Phenix Gazette

From the National Intelligencer.

HAMPDEN—No. XI.

The doctrine of pluralities, broached during the Presidential election, is a dangerous innovation on the People. The partisans of one candidate, returned to the House of Representatives with a larger number of votes than the others, have claimed the right to be elected, and have placed his right upon that gross fallacy. It has been said that "he was the People's candidate," that the favorite of the people had been disappointed; that the injury to his rights, was a violation in his person of the political rights of the People. This attempt to misguide the public judgment was founded in an error too preposterous for serious refutation. It has been permitted to run its course.

The true republican doctrine, on which all free government must rest, is, that majorities must govern; and the principle that a plurality can govern a majority, is destructive of the foundation on which all popular government must depend.

The authority to govern can only be derived from the will of the governed, and in all cases of division, that will must be the will of the greater number, and he who has less than a majority of the whole, has furnished conclusive evidence, that he wants that essential quality, and so far from conferring any right, it is a positive negative to any right whatever. In conformity with this principle, it is required to return the three highest candidates to the House of representatives, that from them may be selected the president of the U. States— They are returned, because neither of them have obtained a majority. But if it was true, that he who had obtained the highest number of votes, ought, on the ground of political principle, to be the President, then it was unnecessary and improper to refer it to the House.— Unnecessary, because the proper candidate is already designated by the People; and improper, because, while it adds no sanction to his appointment, it may afford an occasion of defeating it.

This reference to the House, is a clear interpretation of the meaning of the Constitution, and too plain to be argued. There only who would deceive the People, would resort to an argument, which, under the pretence of defending their rights, deprives the majority of the right of controlling the lesser number.

The Constitution had prescribed that the three highest should be returned, from whom one should be selected, because the majority of the People had failed to elect. This selection was to be made not on the basis of population, but on the basis of States, and therefore a majority of small States might, by possibility, counterpoise a greater weight of population. This is one of the rights & powers of the small States, under the confederation, which cannot be taken away without sapping the foundation of the Confederacy. How absurd, then, and wicked, to talk to the People of the large States of the popular vote in the Electoral Colleges! and how preposterous to require the small States, not only to yield to a majority of popular votes, but to yield to a plurality. It is an attempt to seize on the popular passions, and in its operation to destroy the balance, of the Constitution.

The Government of the U. States is founded on that happy conception, by which the rights of the People are harmonized with the rights of the States, and by which two different elementary principles are made to combine to effect the safety of every part, with the union of the whole. This great end was attained by mutual concession and compromise, which it is dangerous to disturb.

It was a union of thirteen several and preexisting States, as a union of the People, and the powers were so distributed as to preserve to both a due share of weight and influence in the organization.

The power of Legislation was conferred on two bodies, differently constituted. The one on the principle of representation of the People, and the other on a representation of States; so that no law can be passed injurious or dangerous either to the rights of the large or small States, or to the liberty of the People, without a concurrence of a majority of the Representatives in one House, and of the States in the other.

In the formation of the Presidential office, it was impossible to carry this beautiful system into full effect. It was found too difficult to obtain, if not dangerous to require, a majority both of the People and of the States. It was unreasonable in the large States to expect that the small States would consent to abandon their equal and sovereign rights in the Union, to the principle of population. It was equally unreasonable in the small States to expect the large States to abandon altogether the principle on which the legislative branch had been constituted. It became therefore, necessary to compromise the difficulty by a mutual surrender, which was effected on the principle adopted in the Constitution.

That gives to the People the right, in the first instance, of selecting the Chief Magistrate, on the express condition, that a majority of the whole shall concur in the election. But if they do not concur, and fail to make a choice, then the three highest are returned to a Congress formed of separate and sovereign States, voting as States and by States, in which the question is no longer founded on the rights of the People, but on the equal and acknowledged rights of the States, and in which New York and Pennsylvania are no more than Rhode Island and Delaware.

But when this reference is made to the States, they are to express freely, their sovereign will; and the majority of the People are bound to acquiesce, as the majority of small States are, when the choice is made by a majority of the People, although in a minority of States.

But when the last election occurred, an attempt was made, not only to obtrude the popular voice upon the small States but to compel them to adopt as their own, the voice of a plurality, unknown to the Constitution & the laws. And when they failed to prevail over the Representatives of the small States, they attempted to create a prejudice and a clamor by representing that the rights of the People had been violated, and that the People's candidate had been defeated. This practice is in consonance with those principles of amendment to the Constitution, which contemplate the surrender of the rights of the small States to the popular principle: a work which, when it is commenced, will leave the small States nothing to expect— which will undermine the basis of the Confederacy, by destroying the equality of the States, and destroy the Constitution, itself, by deranging the balances on which it rests.

The doctrine of pluralities, which it is my object to expose, does not involve these high considerations. That rests upon no principle, either in the theory or practice of our Government, but is a violation of the highest principle in all popular Governments—That the will of the smaller number must yield to the larger, whether of People or of States.

