The Perrysburg Journal

communication, but there seems to be no means of doing so from our present position: at least from the manner in which it is spoken of, it seems to be an unavoidable difficulty. A force of 45,000 men might defend every street in the town, and the real defence of Sebastopol begin, where defences commonly end, at the moment a breach is made and the allied forces are pressing on to the assault. It is also to be remarked that the Russians have at Sebastopol an advantage similar to the one which gave such aid to the Turks at Silistria. The ravines which break up the ground permitted the Russians in that memorable siege to advance only in small bodies, and caused them to be repulsed in detail. If the Russian soldier were at all worthy of his past reputation, the allies might have to fear a loss which would make the campaign of the Crimea the most gloomy success recorded in our annals. But there is no doubt that from some cause, which neither political nor military critics have yet penetrated, the Russian conscript has shown himself manifestly inferior to the men who fought at Eylau and Borodino. If a cause for disquietude exists, it arises from the presence in the field of a large Russian force, which acts independently of the garrison of Sebastopol, and will, no doubt, attempt to effect a diversion. The strength of the army which lies on the Tchernaya, and threatens the British communication with Balaklava, is not accurately known; but the force of cavalry is said to be large, and is the more dangerous, as in that arm the allies are extremely weak. More than two hundred of the horses of the heavy brigade were lost at sea, or soon after their arrival at the Crimea: the riders of course must be mounted on whatever animals may be found in the country, or remain useless until the place of their former horses be supplied. Forage also is extremely scarce, and the horses even of general officers are suffering in consequence. The Russian force, whose base of operations is Simferopol, does not probably exceed fifteen thousand men, and to expect large reinforcements within the present month is out of the question. But the general opinion seems to be that the enemy are advancing in considerable strength by forced marches, and it is not impossible that in three or four weeks there may be an army of fifty thousand Russians in the field, besides those who hold Sebastopol. That any force which the Czar may dispatch will lose a fourth of its numbers before it reaches Simferopol there can be no doubt. So far as it can be observed, the Russians have about three hundred guns in position at Sebastopol. Probably one-half of these have been taken from the ships, and will be worked by sailors, between whom and the land troops less distinction prevails than in our service. One point is said to be of great strength; it is the southwestern angle of the town, and must be attacked by the French: one of their engineer officers declared that to capture it will cost them dearly. On the other hand, the preparations of the allies are on the grandest scale--far more extensive, indeed, than the generals anticipated when they first seized the heights which encircle the town. The necessity for cautious operations against a place which is naturally strong, and has at least a numerous and well provided garrison, with a communication with the surrounding country, is evident, and the public must not be disappointed if the work has continued longer than their sanguine frame of mind led them to believe. When once the preparations are completed, and the attack commences, we may expect a speedy issue. It is well, however, to know the difficulties that are to be surmounted, if it be only that those engaged may not be robbed of their well-earned reputation by those envious critics who find everything extremely easy after it is effected.