The Daily Union

CONGRESSIONAL.

SPEECH OF MR. THOMAS, OF TENNESSEE,

In the House of Representatives, July 29, 1848-On the President's peace message.

Mr. Speaker: Some days ago, when the President's message, now under consideration, was read, the honorable gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Vinton, chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means,] made a furious attack upon the President. He charged that this message contained a "palpable assumption of power" by the President, in this-that he "undertakes to tell them, (Texas,) voluntarily, and without the authority of this House, his opinion, that whenever the United States shall acquire this territory in New Mexico, their right would operate from the mouth to the source of the Rio Grande."

This, with other charges against the President, has been repeated and urged by other distinguished gentlemen upon the other side, from day to day, with a zeal and ability that would more become a better cause; and I am gratified that I have at last obtained the floor, and that I now have an opportunity of replying to these gentlemen, and of using my humble efforts to repel these attacks, and to have that just commendation awarded to the President which his able and patriotic services so eminently deserve. The President, in this message, speaking of the "temporary governments established on the east side of the Rio Grande, and of the right of Texas to that country," says:

"Nothing, therefore, can be more certain than that this temporary government, resulting from necessity, can never injuriously affect the right which the President believes to be justly asserted by Texas to the whole territory on this side of the Rio Grande, whenever the Mexican claim to it shall have been extinguished by treaty. But this is a subject which more properly belongs to the legislative than the executive branch of the government."

It will be perceived that the President says that this subject "more properly belongs" to Congress; the gentlemen all assent to this. But the President says, further, that he "believes" this claim to be "justly asserted by Texas;" and it is the expression of this "belief" by the President that has so much aroused the wrath of the hon. Chairman. He cannot, for a moment, tolerate the idea that the President shall presume to express an opinion that Texas has this right to a country worth, as he says, "sixty or seventy millions of dollars." I suppose the gentleman would say this is slandering the title of the United States. If the rule, "let him that is without fault cast the first stone," were enforced upon this subject, how long would it be before the gentleman, or any of his party in this House, would get a fling at the President? Who is this gentleman? He is an able and distinguished leader of the whig party-a party many of whom, since December, 1846, have denounced the war as odious, unnecessary, unconstitutional, and unjust-a party that, during the present session, and after our gallant armies in a war for the rights of our country had won near thirty victories, small and great, and had marched through battle and through blood to the capital of our enemy; and after deeds of gallantry almost, if not altogether, unparalleled in the history of the world, had planted the "star-spangled banner" upon the palace of Mexico, holding in subjection more than half of the enemy's country, extending from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific; when the enemy's forces were defeated and dispersed, and there was scarcely a show of resistance to our just claims for "indemnity for the past and security for the future," it was then, sir, that forty-one of this gentleman's party-and, I believe, he among the number-voted to call the army back," thereby to relinquish the just claims of our citizens, and the rights of our country, and to force our brave armies to an inglorious retreat, trailing our hitherto untarnished flag in the dust, dishonored and disgraced. This war had been recognised by the Congress of the United States and by the constitution. This House is not the commander-in-chief of the army, nor has it the treaty-making power; yet every member of the gentleman's party upon this floor has voluntarily declared this war to have been "unnecessarily and unconstitutionally commenced," thereby prejudicing our claims against Mexico. This was a controversy between the United States and Mexico; and, to express an opinion favoring Mexico, not only escapes the patriotic vigilance of the gentleman, but receives his hearty assent. But if the President, in answer to an inquiry of a governor of one of our States, expresses an opinion favorable to the claim of such State-an opinion, too, which the learned gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. Duncan] (a whig) not only asserted was correct, but, in an able argument, showed it to be so-this, with the gentleman, is "a palpable assumption of power" on the part of the President.

Since the repeal of the odious sedition law, it has been lawful to give the truth in evidence; and the gentleman from Kentucky most clearly demonstrated the correctness of this opinion of the President, and the right of Texas to this country as against the United States. Texas was annexed by resolutions introduced by two whigs from Tennessee, and passed Congress before Mr. Polk became the President; and, upon the face of these resolutions, Texas claimed territory north of the line of 36 deg. 30 min.--enough to make at least two States; and these resolutions expressly provide that these States are thereafter to be made with the assent of Texas; and Texas had not an inhabitant then within one hundred miles of this territory; and, unless the country east of the Rio Grande, claimed as New Mexico, is included, there is not sufficient territory for one, much less for two States.

