part of the subject is connected with the authority empowering me to negociate with you. It will not, I dare say, have escaped your recollection, that I informed you, at a very early period of our communications, that, in addition to the usual credential letter, his majesty had been pleased to invest me with a full power, under the great seal of his kingdom, for the express purpose of concluding a treaty or convention. I well remember your testifying your satisfaction at the circumstance; and I have only now to add, that I am ready, whenever it suits your convenience, to exchange my full power against that with which you shall be provided for the progress of our negociation."

From these citations, it is plain, that Mr. J's statements of his powers are vague and ambiguous. He deals in equivokes—he wraps himself in the most mysterious mazes of diplomatic lore.—Since, therefore, his expressions about the nature of his powers are so indefinite and vague, would it not be rational to look for the same ambiguity in his statement of the terms, which his powers would permit him to entertain? The same want of precision, indeed, pervades this branch of the subject—and therefore it seems somewhat difficult to fix the precise nature of the terms, which he was to demand from our government. From his different expressions, however, on this subject, as well as from the general tone and course of his negociation, it is not difficult to see, that the three Conditions in the Despatch of January 23d, are not forgotten—and that no arrangement was likely to be made, which did not formally recognize or substantially, in some form or other, secure the object of these propositions.

We shall take up the Correspondence in our next, and show that such are the facts.

Mr. Dana quotes Grotius as justifying the disavowal of Mr. Erskine's arrangement.—How does he reconcile this with Grotius B. 3 c. 22, s.4. where he says, "Here we must repeat what we formerly said, viz. that the Sovereign is obliged by the act of his Agent, though he act contrary to his private instructions?" And in b. 2, c. 11, s.11—“But we may also be obliged by what another man does, if it appears that we have deputed and empowered him to act for us either as our Proxy in that particular, or by virtue of some general qualification; it may also happen where the commission is to act in general, that the person so commissioned may lay us under an obligation, tho' he acts contrary to our will, signified to him by his private instructions; for here be two distinct acts of the will, the one by which we bind ourselves to ratify, whatever our Proxy shall do in such a business; the other, whereby we tell our Proxy that he shall not act beyond some private instructions that are known to him and nobody else. This is to be well observed in relation to those things which ambassadors promise for their principals, who by virtue of their public powers and credentials, do sometime exceed their secret orders."