Imperial Valley Press

How to get along with the French, the Danes, the Dutch, the Norwegians and the Belgians is the delicate problem ahead for AMG, the Allied Military Government setup, after invasion is established. Mistakes and miscalculation made by AMG in Italy will not be repeated in the counter-invasion of northern Europe, say Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy and Maj-Gen. John H. Hilldring, chief of the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department's special staff.

The mistakes which AMG made in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, evoking considerable criticism, were principally three: miscalculation of the amount of food required to feed the civilian population and the re-building of local food distribution system; uncertainty in control of the black market, food prices and the rate of exchange; misunderstanding in the United States of the problem of dealing with local officials who were holdovers from the Fascist government.

Somehow the plans made in the army's military government school at Charlottesville, Va., and Algiers did not work out as they had been conceived in the classroom. But Secretary McCloy and General Hilldring say that the post-graduate training center for military government officers - which General Eisenhower has established in England - has profited by those mistakes. That is the best assurance that they will not be repeated. It is considered no particular disgrace that there was a certain amount of fumbling in Italy, for there was no precedent in American history for establishment of military government. The lessons had to be learned the hard way.

IT SHOULD BE DIFFERENT IN FRANCE

In France the job should be easier than it was in Italy, according to Secretary McCloy, first because the people of France will be welcoming the American and British forces as allies, second because General Eisenhower has already well-established liaison with the French National Committee through General de Gaulle in Algiers and his deputy General Koenig, in London.

Since the French National Committee may be presumed to have the closest of connections with the French underground, the appointing of Vichy collaborationists and their elimination from the transitional government should be simpler than the elimination of Fascists from southern Italy.

The danger in France, however, is that any domination of provisional government by U. S. and French officers may be resented by the De Gaullists. From the very beginning the French liberationists have tried to establish the position that they should be in charge of the central administrative government the day the invasion begins.

Further, they have argued that this central administrative government should be permitted to work through the existing governmental machinery in each area and have charge of civilian supply distribution. Under any other arrangement the French have maintained, there will be a repetition of the experience in Italy.

AMG WILL HAVE THE SAY

This point of view has apparently not been adopted in full. In Washington, Algiers and London, there has been collaboration with the French National Committee representatives charged with acquisition of some supplies, but the main movement of relief food and clothing will be under British and American officers who will be the first military governors after invasion.

In insisting on this course of action, General Eisenhower will be merely exercising his right as a commander-in-chief to set up his own form of government behind his battle lines. AMG will probably be in for criticism in France as it was in Italy, and on the same grounds.

But as the only function of military government is to facilitate operations of the armed forces by maintaining order in the civil population, it is on this basis that AMG results in northern Europe should be judged.