Daily National Intelligencer

DEBATE ON THE COMPENSATION LAW

[CONTINUED]

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Jan. 18, 1817.

Mr. GROSVENOR, of New York, apologized to the House for rising at so late an hour. [It was past 4 o'clock.] He said he had abandoned his intention to address the House upon the question before them, and he should not have resumed it, for the mere purpose of discussing the merits of the bill of last session, now proposed to be repealed. The merits of that measure appeared to him to have been ably and amply examined. Several gentlemen had triumphantly vindicated the law. Among them, Mr. G. said, he had heard with peculiar satisfaction the able, manly and constitutional speech of the honorable gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Calhoun). [Mr. G. paused a moment and then proceeded.] Mr. Speaker, I will not be restrained, no barrier shall exist which I will not leap over for the purpose of offering to that gentleman my thanks for the judicious, independent and national course which he has pursued in this House for the last two years, and particularly upon the subject now before us. Let the honorable gentleman continue with the same manly independence, alone from party views, and local prejudices, to pursue the great interests of his country—and fulfil the high destiny for which it is manifest he was born. The buzz of popular applause may not cheer him on his way; but he will inevitably arrive at a high and happy elevation in the view of his country and the world—and to those who surrender their conscience, their judgment and their independence at the shrine of popular caprice and clamor, he shall finally hold the same relation, that the Eagle in his towering flight holds to the grovelling Buzzard. No gentleman had been bold enough to encounter his argument of yesterday. No gentleman could encounter it without a sure prospect of discomfiture.

It is unnecessary to add, said Mr. Grosvenor, that I agree with that gentleman in all his views of the propriety, importance and necessity of the bill of last session. It is perfectly notorious, hardly a gentleman, be he for or against that bill, has denied, that an increased pay to the members of Congress was essential to their comfort and support. By the depreciation of the coin, the old per diem pay had sunk to half its original value—and the bill of last session did not restore the present members to an equality of compensation, with those who were here in the first years of our constitution. Nor can any gentleman who has experienced the expenses of a temporary residence at the Capital, pretend for a moment, that the compensation of last session is a lavish allowance, for services of gentlemen, under circumstances like those which surround the members of this House.

But, Mr. Speaker, this view of the subject sinks into insignificance, when compared with another first exhibited by the gentleman from Louisiana, (Mr. Robertson) and enforced by the gentleman from South Carolina. The purity, dignity and independence of this House, the interest and safety of the people, the durability and spirit of the government, all demanded an increased compensation. Talents, integrity and political experience, can be kept on this floor only by something like a remuneration for the services of those who possess them. Not, Mr. Speaker, a full remuneration; but such a reward as will enable the possessors of them, without becoming "worse than infidels," to devote them to the good of the country.

Is it not important to the existence of the government, to the safety of the people, that talents, integrity, independence and political experience, should be placed and continued here? Look at the power and patronage of the Executive. Armies, navies, revenues, with all their hosts of dependents, with the whole civil list of officers and salaries. With these mighty instruments of influence and power, the Executive pervades and influences the whole Republic. And the eyes of every ambitious and aspiring man must be elevated above this House, to executive favour, as the object of all his hopes and all his exertions.

Well have gentlemen said, that to resist and render harmless this flood of patronage and influence, the people can look only to this House. It is through this House the treasury must be watched and protected from abuses. By this House only can the people exercise the power of impeachment. Through it alone can the minions of patronage, the instruments of oppression, be seized and dragged to the public tribunal, and punished for their offences. And here, too, and here only, can the great source of all power and patronage, the Executive himself, be arraigned and punished for abuses of his power, for injuries to the people.

Can it then be wise to degrade this House? Can it be safe for the people to shatter in pieces their own shield and buckler? To wither the arm that, in their cause and in their defence, must wield the sword of justice and of punishment? Can it be for their safety to place the compensation of members on a footing, which will render this House a receptacle for the rich and the powerful on the one hand, and the unprincipled hunters after executive favors on the other; and infallibly exclude from its halls all in those middle walks of life, where, in this country, talents, knowledge and political experience, though not exclusively, are most generally found?

What must finally result from such a policy? Why, sir, this House will become, as the Commons of England, a mere step in the ladder of ambition—a lower bough, on which the birds of foul omen will rest for a moment, only to take a new flight to the higher regions of office and patronage; while those who shall remain will constitute a mass of inert matter, receiving motion and direction from the hand, which the Executive shall set apart to manage it.