Again: when Texas is received into the Union, she is received with a constitution and laws, which extend her limits to include this country. And the map, which is a part of the recent treaty, as ratified between the United States and Mexico, represents all the country east of the Rio Grande as belonging to Texas.

Mr. Speaker, I have but time to refer to these points; and more than a mere reference is unnecessary, since gentlemen of both political parties have so firmly and clearly established the correctness of this opinion of the President.

I may ask, here, why do gentlemen have so much solicitude about this territory? It was but yesterday that their party from the north unanimously refused, in effect, to make any laws or regulations for this and the whole of the territory acquired from Mexico; and it is but a half hour since a leading member of that party from New York [Mr. Duer] avowed his readiness to give all this country back to Mexico, and, so far as I could see, he was uttering the sentiments of many of his party; and this proposition is in perfect accordance with their refusal upon yesterday to legislate for this country. The whole matter is, that this gentleman, as he avowed, would consent to give this country, intrinsically so valuable, and acquired by a treaty voted for by a majority of his party in the Senate, to Mexico, rather than permit our honest slaveholders of the south to occupy one foot of it with their slaves; and the gentleman asserts that he is for bestowing benefits upon a foreign nation rather than give a portion of his own country its just rights-and that, too, upon such a people as the Mexican-require no commendation.

I will not delay to comment further upon these points, but proceed to notice the argument of the honorable gentleman from Kentucky. [Mr. Duncan.] This gentleman, after quoting from the message the remarks of the President in relation to the temporary civil governments established in the territories during the war, declares his purpose "to examine" them, "and to demonstrate that they exhibit a lamentable lack of statesmanship, and an utter ignorance of the laws of nations, and the theory of our own constitution." He then lays down this principle:

"That there is not a respectable author of modern times to be found, who says that the laws of a conquered nation do not remain until they are changed by the conqueror."

And, to sustain this position, he adds:

"This question, as must be known to every lawyer in this House, came up in the reign of James I. All who have read Lord Coke know that it was brought before the British courts, with Lord Bacon as counsel on one side, and other eminent counsel on the other. I allude to Calvin's case. He was born in Edinburgh before the union. After the act of union he brought a real action, and the question was whether he was or was not an alien. If an alien, he could not maintain the real action. This case brought up these questions, and it was, at that early day, decided that, until the conqueror made an alteration of those laws, the ancient laws of that kingdom remained."

Now, sir, the gentleman has wholly mistaken this case, not only as to the law, but as to the facts. The reporter says "the question of this case as to matter in law was, whether Calvin, the plaintiff, (being born in Scotland,) since the crown of England descended to his Majesty, King James I, to be an alien born, and consequently disabled to bring any real or personal action for any lands within the realm of England." I admit that then this was a great case. Lord Coke says, "for that never any case within man's memory was argued by so many judges in the Exchequer Chamber as this was there having argued the lord chancellor and fourteen judges;" yet, great as it was or is, it is difficult to perceive in it any analogy to the question under consideration. The question then to be decided upon of the two kingdoms was completed. In the discussion of this question many arguments are adduced and many authorities cited. I will call attention to one which, in principle, the reporter cites as analogous to the question considered in Calvin's case. This is the case reported by St. Luke, in the acts of the apostles-the Roman tribune vs. St. Paul. St. Paul was a Jew, born in Tarsus, a famous city of Cilicia, in Asia Minor. The turbulent multitude having raised a cry against him, "Claudius Lysius, the popular tribune, (though it were utterly against justice and common reason,) bade that he should be examined by scourging." And when they had bound Paul, ready to execute the tribune's unjust command, the blessed apostle (to avoid unlawful and sharp punishment) took hold of a law of a heathen emperor, and said to the centurion standing by him: "Is it lawful for you to scourge a man that is a Roman and uncondemned? When the centurion heard that, he went and told the chief captain, saying. Take heed what thou doest: for this man is a Roman. Then the chief captain came and said to him, Tell me, art thou a Roman? He said, yea. And the chief captain answered, With a great sum obtained I this freedom." But Paul (meaning to assert his birthright as a Roman citizen) said he was "free-born." Thereupon, the tribune becoming alarmed he was discharged. So hereby it was manifest that Paul was a Jew, and though born at Tarsus, in Cilicia, in Asia Minor-then under the obedience of the Roman Emperor-he was by birth a citizen of Rome in Italy, in Europe; that is, capable of and inheritable to, all the privileges and immunities of that city." Now, this is a case commented and relied upon in Calvin's case, and fully illustrates the principle of that great case. The principle is very correct, and is now so universally acknowledged that, to the popular mind, it is matter of astonishment that it ever was doubted. It is like the claim of a citizen of Louisiana, born since the acquisition of that country, to be a citizen of the United States. A claim so just, and so in accordance with the theory of our government, that not a well-informed man in America would dispute it. Yet, self-evident as it now is, how is it applicable to the question of the power of the President of the United States, in a conquered country, in a time of war? Sir, it is about as applicable as it would have been to the celebrated bridge case tried by Sancho Panza while governor of the island of Barataria.

