The New Hampshire Gazette

Continuation of the Letter addressed to Two Great Men, begun in No. 21 of this Paper:

NOW it is with the greatest Pleasure, I would observe, that with Regard to North America, we have nothing to ask, at the Peace, which we have not already made ourselves Masters of, during the War. We have been blessed by Heaven, with a Success, in that Part of the World, scarcely to be paralleled in History. The Rashness of Braddock, the Inexperience of Shirley, the Inactivity of Loudoun, and the Ill success of Abercrombie, seem only to have been so many necessary Means of producing that Unanimity in our Colonies, that Spirit in our Troops, and that steady Perseverance in our Ministers, as hath not only recovered from the Enemy all his Usurpations, but Louisburg is an English Harbour; Quebec, the Capital of Canada, is already in our Possession; and the Rest of that Country will fall of Course. It is a Prospect still more agreeable; that by destroying the Naval Force of France, our North American Conquests cannot be retaken; and the Principle I would now lay down, and which I would recommend it to you to adopt, is not to give up any of them. And I shall now endeavour to prove to you, that such a Demand may be insisted upon, without giving the Enemy any Pretence for accusing us of Insolence towards them; and cannot be omitted without giving the Nation just Reason to complain, that we have consented to a treacherous and delusive Peace.

It cannot, surely, ever enter the Imagination of a British Administration, to make Peace, without, at least, keeping in our Possession, all those Places, where the French had settled themselves, in Violation of former Treaties, and from which we have, fortunately: driven them. Upon this Plan, then, we Shall, at the Peace, be left in Possession not only of the Peninsula of Acadia, but of All Nova Scotia, according to its old Limits.; the Bay of Fundi, and the River St. John. The important Conquests of Crown Point and Niagara, will not be relinquished; and Fort Du Quesne, and the Country near the Ohio, will remain Ours.--They are already Ours; the French know they cannot get them back during the War, and they do not expect that we shall give them up at the Peace.

But though Care should be taken to keep all those Places just mentioned; something more must be done, or our American Colonies will tell you you have done Nothing. In a Word, you must keep Canada, otherwise you lay the Foundation of another War.

The Necessity of this may be placed in so striking a View, as to silence the French Plenipotentiaries, and to convince all Europe, of the Justice of our Demand.

Ask the French, what Security they can give you, if we restore Canada to them, however restrained in its Boundaries, that they will not again begin to extend them at our Expence.? If the Treaty of Utrecht could not keep them from Encroachments, what Reason can we have to suppose the future Treaty will be better observed? If the French are left at Montreal, and the three Rivers, can we be certain they will not again cross the Champlain Lake, and attack Crown-Point? If the River St. Lawrence be still theirs, what is to insure us against an Expedition to Niagara? Can we flatter ourselves, that a People, who in full Peace, erected those two Fortresses, in direct Violation of their Faith plighted at Utrecht, will be restrained, by any future Treaty, from attempting, also in full Peace, to recover them? After having seen the French carrying on a regular Plan of Usurpation, in North America, for these Forty Years past, shall we be so weak as to believe that they will now lay it aside? No, depend upon it, if the French think it worth their while to ask back that Part of North America, which was their own, they mean to take a proper Opportunity, of Elbowing all our Colonies round about, and of resuming the same ambitious Views of Enlargement, which the most sacred Ties of former Treaties could not restrain..

The Truth of the Matter is, they were tired of Canada. The Inclemency of the Climate, the difficult Access to it; and a Trade scarcely defraying the Expence of the Colony, would long ago have induced them to abandon it, if the Plan of extending its Boundaries, at the Expence of the English; and of opening its Communication with Louisiana and with the Ocean; Had not made them persevere.- Canada itself is not worth their asking; and if they do desire to have it restored to them, it can only be with a View to repeat the same Injuries and Infidelities, to punish which, we engaged in the present War. Unless, therefore, we be resolved, with our Eyes open, to expose ourselves to a Repetition of former Encroachments; unless we would choose to be obliged to keep great Bodies of Troops in America, in full Peace, at an immense Expence; we can never consent to leave the French any Footing in Canada. If we do not exclude them absolutely and entirely from that Country; we shall soon find we have done nothing. Let the Treaty be drawn ever so accurately; let the Boundaries between Canada and our Colonies be described ever so precisely, and regulated ever so much in our Favour; what has happened already, ought to teach us what we may expect again; the future Treaty will be observed no better than the former have been; Usurpation and Encroachment will gradually revive; and thus shall we have thrown away all our Successes; so many Millions will have been expended to no Purpose; and the Blood of so many thousands of our brave Countrymen spilt, only to remind us, that though we knew how to conquer, we knew not how to improve, perhaps, the only Opportunity we shall ever have, of putting it out of the Power of France to violate its Faith.