And then, instead of constituting, as was originally intended, a mound against the flood of patronage constantly flowing into the great Executive reservoir, it will itself plunge into the stream; and air to swell and give force and violence to the current, which will sweep away the liberties of this people—sir, upon a question involving, as in my conscience I believe this does, such consequences, I will not descend to the calculations of shillings and pence. Every dollar, within reasonable reward and compass, bestowed on the members of this house by the people, will add only to the patronage of the people. It will render less attractive the glittering baubles in the hands of the Executive—and by increasing the dignity, independence and strength of this House, will render it forever inaccessible to the sappings and minings of Executive patronage, and to the open assaults of Executive power.

I have heard it objected, that, if the compensation for services here be increased, men will seek a seat in the House, merely from a base love of the emolument. Sir, it is a vulgar and gross error, to suppose that men in general seek for high office and political power from any sort of regard to the pitiful pecuniary rewards with which it is attended. This is the passion of underlings only, of the base and grovelling spirits who are without any real love of fame or glory, and this is the imputation, which they justly seek to fasten on each other. But it never can attach to the genuine statesman, of our Republic, nor to any who aspire to be ranked among its statesmen.

If the compensation to members be placed on an honorable and competent footing, the doors of this House are opened to such honorable and aspiring citizens—and the men of base and grovelling spirit, who seek a seat here for the paltry pittance of emolument by which it is attended, will stand no chance in the competition. No, Mr. Speaker, the objection is not substantial—it recoils upon the objector. It is only by reducing the reward for service so low, as to leave men of character, and honor, and independence, and science, no decent support at the capitol, that you can close the doors of this House upon them. Such men are then driven from the political field, and the purse-proud nabobs on the one hand, and the ignorant noisy, fawning sycophants of power on the other, for whose talents and services the lowest compensation may be a huge remuneration, will pour into this House without check or competition.

Another objection has been repeatedly advanced. Increase of compensation tends, it is said, to render the representative independent of the people and unfaithful to their interests. This objection supposes, in him who makes it, a total ignorance of the theory of our government. Is not every member periodically reduced to a level with the people? And can he again rise but by the will of the people? This is his dependence; and whether he receives six, or sixteen dollars per day, it can have no conceivable influence upon that dependence. He holds his seat by the tenure of good behavior. And singular indeed is the notion, that, in proportion as you increase his pay and render his seat valuable, he will find inducements to neglect his duty and insure its forfeiture.

But Mr. G. said the merits of the bill had been amply discussed by others. He would pursue that topic no farther. He had risen almost entirely to examine another doctrine which had become essentially connected with the subject—a doctrine which, if it were sound and constitutional, would indeed render all argument upon the main question worse than useless. It had been distinctly announced by several gentlemen in the course of the debate, who had voted for the law of last session, that, although their minds remained unchanged as to the justice and policy of the law, they should now vote for its repeal, because they were instructed to do so by their constituents.

Others had declared, that they considered the voice of the people against the law, and this they considered as tantamount to a command or instruction, which they were bound to obey, without considering the reasonableness, justice or policy of that command or instruction. The gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Tyler who has just taken his seat, has not hesitated to repeat this doctrine in the broadest terms, and to press it earnestly upon the House.

This position is that the people, in districts, in states and throughout the union, have distinctly decided the question, have commanded the repeal, and we are bound by our constitution and the nature of government, to obey their commands.

Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman be correct, if the fact and the law be indeed as he has stated, what a spectacle of singular folly has this House exhibited during this whole week? We have been gravely discussing the merits of a measure already decided by the constitutional and competent authority. Nay, the honorable gentleman himself, in the speech which he has just closed, has presented his full share of this incongruous spectacle. Has he not pressed upon us the propriety of the repeal of the law on its own merits? How does he reconcile that with his doctrine which leaves us no right to examine its merits? He first pressed upon us a doctrine, which deprives us of all volition or free agency, and then spent a full half hour, in enquiry with us, as beings having a right to volition and free agency in favour of the repeal.

Mr. Speaker, I deny, I wholly deny, that in the nature of a representative government; in the spirit of our system, or in our constitution, one principle, reason or provision can be found, on which this doctrine of the right to instruct in the people and the obligation of such instruction on the representative can rest, for a moment. It matters not to me what form of instructions gentlemen may design; whether in writing, or by parol; whether by the people of districts or states or of the whole union? They have no constitutional power, to fetter the free will of the representative, or to control his judgment, his conscience or his independence in any the highest or the lowest act of legislation.

