The Charleston Daily News

Answer It, If You Can,

The Louisville Democrat has always been what it is now the fashion to call "loyal." The following unanswerable argument, which it puts forth, cannot therefore be attributed to any sympathy with secession. It examines the subject of Confederate "treason" from a Union stand-point.

After some remarks upon the continued detention, without trial, of Mr. Davis, the Democrat proceeds as follows:

A trial or a release the prisoner is entitled to now, and was entitled to it long since. How can both be denied him? It will be easy to decide that there is no such right as that of secession, but that is not the difficulty. There is the right of revolution, which has been acknowledged in the world after a successful effort of revolution.

We began by declaring the right in advance. We asserted, in the face of all Governments, "Whenever a Government becomes destructive of these ends, the people have a right to alter or abolish it." The people affected are to be their own judges, it is assumed.

Why had not the five or eight millions of eleven States as much right to judge for themselves as the three millions of the thirteen colonies had? Where can one find the difference, unless he assumes to judge of their reasons for them, which the doctrine we so formally announced does not allow?

The supporters of the Government must be entitled to judge for themselves, too, and war may ensue, as war often does, between independent nations; but when the war is over, how shall we proceed to punish the millions, who attempted to act on this right we acknowledge, as criminals?

We can easily say that the doctrine here announced does not apply to mere insurrections, or to a few not sufficient to form a community that can take its place amongst nations; but when we say it does not apply to eleven States, with seven or eight millions of people, we had as well discard the doctrine altogether, and say it is inapplicable to any case that could occur; that it is only an empty theory, without any tangible substance or meaning:

Then there is a part of our history that men overlook. Our present Government was formed by an act of secession from a regularly constituted Government, ratified by all the States. Its Constitution, called "Articles of Confederation," generally, is before us. It is entitled on its face "Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union between the States of," &c.

Article 13 says:

"Every State shall abide by the determination of the United States in Congress assembled on all questions which, by this Confederation, are submitted to them; and the Articles of Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them, unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the Legislature of every State."

Here was a regular Government, by which every State of the thirteen was bound to all the rest.

But ten or eleven years afterward the States, all but one, sent delegates to a convention to amend the articles of "perpetual union." They altered the whole structure of the Government, which was all in order, and it was sent to Congress and submitted to all the States. That, too, was in order.

But here is the point of secession without warrant, and in violation of the provisions of the Government by which all were bound.

This new document provided that if nine States ratified it, the new Government should go into operation; that is, the nine would secede from the four, regardless of their constitutional obligations to those four, for there were thirteen States.

There was a powerful minority opposed to that Government. They saw in it what was not developed much until lately. Two States held out against it until it went into operation. Had not the minority a right to denounce all this as treason, and the two States that held out a right to hold up the others as traitors, covenant breakers?

In short were not the majority secessionists, and was not the formation of our present Government the work of secession?

If a majority can thus secede from a minority, in utter disregard of constitutional obligations and still be regarded as patriots, why not a minority secede from a majority? May the strong trample on the rights of the weak, whilst it is criminal in the weak to disregard the rights of the strong?

In addition to this, since the formation of the present Government, there have been unsettled questions, with able advocates on both sides. May not a law of Congress, palpably unconstitutional, be nullified by State authority? Jefferson was in favor of trying it in Virginia, if the alien and sedition laws were enforced there. The State Courts would have granted a writ of habeas corpus to any one imprisoned under these laws, and discharge him. Whether the statesmen of Virginia believed this remedy constitutional or not it is highly probable they would have tried it.

This remedy was tried in Ohio, with the zealous approbation of Mr. Chase, in the case of men arrested, tried, fined and imprisoned under the fugitive slave law. The wisdom and discretion of a majority of the judges prevented the progress the experiment.

South Carolina tried nullification by State authority. The attempt was put down by the prompt action of the Executive and a compromise; but there was left unsettled the question about the power of the State.

Besides, the right of a State to secede from the compact has had its advocates—men of note and historical character. It is true that no majority ever admitted the right; but in the minds of our people the question was left afloat, with millions to believe in the right, if they felt a disposition to exercise it.

These considerations do not affect the legal question—the technical guilt of one accused of treason; but they do affect the moral character of the act.

There was plenty of room in the history of the country for men to be puzzled, or to take the side of secession and believe they were right.

Before we take the lives, liberty or property of men justly, it is necessary to settle some questions by consent or otherwise. Until that is done, we may leave legal points to courts; but whether the moral turpitude is sufficient to justify punishment, is another question.