Daily National Intelligencer

FOR THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Upon being made acquainted with the fate of Napoleon, many well informed men have exclaimed, "Great Britain is now all powerful!" This exclamation has been, in general, accompanied by strong appeals to the patriotism of our fellow-citizens, and an attempt to rally the public spirit to some desperate encounter. The intention of those who are thus affected, and who endeavor to affect others, is undoubtedly good: But we question, in the first place, the omnipotency of England; and, in the second, it can be demonstrated that the U. States have nothing to fear in a contest with G. Britain, single-handed, where the two nations put out their whole strength.

If we strictly examine the opinion which assigns to the British irresistible power, we shall find that it rests chiefly on the single circumstance of the dethronement of Bonaparte. That event, it will be admitted on all hands, was not effected by the physical force of G. Britain: nor did it result from English policy and gold. For 20 years the British government labored, with fruitless toil, with money and by artifice, to restore the Bourbons, and confine France within her ancient limits. She never succeeded, till the powers of the European Continent, and chiefly Russia, outraged beyond endurance by Napoleon, rushed upon him with all their might, when he had been enfeebled by untoward military occurrences, and secretly betrayed, perhaps, by men of talents, in whom he implicitly confided. It was, therefore, the physical force of the powers of the Continent of Europe, invigorated by treachery, that deposed Bonaparte. Say, if you please, that England paid the expenses of the armies of the Allies that marched to Paris; that does not alter the case; for the treasures of G. Britain could never have directed those armies against France, if the Allied Sovereigns had not had a deep interest in curbing the domination of the French. It follows, of course, then, that the opinion of British omnipotency is founded principally on an event that was not produced by British force; but by armies which, however G. Britain might have been able to unite them against France, she never can unite against America. The reason is obvious: It is necessary and profitable to the kingdoms of Continental Europe, that the U. States should maintain their rank and importance in the world.

But why, in a question of war between the U. States and G. Britain, place so much stress upon the overthrow of Bonaparte? He was, by his restless and energetic character, troublesome to the states of Europe; but he furnished no aid thereby to America in her contest with England. The nations with whom he fought, with the exception of the British, are well inclined to the U. States; and as to G. Britain, he could not reach her. Napoleon was formidable to Europe, because he had France at his back. His abdication does not annihilate France. She still remains to hold in check the ambition of England; and although French sway no longer extends over Holland, Germany, &c. yet Germany, Holland, &c. continue to exist, guarding their own rights by their own means. They will, it is reasonable to suppose, do that for their own good which they would not do to please Bonaparte: They will exert themselves to keep G. Britain within proper bounds.

If the British were to put into operation against us all their naval strength, they might batter down some of our towns. This would induce considerable suffering; but that suffering would be little or nothing in its influence on America, especially if the question were freedom and independence or unconditional submission. To make an impression on the U. States, G. Britain must throw an army into the country; and what numerical force is it likely that she could employ in such a service? By straining herself in all parts, she has been able to bring into the field under Lord Wellington, not exceeding 60,000 men. Suppose she were to throw the whole of these troops into the U. States. What have we to fear for the final issue? For one or two years we should be harassed, and a part of the country would be desolated: But it is not in the nature of things that 60,000 soldiers should be competent to subjugate a population of 7 or 8 millions, the male part of which is, in general, robust, hardy, intelligent, active, and sacredly devoted to the protection of their rights.

Let us neither undervalue nor overvalue our enemy: let us not depress ourselves by too cheaply estimating our capacity for war, on an occasion where valor would be required, and where cowardice and treachery would be instantly stamped with infamy and punished with death. It is by truly appreciating the strength of our antagonist, and fairly measuring our own resources, that we shall best prepare ourselves to meet with firmness, and resist with vigor, the hostile visits of a presumptuous foe.