Norfolk Gazette And Publick Ledger

From the National Intelligencer.

In the National Intelligencer of the 18th of June, there appeared a production signed "H. Clay," which purports to supply "the omission of material circumstances, in relation to a late transaction in the House of Representatives." and to "set fully and accurately before the public that matter, which the writer more than insinuates to have been partially and incorrectly represented, in the fragment of a speech dedicated to my constituents"

When this publication first appeared, I was content to let it pass without notice. The facts (as I believe) were too notorious to be distorted. The very circumstance that the Speaker of the House of Representatives should feel himself reduced to a defence of his decisions in the public prints appealed to me, of itself, enough to satisfy all reflecting men that there must be something wrong at bottom: and my ambition did not aspire to the honor of a newspaper contest with any man, however high his dignity in the state. I was therefore content to let the matter rest where it stood. But my friends have urged me not to permit this publication—although it derives its sole claim to consideration from its official character—to pass unnoticed: lest the public mind, so habituated to authority, should be misled by it.

In deference to their judgment, I enter on this task, with a reluctance, the evidence of which will be found in the cold and sluggish manner in which it is executed.

Of all men it especially behoves him, who brings a charge against his neighbour, to avoid the error which he reprehends. There is something repugnant to our natural sense of justice to behold any man—however high his station—or great his claims to knowledge—reproving in another that failing, of which he himself, in his own person, affords a striking example. We would not endure even from Solomon himself—a king and the wisest of mankind—a reproof to the meanest of his subjects, because he did not confine himself to a single wife. This repugnance will be heightened when the example is exhibited in the very act of rebuke; and we reach the last stage of disgust, when we discover that the accused is innocent of the charge laid at his door—the accuser alone guilty.

But I will close my "preliminary remarks," and proceed to specify some of the instances of omission of material circumstances, or of unfairness of statement, on the part of Mr. Clay.

It was not "in the commencement of his observations that Mr. R. was called to order by Mr. Wright." Mr. Randolph had been speaking some time—had read several extracts from the correspondence of our government with its agent at Paris, and had advanced considerably into the case of the New-Orleans Packet, when he was interrupted by Mr. Wright. The Speaker's decision, that Mr. R. had a right to proceed, inasmuch as he had declared his intention to submit a motion—and his permitting that gentleman to proceed, according to his own statement, "or at least one hour," are facts conclusive of the point of order.

It does not become me to question the ignorance, pleaded by the Speaker, of "the case on which his friend Dr. Bibb decided, whilst acting as his substitute in the chair." Although the circumstance is certainly an extraordinary one, I shall not insinuate a doubt that the Speaker was so disengaged, or engaged, whilst out of the chair, that he did not observe an occurrence, which attracted the general attention of the house and of the spectators.

This transaction took place on the 29th of May. Mr. Clay's publication bears date the 17th of June. I cannot sufficiently admire his want of that dangerous quality, curiosity, manifested by his refraining for three weeks from making himself acquainted with the decision of Dr. Bibb, who lodges next door to him and under the same roof.

"I will not say what was the case upon which that gentleman" [Dr. Bibb] "whilst he was so kind as to represent me, was called upon to decide"—Mr. Clay's letter, 1st column: Again—"It results that between the decisions of Mr. Bibb and mine, certainly between my own, there existed no discrepancy." . . .What! no discrepancy—proved to exist between an unknown and a known decision?

The train of reasoning which leads to results like this is a new and invaluable discovery in logic. It far surpasses the old method of reasoning, 'from the known to the unknown,' and is even an improvement upon the modern practice of reasoning to things unknown from things more unknown: ignotum per ignotius.

Mr. Bibb's decision, on the repetition of the call to order by Mr. Calhoun, was substantially the same with that of the Speaker, on the interruption by Mr. Wright. And as Mr. Clay may not have "particularly directed his attention to this point," also—I beg leave to inform him that the "discrepancy" between himself and Dr. Bibb may be found in the recorded vote of the latter gentleman on the journals of the house, affirming the Speaker to have decided contrary to order. But what reasonable man will, for a moment, attach any blame to the Speaker, or ignorance of the "discrepancy" which existed between Dr. Bibb's and his own decision, when he appears unconscious of his "discrepancy" with himself. That he should forget his own repeated decisions, on order occasions, is not so much to be wondered at, as that he should appear insensible to the manifest fact, that twice within the space of an hour he should have reversed his own opinion.

Yet such unquestionably was the case.