If such a right exists in the people, and such an obligation on the representative, they must be somewhere defined. And where would gentlemen search for them? Surely, not in the visions of cosmopolites, not in the licentious fictions of the French revolutionary school, nor in the written and unwritten creeds of jacobins and despots throughout the world. The statesmen of our revolution trusted their rights to no such perishable and undefined securities. No, sir we must find them in that instrument, where the nature of our whole system of government is delineated, where the liberties of the people, the powers, prerogatives and duties of every department of our government are granted, defined and secured; in the constitution and in no other instrument under heaven. Let gentlemen then turn with me to the constitution. The analysis shall be short to demonstrate, not only, that in all its sections not a trace of this doctrine of instruction can be found, but, also, that it is wholly opposed to the fundamental principles of the government therein delineated.

The people were the sovereign of this country. From them emanated all the powers of government. This is now the settled doctrine of the civilized world, and he must be a madman or an idiot in this republic, who would dispute it.

The sovereign people met in convention to organize a government, which should secure the rights and prosperity of the whole. What was the frame and nature of the government which they formed? I enter not into the detail of its new and complicated machinery. I speak of its general divisions, its broad and essential features. They surrendered to, and divided among certain officers, created by themselves, certain portions of their sovereign power. And this is the language in which they expressed that grant, and that division.

"All legislative powers, herein granted, shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."

"The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America."

"The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and such other inferior courts, as Congress shall from time to time establish."

"Legislative power" is the power to make laws—"judicial power" is the power to construe and interpret those laws—and "Executive power" is the power to execute them.

Here then, Mr. Speaker, is the sovereign, legitimate "voice" of the people. Here the great and obligatory instructions which, and which alone the officers of this republic are bound to obey. The members of this House and the Senate are "instructed" to make the laws; the judges are "instructed" to interpret, and the President to execute them. Does not the power of legislation imply of necessity volition, free agency—the right to make the law, or not to make it, as the Legislature shall deem expedient?

Shall I be told that the legislative power is vested in a body, which in every act of legislation, is legally subject to be arrested, defeated, controlled and absolutely governed by another, a distinct and a paramount constitutional power! As well may gentlemen tell me that the power over life and death is vested, in the gallows and guillotine, and not in the judge and executioner; as well may they tell me, that the power of legislation is vested in the Speaker of this House, or the President of the Senate because their signatures, made under the entire control of Congress, are requisite to give validity to every law. No, if this doctrine be true then is the constitution a felo de se. For it has granted a power, and rendered it idle and nugatory, by reserving a right, absolutely and essentially repugnant to the grant; it has rested in Congress an absolute power, which essentially continues to reside in the people. by them to be exercised through the medium of "instructions" and Congress becomes in every act of Legislation, instead of a Legislative body, a mere passive instrument, like the clerk who engrosses the bill, or the pen and parchment with which it is recorded.

Sir, this reasoning applies with equal force to every department of our government; to the Judicial and Executive equally with the Legislative; and the conclusion is irresistible, that not only is the Legislative, but the Judicial and Executive power are, at this moment, in the hands of the people. If the people have indeed reserved to themselves a power, rendering thus nugatory and wholly insufficient the powers they have expressly granted, that reservation must, by every rule of fair construction, be expressed and not implied. In what page of the constitution does the gentleman find any such reservation? From what article or section will he read me anything like a right reserved to the people, either directly or indirectly, to legislate, to judge or to execute? If there be any such, let it be distinctly brought to the eye of the House. There is none to be found. It would have stained its fair pages, for it would have attempted an absurdity; to grant and retain by the same instrument, the same power and authority; to secure a right, in the nature of things incapable of execution.

But if no such right was reserved; if by the constitution the whole power of legislating, judging and executing was granted, will gentlemen say that the people have revoked the grant? I call for the instrument of revocation I will not accept the toasts and harangues with which the 4th of July meetings may have frightened honorable gentlemen. I will not accept those indecent resolutions, which interested demagogues may have persuaded their knots of partisans to adopt at their electioneering conventions. Nor will I recognize the officious intermeddlings of state legislatures upon a subject with which they have no constitutional concern.

I call for a revocation of these grants, not carried by acclamation, but made and executed in the manner which the people themselves have prescribed. If no such revocation can be produced, the grants remain in full and valid force, and the several branches of our government continue to hold, exclusively, and without the participation of any power on earth, the independent right to legislate, to judge, and to execute. This right they have solemnly sworn to execute, and to surrender it, even to the people themselves, would be as clear a violation of the constitution as an attempt to transfer it to an aristocracy or a monarchy. They cannot surrender it without resolving the government into its original elements, nor can the people violently resume it without prostrating the constitution of their country.