The learned gentleman next cites and relies upon "a great case of Campbell and Hall, as decided by Lord Mansfield." I have not examined this case, except the gentleman's report of it; and from that, it appears that it was a question as to the power of the British King in a conquered country, after a capitulation and after a treaty of peace. The gentleman says:

"It was conceded that, if not contrary to the terms of the capitulation or the treaty of peace, the King had the power, as a prerogative of his crown, to alter the laws of a country conquered by British arms, and thus make it a dominion of his kingdom. This royal prerogative right to prescribe new laws or a new civil government, was held to be not an absolute right, but a right limited to such changes of the laws as were not contrary to the fundamental principles of the British constitution. Lord Mansfield, however, recognised the same principles, which were afterwards laid down by our illustrious jurist, Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of Canter, in 1 Peters, that the conquering nation, when its conquest was confirmed and completed, might change the laws of the conquered country."

Here he shows that the King had the power, as a prerogative of his crown, to alter the laws of a conquered country, if not contrary to treaty or capitulation, and not in violation of the British constitution. These principles are not denied. The question is, not what may be done in a conquered country after a treaty of peace, but what may be done while the war continues. In a foreign war, does the constitution restrain the President? or may he do anything against the enemy allowed by the voluntary laws of nations? and does this law of nations permit the establishment of governments, during the war, over the conquered territory, for the security of the conquest and protection of the conquered inhabitants who submit to the conqueror? This the President has done; and, as we maintain, he has in so doing discharged the duties of the high station which he has so honorably filled.

The democratic party is emphatically the Union party; they have, and do yet, sustain the constitution in its purity, and contend for a strict construction of that sacred instrument; they cling to it and its compromises as the last best safeguard of the liberties of our happy country. Yet we regard this constitution as securing the rights of our citizens, and not those of our enemies. This constitution provides for the declaration of war, the making of treaties, and the appointment of ambassadors; yet it does not provide all rules necessary in relation to these, but leaves them to the control of the laws of nations.

We will not here inquire what Congress may or may not do to limit the power of the President as "commander-in-chief of the army," inasmuch as no laws have been passed upon the subject, nor are any proposed. Does the constitution limit the President, or a general, in his power against a foreign enemy? Who for a moment can suppose that the wise framers of that instrument intended to restrain our generals or our army from doing anything in the prosecution of a legal war against the enemies of the country? Such a position is absurd.

There is a rivalry among all nations-republican, aristocratical, and monarchical-to give every power and appliance to their armies in the field, to enable them to subdue their enemies, consistent with the law of nations. This power to govern the conquered inhabitants who submit, is not only permitted, but required by this law, and by the most enlightened principles of justice and humanity. You meet your enemy in battle; you defeat and disperse his army: if you stop here, the country is not yet conquered; the civil government goes on; the legislature enacts laws; the judges dispense justice, and the revenue officers collect the customs; and, by the doctrine of the gentleman, your generals cannot interfere with private property, or levy contributions upon the inhabitants, or interfere with their civil government. If none of these things are done, the nation is not and never will be conquered; or your grievances, be they ever so great, never will be redressed. To conquer a country, you must displace the sovereignty-overthrow the government; and, when this is done, the sovereignty of your country must be set up in its stead. This, and nothing short of this, will give you the full conquest of the country. This is all done against an enemy, and by force, and is a legitimate exercise of the war-power. An acquisition of this sort is not permanent; it is subject to the control of the treaty-making power. Thus we see that it is necessary to conquest, that the government of the enemy shall be overthrown, else it is no conquest. And if this be done, would the humanity of the gentlemen have no government established; would they have nothing but anarchy to prevail among the peaceful inhabitants, and have the innocent, the weak, and the helpless given over to the lusts and avarice of the strong and the lawless? No, sir. The honorable Chairman says "the President was authorized, by the laws of war, to preserve the public peace there, and keep order." And how is this to be done, but by a government? You have destroyed the government of Mexico over this country in conquering it. Do the gentlemen say this must be done by the strict, stern rules of military law? or shall it be done by the more mild forms of civil government? Does any law of the constitution, of Congress, or of nations, prescribe the form of this government? This cannot be pretended.

