Norfolk Gazette And Publick Ledger

THE PUBLICK LEDGER

TO SHEW

THE VERY AGE AND BODY OF THE TIME,

HIS FORM AND PRESSURE.

WEDNESDAY EVENING, MAY 7, 1806.

COMMUNICATION.

Remarks on the Debate in the House of Representatives for publishing the President's Message, on which the secret proceeding were founded, and on some other proceedings.

The refusal to publish the message after the proceedings were made publick, is not less extraordinary than the reasons which were assigned. One gentleman says, his reasons for withholding his assent, are grounded on an apprehension, that by giving publicity to the message, it might embarrass the negotiation. There is much soundness in this argument, for certainly while a negotiation is pending, nothing ought to be done which might embarrass it. In the present case, however, the argument does not apply; because even some gentlemen who were opposed to the motion, admitted that there was no difference between the publick and the confidential messages, consequently the publicity of the latter could have no more operation on the negotiation than the former would have. But the real cause of objection proceeded from another source. The fact we believe is, and so must every one believe, who has attended to the discussion, that there was no difference in the two messages. In this case, say the opponents, why do you wish the confidential message published? The answer is very simple, why reply the advocates do you wish it kept secret.

The real object, as we understand, of the supporters of the resolution, was to shew to the people, that the house of representatives, had without any additional information from the executive, done that upon a private communication, which they did not choose to venture to do upon a publick communication, although there was no difference in the two. The advocates of the resolution wished to prove that measures were adopted in compliance with the secret wishes of the executive, expressed in that irresponsible and unconstitutional manner, which the nature of our government rejects. This is what was dreaded, for it had been expressly asserted, and was not denied, that the measures were in conformity to the secret wishes of the President, but how were those wishes expressed? in the regular constitutional mode? no, and the publication of the message would have proved that fact; gentlemen did not like that their constituents should know that they acted under the influence of the executive, expressed in a way, that had more the semblance of intrigue than a conviction of expediency.

In the course of the very desultory debate which occurred, a point of some importance was made.- Spain it was insisted was stimulated by France in her resistance of our demands, and that the only means of obtaining our object was to give money to France This was answered by observing, that if we obtained our objects, it was of little moment to us, what Spain did with the money, and that it was of no consequence to us if Spain was dependent on France, or acted from her own impulse. The objection to treat with Spain under such circumstances, does not appear to be fully answered.

A nation which acts under the influence of another, and without consulting its own will, has no responsibility. Although nations do not always act with good faith, there is however a respect for the opinion of the world, which will not permit a gross violation of faith. But Spain does not violate her faith, when she has no will. Suppose we pay the two millions to Spain, (without knowing or caring what she does with them) what security have we that France will not again interpose? Directly we have no negotiation with France, of course we have no claim upon her. It appears that we can never say when we shall be done paying, at this rate. In referring to the original purchase of Louisiana, it must be admitted, either that we purchased a country without understanding what we had bought, or if we bought a country with fixed and known boundaries, that we are kept out of our right by some one. By whom? not by Spain-by France then, for if France can influence Spain to sell us the Floridas for two millions, she can compel Spain to give us the country for which France has already been paid, by the United States. Negotiation under such circumstances, does not promise much honour or advantage. We may flatter ourselves that this loan in disguise will pass without notice by Great-Britain, but we shall find ourselves miserably deceived. Upon a former occasion, when Talleyrand wanted money from our Commissioners, they replied that a loan to France would be considered under existing circumstances, as a just cause of war by Great-Britain. Mr. Talleyrand's agent replied, "let us have the money, and we will contrive to disguise the loan, for instance, buy of France thirty "millions of Dutch rescriptions, worth fifty per "cent. for which you are to give par." Our Commissioners were not, however, to be thus duped, they were determined not to commit the honour and interests of their country.

It will be remembered that one of the objections (and if it had been well founded, it was certainly the best) was, that nothing ought to be done, pending a negotiation, which might embarrass it. Consistency, is not to be expected in men, who have no opinions of their own, and who have degraded the character of the representatives of free men, and become the automata of the executive. If uniformity of action had governed, a very different result to our negotiatons with Great-Britain would have been witnessed, than what there is reason to apprehend.

It was very well known that our minister was negotiating with Great-Britain, and with an administration, whose first act was an assurance of friendly dispositions towards the United States, and recent accounts from England confirm those assurances,- Notwithstanding these circumstances, a measure was adopted which is not only calculated to embarrass, but to defeat the negotiations. Will any man pretend to say, that those who were so cautious not to embarrass the negotiation in one instance, could be insensible upon another occasion? or rather will we not conclude, that the prohibitory bill was passed with a view to defeat the negotiation? Was there any apprehension that an honourable and advantageous issue, to Mr. Monroe's negotiations might strengthen his pretensions to the Presidential chair?

Let us suppose that by this time Mr. Monroe has compromised our disputes to his satisfaction: he will be greatly astonished to perceive, that while he was instructed to meet friendly arrangements in England, with friendly dispositions, the government here was pursuing hostile measures.

Mr. Randolph has said, that we have no cabinet. This very circumstance proves the truth of the assertion.

The executive is certainly not responsible for what the legislature does, and the nature of our government is too well understood in Great-Britain, to have it supposed so there. But surely it is well understood that the executive can recommend, and it certainly has a constitutional veto upon the acts of the legislature. While a confidential agent, selected by the executive, is instructed to go into friendly explanations and arrangements with a foreign government, the executive ratifies hostile measures here. The effect which such conduct must have, not only in the present, but upon future negotiations, is obvious.

To suppose a favourable result to Mr. Monroe's negotiations, we must attribute more forbearance and moderation, than we have heretofore experienced from the government with whom he has to negotiate.

The best, that we have to hope for is, that all the negotiations of Mr. Monroe and Mr. Pinckney will be conditioned by a stipulation for the repeal of the law. The enacting of the law will, however, leave an impression, which though policy may conceal, resentment will long cherish. We have said in so many words, that we are willing to give from fifteen to thirty per cent. more (for articles which we want) to any other nation than to Britain. When we are willing to sacrifice our interests to our resentments, our passions are strong. That we have had cause to complain of the conduct of Britain, and that a recent event, if not attoned for, has furnished additional cause, cannot be doubted. At the same time, if we are sincerely disposed to terminate all differences, it appears to be bad policy to augment the causes of dispute.