Against these conclusions. I know gentlemen will exclaim with much apparent surprise and horror. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Tyler) has already done so. What, he asks, are not the people the creator, the representative the creature? The former the master, the latter the servant? And is the creature independent of the creator—the servant above the master?

Sir, by the use of names nothing is proved; and an argument resting alone on such a basis, hardly deserves examination or answer. But if an answer be necessary, it is to be found in the constitution. The objection implies, that if the people may not instruct with obligatory force the representative he is independent of the people. This notion, Mr. Speaker. is founded on a total misconception of the theory and nature of our system; it supposes that the checks upon the abuse of power by their rulers retained by the people, was a right at all times to interfere with all their acts. and to participate in the exercise of all their powers and duties. Widely and totally distinct from such a system is the actual plan of our government. I have already remarked, that the sovereign powers of government were delegated in distinct portions to different and distinct rulers.

But the people well knew the tendency of power to corrupt its possessors—to degenerate into abuse and oppression. Against such corruptions, abuses and oppressions in their rulers they resolved to hold in their own hands checks the most effectual, securities the most powerful, which were consistent with the nature of the system. These checks and guards consisted in the direct and indirect responsibility of the rulers continually or periodically, to the people themselves. Thus, the judges are constantly, though indirectly, responsible to the people for all their judicial conduct—they are subject at all times to impeachment by this House, the immediate representatives of the people.

The President is responsible every fourth year directly to the people—for he then descends to their level, and depends upon their will for a re-elevation. But as that dependence is not direct, he is also constantly subject to punishment for misconduct, by impeachment at the instance of this House.

The members of the Senate are periodically, though indirectly responsible to the people through their State Legislatures.

The members of this House are every second year responsible directly to the people. At that short period they sink into the great public mass, and their official conduct, stripped of all adventitious aids, lies unveiled and naked to the inspection of the people. Can the wisdom of man contrive a more perfect security against all dangerous abuse of power?

The immediate representatives of the people, biennially brought before the people, stripped of all power, and wholly dependent on their will for continued official existence. The Executive, every fourth year, subjected to the same responsibility, and the same dependence, while both he and every judge are responsible for their conduct, through the right of impeachment vested in this House. This, sir, is the true theory and spirit of our representative government. Responsibility for conduct, not control over it, while in office, is the real secret of our safety.

This is the great and active principle which pervades our constitution, and like gravitation in the great solar system, confines each body to its orbit, regulates the whole machinery of our government, and produces in all its parts that order and harmony, and perfect safety, which was the great object of its creation.

In this cursory view of the nature of our system, is found a perfect answer to the objections and exclamations of the honorable gentleman from Virginia. The representative is not independent of the people, or, if other language better please him, (it pleases not me) the creature is not independent of the creator; the servant is not above his master. But his subordination and dependence is that, and that only, which is defined in that instrument, by adopting which the people spoke him into existence. If a biennial responsibility, the responsibility of a man endowed with reason, volition, free agency; and the power while a representative, to use them according to his best judgment, uncontrolled by any paramount authority whatsoever, such and such only is the dependence in any degree sanctioned by the spirit of a representative government.

This constitutional responsibility, the manly and patriotic dependence of a rational being, the proud and dignified submission of an American freeman and representative, to the only sovereign of his country, is totally subverted by this new doctrine of obligatory instruction. Under its influence, when, on the day of election, he shall meet the people, no more can they demand from him evidence of his ability, his integrity, his fidelity to the constitution, and the interests of the state. "Has he never deviated from our instructions? Has he constantly opened his ear to every popular clamor, and with a conscience sufficiently supple, and a spirit sufficiently abject, bent and bowed to every blast of the popular breath, that has passed over him?"

Consistent with this doctrine of express and implied instruction, questions of this character alone can he be required to answer. And what must be the effect on the character and conduct of this House? No longer will the great considerations that influence its conduct be, what is just, what is expedient, what is wise, what is constitutional, what do the exigencies of the Republic demand? No, in every act of legislation, the representative must cast his eye back to his district. How points the political weather-cock now? Which way flows the popular current? What is the whiff of my district? What is the voice of my state? What is the clamor of the day? These must become the great objects of solicitude, and as these questions are answered, he will say aye or no to every measure.

