The People's Voice

(Continued from page one)

As the story was put into the record yesterday from Army files, officers from the Office of Chief of Ordnance tried to keep it out of the press by insisting that publication of the disclosures would aid the enemy.

The attempt to muzzle the story was made by Col. Albert Browning, director of purchases, Army Services of Supply. At the climax of the hearing, Browning got Chairman James E. Murray to announce that the Army requested the press not to publish the story.

Censor Overruled

After hurried conferences between the newspapermen and the committee, Browning was called to the stand. He said publication of information on quantities of the items ordered, and the dates involved, would be of value to the enemy in disclosing delivery schedules of Army equipment.

Arthur Silverman, of the committee's legal staff, objected that under an agreement worked out with the Army the committee was confining its evidence to material that was not marked confidential. He said confidential files were so marked. But Browning insisted on muzzling the story.

Newspapermen protested to Chairman Murray that the whole story hung on the dates, which disclosed that contracts had been given to the Bendix company when it couldn't fill them until late in 1943. Murray decided that the story could be published, with the names of the specific items omitted.

Silverman pointed out that Browning had sat through the morning session, as similar data was placed in the files, without protest. It was not until after lunch, as the story got hotter, that he tried to invoke censorship.

Plenty of Small Plants

The presence of Browning and other high officers from the War department made it more difficult for the committee to get the story from subordinate officials, but the evidence was clear from the files placed in the record.

As a preliminary, Frederick Tomkins, co-ordinator of purchases in the New York Ordnance Office, testified to the availability of plants, workers, housing, and equipment in New York for making ordnance requirements.

He said a survey in July showed New York firms could turn out $109,000,000 worth of ordnance items monthly, including 79 different items.

Tomkins said orders for only 12 of these items had been received from Washington, mostly in small amounts.

He said another survey showed 3,710 plants in the New York ordnance district, of which only 450 had been used.

Listing reasons why these New York facilities had not been used, Tomkins mentioned among other reasons, the practice, since discontinued, of the Office of Chief of Ordnance of sending orders to New York earmarked for particular firms.

Down to Cases

Silverman then began pouring the story into the record from the files of the New York office. In September, the chief of ordnance ordered several thousand ordnance items, directing that they be purchased from the Eclipse Aviation Division of the Bendix Aviation Corp. The contract involved $2,736,528.

Tomkins testified that Bendix was not anxious to take the order, because it was booked so far in advance already. He said an official of the company called up and asked whether the Army wanted these items "for this war or the next war."

He also testified that it was perfectly feasible to break down the contract among many smaller firms and that this alternative should have been investigated. But under the directive from Washington the order was given to Bendix without bidding from anyone else, although the delivery was not scheduled to be completed until October, 1943. There was no alternative under the Washington order.

A similar order came through for Bendix in August for several thousand ordnance items costing $276,000.

Bendix replied that it would be necessary to quote deliveries in November, 1943," and so it did not want the contract, because "we realize it is too late for your requirements."

Definite Instructions

The New York office passed the word along to Washington, asking if it was necessary for the order to go to Bendix, in view of a previous ruling that "all contracts specifying deliveries beyond July 1, 1943, are subject to cancellation."

The Washington office replied abruptly:

"Request contract be executed, even though delivery will not commence until 1943."

A memorandum to the committee investigators signed by Tomkins said:

"This instruction left the New York Ordnance District no choice in the matter."

"Of course," the memo added, "we have the circumstance that Eclipse (Bendix) was being further loaded with this type of production over its own protest, virtually. This circumstance alone would appear to have justified, if not required, that the alternative procedure of breaking the contract down should have been explored."

The evidence showed the contract went to Bendix for delivery late in '43, although the Army considered the order urgent and requested the New York office, in a letter during the negotiations, to try to get delivery of 25 per cent of the order by October, 1942.

Also during these negotiations between the two ordnance offices, the New York office sent to Washington a list of other companies which could handle such work, but the Washington office ignored the alternative and insisted on the contract going to Bendix.

One of these companies was the Eisemann Magneto Corp., which was recommended for the prime contract, on the understanding that it would sub-contract much of the work.

In October an order for another ordnance item finally came through for Eisemann, but the directive said the prime contract should be given to the Delco-Remy Division of General Motors, with Eisemann as a sub-contractor.

The New York office protested that Delco-Remy did not have suitable facilities for this item. Finally, authorization was given for the contract to go to Eisemann Magneto. But even then the order was for only 10,000 of the items, although the New York officials said they had "complete confidence" that Eisemann could produce 6,000 a month.

'Mr. Ed Chapman'

The Tomkins memo to committee investigators said that during these negotiations with Eisemann, a "Mr. Ed Chapman" from the Office of Chief of Ordnance overruled the proposal to give a bigger contract to Eisemann, without indicating why or where he proposed to place the additional orders.

Questioning of Tomkins developed that the contract to the Bendix Corp. resulted in no sub-contracting to small companies; while the contract to Eisemann involved sub-contracts to 36 small firms.

The committee also disclosed another instance of the same kind. In July, Washington ordered 391,000 metal-lined boxes for smokeless powder.

This was the kind of order that could be divided readily among many companies; but the directive said 275,000 of the boxes, costing almost $30,000, should be awarded to the Stangard-Dickerson Co., of Newark, and 116,000 to U. S. Plywood.

Cases Were Typical

The New York office reported to Washington that U. S. Plywood was unwilling to bid, because it did not specialize in this kind of work, and suggested that the 391,000 boxes be divided among smaller companies, a number of which were available.

Washington replied, ordering the district office to make the award of 275,000 to the Stangard-Dickerson company and discontinue negotiations for others.

Silverman charged that these cases, typical of others found in the files of the New York office, all conflicted with the general orders issued by Washington for distributions of war contracts to small firms.

Chairman Murray said the testimony showed "the failure to make use of smaller plants of this country is one of the important factors holding up war production." He also commented that the testimony showed an unsound relationship between superiors and subordinates in the Army's procurement organization." He added:

"When orders are given, no questions must be asked—even if such orders are not based upon adequate knowledge of production facilities.

This is another illustration of the argument that has been made again and again that the Army should stick to its guns and leave the problem of procurement and production to civilian agencies."

Murray said the investigation was just starting. Tomkins was recalled later.