Do the gentlemen say that it should be purely military, and that the courts should be courts martial? These courts have no jurisdiction, except of military offences; they have no jurisdiction to dispense justice among individuals disconnected with the army, either in the punishment of crime, or in securing their rights; they are, therefore, wholly inadequate. And further, if the general can govern by the strict, and often despotic, rules of military law, he surely, as the greater includes the less, can effect the same end by the more mild and appropriate means of civil institutions.

When I remember that our institutions are peculiar, and in our internal affairs so much unlike those of the nations that have established this law, and that we have had so little to do in the prosecution of foreign wars, and the administration has had so little aid from the light of precedent and experience, I am astonished that the able and learned gentlemen have not succeeded in finding important errors in the management of this war; but I maintain that, with all their vigilance and astuteness, they have failed to do this.

The gentleman from Kentucky says "there is no title by conquest, so long as the opposing nation is in existence struggling against her foe." The Supreme Court of the United States have made several decisions in relation to this subject. I will only trouble the House to refer to two of them. Great Britain was for a time at war with Denmark, and during that time conquered the island of Santa Cruz, which was afterwards surrendered to Denmark at the making of peace. A case came before the Supreme Court in relation to the situation of the island while in possession of the British; and Chief Justice Marshall says:

"Some doubt has been suggested whether Santa Cruz, while in the possession of Great Britain, could properly be considered as a British island. But for this doubt there can be no foundation. Although acquisitions made during war are not considered as permanent until confirmed by treaty; yet to every commercial and belligerent purpose, they are considered as a part of the domain of the conqueror, so long as he retains the possession and government of them. The island of Santa Cruz remained a British island until it was restored to Denmark."

The other case in 4th Wheaton is more full upon these points, and I invite the particular attention of the House to it:

"During this period (while Castine, a town in the State of Maine, was in the British possession) the British government exercised all civil and military authority over the place, and established a custom-house, and admitted goods to be imported according to regulations prescribed by itself; and, among others, admitted the goods upon which duties are now demanded."

After the evacuation of the place, this action was brought for duties claimed to be due to the United States.

"Under these circumstances, we are all of opinion (Judge Story delivering the unanimous opinion of the court) that the claim for duties cannot be sustained. By the conquest and military occupation of Castine, the enemy acquired that firm possession which enabled him to exercise the fullest rights of sovereignty over that place. The sovereignty of the United States over the territory was of course suspended, and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conquerors.

"By the surrender the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance to the British government, and were bound by such laws, and such only, as it chose to recognise and impose. From the nature of the case, no other laws could be obligatory upon them, for where there is no protection or allegiance, or sovereignty, there can be no claim to obedience. Castine was, therefore, during this period, so far as respects our revenue laws, to be deemed a foreign port; and goods imported into it by the inhabitants, were subject to such duties only as the British government chose to require. Such goods were, in no correct sense, imported into the United States.

And when, upon the return of peace, the jurisdiction of the United States was reassumed, they were in the same predicament as they would have been if Castine had been a foreign territory ceded to the United States, and the goods had been previously imported there. In the latter case, there would be no pretence to say that American duties could be demanded; and upon principles of public and municipal law, the cases are not distinguishable. The authorities cited at the bar would, if there were any doubt, be decisive of the question; but we think it too clear to require any aid from authority."