Gen. Jackson was returned to the House with more nominal electoral votes than Mr. Adams; but this would weigh but little, when it was known how they were obtained, and of what that difference consisted.

I will say nothing of the representation of three fifths of the slaves counted for General Jackson, because the Southern States are entitled, under the Constitution, to that privilege, which I would no sooner disturb than the rights of the small States. But, in estimating the respective popularity of two men, and weighing the votes which they bring into the House, I would certainly exclude the proportion of slaves. I would not estimate one vote in Georgia equal to one and a half in Pennsylvania. But this is waived.

In the artificial construction of our Government, every State is entitled, in its electoral vote, to two votes, independent of its population, which increases in an equal degree, the smaller States, and confers upon Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, two votes, each, more than they are entitled to on the principle of population. A proper deduction for this, as well as the slave votes, will reduce General Jackson's return to less than Mr. Adams's. But let that pass.

The vote of North Carolina was due, on their own principles, to Mr. Crawford, who was the most popular candidate; but a combination was formed by two minorities, by which the friends of General Jackson and Mr. Adams united on a ticket, under a pledge, that the vote of the State should be given to Mr. Adams, if it should appear by the countersign on the ticket, that his friends were more numerous than those of General Jackson; but the contrary appearing, the whole vote (fifteen in number) was given to General Jackson, although, perhaps, his real strength did not exceed one third. But deduct fifteen from General Jackson's ninety-nine, and there will remain only eighty-four, equal to Mr. Adams.

A similar manœuvre gave him the vote of New Jersey. He obtained the vote of Maryland by means equally well understood. So that the members of North Carolina and of Maryland did not feel themselves justified in voting for him in the House. Where then is his plurality?

But besides, General Jackson received and counted the whole of the 28 votes of Pennsylvania, although there were large minorities; whereas, Mr. Adams, with an immense majority in New York, received only 26 out of the 36 votes of that State, although upon the same principle, he was entitled to 36—which would have increased his vote to 94 and reduced General Jackson's to 89. Besides, the vote for Mr. Adams in the six New England States, was almost unanimous, Whereas there were very large minorities in all General Jackson's States. I have shewn that General Jackson did not come into the House even with a fair claim to a plurality.

But, estimated nominally, what is it? It is but 99 out of 261 votes—a little more than a third of the whole number. It is but 99 to 162, and can any principle of respect to public opinion, justify the arrogant pretension that 162 must yield to 99? and especially, as the Representatives were now to vote by Colleges of States, and were no longer controlled by the popular will, but by the will of the States. Suppose, however, Gen. Jackson to have 99 votes, without deduction; it would require all the popular votes of Ohio, Kentucky, and Missouri which Mr. Clay received, 32 in number, to elect him. Is it reasonable to believe that he could have obtained all the votes in these three States? Do we not know that he could not have obtained Ohio in any event? And I have before shewn that he could not have obtained either Virginia or Georgia. But, if we deduct from his 99, for North Carolina, or for Maryland, or for Jersey, or deduct for slave votes, or the two additional votes allowed to the States upon what principle could the friends of General Jackson claim even a plurality? Or, admitting his plurality, upon what could they claim to govern all the rest? And I have shown that, without yielding implicitly to this factitious plurality, he could not be elected. Much respect is due to a very decisive plurality, but it is voluntary and gratuitous, and in no case imperative; it must be governed by its own circumstances; and there is nothing in the principles or usages of the Republican party, to make such a rule mandatory. In the election of Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mr. Taylor wanted but one vote to give him a majority, while the remainder of the votes were divided; yet all the minorities united against him, and elected Mr. Barbour, by a majority of one—yet this was not censured as a deviation from the practice of the party.

In the election of Senator from Pennsylvania, Mr. Marks had not at first a plurality. In the convention which nominated a candidate for Governor in Pennsylvania, in 1823, on the first ballot Bryan had 41, Shulze 35, and Ingham 25. Yet, afterwards, the lowest voted for Mr. Shulze, and he was, by the democratic party, elected in consequence, and the rights of plurality never thought of. This occurs in every State, and is in conformity with universal usage; and this new doctrine was never thought of, until it became necessary to press it, as a forlorn hope, in the cause of General Jackson.

The bold manner in which this imposing proposition was presented, in a moment of great excitement, obtained a sort of sanction by the easy credulity of the people, which time and information only can correct. It shows that nothing is too absurd to propagate, or too ridiculous to be believed.

I have shown that by the Constitution the States were free to choose among the three highest—that they did so in the exercise of their undoubted right—that General Jackson, in fact, had not a plurality—that if he had, that gave him no right to a majority—that he neither had a majority of the electoral votes, or of the States—and that he ought to take nothing by his false clamor.

HAMPDEN.