I take it for granted that, in the future Negociation, the Island of Cape Breton will follow the Fate of Quebec: I Shall only observe with Regard to it, that though the Harbour and Fortifications of Louisbourg be of infinite Service to France; it can be of little or no Use to England, if Canada be left to us. It is of Consequence to France, as a Retreat to their Ships fishing on the neighbouring Banks of Newfoundland; and as a Security to the Entrance of the Gulph of St. Lawrence. But the Possession of Newfoundland itself makes Louisbourg of no Utility to the English, in the former Respect; and Halifax, where we have a good Harbour, answers very nearly the latter Purpose. Upon this View therefore, may we not hope and expect, that, the Necessity of garrisoning Louisbourg having ended with the Conquest of Quebec, its Fate will be determined, without troubling the French Plenipotentiaries? Without waiting for a Congress, let Orders be forthwith sent to demolish it, so as not to leave one Stone upon another, of the Fortifications; to remove the Inhabitants to Nova Scotia, a better Country: and to leave the Island, a bare and barren Rock; the State it was in, before the Peace of Utrecht gave leave to France to fortify it. If the Right given to the French by the 13th Article of the same Peace, to Fish in some Parts of those Seas should be continued (and I could wish to see it continued, as the refusal of it would be rather unreasonable) let Cape Breton unfortified, and ungarrisoned be left open to them; and a few Men of War kept at Halifax, will effectually prevent Louisburg's being again made a Place of Strength.

If you adopt this Measure, I should be inclined to think, France will see that you know your true Interests; and that you are resolved steadily to pursue them. And, if they should make any Remonstrances against it, tell them they may follow our Example, and demolish, if they please, the Fortifications of Mahon: which we see them possess with as great Indifference as we remember the Circumstances of its Loss, with Shame: Which as being of no Use to them they will not desire to keep, and which, having been kept, by us, at an Expence, not counterbalanced by its Utility, we shall not be very sanguine about recovering. Or, rather tell them, that in demolishing Louisbourg, before the Peace, we only copy a former Example given us by themselves, when their Troops were employed in dismantling the Frontier Towns in Flanders, at the very Time that their Plenipotentiaries at Aix la Chapelle were consenting to give them up.

The Plan which I have had the Honour of sketching out to you besides being so reasonable in itself, is perfectly agreeable to that Moderation expressed by his Majesty, in his Speech, of not having entered into the War with Views of Ambition. The Possession of Canada, is no View of Ambition; it is the only Security the French can give us, for their future Regard to Treaties. We have made other Conquests of great Importance, our Management of which will give us sufficient Means of shewing our Moderation. And tho' I shall not presume to give any Opinion about the future Disposal of them, I think, however, I may be allowed to hint, that "the Possession of Guadaloupe," an additional Sugar Island, when we have so many of our own, ought not to be insisted upon so strenuously as to make it a necessary Condition of the Peace. And though "Senegal and Goree" are of real Importance in the Slave and Gum Trades, our own African Settlements have hitherto supplied us with Slaves, sufficient for our American Purposes: And the Trade for Gum is, perhaps, not of Consequence enough to make us Amends for the annual Mortality, which we already lament, of our brave Countrymen, to guard our African Conquests. The People of England, therefore, will not, I believe, blame the giving them back, for a valuable Consideration -provided Canada be left to us.

To consider this Affair in its proper Light, it will be necessary to reflect on the infinite Consequence of North-America to this Country. Our Colonies there contain above a Million of Inhabitants, who are mostly supplied with the Manufactures of Great-Britain; our Trade our maritime Strength; by supporting our Sugar Islands with their Provisions, and other Necessaries, they pour in upon us all the Riches of the West Indies; we carry their Rice, and Tobacco, and Fish, to all the Markets of Europe; they produce Indigo, and Iron; and the whole Navy of England may be equipped, with the Products of English America. And if, notwithstanding our having lost several Branches of Commerce we formerly enjoyed in Europe and to the Levant, we have still more Commerce than ever; a greater Demand for our Manufactures, and a vast Increase of our Shipping; what can this be owing to, but to the Trade of our own American Colonies; a Trade which the Successes of this War, will render, every Day, more and more advantageous? If this Matter, then, be considered, as being the only Method of guarding our invaluable Possessions there, from Usurpations and Encroachments; and they will look upon every other Conquest, we have made, or may make, in other Parts of the World, as Instruments put into our Hands by Providence to enable us to settle Affairs on the Continent of Europe, as advantageously to our Allies, as our Gratitude could wish, and as their Fidelity doth deserve.

