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Washington, District Of Columbia
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Editorial agrees with Supreme Court's unanimous decision upholding the 1816 Bank of the United States charter as constitutional supreme law, citing necessity for revenue collection, but critiques the Court's reasoning as erroneous, vague, and dangerously expansive, potentially enabling federal overreach into state powers like internal improvements.
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Hæc sunt qua nostra liceat te voce moneri.—VIRGIL
The Supreme Court of the United States, at their last session, decided, unanimously, in a case brought before them by writ of error from the court of appeals of the state of Maryland, that the act of Congress, passed during the session of 1815-16 incorporating the Bank of the U. States is "a law made in pursuance of the constitution," and is a part of the supreme law of the land.
To this decision no objection will be made. If the fact stated by the late Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Dallas, "that the establishment of the national bank was necessary and proper for carrying into execution some of the most important powers constitutionally vested in the government," be true, I agree with the Supreme Court, with the majority of the Congress of 1815-16, and with those who recommended the measure, that the law in question, is in pursuance of the constitution, and is a part of the supreme law of the land. (1)
That this necessity, foreseen and provided for by those who formed the constitution, and most impressively announced by Mr. D. in his official character, had, in relation to the collection of the revenue of the United States, actually occurred, was generally admitted and believed throughout the United States; in Virginia as well as every where else. This fact will account (2) for the acquiescence of the general assembly of Virginia, under a law against which in 1811, they had solemnly protested, and for the silence of those who have sometimes taken a part in constitutional discussions. But they now see, the "necessity for this law, in carrying into effect some of the most important powers of the government," though the ground on which it was proposed and adopted, is not the ground on which the Supreme Court afford their sanction: for, in their judgment, although "the government be one of the enumerated powers," yet, "having a right to do an act," that is to say to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, it must "according to the dictates of reason," be allowed to select the means; "any appropriate means:" and therefore it may select a bank (not as a mean to carry into execution the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, but) as a mean "required for the fiscal operations of the government." Such, I understand, to be the substance of the doctrine of the Supreme Court, on a question affecting the constitution "in its most interesting and vital parts." That the opinion of the court is correctly understood, will be established in the second number of this address. The object of the third number will be to prove, by a full and fair exposition of the constitution, that the premises are not true, and that if they were true, the conclusion is not logical.
To the decision of the Supreme Court, unconnected with the reasoning on which the court rely, I repeat that I have no objection. I do believe that in 1815-16 a bank was necessary: necessary, not in the novel sense of the word, but according to its old established meaning; and constitutional, as I shall hereafter show, because it was necessary: necessary, let me say again, not because it "facilitated the fiscal operations of the government," but because an essential or vital power expressly granted to the government notoriously was not carried into effect, in the way prescribed by the constitution: and it is believed could not be so carried into effect, without the aid of a power, not to be found in the specification, nor to be implied or inferred from any part of it. But the doctrines—advanced by the court are so erroneous, and, although sometimes vague, sometimes obscure, and sometimes contradictory, allow a latitude of construction so boundless, that they will, inevitably, be applied by the advocates of the seductive system of internal improvement, and national grandeur, to cases which do not lie, and I pray to God never may be brought, within the pale of federal legislation. (3)
As this is a subject which affects the vital character of the constitution; the compact on which our union will stand, I trust forever, and as this, though only the second, is, almost certainly, the last time that I can address my fellow citizens on a subject of equal interest, I hope that I may be indulged with a few remarks, preliminary to that exposition of the reasoning of the court, and that exposition of the constitution which it is my determination to lay before the public.
I entreat that it may be distinctly understood, that, in speaking of the Supreme Court, I mean precisely what I say, and nothing more. The purity of their motives is not doubted, and cannot be doubted. The sincerity of the conviction under which they pronounced their opinion, is implicitly admitted: and for their abilities and learning, high respect is entertained. Their decision, too, is believed to be correct. Their reasoning only is questioned; respectfully questioned. They have done right; but for reasons which are erroneous and dangerous; dangerous in the highest degree, because erroneous on a subject of the highest importance. They have performed the journey which their duty prescribed, and they have finished it at the right place; but, instead of travelling along the road and entering at the gate, they pursued a circuitous and pathless course, and have made and left a gap in the enclosure which may subject the proprietors to the most annoying depredations. Let us endeavor to repair this breach, to point out the road hereafter to be taken, when a journey upon it is necessary, and try to convince, even the judges themselves, that they have "erred and strayed from the right way." I have the temerity not to despair.
Let me be indulged with another remark. Rather more than twenty years ago, a great ques—
(1.) See Mr. Dallas's letter of October, 1814, to the chairman of the committee of ways and means. See also Mr. D's report of the 30th September, 1816, to the President of the United States. See also Mr. D's character. which for patriotism, republicanism, integrity in public and in private life, and talents of the highest order, both political and forensic, claims the respect and gratitude of the nation, instead of this humble notice from an obscure individual. Hei mihi, qualis erat! Of the living I say nothing: but "Semper honos, nomenque suum, laudesque manebunt." VIRG.
(2) Particularly to a Friend of the Union. See the U. Union Gazette, Philadelphia, April 24, 1819.
(3) I think the general government has power enough. I do not wish to see it diminished, but I am opposed for— ever to any augmentation at the expense of the states. The employment by the states of the powers which they now possess, has excited and will continue to keep alive a spirit of generous emulation, that will prove the secu— rity of our liberties, and the source of our highest im— provement. Every movement, therefore, calculated to depress the states, strikes at the vital parts of our system.
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Editorial Details
Primary Topic
Critique Of Supreme Court Reasoning On Bank Of The United States Constitutionality
Stance / Tone
Agreement With Decision But Respectful Criticism Of Erroneous And Dangerous Reasoning
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