The Chattanooga News

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1918

TAKING PRISONERS

(E. T. B. in Popular Mechanics.)

An idea persists in many quarters today that at any time a combatant gets into a place too tight for his courage, or a place where continued opposition to an overwhelming force means nothing but useless suicide, all he has to do is to surrender. The popular idea of this giving up in the face of odds is symbolized by the photographed silhouettes of Germans, walking toward the allied trenches with hands held aloft, and crying, "Mercy, Kameraden!"

The truth is much sterner than this. Neither a German nor a fighter under the allied flags has this privilege always. In fact, more than half the soldiers who actually desire to surrender, and who would most certainly do so if given the opportunity, are forced to fight to the end.

Prisoners cannot be taken by either side except at certain stages of the combat.

Under the instructions issued to our boys at the cantonments today, given to the officers at the reserve officers' training camps, and used by the armies of the allies and such of our troops as have figured in attacks thus far, no prisoners can be taken until all objectives of the sector of the attack in question have been established.

Let us illustrate this. In most normal attacks today the battalion is the unit. In the case of a "big push" that is, an attack which extends over five miles or more of front the regiment, an elastic body consisting of any number of battalions—(under the army system adopted by France, England, and Italy, and which probably soon will be adopted by the United States war college) sometimes is the unit, but not often.

The battalion usually forms a wave, and is given a definite objective. If there are only three waves, each battalion's objective may be one of the three opposing trenches. The time card of attack will designate the hour of the advance (zero hour), the kind of barrage (box, creeping or lifting), and the method of advance behind the barrage. Also the card will state exactly the minute and second that each objective should be gained.

In making out these cards no more time is allowed than is deemed absolutely necessary, for seconds wasted in accomplishing the purpose of an attack account for scores of killed and wounded.

The way it all works out is that every ounce of offensive strength possessed by a battalion is needed all of the time until the trench is taken, new trench is made, and the immediate counter-attacks repulsed. Prisoners might stop the advance as effectually as a large body of men brought up as reserves in the opposing trench, for they would demand an escort to the rear.

In the case of a sudden attack no lines of communication to the rear have been established. These have to follow quickly, of course, else ammunition will give out among the capturers of the trench, but the ammunition runners—brave men who take three-to-one chances with death across the unprotected waste of No Man's Land that they may bring up cartridges and grenades to the defenders—have no time or inclination to escort captured Germans back of the lines. It stands to reason that until safe means of communication with the rear have been established, it is suicidal for the attacking party to waste time with prisoners. It is not a pretty thought but c'est la guerre! The same syllogisms and conclusions were discovered and acted upon by the German armies long before the allies were able to do more than strain heart, soul and body in attempting to stem the seemingly inexorable tide of Teutons. Now that the allies in turn are doing the major portion of the attacking, they have had to adopt exactly the same measures.

Where tactics and the promptings of humanity clash in war—well, tactics cannot lose.

These principles are general, of course, and apply to all armies in the field. In certain quarters deep-seated grudges are nursed; certain regiments would not take an enemy prisoner if he brought a prince's ransom with him.

The most spectacular of these grudges, perhaps, is between the Black Watch regiment of Canadians and the Prussian guards. It is not necessary to detail all of the horrible atrocities which gave cause to this terrible super-animosity; one instance will be sufficient. To begin with, the Canadians had no more feeling against Prussians than they had against Austrians or Turks. All were enemies, of course, and to be vanquished, but each individual Prussian was regarded as a human being. When he tried to surrender, the Canadians were all too glad to strain a point, if possible, and allow him to do so. One day, however, two lieutenants were wounded, both from the Black Watch. A German patrol captured them.

Three days later the sweep of the Black Watch gained the particular trench to which they had been taken. The two lieutenants had been crucified to wooden stakes and left to die.

Now any German that looks like a Prussian guard to a Canadian has no chance to save himself by surrender, and the same idea has been adopted by the guards themselves.