Norfolk Gazette And Publick Ledger

From the London Courier.

The last view taken in the Moniteur of the operations of the French armies in Spain, was by no means in that style of boast and confidence to which we have been accustomed. Buonaparte no longer takes up the pen himself, as he was wont, to write up on the affairs of Spain. He never was so backward before in inspecting and directing military operations in person. He seems not to like to turn his eye towards Spain and instead of approaching that country, el going to Bayonne, as was announced, we find him preparing for a journey to Amsterdam. But to Great Britain the struggle of the patriots becomes more and more interesting, and assumes every day a grander aspect. It stamps upon the Spaniards a deeper character of honour, and upon the banditti of France a deeper character of shame. At the beginning of the contest when Spain had large armies she sunk below our expectations. Her ardour brought her too early into the field, her novel situation originated serious faults, and her untried leaders betrayed her. That the heart of Spain was good, under these circumstances, subsequent events have proved. We now no longer hear of traitors. They have been unmasked by the ordeal of danger; the confidence of the military is restored, and she meets every danger with an undaunted eye, with the look of resolution, and the tone of defiance. If indeed any thing could break the spirit of that people, they have been put to the test. In the field they have sustained little but defeat, in the cabinet they have been paralyzed by imbecility and dissensions, individuals have betrayed them, one British army has been driven out of the country, a war which took off the pressure of the invader's force was terminated in his favour, and the subsequent peace with Austria let loose upon them all his legions. As a consequence the heretofore unassailed southern provinces were penetrated, the passes of their protecting mountains were forced, Cadiz itself invested, and every province so intersected with hostile divisions as to intercept communication, and prevent all unity of effort. Yet, under all these adverse circumstances, hope still allures them by its promises, the manly spirit rises above its pressures, and the want of co-operation is supplied by partial and individual exertions. On no part of the peninsula can the eye be placed, where the consecrated sword of patriotism does not gleam upon the usurper. Cadiz rests secure in its defences and courage. In all the south-eastern provinces the enemy finds it necessary to increase his forces : in Galicia and Asturias armies are organizing, and even in the very centre of the country, within the precincts of the new government, in the very rear of the principal French army, innumerable flying bodies intercept his convoys and obstruct his communications. The numerous intercepted letters of French generals, lately published, are in proof of the activity of this kind of warfare, and they too confirm by their statements the harassed state of their own troops, and the universal hatred the Spaniards bear them.

This is the present state of Spain, and it speaks its own praise. How far it augurs ultimate success, is a distinct consideration. Bonaparte has no choice between entire conquest and dishonor; his whole military fame, the very preponderance of France, is involved in the contest. Before he will relinquish, he will bury half his army in the soil. He is at peace too with the continent, the greater part of his immense military establishment is disposable, and we accordingly find that he is pouring in his reinforcements.

But there is a reverse representation which is more pleasing and not less just to contemplate. If we admit, for argument sake, that the British army will be under the necessity of embarking, it may not at least be forced to that measure immediately. The main army of the French will be drawn to the shores of Portugal, but their rear will be endangered by the Gallician army, and if any great activity be found in the officers of that army, they will have in that instance the power either of diverting a part of Massena's force, or of seriously endangering it.--But suppose that we allow Portugal is abandoned, and the principal places in Spain all occupied by the French, even then the subjugation is not complete. The work is in fact but half done. The fortresses in Spain, if defended with equal spirit to that shewn in many places, will not be achieved in a day. A laborious warfare is still before the enemy, and his very marches, in so many places intersected by mountains and strewed with defiles, cannot be made without continual fighting and daily loss. The geography of the country is all in the favor of patriotic defence. Nature itself comes in to the aid of the Spaniard, and invites him by the difficulties she presents to the invaders to take his stand upon her sheltering rocks, and to guard the passes which she has but scarcely opened. But when all these objects are attained, and if they be attained it will be by an awful waste of life, what will Spain be rendered but a vast garrison, too large to be defended at every point, and at some always exposed to surprise or direct attack The heart of the people will be still Spanish. No power can make it French. The antipathies of six centuries, deepened by recent unparalleled injuries into deadly hate, are not to be overcome. Spain cannot be covered by French troops, and where French troops are not in overwhelming numbers, there, experience has taught us, Spanish troops will be found. There the inhabitants will fly to arms. The very oppressions of the French will multiply the number from those very places which they may possess themselves of. Their contributions will reduce numbers to poverty, and poverty will produce desperation; their conscription laws will be enforced, and the youth of Spain, seeing no alternative between fighting in a foreign country to promote the ambitious projects of the enemy, and fighting at home to avenge the miseries inflicted in their native land, will not hesitate on their choice. Constant and long continued warfare must therefore be the result of the utmost successes of the French. Now many hopes arise of this result! The dissatisfaction of the French soldiery, the desertion of the foreigners in their pay, the rapid reduction of the French armies, new openings in different parts of the coast for the co-operation of Great Britain, the possibility of new military events taking place in the mean time on the continent, and the general relaxation of the military strength of France.