Here
Here then, let me change the Scene, and having settled our Affairs in Canada: (would to GOD they were o settled at the Peace!) permit me to finish my Plan of Negociation, by giving my Sentiments on the Part we ought to act, to obtain a proper Settlement of Affairs in Germany.

If a great Number of Allies can make themselves formidable to a common Enemy, during the Operations of the War, they are apt to ruin every Advantage they may have gained, by quarrelling amongst themselves, when they begin their Negociations for Peace. Like an Opposition in our Parliament, carried on against an overgrown Minister, all Sorts of Parties and Connexions, all Sorts of disagreeing and contradictory Interests, join against him, at first, as a common Enemy; and tolerable Unanimity is preserved amongst them; so long as the Fate of this Parliamentary War continues in Suspence. But when once they have driven him to the Wall, and think themselves sure of Victory; the Jealousies, and Suspicions, which, while the Contests depended, had been stifled, break out; every one who shared in the Fatigue, expects to share in the Spoils: separate Interests counteract each other; separate Negociations are set on Foot; till at last, by untimely and mercenary Divisions, they lose the Fruits of their Victory, and the Object of the common Resentment is able to make Terms for himself*.-This was exactly the Case, in the Contest between Lewis XIV, and the Princes of Europe united against him before the peace of Utrecht; and the unhappy Divisions of the Allies (Divisions too likely to have sprung up, even tho' there had not been a party in England, who to gratify their private Resentments, blew up the Coals of Dissentions) gave the French the Means of procuring more favourable Terms of peace, than they could well have hoped after so unsuccessful a War.

I have mentioned this with a View to observe, that the Circumstances of the present War on the Continent are very different; no such unfortunate Disunion seems possible to happen to us though it may happen amongst the Confederates who are engaged on the same Side with France, against Hanover and the King of Prussia.

It may be collected from more than one Hint dropt in this Course of this Letter, that I am no Friend to Continental Measures in general; especially such continental Measures as engaged us during the three last Wars, as Principals; when we seemed eager to ruin ourselves, in Support of that Austrian Family whom we now find, with unparallelled Ingratitude, and incredible Folly, in close Alliance with France.--But the Continental Measures now adopted by England were necessary both with Regard to Our Honour and Our Interest.

Hanover has been attacked by France, on a Quarrel entirely English; and tho' Care was taken, by the Act of Settlement, that England should not be involved in wars on account of Hanover; yet Gratitude, Honour, the Reputation of our Country, every Motive of Generosity, bound us, not to allow the innocent Electorate to be ruined for England's American Quarrel with France: In Regard to our Interest, no English Minister, however inflexible in his Attachment to his native Country, could have devised the Means of making the best Use of our American Conquests, if the French could have treated with Hanover in their Hands. It was with a View to prevent this, to oppose the French in their Projects in Germany, the Success of which would have been so detrimental to England, that we honestly and wisely have formed and have maintained the Army now commanded by Prince Ferdinand; and have entered into an Alliance with the King of Prussia.

But tho' this was a Measure of Prudence, it was scarcely possible for the wisest Statesmen to foresee all those great Consequences which it hath already produced. The Efforts which the French have made in Germany, and the Resistance they have there met with by the Care of the British Administration; have contributed more than perhaps we could expect, to our Success in America, and other Parts of the World. Full of the Project of conquering Hanover, France Saw herself obliged to engage in exorbitant Expences; Armies were to be paid, and maintained in Westphalia and on the Rhine; vast Sums were to be advanced to the Court of Vienna always as indigent as it is haughty: the ravenous Russians, and the degenerate Swedes, would not move, unless allured by Subsidies; and the Mouth of every hungry German Prince was to be stopped, with the Louis D'ors of France. Involved in Expences thus enormous, our Enemies have been prevented from strengthening themselves at Sea where England had most Reason to dread their becoming strong.