And thus, the great benefits of a representative republic are wholly sacrificed. All the value of political science, experience and firmness in the representatives is thrown away. All the lights of superior wisdom and able discussion are blown out. The legislator becomes an automaton, to be danced on this floor by wires to be held and managed by those active and turbulent demagogues, who in succession become the leaders of the people. O, then indeed it shall matter little what shall be the compensation for services here; for what shall it matter who may occupy these chairs? Be he wise or be he foolish; be he learned or be he ignorant, with brains or without brains, it is all the same. If he has skill to spell out his instructions, & to snuff at a goodly distance the tainted gale of popularity; if he have sense enough to understand the affirmative from the negative, and a tongue to cry aye & no, he is armed cap-a-pee for legislation—he is fully qualified to perform all the duties of an instructed representative.

Sir, were we to examine all the musty folios of political empiricism; were we to wade through the innumerable visions of political dreamers since the flood, to find that principle most repugnant to our system of government, most degrading to our rulers, and most destructive to our prosperity; in my conscience, and on my honor, I believe we might return to this doctrine of obligatory instruction, as the one which combined in itself, and in its consequences, as much of all these qualities as any other.

But, Mr. Speaker, were this doctrine as consonant with the spirit and structure of our government as it is repugnant to its principles and subversive of its benefits, it is yet wholly absurd. because it is impracticable. If the right of the people to instruct, and the obligation on the representative to obey, do really exist, is it not very strange that we do not find in the constitution, in the laws, or in the principles of our system, some method presented, in which the right may be exercised and the obligation enforced? Is it not idle to talk of a political power, which cannot be executed by its possessor, or of an obligation which can, by no possible means, be legally enforced?

How are the people to exercise this right of instruction? Shall each district instruct its representative? Some gentlemen have said so. But, may I ask these gentlemen, where, in the constitution, they find a recognition of such a political division, as a district? "The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several states." The people and the states are recognized as separate and distinct political powers. But where does the district derive any distinct political power to interfere in the government of the Union?

Sir. the district is the creature of a state; created for the convenience of suffrage, subject, at any time, to lose all separate existence by an act of the state, or the legislature of the Union. And whence do honorable gentlemen derive another position, which their arguments clearly imply, that in this House the representative dwindles down to the mere agent of a district? For myself, I disclaim the idea, as equally unconstitutional and degrading.

When a member enters this hall, he becomes a representative of the people of this republic—he becomes a legislator for the whole American community. What are his duties? Do they constitute him merely the guardian of his district? Are they confined to the little corners of townships and counties? No; they embrace the rights, the interests, and happiness of a great republic. To "insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity;" these are the sublime and comprehensive terms, in which the people have taught to all their representatives the great duties of their stations. Can we possess a feeling and a spirit requisite for the performance of these great and general duties, if we consider ourselves the mere representatives of distinct sections of the people? Can we act well for the great interests of the whole, if we degrade ourselves into the separate and distinct guardians of separate and distinct parts of the community?

And yet, if I understood the honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Tyler) correctly, he considers himself the representative of his district alone—for when he spoke of submission to instructions, it was exclusively to the instructions of the people of his district to which he alluded To their will he would surrender all—[Mr. Tyler assented]. O, then, said Mr. G. I conjure the gentleman to proceed with the utmost caution. Do I yet understand him correctly? He would surrender his judgment, his conscience, his independence as a representative on this floor, to the will and instruction of those who elected him—[Mr. Tyler still assented]. Sir. continued Mr. G. I would appeal to his judgment, his heart, to all his manly and moral feelings, against this pernicious theory. Surely he would demand, before he made the promised sacrifice, that the voice he was about to worship should be that of a clear majority. Upon any given measure, upon the very measure before the House. how can he ascertain that majority Is there any method prescribed in the constitution or the law? No; he must watch, and listen, and catch the voice of his district, as it floats on the breeze; or he must read it, if he can, in the popular shouts, which issue from partial meetings and conventions of the people. Sir, I have seen much of these popular conventions; I have seen one orator mount the table; and as he developed his political opinions and conduct, have seen the hats, and the caps, and the shouts of approbation fill the very heavens. I have seen another succeed him: and as he developed opinions and conduct exactly opposite, again have seen the hats and the caps blacken the air and the earth shake with thunders of applause Has the honorable gentleman any political crucible into which he may cast these clamors, and separate the true from the false? And, then, has he any balance to shew him which is preponderant? May he not mistake the importunate clamor of a few ephemeral noisy insects of his district for the voice of the real tenants of the soil?

Sir, let the honorable gentleman beware! The sacrifice he offers is not one of indifferent value. It is not indeed the blood of the victim—but may it not be the soul of the representative? Conscience!! Judgment!! Independence! These are offerings too sacred to be thrown away on false deities. And yet, in the nature of things, when he lays them on the altar, he can have no security that it is erected to the real vox populi, the true God of his idolatry.