This, I maintain, is a case precisely in point. War existed between the United States and Great Britain. Great Britain conquered a part of the State of Maine, established a government there, and collected duties, just as has been done in Mexico. In the language of the gentleman from Kentucky, had the United States "ceased to struggle with the foe?" Yet the Supreme Court says: "By the conquest and occupation, the enemy acquired that firm possession which enabled him to exercise the fullest rights of sovereignty." "By the surrender, the inhabitants passed under temporary allegiance to the British government, and were bound by such laws, and such only, as it chose to recognise and impose. From the nature of the case, no other laws could be obligatory upon them," What becomes of the assertion of the honorable gentleman? This was not done by the British Parliament, or by the king, but by a British general; and will the gentleman pretend that the British, or any nation, when they make a temporary conquest of a part of our country, can do more than we can when we conquer theirs? This would be absurd, and in direct conflict with the equality of the laws of nations.

The established rule is, "that the war being reputed equal between two enemies, whatever is permitted to one, in virtue of the state of war, is also permitted to the other. Accordingly, no nation, under pretence of justice being on its side, ever complains of the hostilities of the enemy, while they observe the laws prescribed by the common laws of war."

The honorable gentleman from Ohio says "we expelled her, (Mexico,) and took the country by conquest; and as a part of the republic of Mexico, the President was authorized by the laws of war to preserve the public peace there and keep order." This is right, and is all we contend for; but the honorable gentleman from Kentucky denies this. See how great men of the same party differ. The gentleman from Ohio, though he admits this right of the President, says that if the claim of Texas to the part of New Mexico east of the Rio Grande is good, yet the President had no power to govern there." When an enemy was expelled from their own country, it was absurd to suppose it was necessary to set up a military government there." The gentleman places it upon the proper ground-necessity; for if it was "necessary," the President had the power, otherwise not; and if he had reflected upon the situation of the country east of the Rio Grande, instead of confining his mind solely to the search for complaints against the President, he would have at once seen that his "supposed absurdity" would have changed to an imperious "necessity," which it would have been criminal in the President to disregard. This country was some hundreds of miles from the organized part of Texas, separated from it by high mountain ranges and a wilderness. The country thus situated was inhabited by Mexicans solely, enemies in arms against Texas and the United States: governed by Mexican laws, administered by Mexican officers; and that could not be held in subjection but by a military force. In this situation the United States army found them, and conquered them; thereby superseding the Mexican laws and officers that ruled. This was done at the request of Texas; and when it was done Texas was not present, by her representatives or her laws, to take the control of the country; nor could she have done so, without an army to enforce her authority. In this situation, there was a necessity, not to be avoided, "to preserve the public peace there, and keep order." If the President erred in this case, against whom did he offend? Texas. And has Texas complained? has one word of remonstrance come from the lips of her honored representatives upon this floor, or from any of the people of that gallant State? On the contrary, Texas invited the course taken by the President in sending troops within her limits, and to this hour has assented to all that has been done. A case occurred during the war of 1812 analogous to some extent to this. Mr. T. read the following Proclamation:

"The enemy having been driven from the Territory of Michigan, and a part of the army under my command having taken possession of it, it becomes necessary that the civil government of the Territory should be re-established, and the former officers renew the exercise of their authority: I have, therefore, thought proper to proclaim that all appointments and commissions which have been derived from British officers are at an end; that the citizens of the Territory are restored to all the rights and privileges which they enjoyed previously to the capitulation made by Gen. Hull on the 15th August, 1812. Under the present circumstances, and until the will of the government be known, I have thought proper to direct that all persons having civil offices in the Territory of Michigan at the period of the capitulation of Detroit, resume the exercise of the powers appertaining to their offices respectively. In the present dispersed state of its population, many officers are doubtless absent. In all cases thus situated, the last incumbent who resigned the office will resume the exercise of its duties. The laws in force at the period above-mentioned will be re-established, and continue in force until repealed by the proper authority.

"Given at headquarters, the 29th day of September, 1813.

WM. HENRY HARRISON."

Upon the re-conquest of Michigan, General Harrison proclaimed that "all appointments and commissions which have been derived from British officers are at an end," and proceeds to re-establish a government; and in case of the absence of any officer, he directed the last incumbent who resigned the office to resume the exercise of its duties. This was done in territory belonging to the United States-and done, too, to govern the citizens of the United States inhabiting that country, and friendly to its institutions; and if General Harrison could appoint a man to office there, because he had once held and resigned, and another appointed in his place, he could have appointed any one. Now that General Harrison did right, is manifest. By what right or power did he do this? By his mere power as a general, called forth by the necessity of the case. The country east of the Rio Grande was more distant from Texas, and inhabited by Mexicans, enemies to the United States-such people as could not be controlled by the civil authorities of Texas, (nor were those authorities there to control,) and is a case of much more urgent and imperious necessity than that of Gen. Harrison's. The war of 1812 was opposed throughout by the political progenitors of these gentlemen, with all the zeal and ability that those able men were possessed of; yet, in the plenitude of their patriotism, with all their acumen, they were unable to find this fault. It was reserved for their progressive political descendants, like their ancestors, ever opposed to their country in war, to make this grand discovery.