On the subject of those order decisions I will refer members of the house to the debate in committee on the embargo bill, when at a very late hour Mr. Stanford and Mr. Randolph were both sustained by the chair in the same right against the impatience of the house; and I would call the general recollection to the case of Mr. Randolph's motion to amend Mr. Macon's proposition to afford relief to the people of Caraccas. In this case, the Speaker himself interrupted Mr. Randolph, but as soon as he understood he was about to make a motion, withdrew his objection—and sustained Mr. Randolph's right to the floor against repeated calls to order from different quarters of the house. After delivering his sentiments on the motion which he contemplated to make, Mr. R. concluded by submitting it to the house.

It behoves me to admit that when I presented my motion "under the compulsion of the house"—the Speaker did reply "that it depended on my own pleasure to withhold, or offer it;" which reply is not stated, it seems, in the "fragment," and appears to constitute one of the omissions, on my part, of which Mr. Clay complains. Reader! I was not unconscious of the omission at the time, but I had no disposition to inform the world, that mockery was added to the injustice with which I had been treated; nor can I comprehend the interest which Mr. Clay can feel in making the fact public.

There was no compulsion, mark you! "It depended entirely upon my own pleasure to offer the motion or withhold it" and take my seat in silence.

In like manner, there was no compulsion used upon those unhappy people of old, who obstinately and perversely imagined themselves to be exiled from Rome. They were only interdicted the use of fire and water so long as they should remain there. No compulsion, at all, in the case! "It depended entirely upon their own pleasure, whether they would go or stay"—and yet these wayward objects of the tender regard of the majority for their rights, fancied themselves under compulsion, and vented their party spleen by leaving their homes in disgust.

When the decision was given in favor of Mr. Calhoun's appeal to the chair, and the motion was submitted in writing, Mr. Randolph asked if he was at liberty to proceed? The Speaker decided that he was. Mr. Randolph did accordingly proceed for about a minute, when he was again called to order, and the Speaker, declaring that he had given a hasty opinion, reversed his decision. From this an appeal was taken by Mr. R. but withdrawn out of respect to his friend Mr. Macon—who said, that "he had no doubt the decision to reduce the motion to writing and submit it (against which he had voted) was wrong, but the house having established"—Here Mr. Randolph interrupted him, and said that out of respect to his friend he would withdraw his appeal. This he did under a mistaken idea that Mr. Macon would support by his vote the subsequent decision of the chair. He regretted very much the withdrawal of the appeal, when he afterwards discovered that he had misapprehended the vote, which that gentleman was about to have given.

It will not escape attention, that the facts stated in the "fragment" of Mr. R's speech are few and scarcely accompanied by comment. Let me recapitulate them:

1. The call to order by Mr. Wright; whereupon the speaker decided that Mr. R. was at liberty to proceed, and accordingly he did proceed, "at least one hour," by Mr. Clay's own statement.

2. The repetition of the call to order, by Mr. Calhoun, when Mr. R. was again supported in his right to the floor, by Dr. Bibb.

3. Mr. Calhoun's second call to order, "whereupon the Speaker reversed his own and Dr. Bibb's decision."

4. The Speaker's declaration that it was not necessary to take the vote "to consider," and that Mr. R. was at liberty to continue his argument; and his retraction and reversal of that opinion.

Let any man read Mr. Clay's letter to the Editor of the National Intelligencer, and then pronounce how far these facts are denied or disproved!

I shall not defend the speech against the charge of irrelevancy of the arguments to the motion, brought against it by Mr. Clay. It shall defend itself. Neither shall I stoop to repel the insinuation conveyed in the following passage of the letter—"even after [this motion] was reduced to writing, it was believed not to be the one originally contemplated by the mover." Such insinuations it is in the power of any man to make. A witty writer—one of the most shrewd observers upon human life and character has said, that "a certain class of politicians should speak impersonally, to avoid commitment." Thus, one of this race ought never to say "I hear, or I am told, so and so:" because the question immediately occurs, who told you?—And he may be called upon for his authority—But put it impersonally, it is said, it is reported, it is believed, and he is quite safe from any such disagreeable consequences.

The manner in which Mr. Clay speaks of my being acquainted with the projected measure, inasmuch as I am a member of the committee of foreign relations, is calculated to make an impression upon persons unacquainted with the state of affairs at Washington. Most certainly "on the 29th of May it was not expected," by me at least, or any body else with whom I conversed, that any such measure as "a declaration of war" would "emanate from that committee." On the contrary, "it was expected" that a confidential message would be received from the president, recommending the measure, and the chief of my information was derived, at second hand, from Mr. Clay himself, who, in one of his morning rides to George-Town a day or two before, communicated the intelligence to one of my colleagues, from whom I received it. The authority was good—the thing happened accordingly. The President's message was referred to the committee of foreign relations—by them, to a sub-committee of three (of whom I was not one) and all the agency which I had in the transaction (even subsequently to the 1st of June) was to help to make up a quorum, whilst the manifesto was reading.