The infinite Advantages which this Nation hath reaped from the German War, are indeed now so well understood, that we have seen the greatest Enemies of this Measure acknowledge their Mistake. They now confess that if we had not resisted France, in her Projects of German Conquests, her best Troops had not been destroyed; her own Coasts would have been better protected; she would have been able to pay more Attention to her American Concerns; England might have been threatened, so seriously, with Invasions, as to be afraid of parting with those numerous Armies which have conquered, at such a Distance from Home. In a Word, that universal Bankruptcy, which hath crowned the Distresses of France and gives England greater Reason of Exultation, than any Event of the War, might have been prevented. It is entirely owing to the German Part of the War that France appears thus low in the political Scale of Strength and Riches; that she is found to be a sinking Monarchy. nay a Monarchy already sunk. : And, perhaps, it might be an Inquiry worthy of another Montesquieu, to assign the Causes of the Rise and Fall of the French Monarchy; and to point out those silent Principles of Decay which have, in our Times, made so rapid a Progress, that France, in 1712, after upwards of twenty Years almost constant War, maintained against all Europe, was still more respectable, and less exhausted than it now appears to be, when the single Arm of Great Britain is lifted up against her, and the War has lasted no more than three or four Years.

If this then be the State of the War in Germany: if England be bound to take a Part in it, by every Motive of Honour and Interest: and if the infinite Advantages it hath already produced, be stated fairly--the Inference I would draw, and which I believe the whole Nation will also draw. is. that we should continue to exert those Endeavours which hitherto have been so effectual, in defeating the Designs of France to get Possession of Hanover.

His Majesty, as Elector of Hanover, has no Views of Ambition: His Country has been attacked only because it belonged to the King of Great Britain: and nothing more is required of us, but to be true to ourselves, by neglecting no Step that may prevent Hanover from falling again into the Hands of France, after having been so miraculously rescued from the Contributions of the rapacious Richelieu, and saved from the Military Desert of Belleisle.--I need not say any Thing of the Glory acquired by that Army, which notwithstanding it's great Inferiority, hath driven the French twice from the Weser to the Rhine. I shall only observe, that the next Campaign ( if another Campaign should precede the Peace ) will, in all Probability, lose us none of the Advantages we have gained, on that Side; if our Army, still headed by Prince Ferdinand who has already gained so many Laurels, be rendered more formidable, as I hope it will, by sending to it some Thousands more of our national Troops; who now, since the Conquest of Canada, and the Defeat of the long threatened Invasion, have no other Scene of Action left, but to contribute to another Victory in Germany.

It would be a very pleasing Prospect, if we could speak with equal Confidence, and Probability of Success, concerning the future Operations of the King of Prussia. However, when we reflect on the amazing Difficulties he has had to struggle with: attacked on every Side by a Number of Confederates, each of whom, singly; one would have thought, an equal Match for his whole Strength; bearing up, at the same Time, against the formidable Power of the House of Austria; the brutal Ferocity of the Russians; the Attacks of the Swedes; the Armies of the Empire; and, at one Time, having the additional Weight of the French Army upon him; when, I say, we reflect on the uncommon Difficulties this magnanimous Prince has to resist, we must rather express our Wonder and our Satisfaction that his Situation is still so respectable, than indulge our Fears, that it is likely to be worse. The severest Checks he has met with during this War, have only served to shew how calm he possesses himself under Distress, and how ably he can extricate himself. The Hour of Adversity has called forth all his Abilities. and if he has failed sometimes, from too great an Eagerness to conquer he has always been able to retrieve his Affairs, and like Antaeus, gained fresh Strength from every Overthrow.

And, upon this Principle, I flatter myself his Prussian Majesty will still be able to secure to himself the greater Part, if not the whole of Saxony for his Winter Quarters, and to recruit his Army, no Doubt much shattered with it's Losses and Fatigues, before the opening of another Campaign. It is to be hoped also. that besides the amazing Resources . He has still left in his own unbounded Genius, and the generous and effectual Support which his Connection with England, affords him; the Power of the Confederacy against him may be broken, by disuniting the Confederates. History satisfies us. how seldom a Confederacy of many Princes, has ever ruined a single Power attacked. I have given one Instance of this already, when I spoke of the Grand Alliance against Lewis XIV. and the League of Cambray against the Venetians, in the 16th Century, is an Instance still more remarkable.

But, if contrary to our Hopes, our Wishes. our Endeavours. this should fail; if his Prussian Majesty; like a Lion caught in the Toils ( after a Resistance already made, which will hand him down to Posterity as the greatest of Men ) should at last be unable to defend himself; let him not despair while he is in Alliance with Britain: For I would inculcate a Doctrine, which I think will not be unpopular amongst my Countrymen, and which, therefore, I hope, will not be opposed by our Ministers, That whatever Conquests we have made, and whatever Conquests we may still make, upon the French. except North-America, which must be kept all our own; should be looked upon as given back to France for a most important Consideration, if it can be the Means of extricating the King of Prussia from any unforeseen Distresses.

[ To be continued. ]

* The true History of the Transaction here alluded to, may, possibly, some Time or other, appear ; though, as yet, we are persuaded; the World knows very little of it.