But, sir, we have yet another precedent for the course taken by the President. On the 16th of October, 1813, Gen. McClure, commanding the Niagara frontier, finding the upper province deserted by the British army, and deserted by its government, published an address to the inhabitants of that part of Canada, in which he says:

"In the peculiar situation of the inhabitants, it is essential to their security that some regulations should be established for their government while the American army has the power of enforcing them.

The character of our free republican government, and the nature of our institutions, will justify an expectation of security and protection. All civil magistrates will continue to exercise the functions of their offices merely as conservators of the peace.

"The General enjoins the inhabitants to submit to their magistrates, and those who refuse obedience must be reported to headquarters."

Here is yet another precedent-a proclamation signed by Commodore Perry and General Harrison; and the correctness of which, like the others, cannot and will not be denied:

"A PROCLAMATION.

"Whereas, by the combined operations of the land and naval forces under our command, those of the enemy within the upper district of Upper Canada have been captured or destroyed, and the said district is now in the quiet possession of our troops, it becomes necessary to provide for its government. Therefore we do hereby proclaim and make known, that the rights and privileges of the Inhabitants, and the laws and customs of the country, as they existed or were in force at the period of our arrival, shall continue to prevail. All magistrates and other civil officers are to resume the exercise of their functions, previously taking an oath to be faithful to the government of the United States as long as they shall be in the possession of the country. The authority of all militia commissions is suspended in said district, and the officers required to give their paroles in such way as the officer who may be appointed by the commanding general to administer the government shall direct.

"Given under our hands and seals this 17th October, 1813.

"WM. H. HARRISON.

"OLIVER H. PERRY."

No remark that I could make would more clearly show the direct bearing of this case. "The law of nations," says Chief Justice Marshall, "is the great source from which we derive those rules respecting belligerent and neutral rights which are recognised by all civilized and commercial States throughout Europe and America."

This law is recognised by our constitution as a part of our law, and this law justifies the course of the President. The decisions of our own Supreme Court, in unanimous opinions delivered by a Marshall and a Story, authorize it; the practice of all civilized nations approves it, the conduct of our own generals, under like circumstances, as shown in these cases, sustain it; the universal acquiescence of the American people in these cases for the third of a century, confirms it; and so soon as the zeal of party strife shall have cooled, the common-sense justice and humanity of the people will give it a most unqualified ratification.

I will now call the attention of the House to the argument of the honorable gentleman from Vermont, [Mr. Collamer.] This learned gentleman was pleased to attack the President in relation to his management of the war upon another point-the levying of contributions by a tariff of duties collected at the various Mexican ports in our possession. This, he says, was an unconstitutional assumption of power by the President; and to show this, he relies upon the clause of the constitution which says that "no appropriation of money to the use of the army shall be for a longer term than for two years," and to the clause that says "no money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations by law," &c.; and insists that the President has violated the spirit of these clauses in collecting and disbursing this revenue derived from Mexico. This gentleman, like the others, falls into the same great error, in considering the constitution as being intended for the protection of our enemies, instead of our own citizens. I believe he pretends not that the President has committed any violation of the letter; but it is of the spirit of the constitution; and how he could ever have supposed that the framers of the constitution intended to restrain our generals when in war, more than they were restrained by the law of nations, which operates equally upon our enemies, I cannot imagine. In the war of 1812, the British did collect duties in the State of Maine, while a part of it was in their possession; and our Supreme Court says, and the law of nations says, they had a right to do it; and this cannot be controverted. This being so, if we were in return to conquer a portion of their country, we could also, by the law of nations, collect revenue, unless restrained by this "spirit" of the constitution. This the framers of the constitution did not say in words, but the gentleman would have you believe by construction that this was the intention of those wise men. I could have hoped that he would have had more respect for their intelligence and patriotism than to have attributed to them any such absurd intention. The arguments which I have adduced to show the power to govern a conquered country, will also show the right of the general to levy contributions; and in the case just read from our Supreme Court in relation to the government established in the State of Maine by the British, it will be seen that this power is also clearly recognised.

