Daily National Intelligencer

GENERAL WINCHESTER,

TO THE EDITORS OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER.

(VIII)

Subsequently to my arrival at Malden, as previously noticed, I learned from doctor Todd the melancholy doom of the wounded prisoners who had been left at Frenchtown, and sent for col. Proctor.

Before, however, detailing the particulars of this conference with him, it may not be improper to mark his conduct towards the prisoners who were brought to Malden. Immediately after their arrival, notwithstanding my most pointed remonstrances against it—notwithstanding the severity of the weather, and the nakedness of the prisoners, they were confined in a lumber or boat yard, strongly enclosed around, but entirely undefended from above. Thus situated, they were exposed until the 24th, first to intense cold, and afterwards to a heavy fall of snow and rain. Their situation becoming desperate on the 24th, I prevailed on col. Proctor to assent to their removal—and the humanity of this British officer placed them in an open warehouse, where fire could not be kept and where nothing prevented their perishing with cold but the circumstance of such numbers being crowded together in so confined a space.

When Proctor made his appearance, agreeably to request, I related to him circumstantially, as communicated by doctor Todd, from whom the intelligence had been obtained, the particulars of the unprecedented scene of butchery at Frenchtown. He expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the statement, and affected to be surprised, if indeed it were true, that the Indians could perpetrate such atrocities: but, when doctor Todd, who had been a witness to their commission, authenticated the relation, he replied, with consummate obduracy, not unmixed with exultation, 'The Indians could not be controlled—I left a guard—I am not unaware, that I shall be slandered throughout the United States.'

This magnanimous British hero was mistaken as to the truth of all his allegations. The Indians could have been controlled; but, strictly in character with numbers of his compatriots in arms, he permitted the allies of his most gracious sovereign to swell the catalogue of carnage, for the admiration of a deluded populace at home, and for the gratification of a government, which he knew would promote him in proportion to the numbers he might destroy, no matter by what means!

He did not leave a guard—and an appeal to the laws of his own country will inform this enlightened and humane civilian, that truth is not slander. In truth, without intending any thing complimentary to the jurisprudence of his country, it is to be deplored by most nations of the world, that the depraved political policy of that country should be so completely subversive of the genuine spirit of her laws, as to shield such miscreants as Proctor from the sword of judicial power. Impunity has too long been permitted to embolden in outrage the unprincipled minions of the British crown—and hence have probably arisen some of the most sanguinary national contests of modern ages. From the enormities practised against the liberties and lives of American seamen, and such deeds as the murder of Pierce, in the harbor of New-York, may be clearly inferred, the causes of a war which has prostrated the naval supremacy of England. But these observations are principally made with a hope, that they may arrest the attention of the only tribunal competent to redeem humanity from the disgrace sustained at Frenchtown—that the country of a Proctor may be enabled to record one act of justice, almonitory of such heroes as those of Hampton and Havre de-Grace—and that she may yet enregister among the archives of heaven, one solitary proof, that she is not thoroughly depraved!

Had it been my misfortune to be present at the 'massacre of Raisin,' I would here disclose in detail the tragical horrors of that never-to-be-forgotten scene. But ample justice will unquestionably be done to those events, by historians whose feelings will be less liable to bias than my own; and by men who will not fail to administer strict and impartial justice to the characters of colonel Henry Proctor, general William Henry Harrison, and James Winchester. To those of the present age who may wish to be informed, from the best authority extant, of the particular circumstances and individual butcheries involved in this general murder, I know of no work in which the slaughters of the Au Raisin are more faithfully pourtrayed, than in a history of the late war, 'written by an American, and published by Joseph Cushing, No. 6, Howard street, Baltimore.'

It may not be uninteresting here to take a concise review of the principal facts noted in this and the preceding numbers. I do this with the intention of introducing some documentary evidence, having relation to these publications, not yet adduced.

On the reception of intelligence of the fall of Detroit, I assumed the command, at Newport and Cincinnati, of a detachment of troops under colonel Wells. This command was relinquished to general Harrison, under the circumstances and for the reasons heretofore noticed, who marched those troops to Fort Wayne. I then received peremptory orders from the war department to take command of the north-western army. I did so, at Fort Wayne; and advised general Harrison, on his departure from thence, that I intended on the next day to move for Detroit.

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ance. He promised, on his way, towards the rear, to hasten forward troops and supplies. How he was employed may be inferred from Appendix, B, C, D. F. H, L, Q.

I marched from Fort Wayne to Detroit, with two thousand two hundred effective troops—repaired the old fort and store houses, and awaited supplies. Instead of supplies, general Harrison arrived with a commission from the war department, and I was superseded. He assumed the command; inspected the works, ascertained the state of supplies, and departed. I next received orders from him to march for the Rapids, at which point he had advised me a junction of the wing, and centre of the north western army would be effected. Accompanying these orders to march, were assurances of meeting at the Rapids a detachment of troops under general Tupper, with supplies. Three days after the march of the army, in obedience to these orders, another was received to abandon the idea of advancing, unless the troops had moved. They had moved, and this contingency avoided the last order.

The army lay some days at the Rapids, but neither general Tupper nor supplies arrived. During this time, these imperious calls for a movement on Frenchtown occurred, which determined me to advance. In truth, had no other reasons been given for this movement than those founded on humanity, and those already noticed, the plan of the campaign, to form a junction of the force at the Rapids, would have had considerable weight. The army advanced upon Frenchtown, and the events have been detailed.

When we were made prisoners on the 22d of January, general Harrison, with a heavy reinforcement, was six miles in advance of the Rapids. Governor Madison, under oath, states it as his opinion, that a reinforcement of five hundred men at Frenchtown would have ensured a victory. I assert that it would have done more: It would have led to the immediate reduction of Malden, and given perfect security to the inhabitants of the Michigan territory. I here repeat the interrogatories formerly propounded: Would not general Harrison have been willing to reap the iron harvest of renown, had the position been maintained? I will here add some other queries, for the solution of general Harrison:

1st. How far was he from Frenchtown, when the information reached him of the disaster at Raisin?

2d. What force had he, and how many pieces of artillery?

3d. Compared with the length of time consumed in his advance, how short a time did it take him to retreat to his former position, after receiving intelligence of my defeat and capture on the 22d?

4th. What was the value of provisions and stores destroyed for the U. States at the Rapids on his retreat?

I consider it needless to add any thing more on a subject connected, not with a defence of my conduct, but, with my appeal from the decision of a tribunal, which, perhaps, had prejudged me. I have given a fair, and, as far as possible, an impartial history of my motives and conduct, whilst in the public service at the north; and, as before observed, I rely on the justice of my contemporaries, and on posterity, for a fiat which nothing can destroy.

J. W.

Tennessee, August, 1817.

* See Appendix, B, E, latter part.

† See No. III. quotation from general Harrison's letter to the Secretary at War, near the conclusion.

‡ See Appendix, B and J—Madison's and Lewis's opinions on this subject.