But suppose certainty be fully attainable; suppose every representative instructed at all points, on every subject, which comes before him, what a Babel of legislation would this House present, Local prejudices, narrow feelings: headlong violence must enter this hall; and here uninformed by discussion, unmitigated by sober reflection, and, in their very nature, incapable of compromise, would be seen in disgraceful and endless collision.

Sir, against principles, pregnant with such partial consequences, so repugnant to the spirit of our constitution, and so subversive of all the benefits of a representative system, I will forever enter my solemn protest—And I do it the more confidently, because I do it after the example of the first and wisest statesmen of England. In that nation the question is settled. The authority of the elder Pitt, of Burke and of Fox, and other statesmen, who best understood and loved, as the friend of their liberties: the representative part of their government has placed the stamp of absurdity on this doctrine of instruction—And at this day no man of high talent and integrity, in the British Commons, however he may plunge into the current of opposition, does sanction that principle. But it seems the authority of Burke is of little value here, because he was a pensioner. What was the color of that great man's political existence?

Edmund Burke was a whig of the old English school. He was in his youth an enthusiastic friend to liberty, even an intemperate advocate for the rights of the human race. In maturer years, he was the steady champion of the popular principles of his government, which constitute and secure the liberties of the English nation—And in his old age he rose with all the ardor of his youth, & all the vigor of his maturity, to rescue the civilized world from that monster of popular despotism, which rose in France, was nurtured on human blood and aspired to demolish every wise, and free, and just and merciful, and holy institution on the earth And when, at last, worn out in the service of mankind, he retired to the bed of sorrow and despair, then, and not till then, his grateful country imparted to him a pittance, hardly sufficient, to render comfortable the last stage of his journey to the grave. The judgment of the civilized world has been solemnly pronounced The fame of the orator, statesman, patriot, is embalmed in the gratitude of the four quarters of the globe.

His voice was heard in favor of the justice of our cause, when we struggled against British oppression. He devoted years of his life to avenge the wrongs and desolation of India. The untutored African was learned to bless the name of his benefactor. And Europe must ever acknowledge that he first read the hand writing upon the wall of revolutionary France, and made known the interpretation thereof. Nor can any friend of virtue, religion or civil liberty deny that in the last great act of his life, when he raised the veil from the anarchy, atheism and ambitious despotism of the French Revolution. he was, at the least, as genuine a champion of civil liberty, and human happiness as at any period of his existence.

Such was the man who preached and practised the doctrine I am feebly supporting. He preached and practised it at a time too, when he was glowing in the full vigor of his wonderful faculties—when, in the British Commons, he was engaged in our cause; and with a vigorous arm, was daily beating down the weapons, which Bute and North, and Hillsborough were aiming at our existence. What authority, merely human, can be stronger?

But an honorable gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Conner) has told us that the principle I advocate is an English principle; and he has cautioned us not to borrow principles from England. Sir, I would borrow no political principle from England or any other country, which was not stamped with wisdom, which the great test of experience had not proved to be friendly to civil liberty. Would the honorable gentleman exclude from our code principles of such a character, because they were discovered in other countries or other ages? If he would, it is well for us, that he did not live in the earlier times of our republic. His zeal and activity might have borne him into power, and we might have lost some of the best and wisest principles of our free and happy system of government.

Will the honorable gentleman peruse the Bills of Rights and Constitutions of the states? He will there find principles borrowed from England and scattered through them all. Nay, will he open, with me, the constitution of this Republic? The trial by jury is of Saxon origin Here it is reserved to the people as their grand bulwark against oppression. The Writ of Habeas Corpus is of English origin. Here, it is secured to the people, as the grand palladium of their personal rights and liberties. The idea an independent judiciary here perfected, had we not that from England?

Let me point the honorable gentleman to his own state. That wonderful fabric of human wisdom, the common law of Massachusetts, under the guardian influence of which, he sleeps in the most perfect security—whence were its principles derived? Whence but from England Would the hon. gentleman exclude all these from our code, because they first blessed the country where the bones of our ancestors are buried? Such was not the spirit of our fathers. When they first raised their voices in remonstrance against the English ministry, and their arms in battle against the English nation on what principles did they justify their conduct; on what grounds did they rest their great and sacred cause? Let the numerous appeals of the Old Congress to America, to England and to the world furnish the answer. Let that immortal enumeration of our rights and our wrongs in the Declaration of Independence, answer the question.