The gentleman says, if this be permitted, the President may sustain his army by contributions, and carry on a war indefinitely, contrary to the wishes of the United States, unlimited and unrestrained. He should remember that this power is, and can be, only claimed in a war legally declared by Congress; and that even then, he is elected for only four years, and he may be impeached; and the very law raising an army and commissioning officers may be repealed at any time; so that there are many restraints upon him, which may be exercised if it should become necessary. Where would this gentleman find the power for a President to blockade a port of the enemy with our ships-of-war, so as not only to prohibit the ships of the enemy from entering it, but also the ships of every other nation? The constitution gives no express authority to do this. But it authorizes a declaration of war; and, war being declared, the law of nations authorizes a blockade, and hence the President's power to order it. This power, even in the war against Mexico, has never been denied. Now, if the President can exclude them altogether, or not, at his discretion, he can surely admit them upon terms, upon the condition that they will pay a duty. This has been admitted by a distinguished senator of the gentleman's party, [Mr. Dayton of New Jersey.] He said, "duties are public property; they belong to the government with which you are at war; and, I doubt not, may rightfully be appropriated by you while in possession of your enemy's port." "But can it be a question whether the entire trade, being shut out from the port of the enemy by a blockade, does not do more to coerce the country invaded, than the opening of that trade for the sake of appropriating the duties? In the one case, you deprive the enemy of both the trade and the duties; in the other, of her duties only."

This whig senator admits both the power to levy duties and to declare a blockade, but inclines to the opinion that a blockade is more available "to coerce the country invaded." This, then, is the greater power; and it has never been disputed, even by these learned gentlemen.

This power to levy contributions is not only practised by all civilized nations, but is justified by the latest-yes, by all writers on national law. Marten, in his treatise, says:

"The conqueror has, strictly speaking, a right to make prisoners of war of all the subjects of a hostile State who may fall into his power. But now-a-days the conqueror generally carries his rights no further than to submit such subjects to his domination, to make them swear fealty to him, to exercise certain rights of sovereignty over them, such as raising and quartering troops among them, making them pay taxes, obey his laws, &c., and punishing as rebels those who attempt to betray him or shake off his yoke."

Vattel says:

"Instead of the custom of pillaging the open country and defenceless places, another mode has been substituted which is at once more humane and more advantageous to the belligerent sovereign-I mean that of contributions. Whoever carries on a just war, has a right to make the enemy's country contribute to the support of his army, and towards defraying all the charges of the war. Thus he obtains a part of what is due to him; and the enemy's subjects, by consenting to pay the sum demanded, have their property secured from pillage, and the country is preserved. But a general who wishes to enjoy an unsullied reputation, must be moderate in his demands of contributions, and proportion them to the abilities of those on whom they are imposed."

If precedent and authority avail anything with the gentleman, it is unnecessary to cite more; and if the necessity of such a power in the commander of an army engaged in war is to be considered, then there can be no doubt of its propriety. It is a universally admitted principle, that "whoever carries on a just war, has a right to make the enemy's country contribute to the support of his army, and towards defraying all the charges of the war."

Gentlemen would not dispute the power of even an American general, in an enemy's country, levying contributions in kind, to supply his army with provisions. I suppose they would not deny that the General, after the capture of Monterey, could require the inhabitants of that city to supply his troops with provisions; yet it would trouble them to find any authority for it in the constitution, or anywhere, aside from the law of nations. If the General can take from the inhabitants supplies in kind, then he may well take that which will procure it. Yet to "enjoy an unsullied reputation, he must be moderate in his demands," "and proportion them to the abilities of those on whom they are imposed." This being the rule upon this subject, what more equitable mode can be found than by a tariff of duties such as were laid and collected by order of the President in the Mexican ports: This is the mode of raising revenue adopted by not only our own, but by all civilized nations. But gentlemen may say, "True, the conqueror may levy contributions, but that this power belongs to Congress, and not to the commander of the army. These gentlemen are becoming so popular in their doctrines, that I supposed they would have the general, after he had conquered a town in California, no matter how pressing the wants of his command, to send back to Washington; and if Congress was not in session, wait until the elections take place, and a Congress assembles, that he might get permission to feed his starving soldiery. It is one thing to find fault with a course of policy, and quite another to propose a better. These gentlemen have exhibited some skill in the former, but given us no evidence of their ability in the latter.

