Gazette Of The United States

THE OBSERVER.--NO. II.

The Nation which would be Served by Men of honesty and great abilities, must pay well.

IN my excursions through several parts of New England, I have noticed a class of citizens, who complain of the compensations allowed by Congress to the principal officers of government. The liberal character of the Americans is an evidence that those complaints arise more from their strong jealousy for liberty, than from parsimony. A jealous concern for public liberty is a noble passion, which will guard the freedom of your posterity, but at the same time it needs the rigid correction of reason. A weak and ignorant administration is one common means of subverting popular rights. Those very principles in the human mind, which make men jealous of their liberty, without restraint, will lead them into licentiousness.

The end of a good government is to divide out liberty in proper portions to every citizen, that all may be free, and none oppressed. In a state of anarchy, every neighbour becomes a tyrant in his own little sphere of afflicting; in absolute governments there are few tyrants, awful in their course—and to approach them is approaching death. If you must be wretched, it matters little whether the minister of a prince or an ill-natured neighbour be the instrument. Civil government is the only possible guard against these evils. If you were a nation of slaves, the sword, bayonet and prison would give efficacy to the measures of weak and unprincipled rulers; but you are free, and if governed at all, men of high talents and approved integrity, your most literary and industrious citizens must be called into employment.

Such men never have need to beg business, for the resources of their own minds and their application is a fund of wealth. If the public deign to have their services, the reward must be adequate to their abilities, and bear some proportion to the gains they make in private life.

No man will leave a private employment, which promises him a thousand dollars per annum, for an office of half the sum, in which he is responsible to the public opinion, and perhaps endangers the loss of his reputation or wisdom; a sacrifice for which no pecuniary satisfaction can be made. Honor or the public notice may with a few be an inducement; but these few are persons of great vanity, and have not the abilities for a difficult or confidential trust. Men of discernment, and such you want, know how to estimate their own consequence in the State, they know that if for the present you employ mean abilities for the sake of being served at a cheap rate, the public system will soon be deranged, and that you must then purchase their aid at such prices as they please. It is a better way to commence your government on such principles as will be permanent. Let public officers be few, and make them responsible both for their capacity and honesty.

It is too much the custom of this country to pity a man, who says "I did as well as I knew." Ignorance ought to be no excuse before the sacred tribunal of the public. He who accepts an office doth it at his own risque, and there are as many reasons why he should bear the consequence of incapacity as of knavery. Make this the known rule for decision on public characters, and the ignorant seekers of office will become less troublesome in their solicitations. Give an honorable reward which will command the service of your most distinguished citizens, to whatever department they are called. Such men have a character to lose, and ambition will unite with every other consideration to call forth their greatest exertions.

If this proposal doth not please, it is easy to change the system, for in every country there are rogues and dunces in plenty, who will serve you at any price: BUT REMEMBER THAT THE FIRST WILL CHEAT YOU OUT OF THOUSANDS, AND THE LATTER DISSIPATE MILLIONS BY THEIR IGNORANCE.

The compensations determined by Congress, are as small as can possibly command the service of your best characters—a less sum by throwing the execution of your government into unskillful hands would have endangered the whole. The pay of the Senate and Commons great as it may sound in the ears of some, circumstances being all considered, is not extravagant. It is a prevalent idea through the union that these gentlemen shall hold no other office under the empire or particular States—most of them to serve you have relinquished lucrative employments. After the first year Congress will not probably be together more than fifty days in a year—though your representatives be increased, the expense of a legislature will be much less than the sums given by the several States to support the members of the old Congress. Your whole civil list, including every department, would not half defray the household expenses of an European Prince. The highest officers in your judiciary, and revenue, have not a better provision than grooms of the stable, noble keepers of hawks and hounds, and dependants still more insignificant than those, receive in other nations from the hands of Royalty. Useless officers are the vermin of a State, but some officers are necessary to its very existence.

Let them be few as possible, but men of approved ability—pay them well—make them responsible—and if after this any are unfaithful, demand what you please, it will not be too severe.

NEW-YORK, October 31, 1789.