Their birth right was civil and religious liberty, founded on the principles and in the main of the English law and constitution. These were grossly and perseveringly violated by the King Ministry and Parliament. To secure the enjoyment of their birth right they first took up arms—and they did not relinquish them until the object was more than accomplished.
The fathers of our Republic were educated in the old whig school of England. The great masters of that school, were Locke, and Sidney, Russell, and Hampden, and a host of patriots who suffered persecution and martyrdom for their political faith. They had derived the spirit of patriotism from the ancient republics; a spirit of independence from the examples and traditions of their Saxon ancestors, and by infusing that spirit into the natural & practical principles of the common law, they established wise & beneficent maxims of civil government. It was in this school, in company with the elder Pitt and Burke and Fox, and their compatriots, that the artificers of our system learnt their maxims of political, civil, and religious liberty. They discarded from their system the lumber of the dark ages—and all the cumbrous trappings of a monarchy and a titled aristocracy. They founded a Republic. But into its very soul they infused that genuine spirit, and those essential principles of civil liberty, for which the illustrious whigs of England have in all ages offered up their lives.

Sir, permit me to add a few words, upon what is called the "voice" of this whole people, and I have done. We are told, that the voice of this whole nation has pronounced a condemnation of the law of the last session, and commanded its repeal. Were this even so, were I sure it were so, still I would not obey them—I believe, in my best judgment, in my conscience, and before my God, I believe, that the law of last session was and is, in itself, just and constitutional, and most favorable to the purity, the independence of this House, the durability of this government, and the security of this people. To no human "voice" will I surrender opinions thus maturely and finally settled; on no human altar will I sacrifice my judgment, my reason, and my conscience.

Do I then disregard the "voice of the people"—the will of the public? O, no. In making up my mind upon almost every subject of legislation, that voice would have a powerful influence. I would always view it as a fact, a most important fact, entering into the argument and the reasoning, when I was about to decide on any public measure. On many questions it might, on some it certainly would be conclusive—not because it contains, in itself, any moral, political, or constitutional authority to control my judgment or conduct, but because, from the nature of the question, it might constitute a fact or circumstance, so important as to prevail over every other.

To borrow an illustration of my idea from the honorable gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Calhoun.) The question of declaring or not declaring a war, however just and necessary I might deem it, would be a question of this kind. I would no more declare even such a war against the general voice and will of the people, than I would declare it, with the nation destitute of arms, ammunition and money—and precisely for the same reason, because the former is as essential to the success of a war, as the latter. It is a question solely of expediency, not of constitutional obligation. But reverse the proposition: suppose the voice of the people distinctly in favor of declaring a war, which I in my conscience believed would be unjust and ruinous to the country, should I vote for such a war? No, sir, if the voice of every man in the nation should thunder instructions in my ears, I would still say no—I would struggle for peace against the people themselves; and I should fall in the struggle, the peace of a good conscience would afford me more real happiness, than all the plaudits of the people, could bestow on him, who might rise on my ruin. Sir, I would not be misunderstood. I am not one of those, if any such there be, who hold the political heresy, that the people are their own worst enemies. I believe the people of this republic to be lovers of honesty, friends of civil order and as well enlightened in their interests, as any people on earth—and I know equally well, that they always decide honestly, and when reflection, discussion and knowledge precede decision, in general correctly.

But I should have read history in vain, I should have lived the last ten years of my life worse than in vain, if I did not know, how easy it sometimes is, to rouse the popular prejudice and clamour against any measure, and particularly one of the character of the law of last session. Are gentlemen perfectly sure that this universal uproar, from Maine to St. Mary's, which even yet seems to be ringing in their ears, is not the mere clamor of prejudice, of ignorance, of deception? The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Ross, has addressed to them a solemn warning—May not this vituperated measure, when the excitement of the hour shall have passed away, become a favorite of the people? Gentlemen may read striking examples of this kind, even in their own political history.

Who has forgotten the horrible anathemas, which rolled through the country against the British treaty of 1794—Yet, has not popular applause awaited the negociators of that which we now have, every way inferior as it is? How long is it, since instructions poured in from all quarters against a national bank? How long since the people were excited even to frenzy for its destruction? And yet it has now become the very darling of the people; the sheet anchor of the treasury. How long is it since the navy was a voracious beast, ready to swallow the treasury at a breakfast, to the great terror of every exclusive patriot in the nation? Now, who so bold as to hint one word of disapprobation. I might mention many other measures.—Restrictions, gun-boats, embargoes, all received at their first appearance with the loudest applause, and in short periods, all accompanied in their exits by an universal concert of hisses and execrations. The people must think and decide twice, and the second is generally that of calm reflection and judicious decision.