ter. I would have been gratified to have heard how they propose to conduct a foreign war. A foreign people plunder our commerce, and murder our citizens, until war necessarily results; and this war is waged to prevent the like outrages, and to compel the enemy to remunerate our citizens for their losses. The American general meets the army of the enemy, and defeats and disperses it, and the enemy have no force in the field; what further can he do? Upon these gentlemen's theory, he cannot interfere with their civil government; he cannot take private property; he cannot levy contributions. The civil government of the enemy goes on, in all its functions, dispensing justice in all its forms, and the inhabitants are pursuing their peaceful avocations undisturbed. Is this nation conquered, or will it ever be in this way? Sir, what use has the enemy for an army, or any means of defence, under such a system?

This is not the only necessary result of their theory, but your army would be in the enemy's country, and you must sustain it; and you can do this, generally, only by purchasing supplies from the enemy at high prices; thus furnishing them with a good market at their doors, and making them rich, whilst you get no redress for your wrongs, and are successful in nothing but impoverishing your own country. Such a war would be a blessing to your enemies, and would richly reward them for all their perfidy. If gentlemen really believed their complaints just, why have they not long since proposed some restriction of this power? Why have they so long permitted this alleged usurpation? If they really believe it to be so, they have been criminally negligent of their high duties in not long since proposing and urging a remedy. They have done no such thing, but satisfy themselves with bitter denunciations against the President.

Again: he asks, "what has become of the money the President had received in the form of contributions, duties," &c.? "Did it belong to the treasury?" "If so, what authority had the President to pay it out, except by warrants," &c.? If he would remember that these contributions were levied and collected by the law of nations from the enemy, for the support of the army, and the support of the necessary governments established there he would not suppose that it had gone into the treasury. He should remember that the conquering general may levy these contributions in provisions for the army in kind-beef, flour, &c.; and if this had been done, the gentleman would not, I suppose, contend that the oxen and barrels of flour must go into the treasury, and be paid out by warrant according to the constitution. And if this is so, why may not the duties collected at Vera Cruz, to sustain the army, be expended at the city of Mexico in the purchase of supplies? If these gentlemen really desire to know what has become of this money, let them call upon their friend Gen. Scott, and upon the officers under his command, who were engaged in its collection and disbursement. No; the truth about this is, that these gentlemen have been engaged since the commencement of this war in magnifying its cost, and the evils it was to bring upon the country. They commenced with an expenditure of "half a million a day;" and by this time, the government, to have sustained their assertions, should have been indebted over three hundred millions as the cost of the war. Peace is now made, and the war-debt is not one-sixth of that sum. All that has been received from Mexico has aided to diminish the expenses and falsify their predictions. This should not offend the gentlemen; for even if this had not been done, the cost of the war is far, very far, below their lowest estimates; and their character as prophets is wholly destroyed. They failed in their attempt to recall the army, and, in spite of all their opposition, and their melancholy forebodings as to the evils, cost, and termination of the war, and the expression that the Mexicans should welcome our soldiers "with bloody hands and hospitable graves," the administration, by its wisdom, patriotism and energy, has brought the war to an end by a just and honorable peace.

This war, since its commencement, has been conducted with a success unknown in the history of our government, and unexcelled in the history of the world; and not a town has been taken, or a country conquered, but in obedience to the orders and in the execution of the plans of the administration. Sir, our success is alike attributable to the wisdom and energy of the administration the skill and ability of our officers, and the patriotism and gallantry of our soldiers. These gentlemen highly appreciate the services of a general who conducts a successful campaign or directs a battle, if he be their political friend; but if he be not such friend, they will even refuse him a vote of thanks. Justice makes no such distinctions-parties should make none. This war has given character to every department of the government connected with it. Whilst our soldiers have won imperishable honors upon the field, and generals, through the indomitable courage of their armies, have achieved reputations never to be forgotten, the administration has directed all-every expedition by land and sea-and provided every means necessary to success in the various operations extending across the continent, and has conducted the whole war with a promptitude, wisdom, and energy that have with the unprejudiced commanded universal admiration; and after the ephemeral party malignity of these gentlemen shall have died away, the constitutional "commander in-chief of the army and navy of the United States," alike with the officers and soldiers under his command, will receive the endless approbation and gratitude of the American people.