It is not possible to make out any other difference between Mr. Sprigg's resolution and mine, except the substitution of Great-Britain for the words "French Republic." The circumstances too were similar. The minority apprehended war and were anxious to avert it from the country. Would Mr. Clay's decision have been affected, in case I had added two other resolutions; one to prevent the arming of merchant vessels, and the other to provide for the defence of the coast?*

But what at last is the true question in which the public are interested? It is, whether, after having been bubbled into a wall, by distinctions between "conditions precedent and conditions subsequent;" between "secrets affecting our neutral rights and decrees affecting our rights municipally;" we shall now, under the mask of form be deprived of the substance of freedom of speech in the popular branch of the Legislature; whether we are content to be cast, and lose forever this invaluable privilege, for some alleged want of nicety in special pleading?

The right of illustrating and enforcing his motion, violated for the first time in the case of Mr. Randolph, was the last resort of freedom of debate, which new rules and forced constructions had left untouched. The present practice of the House of Representatives is an anomaly in legislative proceedings. It is new in this country, and there is nothing similar to it in England, or in any of our state governments, as far as I am acquainted. The use made of this "rule to consider, which we practice in the House of Representatives" [which rule does not exist in the Rules and Orders of the House?] and the abuse of "the previous question" are utterly subversive of the rights of the minority, for the preservation of which rules are chiefly instituted, if we are to credit a high authority [Mr. Onslow;] the majority by their numbers being always able to protect themselves.

By these, a member of the minority may be and is prohibited from making any motion whatever—and all discussion precluded at their pleasure, on such measures as the majority choose to bring forward. It is notorious that the previous question instead of being applied to its legitimate objects, that is "when a subject is brought forward of a delicate nature, as to high personages, &c. or the discussion of which may call forth injurious observations"—is brought into play altogether on those great topics which especially demand discussion; and hence the recent change of the rule which requires "a majority to demand the previous question," instead of "any five members" as heretofore. Fortunately, the Constitution secures that "the yeas and nays shall be taken at the requisition of one fifth of the members present;" but even this provision is greatly evaded by secret sessions, which lock the vote and the subject from the public eye.

But the practice of the British Parliament is quoted in justification of the conduct of the House of Representatives. I defy any man to shew an instance in which a member of that Parliament has been subjected to the coercion exercised in the case of Mr. Randolph. "A motion to proceed to the order of the day puts by whatever subject is under consideration"—because the orders of the day have there, as they have here, a preference over ordinary questions. But there is no mode in that Parliament, analogous to the one lately devised and set up here, of preventing a member from bringing forward a motion on any subject fit for legislative deliberation, and illustrating and enforcing it by every argument in his power. Such tyranny would not be borne. Neither would they endure that a member of the opposition should be repeatedly interrupted upon the same plea of order, and by the same member of the court-party, after repeated decisions of the chair in his favor. The British House of Commons present their Speaker to the crown for its [nominal] approbation, they even ask for the confirmation of their ancient privileges; but under this exterior of humility and deference towards the throne, they have sturdily maintained their rights since the restoration, and no legislative assembly in the freedom of speech enjoyed in greater latitude, or security. With all their venality and devotion to ministers, the members of that House know full well, that upon the jealous preservation of their privileges depends their weight in the constitution. It remains to be seen, whether an American Congress shall be justified by the public sentiment, in out-stripping a British House of Commons in ministerial devotion; in prostrating, from motives of caprice, temporary convenience, or party spirit, any one of those great fundamental principles, without a religious observance of which no free government can endure.

JOHN RANDOLPH of Roanoke.
July 2, 1812.

* Mr. Sprigg's motion, March 26, 1798.

Resolved, That it is the opinion of this committee that under existing circumstances it is not expedient for the United States to resort to war against the French Republic.

Resolved, That provision ought to be made by law for restricting the arming of merchant vessels except in cases in which the practice was heretofore permitted.

Resolved, That adequate provision be made by law for the protection of our sea coast and the internal defence of the country.

†On the 25th of May, 1604, is the first instance that I have found of putting the previous question. Sir Thomas Littleton was therefore mistaken, when he says, in Grey's Debates, vol. 11. page 113, "Sir Henry Vane was the first that ever proposed putting a question whether the question should be now put? and since, it has always been the fore-runner of putting the thing in question quite out," Sir Robert Howard, in the same debate says, "This previous question is like the image of the inventor, a perpetual disturbance."

2 Hatsell, p. 80.

1 See Jefferson's Manual under the head "Previous Question."