The clamour that has been heard against the law of last session has not one attribute of the calm enlightened voice of the people. Had I time to traverse each state, and exhibit the rise, progress and issue of the clamour in each, I think this fact would not be doubted. But this I must forego. Yet I will state two facts, already attested by several gentlemen in the debate which do strongly corroborate my opinion.—The supposed indignation of the people was not at all confined to the authors of the law—The clamor was indiscriminate. Those who opposed the law; and only because they received the pay; the pay to which they were legally and justly entitled, and to refuse which, I should have deemed the grossest affectation of delicacy, had their full share of execration.—And numbers fell victims to this unjust and indiscriminate rage.

Again, many gentlemen have declared that it was not the increase of compensation, but the change in the form, which gave umbrage to the districts from which they come—that the most of the clamor we have heard, was not against the amount, but the form of the compensation. Why sir, if this be so, the spectacle is indeed ludicrous. The adage is reversed: the mouse has brought forth the mountain. In this view of the subject, well might my friend (Mr. Hulbert) exclaim of this people, "they resemble ocean into tempest wrought to waft a feather, or to drown a fly."

Mr. Speaker, I repeat, the settled, calm, enlightened voice of this people has not been heard upon the law of last session. Shall I be asked whence then all this popular
clamor, and indignation and execration? It has many sources and numerous causes; I will mention twenty the most prominent: There are many gentlemen within these walls who have occupied their seats too long for those who are waiting without. When we came here, we at must have left behind us numerous demagogues who were office expectants; they were impatiently waiting for some favorable occasion to put you from your seats and to succeed to your places. Hitherto they had found no measure fitted to their use: upon all prominent measures, the two great parties had been divided and committed almost to a man; and to attack any member for his conduct upon any of these measures, was sure to enlist in his defence and support the party to which he belonged. The attempt was too desperate even for a finished demagogue. The law of last session was passed; it was above all others fitted to become an instrument in the hands of office hunters to deceive the people—it was a measure ostensibly personal to the representative, in which his interest seemed alone to be connected. "It took money from the people; it put the money in the pocket of the representative; it was of course a selfish, unjust and corrupt measure."

Involving no party sympathies and apparently no national interests, how easy was it for artful men, pretended patriots, to impose this view of the subject upon a people, honest, unsuspicious of deception, but always peculiarly sensitive upon all measures of expenditure—In this view it was seized by the expectants of office; in this view it was widely & incessantly pressed upon the public, and to this narrow, unjust and wicked view of the measure, palmed upon the people, do I ascribe much of the clamor that was heard against it.

But there was another and a more powerful source. In several of the states, the elections were approaching. Though the rage of party spirit had in a good degree subsided in the general government, it remained unmitigated in these states, and this law was seized upon with avidity for the purpose of influencing those elections. Truth compels me to confess, that the party to which I belong were the first to engage in what I must ever deem a disgraceful attempt to render the law odious to the people, and to cast the odium upon the friends of the administration. The attack being thus commenced, the adverse party not only repelled it, but attempted to carry the war into the territories of the assailants, and thus commenced a conflict, which in its progress would have been really ludicrous, were it not for the permanent injury it may have inflicted on this House and many of its most worthy members. Almost every other instrument of party annoyance was thrown aside; all other sins of the government and the opposition forgotten or forgiven, and the unfortunate "compensation bill," as it was called, became the very foot ball of the parties—it was kicked by stump orators, by bar room slang whany, by editors of all parties, by candidates for all kinds of offices, and by partisans of all colors and capacities, even gentlemen of science and liberal views did not disdain the sport—the bull dogs of both the parties, who in those times have generally pursued game of higher flavor, who have delighted to mangle honest sensibility, devour reputation, and hunt down talents and independence, seemed to forsake all their former propensities to pursue in full cry this scape goat of all political offences—

The justice, the expediency, the real merits of the law seemed totally out of the question—It takes money from the people; that money goes to the representative; it is private robbery and public plunder." This was the short argument and modest conclusion of every party logician. And which party has perpetrated the offence, was the great question at issue. Crimination and recrimination, denunciation & retort, violence, abuse and clamor filled the country. Mr. Speaker, I do in my conscience believe that such are the two principal causes, and such the nature and character of the greatest part of that clamor which has excited against the law of last session—and is it to such a clamor, that an American representative is required to surrender his judgement, his conscience and his independence? Is such the "voice" which is to wither the spirit of American freemen, and degrade the legislator into an automaton or a slave? Sir, I know no, and I care not, what other men may think or do. but for my single self, I would sooner be a dog and bay the moon, than such a representative.